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authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2009-05-08 13:55:22 +0100
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2009-05-11 08:15:36 +1000
commit5e751e992f3fb08ba35e1ca8095ec8fbf9eda523 (patch)
tree711b1b47622dc9661f1d3d9c67d55c0b21456e8c /fs
parentd254117099d711f215e62427f55dfb8ebd5ad011 (diff)
CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r--fs/compat.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/exec.c10
2 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c
index 681ed81e6be0..bb2a9b2e8173 100644
--- a/fs/compat.c
+++ b/fs/compat.c
@@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
if (!bprm)
goto out_files;
- retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
- mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
if (displaced)
@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ out_unmark:
out_unlock:
current->in_execve = 0;
- mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 639177b0eeac..998e856c3079 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
commit_creds(bprm->cred);
bprm->cred = NULL;
- /* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
+ /* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
* ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
* credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */
@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);
/*
* determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program
- * - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against
+ * - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against
* PTRACE_ATTACH
*/
int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
if (!bprm)
goto out_files;
- retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
current->in_execve = 1;
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
/* execve succeeded */
current->fs->in_exec = 0;
current->in_execve = 0;
- mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
if (displaced)
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ out_unmark:
out_unlock:
current->in_execve = 0;
- mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&current->cred_guard_mutex);
out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);