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authorJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>2022-02-25 14:32:28 -0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2022-03-11 11:22:37 +0100
commit6c1599fd1bf8782f2b368e9eacc55571a7c3dd54 (patch)
treec41aba0cf34600ebeb9909607fa9186b435f46f7 /include/linux
parent7c7702569422ed49d66917e163df81dba763e983 (diff)
x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT
commit 0de05d056afdb00eca8c7bbb0c79a3438daf700c upstream. The commit 44a3918c8245 ("x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting") added a warning for the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" combination, which has been shown to be vulnerable against Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks. However, there's no warning about the "eIBRS + LFENCE retpoline + unprivileged eBPF" combo. The LFENCE adds more protection by shortening the speculation window after a mispredicted branch. That makes an attack significantly more difficult, even with unprivileged eBPF. So at least for now the logic doesn't warn about that combination. But if you then add SMT into the mix, the SMT attack angle weakens the effectiveness of the LFENCE considerably. So extend the "eIBRS + unprivileged eBPF" warning to also include the "eIBRS + LFENCE + unprivileged eBPF + SMT" case. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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