Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (105 commits)
  SELinux: don't check permissions for kernel mounts
  security: pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount()
  SELinux: correctly detect proc filesystems of the form "proc/foo"
  Audit: Log TIOCSTI
  user namespaces: document CFS behavior
  user namespaces: require cap_set{ug}id for CLONE_NEWUSER
  user namespaces: let user_ns be cloned with fairsched
  CRED: fix sparse warnings
  User namespaces: use the current_user_ns() macro
  User namespaces: set of cleanups (v2)
  nfsctl: add headers for credentials
  coda: fix creds reference
  capabilities: define get_vfs_caps_from_disk when file caps are not enabled
  CRED: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions
  CRED: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux
  CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
  CRED: Documentation
  CRED: Use creds in file structs
  CRED: Prettify commoncap.c
  CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials
  ...

1 files changed, 24 insertions, 22 deletions

diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index bd237b0a6331..86747151ee5b 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -105,9 +105,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
-	if (rka->context) {
-		put_task_struct(rka->context);
-		rka->context = NULL;
+	if (rka->cred) {
+		put_cred(rka->cred);
+		rka->cred = NULL;
 	}
 
 } /* end request_key_auth_revoke() */
@@ -122,12 +122,13 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
-	if (rka->context) {
-		put_task_struct(rka->context);
-		rka->context = NULL;
+	if (rka->cred) {
+		put_cred(rka->cred);
+		rka->cred = NULL;
 	}
 
 	key_put(rka->target_key);
+	key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
 	kfree(rka->callout_info);
 	kfree(rka);
 
@@ -139,9 +140,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
  * access to the caller's security data
  */
 struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
-				 size_t callout_len)
+				 size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
 {
 	struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
+	const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
 	struct key *authkey = NULL;
 	char desc[20];
 	int ret;
@@ -163,31 +165,29 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
 
 	/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
 	 * another process */
-	if (current->request_key_auth) {
+	if (cred->request_key_auth) {
 		/* it is - use that instantiation context here too */
-		down_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+		down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 
 		/* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
 		 * servicing is already instantiated */
-		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
-			     &current->request_key_auth->flags))
+		if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
 			goto auth_key_revoked;
 
-		irka = current->request_key_auth->payload.data;
-		rka->context = irka->context;
+		irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+		rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
 		rka->pid = irka->pid;
-		get_task_struct(rka->context);
 
-		up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+		up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 	}
 	else {
 		/* it isn't - use this process as the context */
-		rka->context = current;
+		rka->cred = get_cred(cred);
 		rka->pid = current->pid;
-		get_task_struct(rka->context);
 	}
 
 	rka->target_key = key_get(target);
+	rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring);
 	memcpy(rka->callout_info, callout_info, callout_len);
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;
 
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
 	sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial);
 
 	authkey = key_alloc(&key_type_request_key_auth, desc,
-			    current->fsuid, current->fsgid, current,
+			    cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
 			    KEY_POS_VIEW | KEY_POS_READ | KEY_POS_SEARCH |
 			    KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
 	if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
@@ -203,16 +203,16 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
 		goto error_alloc;
 	}
 
-	/* construct and attach to the keyring */
+	/* construct the auth key */
 	ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_inst;
 
-	kleave(" = {%d}", authkey->serial);
+	kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
 	return authkey;
 
 auth_key_revoked:
-	up_read(&current->request_key_auth->sem);
+	up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
 	kfree(rka->callout_info);
 	kfree(rka);
 	kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ error_inst:
 	key_put(authkey);
 error_alloc:
 	key_put(rka->target_key);
+	key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
 	kfree(rka->callout_info);
 	kfree(rka);
 	kleave("= %d", ret);
@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ static int key_get_instantiation_authkey_match(const struct key *key,
  */
 struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
 {
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	struct key *authkey;
 	key_ref_t authkey_ref;
 
@@ -261,7 +263,7 @@ struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id)
 		&key_type_request_key_auth,
 		(void *) (unsigned long) target_id,
 		key_get_instantiation_authkey_match,
-		current);
+		cred);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(authkey_ref)) {
 		authkey = ERR_CAST(authkey_ref);