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authorSeth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>2016-04-26 14:36:22 -0500
committerEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2016-06-24 11:02:22 -0500
commit809c02e091a8272bc8586a5d606565bc900f3467 (patch)
tree4d1667543575f79ec9e1d905081fed3aedf3e531 /security/selinux
parent9f50eda2a9277e0bc51d8ca5dd2ec1d0e73601bc (diff)
Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run with the label supplied in the xattr. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions