MLK-11922 i.mx6: Linux 3.14.28 CAAM & SNVS enabled by default.

JTAG, DS-5 attachment causes exceptions

Added properties to device tree, in order to enable and disable
alarms. The following are the available alarms:
-JTAG active
-WatchDOG 2 reset
-Internal Boot
-External Tamper Detection pad

1 files changed, 35 insertions, 10 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/secvio.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/secvio.c
index b2b4867758c5..305782147ded 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/secvio.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/secvio.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 
 /*
  * SNVS Security Violation Handler
- * Copyright (C) 2012-2015 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., All Rights Reserved
+ * Copyright (C) 2012-2016 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., All Rights Reserved
  */
 
 #include "compat.h"
@@ -205,6 +205,8 @@ static int snvs_secvio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct snvs_full __iomem *snvsregs;
 	int i, error;
 	u32 hpstate;
+	const void *jtd, *wtd, *itd, *etd;
+	u32 td_en;
 
 	svpriv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snvs_secvio_drv_private), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!svpriv)
@@ -227,6 +229,34 @@ static int snvs_secvio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	jtd = of_get_property(npirq, "jtag-tamper", NULL);
+	wtd = of_get_property(npirq, "watchdog-tamper", NULL);
+	itd = of_get_property(npirq, "internal-boot-tamper", NULL);
+	etd = of_get_property(npirq, "external-pin-tamper", NULL);
+	if (!jtd | !wtd | !itd | !etd ) {
+		dev_err(svdev, "can't identify tamper alarm configuration\n");
+		kfree(svpriv);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Configure all sources  according to device tree property.
+	 * If the property is enabled then the source is ser as
+	 * fatal violations except LP section,
+	 * source #5 (typically used as an external tamper detect), and
+	 * source #3 (typically unused). Whenever the transition to
+	 * secure mode has occurred, these will now be "fatal" violations
+	 */
+	td_en = HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC0;
+	if (!strcmp(jtd, "enabled"))
+		td_en |= HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC1;
+	if (!strcmp(wtd, "enabled"))
+		td_en |= HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC2;
+	if (!strcmp(itd, "enabled"))
+		td_en |= HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC4;
+	if (!strcmp(etd, "enabled"))
+		td_en |= HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC5;
+
 	snvsregs = of_iomap(np, 0);
 	if (!snvsregs) {
 		dev_err(svdev, "register mapping failed\n");
@@ -240,6 +270,10 @@ static int snvs_secvio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		svpriv->clk = NULL;
 	}
 
+	/* Write the Secvio Enable Config the SVCR */
+	wr_reg32(&svpriv->svregs->hp.secvio_ctl, td_en);
+	wr_reg32(&svpriv->svregs->hp.secvio_intcfg, td_en);
+
 	 /* Device data set up. Now init interrupt source descriptions */
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_SECVIO_SOURCES; i++) {
 		svpriv->intsrc[i].intname = violation_src_name[i];
@@ -262,15 +296,6 @@ static int snvs_secvio_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	clk_prepare_enable(svpriv->clk);
-	/*
-	 * Configure all sources as fatal violations except LP section,
-	 * source #5 (typically used as an external tamper detect), and
-	 * source #3 (typically unused). Whenever the transition to
-	 * secure mode has occurred, these will now be "fatal" violations
-	 */
-	wr_reg32(&svpriv->svregs->hp.secvio_intcfg,
-		 HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC4 | HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC2 |
-		 HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC1 | HP_SECVIO_INTEN_SRC0);
 
 	hpstate = (rd_reg32(&svpriv->svregs->hp.status) &
 			    HP_STATUS_SSM_ST_MASK) >> HP_STATUS_SSM_ST_SHIFT;