diff options
author | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2010-12-13 16:53:11 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2010-12-15 12:14:27 +0530 |
commit | 1bdbb4024c309e470711b434a24fb356fc92edea (patch) | |
tree | 129f4136a53e0133fcdff81065f2e15fb4aac374 /security/keys | |
parent | bc5e0af0b36b6cc9de301074426c279fc9b72675 (diff) |
trusted-keys: kzalloc and other cleanup
Cleanup based on David Howells suggestions:
- replace kzalloc, where possible, with kmalloc
- revert 'const unsigned int' definitions to 'unsigned int'
Signed-off-by: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted_defined.c | 34 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c index 3dc3db15b5d9..975e9f29a52c 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted_defined.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static struct sdesc *init_sdesc(struct crypto_shash *alg) return sdesc; } -static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, const unsigned int datalen, +static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, unsigned char *digest) { struct sdesc *sdesc; @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, const unsigned int datalen, } static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned int keylen, ...) + unsigned int keylen, ...) { struct sdesc *sdesc; va_list argp; @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ out: * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM */ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, + unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1, unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...) { unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, const uint32_t command, const unsigned char *ononce, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned int keylen, ...) + unsigned int keylen, ...) { uint32_t bufsize; uint16_t tag; @@ -252,9 +252,9 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, const uint32_t command, const unsigned char *ononce, const unsigned char *key1, - const unsigned int keylen1, + unsigned int keylen1, const unsigned char *key2, - const unsigned int keylen2, ...) + unsigned int keylen2, ...) { uint32_t bufsize; uint16_t tag; @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static int my_get_random(unsigned char *buf, int len) struct tpm_buf *tb; int ret; - tb = kzalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); + tb = kmalloc(sizeof *tb, GFP_KERNEL); if (!tb) return -ENOMEM; ret = tpm_get_random(tb, buf, len); @@ -420,8 +420,7 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) * Create an object specific authorisation protocol (OSAP) session */ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, - const unsigned char *key, const uint16_t type, - const uint32_t handle) + const unsigned char *key, uint16_t type, uint32_t handle) { unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; @@ -485,12 +484,12 @@ struct tpm_digests { * Have the TPM seal(encrypt) the trusted key, possibly based on * Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs). AUTH1 for sealing key. */ -static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, const uint16_t keytype, - const uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, - const unsigned char *data, const uint32_t datalen, +static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, + uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *data, uint32_t datalen, unsigned char *blob, uint32_t *bloblen, const unsigned char *blobauth, - const unsigned char *pcrinfo, const uint32_t pcrinfosize) + const unsigned char *pcrinfo, uint32_t pcrinfosize) { struct osapsess sess; struct tpm_digests *td; @@ -599,8 +598,8 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, const uint16_t keytype, * use the AUTH2_COMMAND form of unseal, to authorize both key and blob */ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, - const uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, - const unsigned char *blob, const int bloblen, + uint32_t keyhandle, const unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *blob, int bloblen, const unsigned char *blobauth, unsigned char *data, unsigned int *datalen) { @@ -913,7 +912,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. */ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, const void *data, - const size_t datalen) + size_t datalen) { struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; @@ -996,8 +995,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) /* * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values */ -static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, - const size_t datalen) +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen) { struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; |