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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-12-28 11:43:54 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-12-28 11:43:54 -0800
commitbb26c6c29b7cc9f39e491b074b09f3c284738d36 (patch)
treec7867af2bb4ff0feae889183efcd4d79b0f9a325 /fs/compat.c
parente14e61e967f2b3bdf23f05e4ae5b9aa830151a44 (diff)
parentcbacc2c7f066a1e01b33b0e27ae5efbf534bc2db (diff)
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (105 commits) SELinux: don't check permissions for kernel mounts security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount() SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form "proc/foo" Audit: Log TIOCSTI user namespaces: document CFS behavior user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER user namespaces: let user_ns be cloned with fairsched CRED: fix sparse warnings User namespaces: use the current_user_ns() macro User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2) nfsctl: add headers for credentials coda: fix creds reference capabilities: define get_vfs_caps_from_disk when file caps are not enabled CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task CRED: Documentation CRED: Use creds in file structs CRED: Prettify commoncap.c CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials ...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/compat.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/compat.c42
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c
index e5f49f538502..d1ece79b6411 100644
--- a/fs/compat.c
+++ b/fs/compat.c
@@ -1393,10 +1393,20 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
if (!bprm)
goto out_ret;
+ retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
+ if (!bprm->cred)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
+
file = open_exec(filename);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
- goto out_kfree;
+ goto out_unlock;
sched_exec();
@@ -1410,14 +1420,10 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
bprm->argc = compat_count(argv, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->argc) < 0)
- goto out_mm;
+ goto out;
bprm->envc = compat_count(envp, MAX_ARG_STRINGS);
if ((retval = bprm->envc) < 0)
- goto out_mm;
-
- retval = security_bprm_alloc(bprm);
- if (retval)
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(bprm);
@@ -1438,19 +1444,16 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
goto out;
retval = search_binary_handler(bprm, regs);
- if (retval >= 0) {
- /* execve success */
- security_bprm_free(bprm);
- acct_update_integrals(current);
- free_bprm(bprm);
- return retval;
- }
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
-out:
- if (bprm->security)
- security_bprm_free(bprm);
+ /* execve succeeded */
+ mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ acct_update_integrals(current);
+ free_bprm(bprm);
+ return retval;
-out_mm:
+out:
if (bprm->mm)
mmput(bprm->mm);
@@ -1460,7 +1463,10 @@ out_file:
fput(bprm->file);
}
-out_kfree:
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+
+out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);
out_ret: