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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-12-28 11:43:54 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2008-12-28 11:43:54 -0800 |
| commit | bb26c6c29b7cc9f39e491b074b09f3c284738d36 (patch) | |
| tree | c7867af2bb4ff0feae889183efcd4d79b0f9a325 /fs/nfsd/vfs.c | |
| parent | e14e61e967f2b3bdf23f05e4ae5b9aa830151a44 (diff) | |
| parent | cbacc2c7f066a1e01b33b0e27ae5efbf534bc2db (diff) | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (105 commits)
SELinux: don't check permissions for kernel mounts
security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()
SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form "proc/foo"
Audit: Log TIOCSTI
user namespaces: document CFS behavior
user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER
user namespaces: let user_ns be cloned with fairsched
CRED: fix sparse warnings
User namespaces: use the current_user_ns() macro
User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2)
nfsctl: add headers for credentials
coda: fix creds reference
capabilities: define get_vfs_caps_from_disk when file caps are not enabled
CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
CRED: Documentation
CRED: Use creds in file structs
CRED: Prettify commoncap.c
CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd/vfs.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index 4433c8f00163..d1c5f787b365 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -671,6 +671,7 @@ __be32 nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, int access, struct file **filp) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct dentry *dentry; struct inode *inode; int flags = O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE; @@ -725,7 +726,7 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, DQUOT_INIT(inode); } *filp = dentry_open(dget(dentry), mntget(fhp->fh_export->ex_path.mnt), - flags); + flags, cred); if (IS_ERR(*filp)) host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp); out_nfserr: @@ -1169,7 +1170,7 @@ nfsd_create_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *resfhp, * send along the gid on create when it tries to implement * setgid directories via NFS: */ - if (current->fsuid != 0) + if (current_fsuid() != 0) iap->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID); if (iap->ia_valid) return nfsd_setattr(rqstp, resfhp, iap, 0, (time_t)0); @@ -2001,7 +2002,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp, IS_APPEND(inode)? " append" : "", __mnt_is_readonly(exp->ex_path.mnt)? " ro" : ""); dprintk(" owner %d/%d user %d/%d\n", - inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current->fsuid, current->fsgid); + inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid()); #endif /* Normally we reject any write/sattr etc access on a read-only file @@ -2044,7 +2045,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp, * with NFSv3. */ if ((acc & NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE) && - inode->i_uid == current->fsuid) + inode->i_uid == current_fsuid()) return 0; /* This assumes NFSD_MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} == MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} */ |