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authorFlorian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>2016-03-10 01:56:23 +0100
committerPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>2016-03-12 11:55:01 +0100
commitd157bd761585605b7882935ffb86286919f62ea1 (patch)
tree993900c74587138194c1689aed4e1bed6c97958b /net/netfilter
parentf0716cd6eb89f769bff3b37120219720c994bb7e (diff)
netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow
Ben Hawkes says: integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap corruption. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/netfilter')
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/x_tables.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
index d0cd2b9bf844..582c9cfd6567 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
@@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size)
struct xt_table_info *info = NULL;
size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size;
+ if (sz < sizeof(*info))
+ return NULL;
+
/* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */
if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages)
return NULL;