summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/net
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>2014-09-02 16:31:43 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2014-11-14 08:59:48 -0800
commitc318c31cd1448461dfd2c82d87865f61ddde2d4c (patch)
tree179f358259dc93747b82ed90f31d51027058d786 /net
parent7f4ec7741d144d51063dcf4ca68978729ab2d63f (diff)
evm: properly handle INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS EVM status
commit 3dcbad52cf18c3c379e96b992d22815439ebbe53 upstream. Unless an LSM labels a file during d_instantiate(), newly created files are not labeled with an initial security.evm xattr, until the file closes. EVM, before allowing a protected, security xattr to be written, verifies the existing 'security.evm' value is good. For newly created files without a security.evm label, this verification prevents writing any protected, security xattrs, until the file closes. Following is the example when this happens: fd = open("foo", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0644); setxattr("foo", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof(value), 0); close(fd); While INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS status is handled in other places, such as evm_inode_setattr(), it does not handle it in all cases in evm_protect_xattr(). By limiting the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to newly created files, we can now allow setting "protected" xattrs. Changelog: - limit the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to IMA identified new files Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions