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-rw-r--r--Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst7
-rw-r--r--Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst5
-rw-r--r--Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c17
4 files changed, 35 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst
index daf6fdac49a3..fbbd1719afb9 100644
--- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -265,8 +265,11 @@ time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
============ =============================================================
-Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
-
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full". For processors
+that are affected by both TAA (TSX Asynchronous Abort) and MDS,
+specifying just "mds=off" without an accompanying "tsx_async_abort=off"
+will have no effect as the same mitigation is used for both
+vulnerabilities.
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst b/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
index fddbd7579c53..af6865b822d2 100644
--- a/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+++ b/Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
@@ -174,7 +174,10 @@ the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
============ =============================================================
-Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full". For
+processors that are affected by both TAA and MDS, specifying just
+"tsx_async_abort=off" without an accompanying "mds=off" will have no
+effect as the same mitigation is used for both vulnerabilities.
The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index c81a008d6512..1bc12619bedd 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2365,6 +2365,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
SMT on vulnerable CPUs
off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+ On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
+ an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
+ mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+ this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
+ too.
+
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
mds=full.
@@ -4599,6 +4605,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+ On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
+ prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
+ are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+ this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
+
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected
and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 827fc38df97a..f5fac96f0a5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -303,8 +303,12 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
return;
}
- /* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
- if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ /*
+ * TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
+ * tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
+ */
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
goto out;
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
@@ -338,6 +342,15 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
cpu_smt_disable(false);
+ /*
+ * Update MDS mitigation, if necessary, as the mds_user_clear is
+ * now enabled for TAA mitigation.
+ */
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ }
out:
pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
}