diff options
| author | Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> | 2005-09-03 15:56:59 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@evo.osdl.org> | 2005-09-05 00:06:16 -0700 |
| commit | c2ff18f4070f6303a81fd7d9d967d7c9e01b588f (patch) | |
| tree | 250a50e27885a179d0fee37cef31cf3a4d4627d3 /kernel/power/Kconfig | |
| parent | 583a4e88db1eadc52116e1f97b4519de655b2b80 (diff) | |
[PATCH] encrypt suspend data for easy wiping
The patch protects from leaking sensitive data after resume from suspend.
During suspend a temporary key is created and this key is used to encrypt the
data written to disk. When, during resume, the data was read back into memory
the temporary key is destroyed which simply means that all data written to
disk during suspend are then inaccessible so they can't be stolen lateron.
Think of the following: you suspend while an application is running that keeps
sensitive data in memory. The application itself prevents the data from being
swapped out. Suspend, however, must write these data to swap to be able to
resume lateron. Without suspend encryption your sensitive data are then
stored in plaintext on disk. This means that after resume your sensitive data
are accessible to all applications having direct access to the swap device
which was used for suspend. If you don't need swap after resume these data
can remain on disk virtually forever. Thus it can happen that your system
gets broken in weeks later and sensitive data which you thought were encrypted
and protected are retrieved and stolen from the swap device.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/power/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/power/Kconfig | 12 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig index 2c7121d9bff1..917066a5767c 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig @@ -72,6 +72,18 @@ config PM_STD_PARTITION suspended image to. It will simply pick the first available swap device. +config SWSUSP_ENCRYPT + bool "Encrypt suspend image" + depends on SOFTWARE_SUSPEND && CRYPTO=y && (CRYPTO_AES=y || CRYPTO_AES_586=y || CRYPTO_AES_X86_64=y) + default "" + ---help--- + To prevent data gathering from swap after resume you can encrypt + the suspend image with a temporary key that is deleted on + resume. + + Note that the temporary key is stored unencrypted on disk while the + system is suspended. + config SUSPEND_SMP bool depends on HOTPLUG_CPU && X86 && PM |