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authorThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>2014-06-03 12:27:08 +0000
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2014-06-07 10:28:29 -0700
commitb1f9d594668d008cacd5679cfde675dcdb9f5f8f (patch)
tree0a2ffb1a69074f78a96f5d4e23916c4e0bdbd903 /fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c
parent19040c57ac6f39a6940c7c266bb80cee113d3a18 (diff)
futex: Make lookup_pi_state more robust
commit 54a217887a7b658e2650c3feff22756ab80c7339 upstream. The current implementation of lookup_pi_state has ambigous handling of the TID value 0 in the user space futex. We can get into the kernel even if the TID value is 0, because either there is a stale waiters bit or the owner died bit is set or we are called from the requeue_pi path or from user space just for fun. The current code avoids an explicit sanity check for pid = 0 in case that kernel internal state (waiters) are found for the user space address. This can lead to state leakage and worse under some circumstances. Handle the cases explicit: Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ? [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We came came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died. [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED. [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list() and exit_pi_state_list() [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in the pi_state but cannot access the user space value. [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set. [8] Owner and user space value match [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0 except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4] [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space TID out of sync. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions