Merge git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit

Pull audit updates from Eric Paris:
 "So this change across a whole bunch of arches really solves one basic
  problem.  We want to audit when seccomp is killing a process.  seccomp
  hooks in before the audit syscall entry code.  audit_syscall_entry
  took as an argument the arch of the given syscall.  Since the arch is
  part of what makes a syscall number meaningful it's an important part
  of the record, but it isn't available when seccomp shoots the
  syscall...

  For most arch's we have a better way to get the arch (syscall_get_arch)
  So the solution was two fold: Implement syscall_get_arch() everywhere
  there is audit which didn't have it.  Use syscall_get_arch() in the
  seccomp audit code.  Having syscall_get_arch() everywhere meant it was
  a useless flag on the stack and we could get rid of it for the typical
  syscall entry.

  The other changes inside the audit system aren't grand, fixed some
  records that had invalid spaces.  Better locking around the task comm
  field.  Removing some dead functions and structs.  Make some things
  static.  Really minor stuff"

* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (31 commits)
  audit: rename audit_log_remove_rule to disambiguate for trees
  audit: cull redundancy in audit_rule_change
  audit: WARN if audit_rule_change called illegally
  audit: put rule existence check in canonical order
  next: openrisc: Fix build
  audit: get comm using lock to avoid race in string printing
  audit: remove open_arg() function that is never used
  audit: correct AUDIT_GET_FEATURE return message type
  audit: set nlmsg_len for multicast messages.
  audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive
  audit: invalid op= values for rules
  audit: use atomic_t to simplify audit_serial()
  kernel/audit.c: use ARRAY_SIZE instead of sizeof/sizeof[0]
  audit: reduce scope of audit_log_fcaps
  audit: reduce scope of audit_net_id
  audit: arm64: Remove the audit arch argument to audit_syscall_entry
  arm64: audit: Add audit hook in syscall_trace_enter/exit()
  audit: x86: drop arch from __audit_syscall_entry() interface
  sparc: implement is_32bit_task
  sparc: properly conditionalize use of TIF_32BIT
  ...

6 files changed, 56 insertions, 69 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index ba2ff5a5c600..80983df92cd4 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static atomic_t    audit_lost = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 /* The netlink socket. */
 static struct sock *audit_sock;
-int audit_net_id;
+static int audit_net_id;
 
 /* Hash for inode-based rules */
 struct list_head audit_inode_hash[AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS];
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ static int audit_get_feature(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	seq = nlmsg_hdr(skb)->nlmsg_seq;
 
-	audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0, &af, sizeof(af));
+	audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_GET_FEATURE, 0, 0, &af, sizeof(af));
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ static int audit_set_feature(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct audit_features *uaf;
 	int i;
 
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE + 1 > sizeof(audit_feature_names)/sizeof(audit_feature_names[0]));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE + 1 > ARRAY_SIZE(audit_feature_names));
 	uaf = nlmsg_data(nlmsg_hdr(skb));
 
 	/* if there is ever a version 2 we should handle that here */
@@ -1301,19 +1301,9 @@ err:
  */
 unsigned int audit_serial(void)
 {
-	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(serial_lock);
-	static unsigned int serial = 0;
+	static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
-	unsigned long flags;
-	unsigned int ret;
-
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&serial_lock, flags);
-	do {
-		ret = ++serial;
-	} while (unlikely(!ret));
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&serial_lock, flags);
-
-	return ret;
+	return atomic_add_return(1, &serial);
 }
 
 static inline void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
@@ -1681,7 +1671,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
 	}
 }
 
-void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
+static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
 {
 	kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
 	kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
@@ -1860,7 +1850,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
 void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+	char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
 	struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
 	char *tty;
 
@@ -1894,9 +1884,8 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
 			 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
 			 tty, audit_get_sessionid(tsk));
 
-	get_task_comm(name, tsk);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, tsk));
 
 	if (mm) {
 		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
@@ -1959,6 +1948,7 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	} else {
 		struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(ab->skb);
 
+		nlh->nlmsg_len = ab->skb->len;
 		kauditd_send_multicast_skb(ab->skb);
 
 		/*
@@ -1970,7 +1960,7 @@ void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 		 * protocol between the kaudit kernel subsystem and the auditd
 		 * userspace code.
 		 */
-		nlh->nlmsg_len = ab->skb->len - NLMSG_HDRLEN;
+		nlh->nlmsg_len -= NLMSG_HDRLEN;
 
 		if (audit_pid) {
 			skb_queue_tail(&audit_skb_queue, ab->skb);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 7bb65730c890..3cdffad5a1d9 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -222,7 +222,6 @@ extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
 			     const struct inode *inode);
 extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
 			  kernel_cap_t *cap);
-extern void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name);
 extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
 			   struct audit_names *n, struct path *path,
 			   int record_num, int *call_panic);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
index 135944a7b28a..e242e3a9864a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ static int tag_chunk(struct inode *inode, struct audit_tree *tree)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void audit_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
+static void audit_tree_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static void audit_log_remove_rule(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	if (unlikely(!ab))
 		return;
 	audit_log_format(ab, "op=");
-	audit_log_string(ab, "remove rule");
+	audit_log_string(ab, "remove_rule");
 	audit_log_format(ab, " dir=");
 	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, rule->tree->pathname);
 	audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey);
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static void kill_rules(struct audit_tree *tree)
 		list_del_init(&rule->rlist);
 		if (rule->tree) {
 			/* not a half-baked one */
-			audit_log_remove_rule(rule);
+			audit_tree_log_remove_rule(rule);
 			rule->tree = NULL;
 			list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
 			list_del(&entry->rule.list);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 70b4554d2fbe..ad9c1682f616 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
 					     &nentry->rule.list);
 			}
 
-			audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated rules");
+			audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
 
 			call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
 		}
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static void audit_remove_parent_watches(struct audit_parent *parent)
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(w, nextw, &parent->watches, wlist) {
 		list_for_each_entry_safe(r, nextr, &w->rules, rlist) {
 			e = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
-			audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, w, "remove rule");
+			audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, w, "remove_rule");
 			list_del(&r->rlist);
 			list_del(&r->list);
 			list_del_rcu(&e->list);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index c447cd9848d1..3598e13f2a65 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -71,6 +71,24 @@ static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
 
 DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
 
+static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
+{
+	switch (f->type) {
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+		kfree(f->lsm_str);
+		security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+	}
+}
+
 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -80,11 +98,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
 	if (erule->watch)
 		audit_put_watch(erule->watch);
 	if (erule->fields)
-		for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) {
-			struct audit_field *f = &erule->fields[i];
-			kfree(f->lsm_str);
-			security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
-		}
+		for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++)
+			audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]);
 	kfree(erule->fields);
 	kfree(erule->filterkey);
 	kfree(e);
@@ -148,7 +163,7 @@ static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule,
 				 struct audit_field *f)
 {
 	if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT ||
-	    krule->watch || krule->inode_f || krule->tree ||
+	    krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree ||
 	    (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -422,10 +437,6 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 
 		f->type = data->fields[i];
 		f->val = data->values[i];
-		f->uid = INVALID_UID;
-		f->gid = INVALID_GID;
-		f->lsm_str = NULL;
-		f->lsm_rule = NULL;
 
 		/* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
 		if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
@@ -1053,30 +1064,27 @@ int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data,
 	int err = 0;
 	struct audit_entry *entry;
 
+	entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
+	if (IS_ERR(entry))
+		return PTR_ERR(entry);
+
 	switch (type) {
 	case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
-		entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
-		if (IS_ERR(entry))
-			return PTR_ERR(entry);
-
 		err = audit_add_rule(entry);
-		audit_log_rule_change("add rule", &entry->rule, !err);
-		if (err)
-			audit_free_rule(entry);
+		audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
 		break;
 	case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
-		entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz);
-		if (IS_ERR(entry))
-			return PTR_ERR(entry);
-
 		err = audit_del_rule(entry);
-		audit_log_rule_change("remove rule", &entry->rule, !err);
-		audit_free_rule(entry);
+		audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err);
 		break;
 	default:
-		return -EINVAL;
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		WARN_ON(1);
 	}
 
+	if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE)
+		audit_free_rule(entry);
+
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7208c1df248d..e420a0c41b5f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include <linux/highmem.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <asm/syscall.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
@@ -125,14 +126,6 @@ struct audit_tree_refs {
 	struct audit_chunk *c[31];
 };
 
-static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
-{
-	int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
-	if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
-		n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
-	return n & mask;
-}
-
 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
 {
 	unsigned n;
@@ -1505,7 +1498,6 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 /**
  * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
- * @arch: architecture type
  * @major: major syscall type (function)
  * @a1: additional syscall register 1
  * @a2: additional syscall register 2
@@ -1520,9 +1512,8 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
  * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
  * be written).
  */
-void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
-			 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
-			 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
+void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
+			   unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
 	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
@@ -1536,7 +1527,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
 	if (!audit_enabled)
 		return;
 
-	context->arch	    = arch;
+	context->arch	    = syscall_get_arch();
 	context->major      = major;
 	context->argv[0]    = a1;
 	context->argv[1]    = a2;
@@ -2433,6 +2424,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 	kgid_t gid;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
 
 	auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
@@ -2445,7 +2437,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 			 sessionid);
 	audit_log_task_context(ab);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
 	if (mm) {
 		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
 		if (mm->exe_file)
@@ -2488,11 +2480,9 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
 	if (unlikely(!ab))
 		return;
 	audit_log_task(ab);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
-	audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
-	audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
+	audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
+			 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, is_compat_task(),
+			 KSTK_EIP(current), code);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 }