diff options
| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2012-07-17 10:13:05 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2013-01-16 01:13:25 +0000 |
| commit | 61f69dc4e40e41b0018f00fa4aeb23d3239556fb (patch) | |
| tree | 45e2dd9ffbe32aee06acdab13c57e2985f2341db /net/ipv4 | |
| parent | 254a98481ae19da3e98440afbfefa25d1b322dac (diff) | |
tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2
[ Upstream commit 282f23c6ee343126156dd41218b22ece96d747e3 ]
Implement the RFC 5691 mitigation against Blind
Reset attack using RST bit.
Idea is to validate incoming RST sequence,
to match RCV.NXT value, instead of previouly accepted
window : (RCV.NXT <= SEG.SEQ < RCV.NXT+RCV.WND)
If sequence is in window but not an exact match, send
a "challenge ACK", so that the other part can resend an
RST with the appropriate sequence.
Add a new sysctl, tcp_challenge_ack_limit, to limit
number of challenge ACK sent per second.
Add a new SNMP counter to count number of challenge acks sent.
(netstat -s | grep TCPChallengeACK)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kiran Kumar Kella <kkiran@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/proc.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 31 |
3 files changed, 38 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/proc.c b/net/ipv4/proc.c index 466ea8bb7a4d..f46c478f3f42 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/proc.c +++ b/net/ipv4/proc.c @@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib snmp4_net_list[] = { SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPTimeWaitOverflow", LINUX_MIB_TCPTIMEWAITOVERFLOW), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPReqQFullDoCookies", LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDOCOOKIES), SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPReqQFullDrop", LINUX_MIB_TCPREQQFULLDROP), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TCPChallengeACK", LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK), SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL }; diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c index 69fd7201129a..5485077a36ab 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c @@ -552,6 +552,13 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec }, + { + .procname = "tcp_challenge_ack_limit", + .data = &sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, #ifdef CONFIG_NET_DMA { .procname = "tcp_dma_copybreak", diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index a08a62141d6f..a0d3b88a1ccc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -86,6 +86,9 @@ int sysctl_tcp_app_win __read_mostly = 31; int sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale __read_mostly = 1; EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale); +/* rfc5961 challenge ack rate limiting */ +int sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit = 100; + int sysctl_tcp_stdurg __read_mostly; int sysctl_tcp_rfc1337 __read_mostly; int sysctl_tcp_max_orphans __read_mostly = NR_FILE; @@ -5240,6 +5243,23 @@ out: } #endif /* CONFIG_NET_DMA */ +static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struct sock *sk) +{ + /* unprotected vars, we dont care of overwrites */ + static u32 challenge_timestamp; + static unsigned int challenge_count; + u32 now = jiffies / HZ; + + if (now != challenge_timestamp) { + challenge_timestamp = now; + challenge_count = 0; + } + if (++challenge_count <= sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit) { + NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPCHALLENGEACK); + tcp_send_ack(sk); + } +} + /* Does PAWS and seqno based validation of an incoming segment, flags will * play significant role here. */ @@ -5276,7 +5296,16 @@ static int tcp_validate_incoming(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, /* Step 2: check RST bit */ if (th->rst) { - tcp_reset(sk); + /* RFC 5961 3.2 : + * If sequence number exactly matches RCV.NXT, then + * RESET the connection + * else + * Send a challenge ACK + */ + if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tp->rcv_nxt) + tcp_reset(sk); + else + tcp_send_challenge_ack(sk); goto discard; } |