diff options
| author | Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de> | 2007-11-13 11:12:46 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> | 2007-11-13 11:12:46 +0100 |
| commit | 624e4ff675005168e71d297185f4b75dbdf650af (patch) | |
| tree | f59d7edef1653c51656d3c167e03b123830acafa /drivers | |
| parent | 07c2420331fc05ff768b35ef8d4de2d17700756e (diff) | |
PPPOE: fix memory leak (local DoS) (CVE-2007-2525)
This patch fixes a memory leak when a PPPoE socket is release()d after
it has been connect()ed, but before the PPPIOCGCHAN ioctl ever has been
called on it.
This is somewhat of a security problem, too, since PPPoE sockets can be
created by any user, so any user can easily allocate all the machine's
RAM to non-swappable address space and thus DoS the system.
Is there any specific reason for PPPoE sockets being available to any
unprivileged process, BTW? After all, you need a packet socket for the
discovery stage anyway, so it's unlikely that any unprivileged process
will ever need to create a PPPoE socket, no? Allocating all session IDs
for a known AC is a kind of DoS, too, after all - with Juniper ERXes,
this is really easy, actually, since they don't ever assign session ids
above 8000 ...
Signed-off-by: Florian Zumbiehl <florz@florz.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/pppox.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/pppox.c b/drivers/net/pppox.c index 9315046b3f55..3f8115db4d54 100644 --- a/drivers/net/pppox.c +++ b/drivers/net/pppox.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void pppox_unbind_sock(struct sock *sk) { /* Clear connection to ppp device, if attached. */ - if (sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) { + if (sk->sk_state & (PPPOX_BOUND | PPPOX_CONNECTED | PPPOX_ZOMBIE)) { ppp_unregister_channel(&pppox_sk(sk)->chan); sk->sk_state = PPPOX_DEAD; } |