Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (54 commits)
  tpm_nsc: Fix bug when loading multiple TPM drivers
  tpm: Move tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts out of CONFIG_PNP block
  tpm: Fix compilation warning when CONFIG_PNP is not defined
  TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc.
  tpm: Fix a typo
  tpm_tis: Probing function for Intel iTPM bug
  tpm_tis: Fix the probing for interrupts
  tpm_tis: Delay ACPI S3 suspend while the TPM is busy
  tpm_tis: Re-enable interrupts upon (S3) resume
  tpm: Fix display of data in pubek sysfs entry
  tpm_tis: Add timeouts sysfs entry
  tpm: Adjust interface timeouts if they are too small
  tpm: Use interface timeouts returned from the TPM
  tpm_tis: Introduce durations sysfs entry
  tpm: Adjust the durations if they are too small
  tpm: Use durations returned from TPM
  TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL.
  TOMOYO: Allow using argv[]/envp[] of execve() as conditions.
  TOMOYO: Allow using executable's realpath and symlink's target as conditions.
  TOMOYO: Allow using owner/group etc. of file objects as conditions.
  ...

Fix up trivial conflict in security/tomoyo/realpath.c

2 files changed, 124 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/include/keys/encrypted-type.h b/include/keys/encrypted-type.h
index 95855017a32b..1d4541370a64 100644
--- a/include/keys/encrypted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/encrypted-type.h
@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 /*
  * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation
- * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Politecnico di Torino, Italy
+ *                    TORSEC group -- http://security.polito.it
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -15,13 +20,17 @@
 
 struct encrypted_key_payload {
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
+	char *format;		/* datablob: format */
 	char *master_desc;	/* datablob: master key name */
 	char *datalen;		/* datablob: decrypted key length */
 	u8 *iv;			/* datablob: iv */
 	u8 *encrypted_data;	/* datablob: encrypted data */
 	unsigned short datablob_len;	/* length of datablob */
 	unsigned short decrypted_datalen;	/* decrypted data length */
-	u8 decrypted_data[0];	/* decrypted data +  datablob + hmac */
+	unsigned short payload_datalen;		/* payload data length */
+	unsigned short encrypted_key_format;	/* encrypted key format */
+	u8 *decrypted_data;	/* decrypted data */
+	u8 payload_data[0];	/* payload data + datablob + hmac */
 };
 
 extern struct key_type key_type_encrypted;
diff --git a/include/linux/ecryptfs.h b/include/linux/ecryptfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2224a8c0cb64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/ecryptfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_ECRYPTFS_H
+#define _LINUX_ECRYPTFS_H
+
+/* Version verification for shared data structures w/ userspace */
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSION_MINOR 0x04
+#define ECRYPTFS_SUPPORTED_FILE_VERSION 0x03
+/* These flags indicate which features are supported by the kernel
+ * module; userspace tools such as the mount helper read
+ * ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK from a sysfs handle in order to determine
+ * how to behave. */
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE            0x00000001
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY                0x00000002
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH 0x00000004
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_POLICY                0x00000008
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR                 0x00000010
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY               0x00000020
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_DEVMISC               0x00000040
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_HMAC                  0x00000080
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_FILENAME_ENCRYPTION   0x00000100
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_GCM                   0x00000200
+#define ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK (ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PASSPHRASE \
+				  | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PLAINTEXT_PASSTHROUGH \
+				  | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_PUBKEY \
+				  | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_XATTR \
+				  | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MULTKEY \
+				  | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_DEVMISC \
+				  | ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_FILENAME_ENCRYPTION)
+#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH 64
+#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSPHRASE_BYTES ECRYPTFS_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH
+#define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE 8
+#define ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE_HEX (ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE*2)
+/* The original signature size is only for what is stored on disk; all
+ * in-memory representations are expanded hex, so it better adapted to
+ * be passed around or referenced on the command line */
+#define ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE 8
+#define ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX (ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE*2)
+#define ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX
+#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES 64
+#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES 512
+#define ECRYPTFS_FILE_VERSION 0x03
+#define ECRYPTFS_MAX_PKI_NAME_BYTES 16
+
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_DES3_EDE 0x02
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_5 0x03
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 0x04
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_128 0x07
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_192 0x08
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_256 0x09
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_TWOFISH 0x0a
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_6 0x0b
+
+#define RFC2440_CIPHER_RSA 0x01
+
+/**
+ * For convenience, we may need to pass around the encrypted session
+ * key between kernel and userspace because the authentication token
+ * may not be extractable.  For example, the TPM may not release the
+ * private key, instead requiring the encrypted data and returning the
+ * decrypted data.
+ */
+struct ecryptfs_session_key {
+#define ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT 0x00000001
+#define ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT 0x00000002
+#define ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY 0x00000004
+#define ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY 0x00000008
+	u32 flags;
+	u32 encrypted_key_size;
+	u32 decrypted_key_size;
+	u8 encrypted_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES];
+	u8 decrypted_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
+};
+
+struct ecryptfs_password {
+	u32 password_bytes;
+	s32 hash_algo;
+	u32 hash_iterations;
+	u32 session_key_encryption_key_bytes;
+#define ECRYPTFS_PERSISTENT_PASSWORD 0x01
+#define ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET 0x02
+	u32 flags;
+	/* Iterated-hash concatenation of salt and passphrase */
+	u8 session_key_encryption_key[ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES];
+	u8 signature[ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE + 1];
+	/* Always in expanded hex */
+	u8 salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE];
+};
+
+enum ecryptfs_token_types {ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD, ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY};
+
+struct ecryptfs_private_key {
+	u32 key_size;
+	u32 data_len;
+	u8 signature[ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE + 1];
+	char pki_type[ECRYPTFS_MAX_PKI_NAME_BYTES + 1];
+	u8 data[];
+};
+
+/* May be a password or a private key */
+struct ecryptfs_auth_tok {
+	u16 version; /* 8-bit major and 8-bit minor */
+	u16 token_type;
+#define ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPT_ONLY 0x00000001
+	u32 flags;
+	struct ecryptfs_session_key session_key;
+	u8 reserved[32];
+	union {
+		struct ecryptfs_password password;
+		struct ecryptfs_private_key private_key;
+	} token;
+} __attribute__ ((packed));
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_ECRYPTFS_H */