diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org> | 2006-03-25 09:24:53 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org> | 2006-03-25 09:24:53 -0800 |
commit | 1b9a3917366028cc451a98dd22e3bcd537d4e5c1 (patch) | |
tree | d911058720e0a9aeeaf9f407ccdc6fbf4047f47d /security | |
parent | 3661f00e2097676847deb01add1a0918044bd816 (diff) | |
parent | 71e1c784b24a026a490b3de01541fc5ee14ebc09 (diff) |
Merge branch 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current
* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
[PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
[PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
[PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
[PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
[PATCH] Fix audit operators
[PATCH] promiscuous mode
[PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
[PATCH] add/remove rule update
[PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
[PATCH] SE Linux audit events
[PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
[PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
[PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
[PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
[PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
[PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
[PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
[PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
...
Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 98 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 15 |
5 files changed, 86 insertions, 61 deletions
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index a678f094b72d..fd99429278e9 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) return 0; } -static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) +static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu return 0; } +static const char *dummy_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) +{ + return NULL; +} + static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; @@ -558,6 +563,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return 0; } +static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg) { return 0; @@ -931,6 +941,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_xattr_getsuffix); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); @@ -965,6 +976,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ccaf988f3729..b61b9554bc27 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -119,6 +119,32 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock); static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache; +/* Return security context for a given sid or just the context + length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */ +static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + char *context; + unsigned len; + int rc; + + rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (!buffer || !size) + goto getsecurity_exit; + + if (size < len) { + len = -ERANGE; + goto getsecurity_exit; + } + memcpy(buffer, context, len); + +getsecurity_exit: + kfree(context); + return len; +} + /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task) @@ -2210,6 +2236,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) return -EACCES; } +static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) +{ + return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; +} + /* * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to @@ -2217,47 +2248,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name) * * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. */ -static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) +static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - char *context; - unsigned len; - int rc; - - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) { - rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; - goto out; - } - - rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); - if (rc) - goto out; - - /* Probe for required buffer size */ - if (!buffer || !size) { - rc = len; - goto out_free; - } - if (size < len) { - rc = -ERANGE; - goto out_free; - } + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (err > 0) { - if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) { - /* Don't need to canonicalize value */ - rc = err; - goto out_free; - } - memset(buffer, 0, size); - } - memcpy(buffer, context, len); - rc = len; -out_free: - kfree(context); -out: - return rc; + return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size); } static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, @@ -4054,6 +4052,13 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } +static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size) +{ + struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; + + return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size); +} + /* module stacking operations */ static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) { @@ -4095,8 +4100,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; - u32 sid, len; - char *context; + u32 sid; int error; if (current != p) { @@ -4105,9 +4109,6 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, return error; } - if (!size) - return -ERANGE; - tsec = p->security; if (!strcmp(name, "current")) @@ -4124,16 +4125,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, if (!sid) return 0; - error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len); - if (error) - return error; - if (len > size) { - kfree(context); - return -ERANGE; - } - memcpy(value, context, len); - kfree(context); - return len; + return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size); } static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, @@ -4291,6 +4283,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr, .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr, .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr, + .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix, .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, @@ -4328,6 +4321,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, + .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity, .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 85e399259832..b8f4d25cf335 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = { AUDIT_LIST, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV }, { AUDIT_ADD, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { AUDIT_DEL, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { AUDIT_LIST_RULES, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV }, + { AUDIT_ADD_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY }, { AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; @@ -152,8 +155,10 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm) break; case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET: - if (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG && - nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) { + if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG && + nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) || + (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 && + nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) { *perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY; } else { err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms, diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index f5d78365488f..a4efc966f065 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <linux/major.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/semaphore.h> @@ -127,6 +128,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE); if (length) goto out; + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, + "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u", new_value, + selinux_enforcing, + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); selinux_enforcing = new_value; if (selinux_enforcing) avc_ss_reset(0); @@ -177,6 +182,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = selinux_disable(); if (length < 0) goto out; + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, + "selinux=0 auid=%u", + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); } length = count; @@ -262,6 +270,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, length = ret; else length = count; + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD, + "policy loaded auid=%u", + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); out: mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex); vfree(data); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 63e0b7f29cb5..61492485de84 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1759,19 +1759,22 @@ int security_set_bools(int len, int *values) goto out; } - printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { "); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) { + audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, + AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE, + "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u", + policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], + !!values[i], + policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state, + audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context)); + } if (values[i]) { policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1; } else { policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0; } - if (i != 0) - printk(", "); - printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], - policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state); } - printk(" }\n"); for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) { rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur); |