summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/crypto
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorKees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>2011-03-23 16:42:53 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>2011-03-27 11:30:37 -0700
commit56df433ee53f5131fa58d467e68c478c06f90892 (patch)
treea26a35cbf2d52a530af3fc49ca44eac50dd2dbfd /crypto
parent513d46817231bd1741c3cc330f959f091bfc93f9 (diff)
proc: protect mm start_code/end_code in /proc/pid/stat
commit 5883f57ca0008ffc93e09cbb9847a1928e50c6f3 upstream. While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit f83ce3e6b02d5 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR. Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since "ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to Brad Spengler for pointing this out. Addresses CVE-2011-0726 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions