diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 5b5231068516..ef18e25ae717 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ +#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -4690,6 +4691,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum, static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { + struct sock *sk; u32 sid; if (!netlbl_enabled()) @@ -4698,8 +4700,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ - if (skb->sk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security; + sk = skb->sk; + if (sk) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + + if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) + /* if the socket is the listening state then this + * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to + * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and + * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't + * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on + * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. + * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is + * as any IP option based labeling should be copied + * from the initial connection request (in the IP + * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a + * security label in the packet itself this is the + * best we can do. */ + return NF_ACCEPT; + + /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ + sksec = sk->sk_security; sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |