Merge tag 'v5.15.41' into lf-5.15.y

This is the 5.15.41 stable release

* tag 'v5.15.41': (1977 commits)
  Linux 5.15.41
  usb: gadget: uvc: allow for application to cleanly shutdown
  usb: gadget: uvc: rename function to be more consistent
  ...

Signed-off-by: Jason Liu <jason.hui.liu@nxp.com>

 Conflicts:
	arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1043a.dtsi
	arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1046a.dtsi
	arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
	drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx8qxp-lpcg.c
	drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c
	drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/nwl-dsi.c
	drivers/mailbox/imx-mailbox.c
	drivers/net/phy/at803x.c
	drivers/tty/serial/fsl_lpuart.c
	security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c

13 files changed, 99 insertions, 55 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 08f907382c61..7d87772f0ce6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
 	else
 		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str);
 
-	return 0;
+	return 1;
 }
 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index 5de0d599a274..97bc27bbf079 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -135,15 +135,23 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
 
 	switch (op) {
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_dec_size ||
+		    uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_enc_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
+		    uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
-		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_sig_size ||
-		    uparams.out_len > info.max_data_size)
+		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
+		    uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -151,7 +159,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
 	}
 
 	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
-	params->out_len = uparams.out_len;
+	params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
index b7920482ebcb..eafd230eebf8 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@ module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee or caam)");
 
 static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
-#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM)
 	{ "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops },
 #endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE)
 	{ "tee", &trusted_key_tee_ops },
 #endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM)
 	{ "caam", &trusted_key_caam_ops },
 #endif
 };
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
 
 static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
 {
-	static_call(trusted_key_exit)();
+	static_call_cond(trusted_key_exit)();
 }
 
 late_initcall(init_trusted);
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 32396962f04d..7e27ce394020 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
 		return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
 
 	/* Creates anonymous FD referring to the ruleset. */
-	ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("landlock-ruleset", &ruleset_fops,
+	ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("[landlock-ruleset]", &ruleset_fops,
 			ruleset, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (ruleset_fd < 0)
 		landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 67264cb08fb3..da631339e969 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -884,9 +884,22 @@ int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
 	return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
 }
 
-int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+				    struct fs_parameter *param)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(fs_context_parse_param, -ENOPARAM, fc, param);
+	struct security_hook_list *hp;
+	int trc;
+	int rc = -ENOPARAM;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param,
+			     list) {
+		trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
+		if (trc == 0)
+			rc = 0;
+		else if (trc != -ENOPARAM)
+			return trc;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 
 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index baa12d1007c7..9ce029b2f226 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 
 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
 	const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
+	u32 fscontext_sid;
+	u32 context_sid;
+	u32 rootcontext_sid;
+	u32 defcontext_sid;
 };
 
 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
@@ -492,7 +496,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 
 static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
 {
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 	struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 	u32 sid;
@@ -611,15 +615,14 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid,
-		     gfp_t gfp)
+static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
 {
 	int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
-					     sid, gfp);
+					     sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 		       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
-		       s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+		       s, sb ? sb->s_id : "?", sb ? sb->s_type->name : "?", rc);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -686,8 +689,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 	 */
 	if (opts) {
 		if (opts->fscontext) {
-			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid,
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 			if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
@@ -696,8 +698,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 		}
 		if (opts->context) {
-			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid,
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 			if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
@@ -706,8 +707,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 		}
 		if (opts->rootcontext) {
-			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid,
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
@@ -716,8 +716,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 			sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 		}
 		if (opts->defcontext) {
-			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid,
-					GFP_KERNEL);
+			rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 			if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
@@ -1008,21 +1007,29 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
 		if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
 			goto Einval;
 		opts->context = s;
+		if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
+			parse_sid(NULL, s, &opts->context_sid);
 		break;
 	case Opt_fscontext:
 		if (opts->fscontext)
 			goto Einval;
 		opts->fscontext = s;
+		if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
+			parse_sid(NULL, s, &opts->fscontext_sid);
 		break;
 	case Opt_rootcontext:
 		if (opts->rootcontext)
 			goto Einval;
 		opts->rootcontext = s;
+		if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
+			parse_sid(NULL, s, &opts->rootcontext_sid);
 		break;
 	case Opt_defcontext:
 		if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
 			goto Einval;
 		opts->defcontext = s;
+		if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
+			parse_sid(NULL, s, &opts->defcontext_sid);
 		break;
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -2695,9 +2702,7 @@ free_opt:
 static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
 {
 	struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
-	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
-	u32 sid;
-	int rc;
+	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 
 	/*
 	 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
@@ -2714,34 +2719,36 @@ static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
 		return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
 
 	if (opts->fscontext) {
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT);
-		if (rc)
+		if (opts->fscontext_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 			return 1;
-		if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
+		else if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
+				       opts->fscontext_sid))
 			return 1;
 	}
 	if (opts->context) {
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT);
-		if (rc)
+		if (opts->context_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 			return 1;
-		if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
+		else if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+				       opts->context_sid))
 			return 1;
 	}
 	if (opts->rootcontext) {
-		struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
-
-		root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT);
-		if (rc)
-			return 1;
-		if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
+		if (opts->rootcontext_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 			return 1;
+		else {
+			struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
+
+			root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
+			if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
+				       opts->rootcontext_sid))
+				return 1;
+		}
 	}
 	if (opts->defcontext) {
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT);
-		if (rc)
+		if (opts->defcontext_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 			return 1;
-		if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
+		else if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
+				       opts->defcontext_sid))
 			return 1;
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -2761,14 +2768,14 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (opts->fscontext) {
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
 			goto out_bad_option;
 	}
 	if (opts->context) {
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
@@ -2777,14 +2784,14 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
 	if (opts->rootcontext) {
 		struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
 		root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
 			goto out_bad_option;
 	}
 	if (opts->defcontext) {
-		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
@@ -2908,10 +2915,9 @@ static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
 		return opt;
 
 	rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
-	if (!rc) {
+	if (!rc)
 		param->string = NULL;
-		rc = 1;
-	}
+
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3789,6 +3795,12 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 					    CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
 		break;
 
+	case FIOCLEX:
+	case FIONCLEX:
+		if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
+			error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
+		break;
+
 	/* default case assumes that the command will go
 	 * to the file's ioctl() function.
 	 */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
index 2ec038efbb03..a9e572ca4fd9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL,
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
 	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS,
+	POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC,
 	__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
index b89289f092c9..ebd64afe1def 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
 	"always_check_network",
 	"cgroup_seclabel",
 	"nnp_nosuid_transition",
-	"genfs_seclabel_symlinks"
+	"genfs_seclabel_symlinks",
+	"ioctl_skip_cloexec"
 };
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index ac0ece01305a..c0d966020ebd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -219,6 +219,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
 	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
 }
 
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
+}
+
 struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
 
 struct selinux_load_state {
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index e4cd7cb856f3..f2f6203e0fff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -2127,6 +2127,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
 	}
 
 	ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
 
 	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "ss", &fsi->last_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index be83e5ce4469..debe15207d2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	int rc;
 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
 	char *ctx_str = NULL;
-	int str_len;
+	u32 str_len;
 
 	if (!polsec)
 		return 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 21a0e7c3b8de..3f3f56f6be4d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2505,7 +2505,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
 	ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
-	ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
+	ad.a.u.net->dport = address->sin6_port;
 	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
 		ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
 	else
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
index 3445ae6fd479..363b65be87ab 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static const char *tomoyo_loader;
 static int __init tomoyo_loader_setup(char *str)
 {
 	tomoyo_loader = str;
-	return 0;
+	return 1;
 }
 
 __setup("TOMOYO_loader=", tomoyo_loader_setup);
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static const char *tomoyo_trigger;
 static int __init tomoyo_trigger_setup(char *str)
 {
 	tomoyo_trigger = str;
-	return 0;
+	return 1;
 }
 
 __setup("TOMOYO_trigger=", tomoyo_trigger_setup);