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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-04-23 14:29:27 -0700
committerJiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>2014-06-23 10:27:57 +0200
commit50b8b6e75fa0c08cef1e1ed30a7ab91f05bcb779 (patch)
treec103d35936dd292b3bbede716ffb1cf1e281d13a /net/decnet/netfilter
parent3b175c7b361838fe80fdd000bf1f0970ca8fbdaf (diff)
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/decnet/netfilter')
-rw-r--r--net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
index 2a7efe388344..f3dc69a41d63 100644
--- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
+++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len)
return;
- if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
RCV_SKB_FAIL(-EPERM);
/* Eventually we might send routing messages too */