diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-04-15 09:00:47 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2015-04-15 09:00:47 -0700 |
commit | 6c373ca89399c5a3f7ef210ad8f63dc3437da345 (patch) | |
tree | 74d1ec65087df1da1021b43ac51acc1ee8601809 /net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | |
parent | bb0fd7ab0986105765d11baa82e619c618a235aa (diff) | |
parent | 9f9151412dd7aae0e3f51a89ae4a1f8755fdb4d0 (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add BQL support to via-rhine, from Tino Reichardt.
2) Integrate SWITCHDEV layer support into the DSA layer, so DSA drivers
can support hw switch offloading. From Floria Fainelli.
3) Allow 'ip address' commands to initiate multicast group join/leave,
from Madhu Challa.
4) Many ipv4 FIB lookup optimizations from Alexander Duyck.
5) Support EBPF in cls_bpf classifier and act_bpf action, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Remove the ugly compat support in ARP for ugly layers like ax25,
rose, etc. And use this to clean up the neigh layer, then use it to
implement MPLS support. All from Eric Biederman.
7) Support L3 forwarding offloading in switches, from Scott Feldman.
8) Collapse the LOCAL and MAIN ipv4 FIB tables when possible, to speed
up route lookups even further. From Alexander Duyck.
9) Many improvements and bug fixes to the rhashtable implementation,
from Herbert Xu and Thomas Graf. In particular, in the case where
an rhashtable user bulk adds a large number of items into an empty
table, we expand the table much more sanely.
10) Don't make the tcp_metrics hash table per-namespace, from Eric
Biederman.
11) Extend EBPF to access SKB fields, from Alexei Starovoitov.
12) Split out new connection request sockets so that they can be
established in the main hash table. Much less false sharing since
hash lookups go direct to the request sockets instead of having to
go first to the listener then to the request socks hashed
underneath. From Eric Dumazet.
13) Add async I/O support for crytpo AF_ALG sockets, from Tadeusz Struk.
14) Support stable privacy address generation for RFC7217 in IPV6. From
Hannes Frederic Sowa.
15) Hash network namespace into IP frag IDs, also from Hannes Frederic
Sowa.
16) Convert PTP get/set methods to use 64-bit time, from Richard
Cochran.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1816 commits)
fm10k: Bump driver version to 0.15.2
fm10k: corrected VF multicast update
fm10k: mbx_update_max_size does not drop all oversized messages
fm10k: reset head instead of calling update_max_size
fm10k: renamed mbx_tx_dropped to mbx_tx_oversized
fm10k: update xcast mode before synchronizing multicast addresses
fm10k: start service timer on probe
fm10k: fix function header comment
fm10k: comment next_vf_mbx flow
fm10k: don't handle mailbox events in iov_event path and always process mailbox
fm10k: use separate workqueue for fm10k driver
fm10k: Set PF queues to unlimited bandwidth during virtualization
fm10k: expose tx_timeout_count as an ethtool stat
fm10k: only increment tx_timeout_count in Tx hang path
fm10k: remove extraneous "Reset interface" message
fm10k: separate PF only stats so that VF does not display them
fm10k: use hw->mac.max_queues for stats
fm10k: only show actual queues, not the maximum in hardware
fm10k: allow creation of VLAN on default vid
fm10k: fix unused warnings
...
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_input.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 218 |
1 files changed, 175 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index f501ac048366..a7ef679dd3ea 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static void tcp_update_reordering(struct sock *sk, const int metric, /* This must be called before lost_out is incremented */ static void tcp_verify_retransmit_hint(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct sk_buff *skb) { - if ((tp->retransmit_skb_hint == NULL) || + if (!tp->retransmit_skb_hint || before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(tp->retransmit_skb_hint)->seq)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = skb; @@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ static u8 tcp_sacktag_one(struct sock *sk, fack_count += pcount; /* Lost marker hint past SACKed? Tweak RFC3517 cnt */ - if (!tcp_is_fack(tp) && (tp->lost_skb_hint != NULL) && + if (!tcp_is_fack(tp) && tp->lost_skb_hint && before(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(tp->lost_skb_hint)->seq)) tp->lost_cnt_hint += pcount; @@ -1535,7 +1535,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_sacktag_walk(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end_seq)) break; - if ((next_dup != NULL) && + if (next_dup && before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, next_dup->end_seq)) { in_sack = tcp_match_skb_to_sack(sk, skb, next_dup->start_seq, @@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_sacktag_walk(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk, if (in_sack <= 0) { tmp = tcp_shift_skb_data(sk, skb, state, start_seq, end_seq, dup_sack); - if (tmp != NULL) { + if (tmp) { if (tmp != skb) { skb = tmp; continue; @@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_maybe_skipping_dsack(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_sacktag_state *state, u32 skip_to_seq) { - if (next_dup == NULL) + if (!next_dup) return skb; if (before(next_dup->start_seq, skip_to_seq)) { @@ -1783,7 +1783,7 @@ tcp_sacktag_write_queue(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *ack_skb, if (tcp_highest_sack_seq(tp) == cache->end_seq) { /* ...but better entrypoint exists! */ skb = tcp_highest_sack(sk); - if (skb == NULL) + if (!skb) break; state.fack_count = tp->fackets_out; cache++; @@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ tcp_sacktag_write_queue(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *ack_skb, if (!before(start_seq, tcp_highest_sack_seq(tp))) { skb = tcp_highest_sack(sk); - if (skb == NULL) + if (!skb) break; state.fack_count = tp->fackets_out; } @@ -3099,17 +3099,15 @@ static int tcp_clean_rtx_queue(struct sock *sk, int prior_fackets, if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_RETRANS) tp->retrans_out -= acked_pcount; flag |= FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED; - } else { + } else if (!(sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)) { last_ackt = skb->skb_mstamp; WARN_ON_ONCE(last_ackt.v64 == 0); if (!first_ackt.v64) first_ackt = last_ackt; - if (!(sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED)) { - reord = min(pkts_acked, reord); - if (!after(scb->end_seq, tp->high_seq)) - flag |= FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED; - } + reord = min(pkts_acked, reord); + if (!after(scb->end_seq, tp->high_seq)) + flag |= FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED; } if (sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) @@ -3322,6 +3320,36 @@ static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 return flag; } +/* Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and + * thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in + * response to out-of-window SYNs or ACKs to mitigate ACK loops or DoS + * attacks that send repeated SYNs or ACKs for the same connection. To + * do this, we do not send a duplicate SYNACK or ACK if the remote + * endpoint is sending out-of-window SYNs or pure ACKs at a high rate. + */ +bool tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, + int mib_idx, u32 *last_oow_ack_time) +{ + /* Data packets without SYNs are not likely part of an ACK loop. */ + if ((TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) && + !tcp_hdr(skb)->syn) + goto not_rate_limited; + + if (*last_oow_ack_time) { + s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_time_stamp - *last_oow_ack_time); + + if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit) { + NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, mib_idx); + return true; /* rate-limited: don't send yet! */ + } + } + + *last_oow_ack_time = tcp_time_stamp; + +not_rate_limited: + return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */ +} + /* RFC 5961 7 [ACK Throttling] */ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -3573,6 +3601,23 @@ old_ack: return 0; } +static void tcp_parse_fastopen_option(int len, const unsigned char *cookie, + bool syn, struct tcp_fastopen_cookie *foc, + bool exp_opt) +{ + /* Valid only in SYN or SYN-ACK with an even length. */ + if (!foc || !syn || len < 0 || (len & 1)) + return; + + if (len >= TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MIN && + len <= TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX) + memcpy(foc->val, cookie, len); + else if (len != 0) + len = -1; + foc->len = len; + foc->exp = exp_opt; +} + /* Look for tcp options. Normally only called on SYN and SYNACK packets. * But, this can also be called on packets in the established flow when * the fast version below fails. @@ -3662,21 +3707,22 @@ void tcp_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, */ break; #endif + case TCPOPT_FASTOPEN: + tcp_parse_fastopen_option( + opsize - TCPOLEN_FASTOPEN_BASE, + ptr, th->syn, foc, false); + break; + case TCPOPT_EXP: /* Fast Open option shares code 254 using a - * 16 bits magic number. It's valid only in - * SYN or SYN-ACK with an even size. + * 16 bits magic number. */ - if (opsize < TCPOLEN_EXP_FASTOPEN_BASE || - get_unaligned_be16(ptr) != TCPOPT_FASTOPEN_MAGIC || - foc == NULL || !th->syn || (opsize & 1)) - break; - foc->len = opsize - TCPOLEN_EXP_FASTOPEN_BASE; - if (foc->len >= TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MIN && - foc->len <= TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_MAX) - memcpy(foc->val, ptr + 2, foc->len); - else if (foc->len != 0) - foc->len = -1; + if (opsize >= TCPOLEN_EXP_FASTOPEN_BASE && + get_unaligned_be16(ptr) == + TCPOPT_FASTOPEN_MAGIC) + tcp_parse_fastopen_option(opsize - + TCPOLEN_EXP_FASTOPEN_BASE, + ptr + 2, th->syn, foc, true); break; } @@ -4640,7 +4686,7 @@ static void tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk) struct sk_buff *head; u32 start, end; - if (skb == NULL) + if (!skb) return; start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; @@ -5095,7 +5141,7 @@ void tcp_rcv_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); - if (unlikely(sk->sk_rx_dst == NULL)) + if (unlikely(!sk->sk_rx_dst)) inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->sk_rx_dst_set(sk, skb); /* * Header prediction. @@ -5292,7 +5338,7 @@ void tcp_finish_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED); - if (skb != NULL) { + if (skb) { icsk->icsk_af_ops->sk_rx_dst_set(sk, skb); security_inet_conn_established(sk, skb); } @@ -5330,8 +5376,8 @@ static bool tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *synack, { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct sk_buff *data = tp->syn_data ? tcp_write_queue_head(sk) : NULL; - u16 mss = tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp; - bool syn_drop; + u16 mss = tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp, try_exp = 0; + bool syn_drop = false; if (mss == tp->rx_opt.user_mss) { struct tcp_options_received opt; @@ -5343,16 +5389,25 @@ static bool tcp_rcv_fastopen_synack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *synack, mss = opt.mss_clamp; } - if (!tp->syn_fastopen) /* Ignore an unsolicited cookie */ + if (!tp->syn_fastopen) { + /* Ignore an unsolicited cookie */ cookie->len = -1; + } else if (tp->total_retrans) { + /* SYN timed out and the SYN-ACK neither has a cookie nor + * acknowledges data. Presumably the remote received only + * the retransmitted (regular) SYNs: either the original + * SYN-data or the corresponding SYN-ACK was dropped. + */ + syn_drop = (cookie->len < 0 && data); + } else if (cookie->len < 0 && !tp->syn_data) { + /* We requested a cookie but didn't get it. If we did not use + * the (old) exp opt format then try so next time (try_exp=1). + * Otherwise we go back to use the RFC7413 opt (try_exp=2). + */ + try_exp = tp->syn_fastopen_exp ? 2 : 1; + } - /* The SYN-ACK neither has cookie nor acknowledges the data. Presumably - * the remote receives only the retransmitted (regular) SYNs: either - * the original SYN-data or the corresponding SYN-ACK is lost. - */ - syn_drop = (cookie->len <= 0 && data && tp->total_retrans); - - tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, mss, cookie, syn_drop); + tcp_fastopen_cache_set(sk, mss, cookie, syn_drop, try_exp); if (data) { /* Retransmit unacked data in SYN */ tcp_for_write_queue_from(data, sk) { @@ -5661,11 +5716,11 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, } req = tp->fastopen_rsk; - if (req != NULL) { + if (req) { WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_RECV && sk->sk_state != TCP_FIN_WAIT1); - if (tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, NULL, true) == NULL) + if (!tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, true)) goto discard; } @@ -5751,7 +5806,7 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, * ACK we have received, this would have acknowledged * our SYNACK so stop the SYNACK timer. */ - if (req != NULL) { + if (req) { /* Return RST if ack_seq is invalid. * Note that RFC793 only says to generate a * DUPACK for it but for TCP Fast Open it seems @@ -5913,6 +5968,80 @@ static void tcp_ecn_create_request(struct request_sock *req, inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok = 1; } +static void tcp_openreq_init(struct request_sock *req, + const struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt, + struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sock *sk) +{ + struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); + + req->rcv_wnd = 0; /* So that tcp_send_synack() knows! */ + req->cookie_ts = 0; + tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; + tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1; + tcp_rsk(req)->snt_synack = tcp_time_stamp; + tcp_rsk(req)->last_oow_ack_time = 0; + req->mss = rx_opt->mss_clamp; + req->ts_recent = rx_opt->saw_tstamp ? rx_opt->rcv_tsval : 0; + ireq->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->tstamp_ok; + ireq->sack_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok; + ireq->snd_wscale = rx_opt->snd_wscale; + ireq->wscale_ok = rx_opt->wscale_ok; + ireq->acked = 0; + ireq->ecn_ok = 0; + ireq->ir_rmt_port = tcp_hdr(skb)->source; + ireq->ir_num = ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->dest); + ireq->ir_mark = inet_request_mark(sk, skb); +} + +struct request_sock *inet_reqsk_alloc(const struct request_sock_ops *ops, + struct sock *sk_listener) +{ + struct request_sock *req = reqsk_alloc(ops, sk_listener); + + if (req) { + struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req); + + kmemcheck_annotate_bitfield(ireq, flags); + ireq->opt = NULL; + atomic64_set(&ireq->ir_cookie, 0); + ireq->ireq_state = TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV; + write_pnet(&ireq->ireq_net, sock_net(sk_listener)); + ireq->ireq_family = sk_listener->sk_family; + } + + return req; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_reqsk_alloc); + +/* + * Return true if a syncookie should be sent + */ +static bool tcp_syn_flood_action(struct sock *sk, + const struct sk_buff *skb, + const char *proto) +{ + const char *msg = "Dropping request"; + bool want_cookie = false; + struct listen_sock *lopt; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES + if (sysctl_tcp_syncookies) { + msg = "Sending cookies"; + want_cookie = true; + NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDOCOOKIES); + } else +#endif + NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDROP); + + lopt = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.listen_opt; + if (!lopt->synflood_warned && sysctl_tcp_syncookies != 2) { + lopt->synflood_warned = 1; + pr_info("%s: Possible SYN flooding on port %d. %s. Check SNMP counters.\n", + proto, ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->dest), msg); + } + return want_cookie; +} + int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *af_ops, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -5950,7 +6079,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, goto drop; } - req = inet_reqsk_alloc(rsk_ops); + req = inet_reqsk_alloc(rsk_ops, sk); if (!req) goto drop; @@ -5967,6 +6096,9 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp; tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb, sk); + /* Note: tcp_v6_init_req() might override ir_iif for link locals */ + inet_rsk(req)->ir_iif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if; + af_ops->init_req(req, sk, skb); if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req)) @@ -6039,7 +6171,7 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (err || want_cookie) goto drop_and_free; - tcp_rsk(req)->listener = NULL; + tcp_rsk(req)->tfo_listener = false; af_ops->queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT); } |