mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks

commit bfedb589252c01fa505ac9f6f2a3d5d68d707ef4 upstream.

During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
not readable by the user executing the file.  A bug in
ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).

This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec, so
it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present in
to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.

The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
user namespace it does not become ptraceable.

The function ptrace_attach is modified to only set PT_PTRACE_CAP when
CAP_SYS_PTRACE is held over task->mm->user_ns.  The intent of
PT_PTRACE_CAP is to be a flag to note that whatever permission changes
the task might go through the tracer has sufficient permissions for
it not to be an issue.  task->cred->user_ns is always the same
as or descendent of mm->user_ns.  Which guarantees that having
CAP_SYS_PTRACE over mm->user_ns is the worst case for the tasks
credentials.

To prevent regressions mm->dumpable and mm->user_ns are not considered
when a task has no mm.  As simply failing ptrace_may_attach causes
regressions in privileged applications attempting to read things
such as /proc/<pid>/stat

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 6 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 7161ebe67cbb..2e55b53399de 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -585,7 +585,8 @@ static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
 #endif
 }
 
-static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
+static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns)
 {
 	mm->mmap = NULL;
 	mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
@@ -625,6 +626,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
 	if (init_new_context(p, mm))
 		goto fail_nocontext;
 
+	mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
 	return mm;
 
 fail_nocontext:
@@ -670,7 +672,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_alloc(void)
 		return NULL;
 
 	memset(mm, 0, sizeof(*mm));
-	return mm_init(mm, current);
+	return mm_init(mm, current, current_user_ns());
 }
 
 /*
@@ -685,6 +687,7 @@ void __mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
 	destroy_context(mm);
 	mmu_notifier_mm_destroy(mm);
 	check_mm(mm);
+	put_user_ns(mm->user_ns);
 	free_mm(mm);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mmdrop);
@@ -942,7 +945,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	memcpy(mm, oldmm, sizeof(*mm));
 
-	if (!mm_init(mm, tsk))
+	if (!mm_init(mm, tsk, mm->user_ns))
 		goto fail_nomem;
 
 	err = dup_mmap(mm, oldmm);