diff options
author | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2007-10-16 23:31:32 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-10-17 08:43:07 -0700 |
commit | 20510f2f4e2dabb0ff6c13901807627ec9452f98 (patch) | |
tree | d64b9eeb90d577f7f9688a215c4c6c3c2405188a /security | |
parent | 5c3b447457789374cdb7b03afe2540d48c649a36 (diff) |
security: Convert LSM into a static interface
Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.
Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.
Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/root_plug.c | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 964 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 1 |
8 files changed, 961 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 460e5c9cf496..a94ee94cf491 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -74,15 +74,15 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_CAPABILITIES - tristate "Default Linux Capabilities" + bool "Default Linux Capabilities" depends on SECURITY help This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y. config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG - tristate "Root Plug Support" - depends on USB && SECURITY + bool "Root Plug Support" + depends on USB=y && SECURITY help This is a sample LSM module that should only be used as such. It prevents any programs running with egid == 0 if a specific diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 38296a005465..fda6a14cb24d 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ * */ -#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/security.h> @@ -52,7 +51,6 @@ static int secondary; static int capability_disable; module_param_named(disable, capability_disable, int, 0); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable, "To disable capabilities module set disable = 1"); static int __init capability_init (void) { @@ -75,26 +73,4 @@ static int __init capability_init (void) return 0; } -static void __exit capability_exit (void) -{ - if (capability_disable) - return; - /* remove ourselves from the security framework */ - if (secondary) { - if (mod_unreg_security (KBUILD_MODNAME, &capability_ops)) - printk (KERN_INFO "Failure unregistering capabilities " - "with primary module.\n"); - return; - } - - if (unregister_security (&capability_ops)) { - printk (KERN_INFO - "Failure unregistering capabilities with the kernel\n"); - } -} - security_initcall (capability_init); -module_exit (capability_exit); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Standard Linux Capabilities Security Module"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 7520361663e8..0f8a2ce3f3a6 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -339,6 +339,3 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_post_setuid); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_reparent_to_init); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_syslog); EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_vm_enough_memory); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Standard Linux Common Capabilities Security Module"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 64b647a0d9a6..4129dcf3daec 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #undef DEBUG #include <linux/capability.h> -#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> diff --git a/security/root_plug.c b/security/root_plug.c index 38dd4f3e641f..870f13095bb6 100644 --- a/security/root_plug.c +++ b/security/root_plug.c @@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ * License. */ -#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/usb.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> /* flag to keep track of how we were registered */ static int secondary; @@ -36,22 +36,14 @@ static int vendor_id = 0x0557; static int product_id = 0x2008; module_param(vendor_id, uint, 0400); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(vendor_id, "USB Vendor ID of device to look for"); - module_param(product_id, uint, 0400); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(product_id, "USB Product ID of device to look for"); /* should we print out debug messages */ static int debug = 0; module_param(debug, bool, 0600); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Debug enabled or not"); -#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG_MODULE) -#define MY_NAME THIS_MODULE->name -#else #define MY_NAME "root_plug" -#endif #define root_dbg(fmt, arg...) \ do { \ @@ -117,25 +109,4 @@ static int __init rootplug_init (void) return 0; } -static void __exit rootplug_exit (void) -{ - /* remove ourselves from the security framework */ - if (secondary) { - if (mod_unreg_security (MY_NAME, &rootplug_security_ops)) - printk (KERN_INFO "Failure unregistering Root Plug " - " module with primary module.\n"); - } else { - if (unregister_security (&rootplug_security_ops)) { - printk (KERN_INFO "Failure unregistering Root Plug " - "module with the kernel\n"); - } - } - printk (KERN_INFO "Root Plug module removed\n"); -} - security_initcall (rootplug_init); -module_exit (rootplug_exit); - -MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Root Plug sample LSM module, written for Linux Journal article"); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); - diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 27e5863d30f1..5b1c034815a8 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/security.h> -#define SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION "1.0.0" /* things that live in dummy.c */ extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; @@ -52,8 +51,7 @@ static void __init do_security_initcalls(void) */ int __init security_init(void) { - printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework v" SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION - " initialized\n"); + printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework initialized\n"); if (verify(&dummy_security_ops)) { printk(KERN_ERR "%s could not verify " @@ -173,8 +171,958 @@ int mod_unreg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) return security_ops->unregister_security(name, ops); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_reg_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mod_unreg_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ops); +/* Security operations */ + +int security_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child) +{ + return security_ops->ptrace(parent, child); +} + +int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); +} + +int security_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + return security_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); +} + +void security_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); +} + +int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap) +{ + return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap); +} + +int security_acct(struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->acct(file); +} + +int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op) +{ + return security_ops->sysctl(table, op); +} + +int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) +{ + return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb); +} + +int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return security_ops->quota_on(dentry); +} + +int security_syslog(int type) +{ + return security_ops->syslog(type); +} + +int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz) +{ + return security_ops->settime(ts, tz); +} + +int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages) +{ + return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages); +} + +int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) +{ + return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages); +} + +int security_bprm_alloc(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(bprm); +} + +void security_bprm_free(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + security_ops->bprm_free_security(bprm); +} + +void security_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) +{ + security_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe); +} + +void security_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + security_ops->bprm_post_apply_creds(bprm); +} + +int security_bprm_set(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return security_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm); +} + +int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); +} + +int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + return security_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm); +} + +int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) +{ + return security_ops->sb_alloc_security(sb); +} + +void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) +{ + security_ops->sb_free_security(sb); +} + +int security_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy) +{ + return security_ops->sb_copy_data(type, orig, copy); +} + +int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) +{ + return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, data); +} + +int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry); +} + +int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct nameidata *nd, + char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data); +} + +int security_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct nameidata *nd) +{ + return security_ops->sb_check_sb(mnt, nd); +} + +int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + return security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); +} + +void security_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + security_ops->sb_umount_close(mnt); +} + +void security_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ + security_ops->sb_umount_busy(mnt); +} + +void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + security_ops->sb_post_remount(mnt, flags, data); +} + +void security_sb_post_mountroot(void) +{ + security_ops->sb_post_mountroot(); +} + +void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct nameidata *mountpoint_nd) +{ + security_ops->sb_post_addmount(mnt, mountpoint_nd); +} + +int security_sb_pivotroot(struct nameidata *old_nd, struct nameidata *new_nd) +{ + return security_ops->sb_pivotroot(old_nd, new_nd); +} + +void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct nameidata *old_nd, struct nameidata *new_nd) +{ + security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot(old_nd, new_nd); +} + +int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) +{ + inode->i_security = NULL; + return security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode); +} + +void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) +{ + security_ops->inode_free_security(inode); +} + +int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, + char **name, void **value, size_t *len) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, name, value, len); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); + +int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mode); +} + +int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name); +} + +int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode); +} + +int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry); +} + +int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); +} + +int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(old_dentry->d_inode) || + (new_dentry->d_inode && IS_PRIVATE(new_dentry->d_inode)))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, + new_dir, new_dentry); +} + +int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry); +} + +int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nd); +} + +int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd); +} + +int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr); +} + +int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_getattr(mnt, dentry); +} + +void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return; + security_ops->inode_delete(inode); +} + +int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, + void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); +} + +void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, + void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return; + security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); +} + +int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, name); +} + +int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry); +} + +int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name); +} + +const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void) +{ + return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix(); +} + +int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, size, err); +} + +int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags); +} + +int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) +{ + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return 0; + return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size); +} + +int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask); +} + +int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->file_alloc_security(file); +} + +void security_file_free(struct file *file) +{ + security_ops->file_free_security(file); +} + +int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg); +} + +int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +{ + return security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); +} + +int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot) +{ + return security_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); +} + +int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +{ + return security_ops->file_lock(file, cmd); +} + +int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + return security_ops->file_fcntl(file, cmd, arg); +} + +int security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->file_set_fowner(file); +} + +int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) +{ + return security_ops->file_send_sigiotask(tsk, fown, sig); +} + +int security_file_receive(struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->file_receive(file); +} + +int security_dentry_open(struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->dentry_open(file); +} + +int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) +{ + return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags); +} + +int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return security_ops->task_alloc_security(p); +} + +void security_task_free(struct task_struct *p) +{ + security_ops->task_free_security(p); +} + +int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) +{ + return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags); +} + +int security_task_post_setuid(uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, + uid_t old_suid, int flags) +{ + return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, flags); +} + +int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) +{ + return security_ops->task_setgid(id0, id1, id2, flags); +} + +int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) +{ + return security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid); +} + +int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return security_ops->task_getpgid(p); +} + +int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return security_ops->task_getsid(p); +} + +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +{ + security_ops->task_getsecid(p, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid); + +int security_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) +{ + return security_ops->task_setgroups(group_info); +} + +int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) +{ + return security_ops->task_setnice(p, nice); +} + +int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) +{ + return security_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio); +} + +int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return security_ops->task_getioprio(p); +} + +int security_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) +{ + return security_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim); +} + +int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, + int policy, struct sched_param *lp) +{ + return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); +} + +int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return security_ops->task_getscheduler(p); +} + +int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return security_ops->task_movememory(p); +} + +int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, + int sig, u32 secid) +{ + return security_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); +} + +int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) +{ + return security_ops->task_wait(p); +} + +int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) +{ + return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); +} + +void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p) +{ + security_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p); +} + +void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) +{ + security_ops->task_to_inode(p, inode); +} + +int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) +{ + return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag); +} + +int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); +} + +void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) +{ + security_ops->msg_msg_free_security(msg); +} + +int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq) +{ + return security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security(msq); +} + +void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq) +{ + security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq); +} + +int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) +{ + return security_ops->msg_queue_associate(msq, msqflg); +} + +int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) +{ + return security_ops->msg_queue_msgctl(msq, cmd); +} + +int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, + struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) +{ + return security_ops->msg_queue_msgsnd(msq, msg, msqflg); +} + +int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, + struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) +{ + return security_ops->msg_queue_msgrcv(msq, msg, target, type, mode); +} + +int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp) +{ + return security_ops->shm_alloc_security(shp); +} + +void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp) +{ + security_ops->shm_free_security(shp); +} + +int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) +{ + return security_ops->shm_associate(shp, shmflg); +} + +int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) +{ + return security_ops->shm_shmctl(shp, cmd); +} + +int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) +{ + return security_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg); +} + +int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma) +{ + return security_ops->sem_alloc_security(sma); +} + +void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma) +{ + security_ops->sem_free_security(sma); +} + +int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) +{ + return security_ops->sem_associate(sma, semflg); +} + +int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) +{ + return security_ops->sem_semctl(sma, cmd); +} + +int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, + unsigned nsops, int alter) +{ + return security_ops->sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter); +} + +void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) +{ + if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) + return; + security_ops->d_instantiate(dentry, inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); + +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) +{ + return security_ops->getprocattr(p, name, value); +} + +int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) +{ + return security_ops->setprocattr(p, name, value, size); +} + +int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_send); + +int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) +{ + return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv); + +int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) +{ + return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); + +void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) +{ + return security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK + +int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other, + struct sock *newsk) +{ + return security_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); + +int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) +{ + return security_ops->unix_may_send(sock, other); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); + +int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + return security_ops->socket_create(family, type, protocol, kern); +} + +int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, + int type, int protocol, int kern) +{ + return security_ops->socket_post_create(sock, family, type, + protocol, kern); +} + +int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + return security_ops->socket_bind(sock, address, addrlen); +} + +int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +{ + return security_ops->socket_connect(sock, address, addrlen); +} + +int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) +{ + return security_ops->socket_listen(sock, backlog); +} + +int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock); +} + +void security_socket_post_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) +{ + security_ops->socket_post_accept(sock, newsock); +} + +int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) +{ + return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size); +} + +int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, + int size, int flags) +{ + return security_ops->socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags); +} + +int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) +{ + return security_ops->socket_getsockname(sock); +} + +int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) +{ + return security_ops->socket_getpeername(sock); +} + +int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +{ + return security_ops->socket_getsockopt(sock, level, optname); +} + +int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) +{ + return security_ops->socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); +} + +int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) +{ + return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how); +} + +int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); + +int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, + int __user *optlen, unsigned len) +{ + return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen, len); +} + +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +{ + return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); + +int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) +{ + return security_ops->sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority); +} + +void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) +{ + return security_ops->sk_free_security(sk); +} + +void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) +{ + return security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); +} + +void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl) +{ + security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->secid); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); + +void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl) +{ + security_ops->req_classify_flow(req, fl); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); + +void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) +{ + security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); + +int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) +{ + return security_ops->inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); + +void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, + const struct request_sock *req) +{ + security_ops->inet_csk_clone(newsk, req); +} + +void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + +int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(xp, sec_ctx); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); + +int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old, new); +} + +void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp) +{ + security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(xp); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); + +int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(xp); +} + +int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, sec_ctx, 0); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); + +int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) +{ + if (!polsec) + return 0; + /* + * We want the context to be taken from secid which is usually + * from the sock. + */ + return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_security(x, NULL, secid); +} + +int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_state_delete_security(x); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); + +void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) +{ + security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x); +} + +int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(xp, fl_secid, dir); +} + +int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, + struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl); +} + +int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +{ + return security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, secid, 1); +} + +void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl) +{ + int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->secid, 0); + + BUG_ON(rc); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + +int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long flags) +{ + return security_ops->key_alloc(key, tsk, flags); +} + +void security_key_free(struct key *key) +{ + security_ops->key_free(key); +} + +int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, + struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm) +{ + return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, context, perm); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 97b7e2738097..83a535b7bc60 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ * as published by the Free Software Foundation. */ -#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> @@ -86,6 +85,7 @@ extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); extern int selinux_compat_net; +extern struct security_operations *security_ops; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP int selinux_enforcing = 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index ba715f40b658..cb008d9f0a82 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ * 2. Emulating a reasonable SO_PEERSEC across machines * 3. Testing addition of sk_policy's with security context via setsockopt */ -#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/security.h> |