diff options
author | Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> | 2008-02-25 16:27:43 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> | 2008-03-06 15:30:46 -0500 |
commit | 5cf121c3cdb955583bf0c5d28c992b7968a4aa1a (patch) | |
tree | 7bfd1a667f4703f3e6627d176b9a3f374c2db069 /net/mac80211/wpa.c | |
parent | 7495883bdd07e6a233f8a7f3d85c085c1618a203 (diff) |
mac80211: split ieee80211_txrx_data
Split it into ieee80211_tx_data and ieee80211_rx_data to clarify
usage/flag usage and remove the stupid union thing.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/wpa.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/wpa.c | 80 |
1 files changed, 40 insertions, 40 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c index b35e51c6ce0c..df0b7341efc8 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c +++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int ieee80211_get_hdr_info(const struct sk_buff *skb, u8 **sa, u8 **da, ieee80211_tx_result -ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) +ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { u8 *data, *sa, *da, *key, *mic, qos_tid; size_t data_len; @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) return TX_DROP; if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && - !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_FRAGMENTED) && + !(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_FRAGMENTED) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC) && !wpa_test) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for Michael MIC @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) ieee80211_rx_result -ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) +ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { u8 *data, *sa, *da, *key = NULL, qos_tid; size_t data_len; @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) /* * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it */ - if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED) + if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED) return RX_CONTINUE; if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.alg != ALG_TKIP || @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) ALG_TKIP_TEMP_AUTH_TX_MIC_KEY]; michael_mic(key, da, sa, qos_tid & 0x0f, data, data_len, mic); if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0 || wpa_test) { - if (!(rx->flags & IEEE80211_TXRXD_RXRA_MATCH)) + if (!(rx->flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH)) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: invalid Michael MIC in data frame from " @@ -176,14 +176,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN); /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */ - rx->key->u.tkip.iv32_rx[rx->u.rx.queue] = rx->u.rx.tkip_iv32; - rx->key->u.tkip.iv16_rx[rx->u.rx.queue] = rx->u.rx.tkip_iv16; + rx->key->u.tkip.iv32_rx[rx->queue] = rx->tkip_iv32; + rx->key->u.tkip.iv16_rx[rx->queue] = rx->tkip_iv16; return RX_CONTINUE; } -static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, +static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, int test) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, 0x7f), (u8) key->u.tkip.iv16); - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; + tx->control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; return 0; } @@ -243,30 +243,30 @@ static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, ieee80211_tx_result -ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) +ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; int wpa_test = 0, test = 0; - tx->u.tx.control->icv_len = TKIP_ICV_LEN; - tx->u.tx.control->iv_len = TKIP_IV_LEN; - ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx); + tx->control->icv_len = TKIP_ICV_LEN; + tx->control->iv_len = TKIP_IV_LEN; + ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) && !wpa_test) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for IV/ICV */ - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; + tx->control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; return TX_CONTINUE; } if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, test) < 0) return TX_DROP; - if (tx->u.tx.extra_frag) { + if (tx->extra_frag) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < tx->u.tx.num_extra_frag; i++) { - if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->u.tx.extra_frag[i], test) + for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) { + if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i], test) < 0) return TX_DROP; } @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) ieee80211_rx_result -ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) +ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; u16 fc; @@ -295,8 +295,8 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { - if (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) { + if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) { + if (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) { /* * Hardware took care of all processing, including * replay protection, and stripped the ICV/IV so @@ -312,9 +312,9 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm, key, skb->data + hdrlen, skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->addr, - hwaccel, rx->u.rx.queue, - &rx->u.rx.tkip_iv32, - &rx->u.rx.tkip_iv16); + hwaccel, rx->queue, + &rx->tkip_iv32, + &rx->tkip_iv16); if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK || wpa_test) { #ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUG if (net_ratelimit()) @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static inline int ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr) } -static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, +static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb, int test) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) { /* hwaccel - with preallocated room for CCMP header */ - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = key->conf.hw_key_idx; + tx->control->key_idx = key->conf.hw_key_idx; return 0; } @@ -492,30 +492,30 @@ static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx, ieee80211_tx_result -ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) +ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx) { struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb; int test = 0; - tx->u.tx.control->icv_len = CCMP_MIC_LEN; - tx->u.tx.control->iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN; - ieee80211_tx_set_iswep(tx); + tx->control->icv_len = CCMP_MIC_LEN; + tx->control->iv_len = CCMP_HDR_LEN; + ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx); if ((tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) && !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)) { /* hwaccel - with no need for preallocated room for CCMP " * header or MIC fields */ - tx->u.tx.control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; + tx->control->key_idx = tx->key->conf.hw_key_idx; return TX_CONTINUE; } if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, test) < 0) return TX_DROP; - if (tx->u.tx.extra_frag) { + if (tx->extra_frag) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < tx->u.tx.num_extra_frag; i++) { - if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->u.tx.extra_frag[i], test) + for (i = 0; i < tx->num_extra_frag; i++) { + if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, tx->extra_frag[i], test) < 0) return TX_DROP; } @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *tx) ieee80211_rx_result -ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) +ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data; u16 fc; @@ -547,15 +547,15 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - if ((rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - (rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) + if ((rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && + (rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) return RX_CONTINUE; (void) ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen); - if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->u.rx.queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { + if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) { #ifdef CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUG - u8 *ppn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->u.rx.queue]; + u8 *ppn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue]; printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: CCMP replay detected for RX frame from " "%s (RX PN %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x <= prev. PN " @@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; } - if (!(rx->u.rx.status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { + if (!(rx->status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) { /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */ u8 *scratch, *b_0, *aad; @@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_txrx_data *rx) } } - memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->u.rx.queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); + memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[rx->queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN); /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */ skb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN); |