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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2012-09-21 23:25:40 +0100
committerRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>2012-10-08 13:50:16 +1030
commit612e0fe99965a4028359cd1da5af56b7f6caf7f6 (patch)
treeff7fe3993067c3dc4f011ea702480add96b8e1e7 /crypto/asymmetric_keys
parent12f008b6dc5ff1c822fdb2198d20e3dbdc92f3f5 (diff)
RSA: Implement signature verification algorithm [PKCS#1 / RFC3447]
Implement RSA public key cryptography [PKCS#1 / RFC3447]. At this time, only the signature verification algorithm is supported. This uses the asymmetric public key subtype to hold its key data. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys')
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig7
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c269
4 files changed, 279 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
index bbfccaa35293..561759d6a65f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig
@@ -18,4 +18,11 @@ config ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
appropriate hash algorithms (such as SHA-1) must be available.
ENOPKG will be reported if the requisite algorithm is unavailable.
+config PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+ tristate "RSA public-key algorithm"
+ depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ select MPILIB_EXTRA
+ help
+ This option enables support for the RSA algorithm (PKCS#1, RFC3447).
+
endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index 8dcdf0cdb261..7c92691a45eb 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += asymmetric_keys.o
asymmetric_keys-y := asymmetric_type.o signature.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE) += public_key.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
index 1f86aad31003..5e5e35626899 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.h
@@ -26,3 +26,5 @@ struct public_key_algorithm {
int (*verify_signature)(const struct public_key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
};
+
+extern const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9b31ee25a459
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+/* RSA asymmetric public-key algorithm [RFC3447]
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "public_key.h"
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("RSA Public Key Algorithm");
+
+#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("==> %s("FMT")\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+#define kleave(FMT, ...) \
+ pr_devel("<== %s()"FMT"\n", __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+/*
+ * Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2].
+ */
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_MD5[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08,
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA1[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_RIPE_MD_160[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA224[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA256[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA384[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA512[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const u8 *data;
+ size_t size;
+} RSA_ASN1_templates[PKEY_HASH__LAST] = {
+#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) }
+ [PKEY_HASH_MD5] = _(MD5),
+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA1] = _(SHA1),
+ [PKEY_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160),
+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA256] = _(SHA256),
+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA384] = _(SHA384),
+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA512] = _(SHA512),
+ [PKEY_HASH_SHA224] = _(SHA224),
+#undef _
+};
+
+/*
+ * RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2]
+ */
+static int RSAVP1(const struct public_key *key, MPI s, MPI *_m)
+{
+ MPI m;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */
+ if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (mpi_cmp(s, key->rsa.n) >= 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ m = mpi_alloc(0);
+ if (!m)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* (2) m = s^e mod n */
+ ret = mpi_powm(m, s, key->rsa.e, key->rsa.n);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ mpi_free(m);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *_m = m;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1]
+ */
+static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
+{
+ unsigned X_size, x_size;
+ int X_sign;
+ u8 *X;
+
+ /* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin
+ * with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero
+ * bits not being reported by MPI.
+ */
+ x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x);
+ pr_devel("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu\n", x_size, xLen * 8);
+ if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15)
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign);
+ if (!X)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (X_sign < 0) {
+ kfree(X);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (X_size != xLen - 1) {
+ kfree(X);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ *_X = X;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform the RSA signature verification.
+ * @H: Value of hash of data and metadata
+ * @EM: The computed signature value
+ * @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00)
+ * @hash_size: The size of H
+ * @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template
+ * @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[]
+ */
+static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
+ const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size)
+{
+ unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i;
+
+ kenter(",,%zu,%zu,%zu", k, hash_size, asn1_size);
+
+ if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ /* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */
+ if (EM[1] != 0x01) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ T_offset = k - (asn1_size + hash_size);
+ PS_end = T_offset - 1;
+ if (EM[PS_end] != 0x00) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T-1] == %02u]", EM[PS_end]);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) {
+ if (EM[i] != 0xff) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ kleave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2].
+ */
+static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key *key,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+ size_t tsize;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */
+ const u8 *H = sig->digest;
+ u8 *EM = NULL;
+ MPI m = NULL;
+ size_t k;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ if (!RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data)
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */
+ k = (mpi_get_nbits(key->rsa.n) + 7) / 8;
+
+ tsize = (mpi_get_nbits(sig->rsa.s) + 7) / 8;
+ pr_devel("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu\n", k, tsize);
+ if (tsize != k) {
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */
+ ret = RSAVP1(key, sig->rsa.s, &m);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message
+ * (EM) of length k octets.
+ *
+ * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a
+ * pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()!
+ */
+ ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size,
+ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data,
+ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size);
+
+error:
+ kfree(EM);
+ mpi_free(m);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const struct public_key_algorithm RSA_public_key_algorithm = {
+ .name = "RSA",
+ .n_pub_mpi = 2,
+ .n_sec_mpi = 3,
+ .n_sig_mpi = 1,
+ .verify_signature = RSA_verify_signature,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(RSA_public_key_algorithm);