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authorHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2006-08-13 14:16:39 +1000
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2006-09-21 11:41:02 +1000
commit560c06ae1ab7c677002ea3b6ac83521bf12ee07d (patch)
tree374ed69a7e23ba9d07458d20672aac6ae552ae51 /arch
parent25cdbcd9e5d20e431f829cafce48a418830011f4 (diff)
[CRYPTO] api: Get rid of flags argument to setkey
Now that the tfm is passed directly to setkey instead of the ctx, we no longer need to pass the &tfm->crt_flags pointer. This patch also gets rid of a few unnecessary checks on the key length for ciphers as the cipher layer guarantees that the key length is within the bounds specified by the algorithm. Rather than testing dia_setkey every time, this patch does it only once during crypto_alloc_tfm. The redundant check from crypto_digest_setkey is also removed. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/i386/crypto/aes.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c5
4 files changed, 15 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c b/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c
index d3806daa3de3..49aad9397f10 100644
--- a/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c
+++ b/arch/i386/crypto/aes.c
@@ -379,12 +379,13 @@ static void gen_tabs(void)
}
static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
- unsigned int key_len, u32 *flags)
+ unsigned int key_len)
{
int i;
u32 ss[8];
struct aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
+ u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
/* encryption schedule */
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
index 5713c7e5bd16..c7c43c9de0d9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
@@ -38,9 +38,10 @@ struct s390_aes_ctx {
};
static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
- unsigned int key_len, u32 *flags)
+ unsigned int key_len)
{
struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
switch (key_len) {
case 16:
diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
index b3f7496a79b4..170757b3451d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/des_s390.c
@@ -45,9 +45,10 @@ struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx {
};
static int des_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+ unsigned int keylen)
{
struct crypt_s390_des_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
int ret;
/* test if key is valid (not a weak key) */
@@ -167,11 +168,12 @@ static struct crypto_alg des_alg = {
*
*/
static int des3_128_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+ unsigned int keylen)
{
int i, ret;
struct crypt_s390_des3_128_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- const u8* temp_key = key;
+ const u8 *temp_key = key;
+ u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
if (!(memcmp(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE))) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED;
@@ -303,11 +305,12 @@ static struct crypto_alg des3_128_alg = {
*
*/
static int des3_192_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen, u32 *flags)
+ unsigned int keylen)
{
int i, ret;
struct crypt_s390_des3_192_ctx *dctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- const u8* temp_key = key;
+ const u8 *temp_key = key;
+ u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
if (!(memcmp(key, &key[DES_KEY_SIZE], DES_KEY_SIZE) &&
memcmp(&key[DES_KEY_SIZE], &key[DES_KEY_SIZE * 2],
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c b/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c
index 68866fab37aa..5cdb13ea5cc2 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c
+++ b/arch/x86_64/crypto/aes.c
@@ -228,13 +228,14 @@ static void __init gen_tabs(void)
}
static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
- unsigned int key_len, u32 *flags)
+ unsigned int key_len)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
+ u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags;
u32 i, j, t, u, v, w;
- if (key_len != 16 && key_len != 24 && key_len != 32) {
+ if (key_len % 8) {
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}