Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called
  before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
  selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded
  selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls
  selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux
  evm: enable key retention service automatically
  ima: skip memory allocation for empty files
  evm: EVM does not use MD5
  ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails
  integrity: fix checkpatch errors
  ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr
  security: integrity: Use a more current logging style
  MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes
  ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used
  ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template
  Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()
  fs: move i_readcount
  ima: use static const char array definitions
  security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error
  ima: new helper: file_inode(file)
  kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c
  capability: Use current logging styles
  ...

26 files changed, 208 insertions, 175 deletions

diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index a5918e01a4f7..05f1c934d74b 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)			+= min_addr.o
 # Object file lists
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o capability.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= apparmor/built-in.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= apparmor/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
 subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)		+= integrity
-obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)			+= integrity/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)			+= integrity/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4257b7e2796b..998100093332 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long enabled;
-	int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
+	int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
 	if (!error)
 		apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 21e2b9cae685..ad0d4de69944 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int cap_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
 					u32 *ctxlen)
 {
-	return 0;
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
 static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 0f9cffb1f9ad..0793f4811cb7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -10,6 +10,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 integrity-y := iint.o
 
 subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)			+= ima/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm
-obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_EVM)			+= evm/
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index fea9749c3756..d35b4915b00d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 config EVM
 	boolean "EVM support"
-	depends on SECURITY && KEYS && (TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)
+	depends on SECURITY
+	select KEYS
+	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
-	select CRYPTO_MD5
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
-	select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
 	default n
 	help
 	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 30bd1ec0232e..37c88ddb3cfe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
 /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
 extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
 
-extern int evm_init_key(void);
-extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
-			       const char *req_xattr_name,
-			       const char *req_xattr_value,
-			       size_t req_xattr_value_len);
-extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-			 const char *req_xattr_value,
-			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
-			 const char *req_xattr_value,
-			 size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
-extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
-			 char *hmac_val);
-extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
+int evm_init_key(void);
+int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+			const char *req_xattr_name,
+			const char *req_xattr_value,
+			size_t req_xattr_value_len);
+int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
+		  const char *req_xattr_value,
+		  size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
+		  char *hmac_val);
+int evm_init_secfs(void);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 3bab89eb21d6..babd8626bf96 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
  *	 Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
@@ -103,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
 		umode_t mode;
 	} hmac_misc;
 
-	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
+	memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
 	hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
 	hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
 	hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
 	hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
 	hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
-	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
+	crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
 	if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
 		crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
 				    sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
@@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
 
 	desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
 	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "init_desc failed\n");
+		pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
 		return PTR_ERR(desc);
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 336b3ddfe63f..996092f21b64 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
  *	evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -432,7 +434,7 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
 
 	error = evm_init_secfs();
 	if (error < 0) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: Error registering secfs\n");
+		pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");
 		goto err;
 	}
 
@@ -449,7 +451,7 @@ static int __init evm_display_config(void)
 	char **xattrname;
 
 	for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++)
-		printk(KERN_INFO "EVM: %s\n", *xattrname);
+		pr_info("%s\n", *xattrname);
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 30f670ad6ac3..cf12a04717d3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
  *	- Get the key and enable EVM
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include "evm.h"
@@ -79,9 +81,9 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	error = evm_init_key();
 	if (!error) {
 		evm_initialized = 1;
-		pr_info("EVM: initialized\n");
+		pr_info("initialized\n");
 	} else
-		pr_err("EVM: initialization failed\n");
+		pr_err("initialization failed\n");
 	return count;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index c49d3f14cbec..a521edf4cbd6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
 {
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
 
-	memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
+	memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
 	iint->version = 0;
 	iint->flags = 0UL;
 	iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 0356e1d437ca..f79fa8be203c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #include "../integrity.h"
 
 enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN,
-		     IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+		     IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
 enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 
 /* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index c38bbce8c6a6..ba9e4d792dd5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
 		       int violation, struct inode *inode,
 		       const unsigned char *filename)
 {
-	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
-	const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+	static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
 	char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name;
 	int result;
 	struct {
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
 		       const char *op, const char *cause)
 {
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
-	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	int violation = 1;
 	int result;
 
@@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out:
  * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
- * 		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
+ *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *	subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- * 	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
- * 	mask: contains the permission mask
+ *	func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
+ *	mask: contains the permission mask
  *	fsmagic: hex value
  *
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
  *
  * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
  * but the measurement could already exist:
- * 	- multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
+ *	- multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
  *	  different filesystems.
  *	- the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
  *	  containing the hashing info.
@@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len)
 {
-	const char *op = "add_template_measure";
-	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+	static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
+	static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
@@ -332,5 +332,5 @@ const char *ima_d_path(struct path *path, char **pathbuf)
 			pathname = NULL;
 		}
 	}
-	return pathname;
+	return pathname ?: (const char *)path->dentry->d_name.name;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 734e9468aca0..291bf0f3a46d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -177,11 +177,11 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			     struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			     int xattr_len)
 {
+	static const char op[] = "appraise_data";
+	char *cause = "unknown";
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-	const char *op = "appraise_data";
-	char *cause = "unknown";
 	int rc = xattr_len, hash_start = 0;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index fdf60def52e9..1bde8e627766 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -10,9 +10,11 @@
  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
  *
  * File: ima_crypto.c
- * 	Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
+ *	Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
  */
 
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
@@ -85,16 +87,20 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!rbuf) {
-		rc = -ENOMEM;
+	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+	if (i_size == 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
+
+	rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!rbuf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
 		file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
 		read = 1;
 	}
-	i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
 	while (offset < i_size) {
 		int rbuf_len;
 
@@ -111,12 +117,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 	}
-	kfree(rbuf);
-	if (!rc)
-		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
 	if (read)
 		file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
+	kfree(rbuf);
 out:
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = crypto_shash_final(&desc.shash, hash->digest);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -161,15 +167,22 @@ static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
 		return rc;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < num_fields; i++) {
+		u8 buffer[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1] = { 0 };
+		u8 *data_to_hash = field_data[i].data;
+		u32 datalen = field_data[i].len;
+
 		if (strcmp(td->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
 			rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash,
 						(const u8 *) &field_data[i].len,
 						sizeof(field_data[i].len));
 			if (rc)
 				break;
+		} else if (strcmp(td->fields[i]->field_id, "n") == 0) {
+			memcpy(buffer, data_to_hash, datalen);
+			data_to_hash = buffer;
+			datalen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
 		}
-		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, field_data[i].data,
-					 field_data[i].len);
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(&desc.shash, data_to_hash, datalen);
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 	}
@@ -205,7 +218,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
 		return;
 
 	if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
-		pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index db01125926bd..da92fcc08d15 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	 * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
 	 * little-endian format
 	 */
-	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
+	ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
 
 	/* 2nd: template digest */
 	ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* 3rd: template name size */
 	namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
-	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
+	ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
 
 	/* 4th:  template name */
 	ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 
 		if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "d") == 0)
 			show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN;
+		if (is_ima_template && strcmp(field->field_id, "n") == 0)
+			show = IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT;
 		field->field_show(m, show, &e->template_data[i]);
 	}
 	return 0;
@@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
 /*
  * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
  */
-static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
 	/* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
 	if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 37122768554a..e8f9d70a465d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
  * File: ima_init.c
  *             initialization and cleanup functions
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -42,10 +45,10 @@ int ima_used_chip;
  */
 static void __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
 {
+	static const char op[] = "add_boot_aggregate";
+	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	struct ima_template_entry *entry;
 	struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
-	const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
-	const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
 	int result = -ENOMEM;
 	int violation = 0;
 	struct {
@@ -93,7 +96,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 		ima_used_chip = 1;
 
 	if (!ima_used_chip)
-		pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+		pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
 
 	rc = ima_init_crypto();
 	if (rc)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 149ee1119f87..52ac6cf41f88 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -71,15 +71,14 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
  * ima_rdwr_violation_check
  *
  * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
- * 	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ *	- Opening a file for write when already open for read,
  *	  results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
  *	- Opening a file for read when already open for write,
- * 	  could result in a file measurement error.
+ *	  could result in a file measurement error.
  *
  */
 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
 {
-	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
 	int must_measure;
@@ -111,8 +110,6 @@ out:
 		return;
 
 	pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
-	if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
-		pathname = dentry->d_name.name;
 
 	if (send_tomtou)
 		ima_add_violation(file, pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
@@ -220,9 +217,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto out_digsig;
 
-	pathname = !filename ? ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf) : filename;
-	if (!pathname)
-		pathname = (const char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+	pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
 
 	if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
 		ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a9c3d3cd1990..93873a450ff7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
  *
  * ima_policy.c
- * 	- initialize default measure policy rules
+ *	- initialize default measure policy rules
  *
  */
 #include <linux/module.h>
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
 #include "ima.h"
 
 /* flags definitions */
-#define IMA_FUNC 	0x0001
-#define IMA_MASK 	0x0002
+#define IMA_FUNC	0x0001
+#define IMA_MASK	0x0002
 #define IMA_FSMAGIC	0x0004
 #define IMA_UID		0x0008
 #define IMA_FOWNER	0x0010
@@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
  * and running executables.
  */
 static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
 	 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
-	{.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+	{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
 };
 
 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
-	{.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+	{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
 };
 
 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
@@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
 }
 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
 
-/* 
+/*
  * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
  * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
  * stale LSM policy.
  *
- * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy. 
+ * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
  * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
  */
 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
@@ -167,9 +167,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	int i;
 
-	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
+	    (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
-	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
+	    (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
 		return false;
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
 	    && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
@@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ retry:
 			retried = 1;
 			ima_lsm_update_rules();
 			goto retry;
-		} 
+		}
 		if (!rc)
 			return false;
 	}
@@ -232,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
 	if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
 		return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
 
-	switch(func) {
+	switch (func) {
 	case MMAP_CHECK:
 		return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
 	case BPRM_CHECK:
@@ -304,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
 	measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
 	appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
 			 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
-	
+
 	for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
 		if (i < measure_entries)
 			list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
@@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
  */
 void ima_update_policy(void)
 {
-	const char *op = "policy_update";
+	static const char op[] = "policy_update";
 	const char *cause = "already exists";
 	int result = 1;
 	int audit_info = 0;
@@ -520,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				break;
 			}
 
-			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
-						&entry->fsmagic);
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
 			if (!result)
 				entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
 			break;
@@ -547,7 +548,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				break;
 			}
 
-			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
 			if (!result) {
 				entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
 				if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
@@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 				break;
 			}
 
-			result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+			result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
 			if (!result) {
 				entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
 				if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
@@ -645,7 +646,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
  */
 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 {
-	const char *op = "update_policy";
+	static const char op[] = "update_policy";
 	char *p;
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	ssize_t result, len;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index d85e99761f4f..552705d5a78d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
  *       The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
  *       ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -72,7 +75,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
 
 	qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (qe == NULL) {
-		pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
+		pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry\n");
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 	qe->entry = entry;
@@ -95,8 +98,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
 
 	result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
 	if (result != 0)
-		pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n",
-		       result);
+		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
 	return result;
 }
 
@@ -115,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 
 	mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
 	if (!violation) {
-		memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
+		memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
 		if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
 			audit_cause = "hash_exists";
 			result = -EEXIST;
@@ -131,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
 	}
 
 	if (violation)		/* invalidate pcr */
-		memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
+		memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
 
 	tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
 	if (tpmresult != 0) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 635695f6a185..a076a967ec47 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
  * File: ima_template.c
  *      Helpers to manage template descriptors.
  */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
@@ -19,20 +22,20 @@
 
 static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
 	{.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
-	{.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
-	{.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
+	{.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
+	{.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
 };
 
 static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
-	{.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
+	{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
-	{.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
+	{.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
-	{.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
+	{.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
-	{.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
+	{.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
-	{.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
+	{.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
 	 .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
 };
 
@@ -58,7 +61,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
 	 */
 	if (template_len == 3 && strcmp(str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0 &&
 	    ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_SHA1 && ima_hash_algo != HASH_ALGO_MD5) {
-		pr_err("IMA: template does not support hash alg\n");
+		pr_err("template does not support hash alg\n");
 		return 1;
 	}
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index 1683bbf289a4..1506f0248572 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo)
 enum data_formats {
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST = 0,
 	DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO,
-	DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME,
 	DATA_FMT_STRING,
 	DATA_FMT_HEX
 };
@@ -37,18 +36,10 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
 					 struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
 	u8 *buf, *buf_ptr;
-	u32 buflen;
+	u32 buflen = datalen;
 
-	switch (datafmt) {
-	case DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME:
-		buflen = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1;
-		break;
-	case DATA_FMT_STRING:
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING)
 		buflen = datalen + 1;
-		break;
-	default:
-		buflen = datalen;
-	}
 
 	buf = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buf)
@@ -63,7 +54,7 @@ static int ima_write_template_field_data(const void *data, const u32 datalen,
 	 * split into multiple template fields (the space is the delimitator
 	 * character for measurements lists in ASCII format).
 	 */
-	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME || datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
+	if (datafmt == DATA_FMT_STRING) {
 		for (buf_ptr = buf; buf_ptr - buf < datalen; buf_ptr++)
 			if (*buf_ptr == ' ')
 				*buf_ptr = '_';
@@ -109,13 +100,16 @@ static void ima_show_template_data_binary(struct seq_file *m,
 					  enum data_formats datafmt,
 					  struct ima_field_data *field_data)
 {
+	u32 len = (show == IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT) ?
+	    strlen(field_data->data) : field_data->len;
+
 	if (show != IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN)
-		ima_putc(m, &field_data->len, sizeof(u32));
+		ima_putc(m, &len, sizeof(len));
 
-	if (!field_data->len)
+	if (!len)
 		return;
 
-	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, field_data->len);
+	ima_putc(m, field_data->data, len);
 }
 
 static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
@@ -129,6 +123,7 @@ static void ima_show_template_field_data(struct seq_file *m,
 		break;
 	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
 	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN:
+	case IMA_SHOW_BINARY_OLD_STRING_FMT:
 		ima_show_template_data_binary(m, show, datafmt, field_data);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -277,8 +272,6 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 {
 	const char *cur_filename = NULL;
 	u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
-	enum data_formats fmt = size_limit ?
-	    DATA_FMT_EVENT_NAME : DATA_FMT_STRING;
 
 	BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
 
@@ -301,7 +294,7 @@ static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 		cur_filename_len = IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX;
 out:
 	return ima_write_template_field_data(cur_filename, cur_filename_len,
-					     fmt, field_data);
+					     DATA_FMT_STRING, field_data);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index d7efb30404aa..aab9fa5a8231 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
  *
  * File: integrity_audit.c
- * 	Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ *	Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
  */
 
 #include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long audit;
 
-	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit))
 		integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	char name[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
 	if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1)	/* Skip info messages */
 		return;
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 	audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
 	audit_log_string(ab, cause);
 	audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
-	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
 	if (fname) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
 		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 9e1e005c7596..5fe443d120af 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
 	long dlen;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = strict_strtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
+	ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
 	if (ret < 0 || dlen < MIN_DATA_SIZE || dlen > MAX_DATA_SIZE)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index e13fcf7636f7..6b804aa4529a 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
 				return -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_keyhandle:
-			res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
 			if (res < 0)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
 				return -EINVAL;
 			break;
 		case Opt_pcrlock:
-			res = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
+			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
 			if (res < 0)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			opt->pcrlock = lock;
@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p,
 		c = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
 		if (!c)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		ret = strict_strtol(c, 10, &keylen);
+		ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
 		if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
 			return -EINVAL;
 		p->key_len = keylen;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b332e2cc0954..869c2f1e0da1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int selinux_enforcing;
 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long enforcing;
-	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 		selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long enabled;
-	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 		selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -1418,15 +1418,33 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
-			if (opt_dentry) {
-				isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
-				rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
-							  isec->sclass,
-							  &sid);
-				if (rc)
-					goto out_unlock;
-				isec->sid = sid;
-			}
+			/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
+			 * procfs inodes */
+			if (opt_dentry)
+				/* Called from d_instantiate or
+				 * d_splice_alias. */
+				dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+			else
+				/* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
+				 * find a dentry. */
+				dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+			/*
+			 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+			 * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
+			 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+			 * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
+			 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
+			 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
+			 * could be used again by userspace.
+			 */
+			if (!dentry)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+			rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+			dput(dentry);
+			if (rc)
+				goto out_unlock;
+			isec->sid = sid;
 		}
 		break;
 	}
@@ -3205,24 +3223,20 @@ error:
 
 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	u32 sid = current_sid();
+	int rc;
+
+	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
+	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
 
-	/*
-	 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
-	 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check.  This is such a likely attempt
-	 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
-	 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
-	 */
 	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
+		u32 sid = current_sid();
 		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
 				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
-		if (rc)
-			return rc;
 	}
 
-	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index d60c0ee66387..c71737f6d1cc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long checkreqprot;
-	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
 		selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }