mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation

Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue.  The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.

When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to
KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE.  The object is poisoned and put into quarantine
instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent
access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is
able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated.

When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes
KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator.  From now on the
allocator may reuse it for another allocation.  Before that happens,
it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it
retains the allocation/deallocation stacks).

When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old
allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped.  Therefore a use of this
object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning.

Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't
reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a
use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place.

Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue.  The objects are
returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free
errors.

Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues.  When a
cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are
moved into the global quarantine queue.  Whenever a kmalloc call allows
memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue
until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the
maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical
memory).

As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report
accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is
increased.  Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse
it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect
incorrect accesses to it.

Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator.
Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later.

This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally
prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov.  A number of improvements have been
suggested by Andrey Ryabinin.

[glider@google.com: v9]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462987130-144092-1-git-send-email-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index 5969769fbee6..dedb1a920fb8 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -462,4 +462,6 @@ void *slab_next(struct seq_file *m, void *p, loff_t *pos);
 void slab_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *p);
 int memcg_slab_show(struct seq_file *m, void *p);
 
+void ___cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *x, unsigned long addr);
+
 #endif /* MM_SLAB_H */