diff options
| author | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2007-07-27 16:10:37 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu> | 2007-10-09 18:31:56 -0400 |
| commit | 2fdada03b3876ab9f84ede160f187e888cafefb4 (patch) | |
| tree | 4fb687764c83d63083261f079695627003c22dd9 /fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | |
| parent | 599e0a2290b22d959c7748bda83da3614187a299 (diff) | |
knfsd: demote some printk()s to dprintk()s
To quote a recent mail from Andrew Morton:
Look: if there's a way in which an unprivileged user can trigger
a printk we fix it, end of story.
OK. I assume that goes double for printk()s that might be triggered by
random hosts on the internet. So, disable some printk()s that look like
they could be triggered by malfunctioning or malicious clients. For
now, just downgrade them to dprintk()s.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 29b7e63cb32c..18ead1790bb3 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -238,12 +238,12 @@ nfsd4_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, break; case NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_DELEGATE_PREV: open->op_stateowner->so_confirmed = 1; - printk("NFSD: unsupported OPEN claim type %d\n", + dprintk("NFSD: unsupported OPEN claim type %d\n", open->op_claim_type); status = nfserr_notsupp; goto out; default: - printk("NFSD: Invalid OPEN claim type %d\n", + dprintk("NFSD: Invalid OPEN claim type %d\n", open->op_claim_type); status = nfserr_inval; goto out; |