diff options
author | Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> | 2016-08-03 11:31:54 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> | 2016-08-03 11:36:51 -0400 |
commit | 2686f12b26e217befd88357cf84e78d0ab3c86a1 (patch) | |
tree | ed6f869ccb2dba8bf930de55922591e0a259b26f /net | |
parent | c3ed55b836cff718dd0d654b6daf7c96be2a5ac2 (diff) |
netfilter: x_tables: speed up jump target validation
[ Upstream commit f4dc77713f8016d2e8a3295e1c9c53a21f296def ]
The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken,
most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains().
In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require
several minutes.
sample ruleset that shows the behaviour:
echo "*filter"
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i
done
for i in $(seq 0 100000);do
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i
done
echo COMMIT
[ pipe result into iptables-restore ]
This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches
though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever
(gave up after 10 minutes)
Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an
array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct,
then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not.
After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one
gets when reverting 36472341017529e (~3 seconds on my workstation).
[1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get
300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries
Fixes: 36472341017529e ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps")
Reported-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 47 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 50 |
4 files changed, 122 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index 2953ee9e5fa0..ebf5821caefb 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -362,23 +362,12 @@ static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e) memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0; } -static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t, - const struct arpt_entry *target) -{ - struct arpt_entry *iter; - - xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) { - if (iter == target) - return true; - } - return false; -} - /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if * there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, - unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0) + unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0, + unsigned int *offsets) { unsigned int hook; @@ -467,10 +456,11 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); + if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos, + newinfo->number)) + return 0; e = (struct arpt_entry *) (entry0 + newpos); - if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, e)) - return 0; } else { /* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset; @@ -630,6 +620,7 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, const struct arpt_replace *repl) { struct arpt_entry *iter; + unsigned int *offsets; unsigned int i; int ret = 0; @@ -643,6 +634,9 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, } duprintf("translate_table: size %u\n", newinfo->size); + offsets = xt_alloc_entry_offsets(newinfo->number); + if (!offsets) + return -ENOMEM; i = 0; /* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ @@ -653,20 +647,21 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, repl->underflow, repl->valid_hooks); if (ret != 0) - break; + goto out_free; + if (i < repl->num_entries) + offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0; ++i; if (strcmp(arpt_get_target(iter)->u.user.name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) ++newinfo->stacksize; } duprintf("translate_table: ARPT_ENTRY_ITERATE gives %d\n", ret); - if (ret != 0) - return ret; + ret = -EINVAL; if (i != repl->num_entries) { duprintf("translate_table: %u not %u entries\n", i, repl->num_entries); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } /* Check hooks all assigned */ @@ -677,17 +672,20 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) { duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n", i, repl->hook_entry[i]); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } if (newinfo->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) { duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n", i, repl->underflow[i]); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } } - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0)) - return -ELOOP; + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0, offsets)) { + ret = -ELOOP; + goto out_free; + } + kvfree(offsets); /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; @@ -714,6 +712,9 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, } return ret; + out_free: + kvfree(offsets); + return ret; } static void get_counters(const struct xt_table_info *t, diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c index 3bcf28bf1525..8e729cba1e59 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c @@ -438,23 +438,12 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, #endif } -static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t, - const struct ipt_entry *target) -{ - struct ipt_entry *iter; - - xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) { - if (iter == target) - return true; - } - return false; -} - /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, - unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0) + unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0, + unsigned int *offsets) { unsigned int hook; @@ -547,10 +536,11 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); + if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos, + newinfo->number)) + return 0; e = (struct ipt_entry *) (entry0 + newpos); - if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, e)) - return 0; } else { /* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset; @@ -797,6 +787,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, const struct ipt_replace *repl) { struct ipt_entry *iter; + unsigned int *offsets; unsigned int i; int ret = 0; @@ -810,6 +801,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, } duprintf("translate_table: size %u\n", newinfo->size); + offsets = xt_alloc_entry_offsets(newinfo->number); + if (!offsets) + return -ENOMEM; i = 0; /* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) { @@ -819,17 +813,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, repl->underflow, repl->valid_hooks); if (ret != 0) - return ret; + goto out_free; + if (i < repl->num_entries) + offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0; ++i; if (strcmp(ipt_get_target(iter)->u.user.name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) ++newinfo->stacksize; } + ret = -EINVAL; if (i != repl->num_entries) { duprintf("translate_table: %u not %u entries\n", i, repl->num_entries); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } /* Check hooks all assigned */ @@ -840,17 +837,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) { duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n", i, repl->hook_entry[i]); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } if (newinfo->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) { duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n", i, repl->underflow[i]); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } } - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0)) - return -ELOOP; + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0, offsets)) { + ret = -ELOOP; + goto out_free; + } + kvfree(offsets); /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; @@ -877,6 +877,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, } return ret; + out_free: + kvfree(offsets); + return ret; } static void diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c index 5254d76dfce8..98e99fa833f1 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -451,23 +451,12 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb, #endif } -static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t, - const struct ip6t_entry *target) -{ - struct ip6t_entry *iter; - - xt_entry_foreach(iter, t->entries, t->size) { - if (iter == target) - return true; - } - return false; -} - /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if there are loops. Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, - unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0) + unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0, + unsigned int *offsets) { unsigned int hook; @@ -560,10 +549,11 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo, /* This a jump; chase it. */ duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n", pos, newpos); + if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos, + newinfo->number)) + return 0; e = (struct ip6t_entry *) (entry0 + newpos); - if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, e)) - return 0; } else { /* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset; @@ -810,6 +800,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, const struct ip6t_replace *repl) { struct ip6t_entry *iter; + unsigned int *offsets; unsigned int i; int ret = 0; @@ -823,6 +814,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, } duprintf("translate_table: size %u\n", newinfo->size); + offsets = xt_alloc_entry_offsets(newinfo->number); + if (!offsets) + return -ENOMEM; i = 0; /* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) { @@ -832,17 +826,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, repl->underflow, repl->valid_hooks); if (ret != 0) - return ret; + goto out_free; + if (i < repl->num_entries) + offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0; ++i; if (strcmp(ip6t_get_target(iter)->u.user.name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) ++newinfo->stacksize; } + ret = -EINVAL; if (i != repl->num_entries) { duprintf("translate_table: %u not %u entries\n", i, repl->num_entries); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } /* Check hooks all assigned */ @@ -853,17 +850,20 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) { duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n", i, repl->hook_entry[i]); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } if (newinfo->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) { duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n", i, repl->underflow[i]); - return -EINVAL; + goto out_free; } } - if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0)) - return -ELOOP; + if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0, offsets)) { + ret = -ELOOP; + goto out_free; + } + kvfree(offsets); /* Finally, each sanity check must pass */ i = 0; @@ -890,6 +890,9 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, } return ret; + out_free: + kvfree(offsets); + return ret; } static void diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c index 4b850c639ac5..703fc9ba6f20 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c @@ -704,6 +704,56 @@ int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_entry_offsets); +/** + * xt_alloc_entry_offsets - allocate array to store rule head offsets + * + * @size: number of entries + * + * Return: NULL or kmalloc'd or vmalloc'd array + */ +unsigned int *xt_alloc_entry_offsets(unsigned int size) +{ + unsigned int *off; + + off = kcalloc(size, sizeof(unsigned int), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); + + if (off) + return off; + + if (size < (SIZE_MAX / sizeof(unsigned int))) + off = vmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned int)); + + return off; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_alloc_entry_offsets); + +/** + * xt_find_jump_offset - check if target is a valid jump offset + * + * @offsets: array containing all valid rule start offsets of a rule blob + * @target: the jump target to search for + * @size: entries in @offset + */ +bool xt_find_jump_offset(const unsigned int *offsets, + unsigned int target, unsigned int size) +{ + int m, low = 0, hi = size; + + while (hi > low) { + m = (low + hi) / 2u; + + if (offsets[m] > target) + hi = m; + else if (offsets[m] < target) + low = m + 1; + else + return true; + } + + return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_find_jump_offset); + int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *par, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto) { |