diff options
| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-05-21 15:23:46 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-07-18 12:13:38 -0700 |
| commit | 1d4457f99928a968767f6405b4a1f50845aa15fd (patch) | |
| tree | 522641b08f4a465035910a74a3871ad38e62df01 /kernel | |
| parent | 8855d608c145c1ca0e26f4da00741080bb49d80d (diff) | |
sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags
Since seccomp transitions between threads requires updates to the
no_new_privs flag to be atomic, the flag must be part of an atomic flag
set. This moves the nnp flag into a separate task field, and introduces
accessors.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sys.c | 4 |
2 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index f0652578af75..d2596136b0d1 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog) * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the * behavior of privileged children. */ - if (!current->no_new_privs && + if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0) return -EACCES; diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 66a751ebf9d9..ce8129192a26 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -1990,12 +1990,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; - current->no_new_privs = 1; + task_set_no_new_privs(current); break; case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; - return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0; + return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0; case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) return -EINVAL; |