diff options
author | Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> | 2012-07-05 10:35:23 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2012-08-10 00:24:46 +0100 |
commit | 7f5d5266f8a1f7f54707c15e028f220d329726f4 (patch) | |
tree | c171b6c421218935a60b0357862df84186432f37 /drivers/char | |
parent | 060bc1d0cb527cf8b77f049ff6a595ddb68a41c8 (diff) |
random: add new get_random_bytes_arch() function
commit c2557a303ab6712bb6e09447df828c557c710ac9 upstream.
Create a new function, get_random_bytes_arch() which will use the
architecture-specific hardware random number generator if it is
present. Change get_random_bytes() to not use the HW RNG, even if it
is avaiable.
The reason for this is that the hw random number generator is fast (if
it is present), but it requires that we trust the hardware
manufacturer to have not put in a back door. (For example, an
increasing counter encrypted by an AES key known to the NSA.)
It's unlikely that Intel (for example) was paid off by the US
Government to do this, but it's impossible for them to prove otherwise
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 29 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 4a832207cd45..f3200bff922a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1038,17 +1038,34 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf, /* * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some - * number of good random numbers, suitable for seeding TCP sequence - * numbers, etc. + * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding + * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not use the hw random number + * generator, if available; use get_random_bytes_arch() for that. */ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) { + extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes, 0, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); + +/* + * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random + * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will + * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it + * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as + * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a + * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but + * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to + * have put in a back door. + */ +void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) +{ char *p = buf; while (nbytes) { unsigned long v; int chunk = min(nbytes, (int)sizeof(unsigned long)); - + if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; @@ -1057,9 +1074,11 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes) nbytes -= chunk; } - extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, p, nbytes, 0, 0); + if (nbytes) + extract_entropy(&nonblocking_pool, p, nbytes, 0, 0); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch); + /* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data |