diff options
author | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2012-05-30 13:11:37 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2012-05-31 13:10:54 -0400 |
commit | d007794a182bc072a7b7479909dbd0d67ba341be (patch) | |
tree | 75aa7ccd563a0fe8b60391824c92f64098674dda /security | |
parent | cf74d14c4fbce9bcc9eb62f52d721d3399a2b87f (diff) |
split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()
... switch callers.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 |
4 files changed, 26 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 032daab449b0..8430d8937afb 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, int rc = 0; /* do DAC check */ - rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); if (rc || addr_only) return rc; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index e771cb1b2d79..ebac3618896e 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -958,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) } /* - * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr - * @file: unused - * @reqprot: unused - * @prot: unused - * @flags: unused + * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr * @addr: address attempting to be mapped - * @addr_only: unused * * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed * -EPERM if not. */ -int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, - unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { int ret = 0; @@ -986,3 +979,24 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, } return ret; } + +/* + * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr + * @file: unused + * @reqprot: unused + * @prot: unused + * @flags: unused + * @addr: address attempting to be mapped + * @addr_only: unused + * + * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need + * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the + * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed + * -EPERM if not. + */ +int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +{ + return cap_mmap_addr(addr); +} diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index fa2341b68331..25c125eaa3d8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3104,7 +3104,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, } /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); if (rc || addr_only) return rc; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index d583c0545808..a62197718768 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file, int rc; /* do DAC check on address space usage */ - rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); if (rc || addr_only) return rc; |