Merge tag 'v5.15.41' into lf-5.15.y

This is the 5.15.41 stable release

* tag 'v5.15.41': (1977 commits)
  Linux 5.15.41
  usb: gadget: uvc: allow for application to cleanly shutdown
  usb: gadget: uvc: rename function to be more consistent
  ...

Signed-off-by: Jason Liu <jason.hui.liu@nxp.com>

 Conflicts:
	arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1043a.dtsi
	arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1046a.dtsi
	arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
	drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx8qxp-lpcg.c
	drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
	drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/nwl-dsi.c
	drivers/mailbox/imx-mailbox.c
	drivers/net/phy/at803x.c
	drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c
	security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c

6 files changed, 102 insertions, 50 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 0b4d07aa8811..f94a1d1ad3a6 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -174,12 +174,6 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
 			 sinfo->index, certix);
 
-		if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) {
-			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
-				sinfo->index);
-			continue;
-		}
-
 		sinfo->signer = x509;
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 4fefb219bfdc..7c9e6be35c30 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -60,39 +60,83 @@ static void public_key_destroy(void *payload0, void *payload3)
 }
 
 /*
- * Determine the crypto algorithm name.
+ * Given a public_key, and an encoding and hash_algo to be used for signing
+ * and/or verification with that key, determine the name of the corresponding
+ * akcipher algorithm.  Also check that encoding and hash_algo are allowed.
  */
-static
-int software_key_determine_akcipher(const char *encoding,
-				    const char *hash_algo,
-				    const struct public_key *pkey,
-				    char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME])
+static int
+software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
+				const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo,
+				char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME])
 {
 	int n;
 
-	if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
-		/* The data wangled by the RSA algorithm is typically padded
-		 * and encoded in some manner, such as EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447
-		 * sec 8.2].
+	if (!encoding)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "rsa") == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * RSA signatures usually use EMSA-PKCS1-1_5 [RFC3447 sec 8.2].
+		 */
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
+			if (!hash_algo)
+				n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+					     "pkcs1pad(%s)",
+					     pkey->pkey_algo);
+			else
+				n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+					     "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)",
+					     pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
+			return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		/*
+		 * Raw RSA cannot differentiate between different hash
+		 * algorithms.
+		 */
+		if (hash_algo)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa", 5) == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "x962") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		/*
+		 * ECDSA signatures are taken over a raw hash, so they don't
+		 * differentiate between different hash algorithms.  That means
+		 * that the verifier should hard-code a specific hash algorithm.
+		 * Unfortunately, in practice ECDSA is used with multiple SHAs,
+		 * so we have to allow all of them and not just one.
 		 */
 		if (!hash_algo)
-			n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
-				     "pkcs1pad(%s)",
-				     pkey->pkey_algo);
-		else
-			n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
-				     "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)",
-				     pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
-		return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
-	}
-
-	if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") == 0 ||
-	    strcmp(encoding, "x962") == 0) {
-		strcpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo);
-		return 0;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sha1") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha224") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha256") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha384") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!hash_algo)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (strcmp(hash_algo, "sm3") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") == 0) {
+		if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!hash_algo)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 &&
+		    strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		/* Unknown public key algorithm */
+		return -ENOPKG;
 	}
-
-	return -ENOPKG;
+	if (strscpy(alg_name, pkey->pkey_algo, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static u8 *pkey_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
@@ -113,9 +157,8 @@ static int software_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
 	u8 *key, *ptr;
 	int ret, len;
 
-	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding,
-					      params->hash_algo,
-					      pkey, alg_name);
+	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
+					      params->hash_algo, alg_name);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -179,9 +222,8 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
 
-	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(params->encoding,
-					      params->hash_algo,
-					      pkey, alg_name);
+	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, params->encoding,
+					      params->hash_algo, alg_name);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -325,9 +367,23 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
 	BUG_ON(!sig);
 	BUG_ON(!sig->s);
 
-	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(sig->encoding,
-					      sig->hash_algo,
-					      pkey, alg_name);
+	/*
+	 * If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
+	 * the key's actual public key algorithm.
+	 *
+	 * Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA
+	 * keys do.  So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case:
+	 * "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature.
+	 */
+	if (sig->pkey_algo) {
+		if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
+		    (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
+		     strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
+	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(pkey, sig->encoding,
+					      sig->hash_algo, alg_name);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 3d45161b271a..7fd56df8b919 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -128,12 +128,6 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
-	if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
-	    (strncmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
-	     strcmp(cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
-		goto out;
-
 	ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
diff --git a/crypto/authenc.c b/crypto/authenc.c
index 670bf1a01d00..17f674a7cdff 100644
--- a/crypto/authenc.c
+++ b/crypto/authenc.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail(struct aead_request *req,
 		dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(areq_ctx->dst, req->dst, req->assoclen);
 
 	skcipher_request_set_tfm(skreq, ctx->enc);
-	skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(skreq, flags,
 				      req->base.complete, req->base.data);
 	skcipher_request_set_crypt(skreq, src, dst,
 				   req->cryptlen - authsize, req->iv);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
index 8ac3e73e8ea6..9d804831c8b3 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
@@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 	pos++;
 
 	if (digest_info) {
+		if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos)
+			goto done;
 		if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data,
 				  digest_info->size))
 			goto done;
@@ -495,7 +497,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
 					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
 			   req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
-			   req->dst_len, ctx->key_size);
+			   req->dst_len, req->src_len);
 	/* Do the actual verification step. */
 	if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
 		   req->dst_len) != 0)
@@ -538,7 +540,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
 
 	if (WARN_ON(req->dst) ||
 	    WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) ||
-	    !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size)
+	    !ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -621,6 +623,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 
 	rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn);
 
+	if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_free_inst;
+	}
+
 	err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
 	hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
 	if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {
diff --git a/crypto/xts.c b/crypto/xts.c
index 6c12f30dbdd6..63c85b9e64e0 100644
--- a/crypto/xts.c
+++ b/crypto/xts.c
@@ -466,3 +466,4 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("XTS block cipher mode");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xts");
 MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
+MODULE_SOFTDEP("pre: ecb");