bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation

commit b2157399cc9898260d6031c5bfe45fe137c1fbe7 upstream.

Under speculation, CPUs may mis-predict branches in bounds checks. Thus,
memory accesses under a bounds check may be speculated even if the
bounds check fails, providing a primitive for building a side channel.

To avoid leaking kernel data round up array-based maps and mask the index
after bounds check, so speculated load with out of bounds index will load
either valid value from the array or zero from the padded area.

Unconditionally mask index for all array types even when max_entries
are not rounded to power of 2 for root user.
When map is created by unpriv user generate a sequence of bpf insns
that includes AND operation to make sure that JITed code includes
the same 'index & index_mask' operation.

If prog_array map is created by unpriv user replace
  bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
with
  if (index >= max_entries) {
    index &= map->index_mask;
    bpf_tail_call(ctx, map, index);
  }
(along with roundup to power 2) to prevent out-of-bounds speculation.
There is secondary redundant 'if (index >= max_entries)' in the interpreter
and in all JITs, but they can be optimized later if necessary.

Other array-like maps (cpumap, devmap, sockmap, perf_event_array, cgroup_array)
cannot be used by unpriv, so no changes there.

That fixes bpf side of "Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753)" on
all architectures with and without JIT.

v2->v3:
Daniel noticed that attack potentially can be crafted via syscall commands
without loading the program, so add masking to those paths as well.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index 4f6d29c8e3d8..f2157159b26f 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct bpf_map {
 	u32 value_size;
 	u32 max_entries;
 	u32 pages;
+	bool unpriv_array;
 	struct user_struct *user;
 	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
 	struct work_struct work;
@@ -141,6 +142,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
 struct bpf_array {
 	struct bpf_map map;
 	u32 elem_size;
+	u32 index_mask;
 	/* 'ownership' of prog_array is claimed by the first program that
 	 * is going to use this map or by the first program which FD is stored
 	 * in the map to make sure that all callers and callees have the same