Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next

Pull networking updates from David Miller:

 1) Unified UDP encapsulation offload methods for drivers, from
    Alexander Duyck.

 2) Make DSA binding more sane, from Andrew Lunn.

 3) Support QCA9888 chips in ath10k, from Anilkumar Kolli.

 4) Several workqueue usage cleanups, from Bhaktipriya Shridhar.

 5) Add XDP (eXpress Data Path), essentially running BPF programs on RX
    packets as soon as the device sees them, with the option to mirror
    the packet on TX via the same interface.  From Brenden Blanco and
    others.

 6) Allow qdisc/class stats dumps to run lockless, from Eric Dumazet.

 7) Add VLAN support to b53 and bcm_sf2, from Florian Fainelli.

 8) Simplify netlink conntrack entry layout, from Florian Westphal.

 9) Add ipv4 forwarding support to mlxsw spectrum driver, from Ido
    Schimmel, Yotam Gigi, and Jiri Pirko.

10) Add SKB array infrastructure and convert tun and macvtap over to it.
    From Michael S Tsirkin and Jason Wang.

11) Support qdisc packet injection in pktgen, from John Fastabend.

12) Add neighbour monitoring framework to TIPC, from Jon Paul Maloy.

13) Add NV congestion control support to TCP, from Lawrence Brakmo.

14) Add GSO support to SCTP, from Marcelo Ricardo Leitner.

15) Allow GRO and RPS to function on macsec devices, from Paolo Abeni.

16) Support MPLS over IPV4, from Simon Horman.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1622 commits)
  xgene: Fix build warning with ACPI disabled.
  be2net: perform temperature query in adapter regardless of its interface state
  l2tp: Correctly return -EBADF from pppol2tp_getname.
  net/mlx5_core/health: Remove deprecated create_singlethread_workqueue
  net: ipmr/ip6mr: update lastuse on entry change
  macsec: ensure rx_sa is set when validation is disabled
  tipc: dump monitor attributes
  tipc: add a function to get the bearer name
  tipc: get monitor threshold for the cluster
  tipc: make cluster size threshold for monitoring configurable
  tipc: introduce constants for tipc address validation
  net: neigh: disallow transition to NUD_STALE if lladdr is unchanged in neigh_update()
  MAINTAINERS: xgene: Add driver and documentation path
  Documentation: dtb: xgene: Add MDIO node
  dtb: xgene: Add MDIO node
  drivers: net: xgene: ethtool: Use phy_ethtool_gset and sset
  drivers: net: xgene: Use exported functions
  drivers: net: xgene: Enable MDIO driver
  drivers: net: xgene: Add backward compatibility
  drivers: net: phy: xgene: Add MDIO driver
  ...

1 files changed, 78 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index 8bcd78f94966..2d0beb1b801c 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/gro_cells.h>
 
 #include <uapi/linux/if_macsec.h>
 
@@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ struct macsec_dev {
 	struct net_device *real_dev;
 	struct pcpu_secy_stats __percpu *stats;
 	struct list_head secys;
+	struct gro_cells gro_cells;
 };
 
 /**
@@ -508,7 +510,7 @@ static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len)
 }
 
 #define MACSEC_NEEDED_HEADROOM (macsec_extra_len(true))
-#define MACSEC_NEEDED_TAILROOM MACSEC_MAX_ICV_LEN
+#define MACSEC_NEEDED_TAILROOM MACSEC_STD_ICV_LEN
 
 static void macsec_fill_iv(unsigned char *iv, sci_t sci, u32 pn)
 {
@@ -879,7 +881,7 @@ static void macsec_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
 	macsec_reset_skb(skb, macsec->secy.netdev);
 
 	len = skb->len;
-	ret = netif_rx(skb);
+	ret = gro_cells_receive(&macsec->gro_cells, skb);
 	if (ret == NET_RX_SUCCESS)
 		count_rx(dev, len);
 	else
@@ -942,7 +944,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	macsec_skb_cb(skb)->req = req;
-	macsec_skb_cb(skb)->rx_sa = rx_sa;
 	skb->dev = dev;
 	aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, macsec_decrypt_done, skb);
 
@@ -1052,6 +1053,7 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
 	struct pcpu_rx_sc_stats *rxsc_stats;
 	struct pcpu_secy_stats *secy_stats;
 	bool pulled_sci;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (skb_headroom(skb) < ETH_HLEN)
 		goto drop_direct;
@@ -1169,6 +1171,8 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
 		}
 	}
 
+	macsec_skb_cb(skb)->rx_sa = rx_sa;
+
 	/* Disabled && !changed text => skip validation */
 	if (hdr->tci_an & MACSEC_TCI_C ||
 	    secy->validate_frames != MACSEC_VALIDATE_DISABLED)
@@ -1193,12 +1197,17 @@ deliver:
 
 	if (rx_sa)
 		macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa);
-	count_rx(dev, skb->len);
+
+	ret = gro_cells_receive(&macsec->gro_cells, skb);
+	if (ret == NET_RX_SUCCESS)
+		count_rx(dev, skb->len);
+	else
+		macsec->secy.netdev->stats.rx_dropped++;
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	*pskb = skb;
-	return RX_HANDLER_ANOTHER;
+	*pskb = NULL;
+	return RX_HANDLER_CONSUMED;
 
 drop:
 	macsec_rxsa_put(rx_sa);
@@ -1218,7 +1227,6 @@ nosci:
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(macsec, &rxd->secys, secys) {
 		struct sk_buff *nskb;
-		int ret;
 
 		secy_stats = this_cpu_ptr(macsec->stats);
 
@@ -1263,22 +1271,22 @@ static struct crypto_aead *macsec_alloc_tfm(char *key, int key_len, int icv_len)
 	int ret;
 
 	tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
-	if (!tfm || IS_ERR(tfm))
-		return NULL;
+
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return tfm;
 
 	ret = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		crypto_free_aead(tfm);
-		return NULL;
-	}
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto fail;
 
 	ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, icv_len);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		crypto_free_aead(tfm);
-		return NULL;
-	}
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto fail;
 
 	return tfm;
+fail:
+	crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 
 static int init_rx_sa(struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa, char *sak, int key_len,
@@ -1286,12 +1294,12 @@ static int init_rx_sa(struct macsec_rx_sa *rx_sa, char *sak, int key_len,
 {
 	rx_sa->stats = alloc_percpu(struct macsec_rx_sa_stats);
 	if (!rx_sa->stats)
-		return -1;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	rx_sa->key.tfm = macsec_alloc_tfm(sak, key_len, icv_len);
-	if (!rx_sa->key.tfm) {
+	if (IS_ERR(rx_sa->key.tfm)) {
 		free_percpu(rx_sa->stats);
-		return -1;
+		return PTR_ERR(rx_sa->key.tfm);
 	}
 
 	rx_sa->active = false;
@@ -1384,12 +1392,12 @@ static int init_tx_sa(struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa, char *sak, int key_len,
 {
 	tx_sa->stats = alloc_percpu(struct macsec_tx_sa_stats);
 	if (!tx_sa->stats)
-		return -1;
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	tx_sa->key.tfm = macsec_alloc_tfm(sak, key_len, icv_len);
-	if (!tx_sa->key.tfm) {
+	if (IS_ERR(tx_sa->key.tfm)) {
 		free_percpu(tx_sa->stats);
-		return -1;
+		return PTR_ERR(tx_sa->key.tfm);
 	}
 
 	tx_sa->active = false;
@@ -1622,6 +1630,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	unsigned char assoc_num;
 	struct nlattr *tb_rxsc[MACSEC_RXSC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
 	struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
+	int err;
 
 	if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1658,13 +1667,19 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	rx_sa = kmalloc(sizeof(*rx_sa), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!rx_sa || init_rx_sa(rx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
-				 secy->key_len, secy->icv_len)) {
-		kfree(rx_sa);
+	if (!rx_sa) {
 		rtnl_unlock();
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+	err = init_rx_sa(rx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
+			 secy->key_len, secy->icv_len);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		kfree(rx_sa);
+		rtnl_unlock();
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]) {
 		spin_lock_bh(&rx_sa->lock);
 		rx_sa->next_pn = nla_get_u32(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN]);
@@ -1770,6 +1785,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	struct macsec_tx_sa *tx_sa;
 	unsigned char assoc_num;
 	struct nlattr *tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_MAX + 1];
+	int err;
 
 	if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1806,13 +1822,19 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	tx_sa = kmalloc(sizeof(*tx_sa), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!tx_sa || init_tx_sa(tx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
-				 secy->key_len, secy->icv_len)) {
-		kfree(tx_sa);
+	if (!tx_sa) {
 		rtnl_unlock();
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+	err = init_tx_sa(tx_sa, nla_data(tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEY]),
+			 secy->key_len, secy->icv_len);
+	if (err < 0) {
+		kfree(tx_sa);
+		rtnl_unlock();
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	nla_memcpy(tx_sa->key.id, tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_KEYID], MACSEC_KEYID_LEN);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&tx_sa->lock);
@@ -2675,11 +2697,18 @@ static int macsec_dev_init(struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct macsec_dev *macsec = macsec_priv(dev);
 	struct net_device *real_dev = macsec->real_dev;
+	int err;
 
 	dev->tstats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct pcpu_sw_netstats);
 	if (!dev->tstats)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	err = gro_cells_init(&macsec->gro_cells, dev);
+	if (err) {
+		free_percpu(dev->tstats);
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	dev->features = real_dev->features & MACSEC_FEATURES;
 	dev->features |= NETIF_F_LLTX | NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE;
 
@@ -2698,6 +2727,9 @@ static int macsec_dev_init(struct net_device *dev)
 
 static void macsec_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
 {
+	struct macsec_dev *macsec = macsec_priv(dev);
+
+	gro_cells_destroy(&macsec->gro_cells);
 	free_percpu(dev->tstats);
 }
 
@@ -2707,8 +2739,9 @@ static netdev_features_t macsec_fix_features(struct net_device *dev,
 	struct macsec_dev *macsec = macsec_priv(dev);
 	struct net_device *real_dev = macsec->real_dev;
 
-	features &= real_dev->features & MACSEC_FEATURES;
-	features |= NETIF_F_LLTX | NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE;
+	features &= (real_dev->features & MACSEC_FEATURES) |
+		    NETIF_F_GSO_SOFTWARE | NETIF_F_SOFT_FEATURES;
+	features |= NETIF_F_LLTX;
 
 	return features;
 }
@@ -3192,14 +3225,26 @@ static int macsec_validate_attr(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[])
 	if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE])
 		csid = nla_get_u64(data[IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE]);
 
-	if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN])
+	if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN]) {
 		icv_len = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_MACSEC_ICV_LEN]);
+		if (icv_len != DEFAULT_ICV_LEN) {
+			char dummy_key[DEFAULT_SAK_LEN] = { 0 };
+			struct crypto_aead *dummy_tfm;
+
+			dummy_tfm = macsec_alloc_tfm(dummy_key,
+						     DEFAULT_SAK_LEN,
+						     icv_len);
+			if (IS_ERR(dummy_tfm))
+				return PTR_ERR(dummy_tfm);
+			crypto_free_aead(dummy_tfm);
+		}
+	}
 
 	switch (csid) {
 	case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ID:
 	case MACSEC_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALT:
 		if (icv_len < MACSEC_MIN_ICV_LEN ||
-		    icv_len > MACSEC_MAX_ICV_LEN)
+		    icv_len > MACSEC_STD_ICV_LEN)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	default: