diff options
86 files changed, 13288 insertions, 4596 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/apparmor.txt b/Documentation/apparmor.txt new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..93c1fd7d0635 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/apparmor.txt @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +--- What is AppArmor? --- + +AppArmor is MAC style security extension for the Linux kernel. It implements +a task centered policy, with task "profiles" being created and loaded +from user space. Tasks on the system that do not have a profile defined for +them run in an unconfined state which is equivalent to standard Linux DAC +permissions. + +--- How to enable/disable --- + +set CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + +If AppArmor should be selected as the default security module then + set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="apparmor" + and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1 + +Build the kernel + +If AppArmor is not the default security module it can be enabled by passing +security=apparmor on the kernel's command line. + +If AppArmor is the default security module it can be disabled by passing +apparmor=0, security=XXXX (where XXX is valid security module), on the +kernel's command line + +For AppArmor to enforce any restrictions beyond standard Linux DAC permissions +policy must be loaded into the kernel from user space (see the Documentation +and tools links). + +--- Documentation --- + +Documentation can be found on the wiki. + +--- Links --- + +Mailing List - apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com +Wiki - http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org/ +User space tools - https://launchpad.net/apparmor +Kernel module - git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 2b2407d9a6d0..b61f89fa01c1 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ parameter is applicable: Documentation/scsi/. SECURITY Different security models are enabled. SELINUX SELinux support is enabled. + APPARMOR AppArmor support is enabled. SERIAL Serial support is enabled. SH SuperH architecture is enabled. SMP The kernel is an SMP kernel. @@ -2312,6 +2313,13 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file If enabled at boot time, /selinux/disable can be used later to disable prior to initial policy load. + apparmor= [APPARMOR] Disable or enable AppArmor at boot time + Format: { "0" | "1" } + See security/apparmor/Kconfig help text + 0 -- disable. + 1 -- enable. + Default value is set via kernel config option. + serialnumber [BUGS=X86-32] shapers= [NET] diff --git a/Documentation/tomoyo.txt b/Documentation/tomoyo.txt index b3a232cae7f8..200a2d37cbc8 100644 --- a/Documentation/tomoyo.txt +++ b/Documentation/tomoyo.txt @@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ TOMOYO is a name-based MAC extension (LSM module) for the Linux kernel. LiveCD-based tutorials are available at -http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/ubuntu8.04-live/ -http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/1st-step/centos5-live/ . +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/ubuntu10.04-live/ +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/1st-step/centos5-live/ . Though these tutorials use non-LSM version of TOMOYO, they are useful for you to know what TOMOYO is. @@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ to know what TOMOYO is. Build the kernel with CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y and pass "security=tomoyo" on kernel's command line. -Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/2.2.x/ for details. +Please see http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/ for details. --- Where is documentation? --- User <-> Kernel interface documentation is available at -http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/2.2.x/policy-reference.html . +http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/2.3/policy-reference.html . Materials we prepared for seminars and symposiums are available at http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/docs/?category_id=532&language_id=1 . @@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ multiple LSM modules at the same time. We feel sorry that you have to give up SELinux/SMACK/AppArmor etc. when you want to use TOMOYO. We hope that LSM becomes stackable in future. Meanwhile, you can use non-LSM -version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/en/1.6.x/ . +version of TOMOYO, available at http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/1.7/ . LSM version of TOMOYO is a subset of non-LSM version of TOMOYO. We are planning to port non-LSM version's functionalities to LSM versions. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 02f75fccac20..33606bb91f1f 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5061,6 +5061,14 @@ S: Supported F: include/linux/selinux* F: security/selinux/ +APPARMOR SECURITY MODULE +M: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> +L: apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com (subscribers-only, general discussion) +W: apparmor.wiki.kernel.org +T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev.git +S: Supported +F: security/apparmor/ + SENSABLE PHANTOM M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> S: Maintained @@ -5605,7 +5613,7 @@ L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and us L: tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese) L: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese) W: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ -T: quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.2.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/ +T: quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.3.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/ S: Maintained F: security/tomoyo/ diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c index 3cdc5f78a406..431be0795b6b 100644 --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ static int fuse_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) exist. So if permissions are revoked this won't be noticed immediately, only after the attribute timeout has expired */ - } else if (mask & MAY_ACCESS) { + } else if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) { err = fuse_access(inode, mask); } else if ((mask & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) { if (!(inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) { diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 868d0cb9d473..42d2d28fb827 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -282,8 +282,7 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (retval) return retval; - return security_inode_permission(inode, - mask & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND)); + return security_inode_permission(inode, mask); } /** @@ -1484,8 +1483,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct path *path) */ error = locks_verify_locked(inode); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(path, 0, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN); + error = security_path_truncate(path); if (!error) { error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN, diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index e60416d3f818..832e9e239324 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -1953,7 +1953,7 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if ((mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)) == 0) goto out; /* Is this sys_access() ? */ - if (mask & MAY_ACCESS) + if (mask & (MAY_ACCESS | MAY_CHDIR)) goto force_lookup; switch (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) { diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c index 5463266db9e6..0d1fa3dc0efb 100644 --- a/fs/open.c +++ b/fs/open.c @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length) error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, NULL, length); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(&path, length, 0); + error = security_path_truncate(&path); if (!error) error = do_truncate(path.dentry, length, 0, NULL); @@ -165,8 +165,7 @@ static long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small) error = locks_verify_truncate(inode, file, length); if (!error) - error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path, length, - ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME); + error = security_path_truncate(&file->f_path); if (!error) error = do_truncate(dentry, length, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME, file); out_putf: @@ -367,7 +366,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chdir, const char __user *, filename) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (error) goto dput_and_out; @@ -396,7 +395,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fchdir, unsigned int, fd) if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) goto out_putf; - error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (!error) set_fs_pwd(current->fs, &file->f_path); out_putf: @@ -414,7 +413,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename) if (error) goto out; - error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_ACCESS); + error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR); if (error) goto dput_and_out; diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 39e5ff512fbe..90012b9ddbf3 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct { } __user *cap_user_data_t; -#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" -#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX - #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK 0xFF000000 #define VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT 24 #define VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK ~VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index f91affb7d530..e5106e49bd2c 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct inodes_stat_t { #define MAY_APPEND 8 #define MAY_ACCESS 16 #define MAY_OPEN 32 +#define MAY_CHDIR 64 /* * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index 6907251d5200..112a55033352 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -90,10 +90,42 @@ struct common_audit_data { u32 requested; u32 audited; u32 denied; + /* + * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the + * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage. + */ + u32 auditdeny; struct av_decision *avd; int result; } selinux_audit_data; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + struct { + int error; + int op; + int type; + void *profile; + const char *name; + const char *info; + union { + void *target; + struct { + long pos; + void *target; + } iface; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + struct { + const char *target; + u32 request; + u32 denied; + uid_t ouid; + } fs; + }; + } apparmor_audit_data; +#endif }; /* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */ void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 0c8819170463..723a93df756a 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -470,8 +470,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @path_truncate: * Check permission before truncating a file. * @path contains the path structure for the file. - * @length is the new length of the file. - * @time_attrs is the flags passed to do_truncate(). * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getattr: * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. @@ -1412,8 +1410,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, unsigned int dev); - int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs); + int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path); int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, @@ -2806,8 +2803,7 @@ int security_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode); int security_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry); int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, unsigned int dev); -int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs); +int security_path_truncate(struct path *path); int security_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name); int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, @@ -2841,8 +2837,7 @@ static inline int security_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } -static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs) +static inline int security_path_truncate(struct path *path) { return 0; } diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h index 0cfa1e9c4cc1..f1e5bde4b35a 100644 --- a/include/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h @@ -33,6 +33,20 @@ #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX "user." #define XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_USER_PREFIX) - 1) +/* Security namespace */ +#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" +#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX + +#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" +#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN" +#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN +#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT + +#define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" +#define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX + struct inode; struct dentry; diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 226b9556b25f..bd72ae623494 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig +source security/apparmor/Kconfig source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ choice default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC help @@ -163,6 +165,9 @@ choice config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" @@ -173,6 +178,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC endmenu diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index da20a193c8dd..8bb0fe9e1ca9 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o # Object integrity file lists diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0a0a99f3b083 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# +# Generated include files +# +af_names.h +capability_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..72555b9ca7d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +config SECURITY_APPARMOR + bool "AppArmor support" + depends on SECURITY + select AUDIT + select SECURITY_PATH + select SECURITYFS + select SECURITY_NETWORK + default n + help + This enables the AppArmor security module. + Required userspace tools (if they are not included in your + distribution) and further information may be found at + http://apparmor.wiki.kernel.org + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE + int "AppArmor boot parameter default value" + depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR + range 0 1 + default 1 + help + This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter + 'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled + at boot. If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor + kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at + boot. If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor + kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at + boot. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1. diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f204869399ea --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module +# +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o + +apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ + path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ + resource.o sid.o file.o + +clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h + +quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@ +cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ + +quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN $@ +cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ + +$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h +$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h +$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h + $(call cmd,make-caps) +$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h + $(call cmd,make-af) +$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h + $(call cmd,make-rlim) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7320331b44ab --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor /sys/kernel/security/apparmor interface functions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/apparmorfs.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +/** + * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user + * @op: operation doing the user buffer copy + * @userbuf: user buffer to copy data from (NOT NULL) + * @alloc_size: size of user buffer + * @copy_size: size of data to copy from user buffer + * @pos: position write is at in the file (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: kernel buffer containing copy of user buffer data or an + * ERR_PTR on failure. + */ +static char *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(int op, const char __user *userbuf, + size_t alloc_size, size_t copy_size, + loff_t *pos) +{ + char *data; + + if (*pos != 0) + /* only writes from pos 0, that is complete writes */ + return ERR_PTR(-ESPIPE); + + /* + * Don't allow profile load/replace/remove from profiles that don't + * have CAP_MAC_ADMIN + */ + if (!aa_may_manage_policy(op)) + return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); + + /* freed by caller to simple_write_to_buffer */ + data = kvmalloc(alloc_size); + if (data == NULL) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + if (copy_from_user(data, userbuf, copy_size)) { + kvfree(data); + return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT); + } + + return data; +} + + +/* .load file hook fn to load policy */ +static ssize_t profile_load(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t size, + loff_t *pos) +{ + char *data; + ssize_t error; + + data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_LOAD, buf, size, size, pos); + + error = PTR_ERR(data); + if (!IS_ERR(data)) { + error = aa_replace_profiles(data, size, PROF_ADD); + kvfree(data); + } + + return error; +} + +static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_load = { + .write = profile_load +}; + +/* .replace file hook fn to load and/or replace policy */ +static ssize_t profile_replace(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *pos) +{ + char *data; + ssize_t error; + + data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_REPL, buf, size, size, pos); + error = PTR_ERR(data); + if (!IS_ERR(data)) { + error = aa_replace_profiles(data, size, PROF_REPLACE); + kvfree(data); + } + + return error; +} + +static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_replace = { + .write = profile_replace +}; + +/* .remove file hook fn to remove loaded policy */ +static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *pos) +{ + char *data; + ssize_t error; + + /* + * aa_remove_profile needs a null terminated string so 1 extra + * byte is allocated and the copied data is null terminated. + */ + data = aa_simple_write_to_buffer(OP_PROF_RM, buf, size + 1, size, pos); + + error = PTR_ERR(data); + if (!IS_ERR(data)) { + data[size] = 0; + error = aa_remove_profiles(data, size); + kvfree(data); + } + + return error; +} + +static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = { + .write = profile_remove +}; + +/** Base file system setup **/ + +static struct dentry *aa_fs_dentry __initdata; + +static void __init aafs_remove(const char *name) +{ + struct dentry *dentry; + + dentry = lookup_one_len(name, aa_fs_dentry, strlen(name)); + if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) { + securityfs_remove(dentry); + dput(dentry); + } +} + +/** + * aafs_create - create an entry in the apparmor filesystem + * @name: name of the entry (NOT NULL) + * @mask: file permission mask of the file + * @fops: file operations for the file (NOT NULL) + * + * Used aafs_remove to remove entries created with this fn. + */ +static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, int mask, + const struct file_operations *fops) +{ + struct dentry *dentry; + + dentry = securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | mask, aa_fs_dentry, + NULL, fops); + + return IS_ERR(dentry) ? PTR_ERR(dentry) : 0; +} + +/** + * aa_destroy_aafs - cleanup and free aafs + * + * releases dentries allocated by aa_create_aafs + */ +void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void) +{ + if (aa_fs_dentry) { + aafs_remove(".remove"); + aafs_remove(".replace"); + aafs_remove(".load"); + + securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry); + aa_fs_dentry = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * aa_create_aafs - create the apparmor security filesystem + * + * dentries created here are released by aa_destroy_aafs + * + * Returns: error on failure + */ +int __init aa_create_aafs(void) +{ + int error; + + if (!apparmor_initialized) + return 0; + + if (aa_fs_dentry) { + AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__); + return -EEXIST; + } + + aa_fs_dentry = securityfs_create_dir("apparmor", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(aa_fs_dentry)) { + error = PTR_ERR(aa_fs_dentry); + aa_fs_dentry = NULL; + goto error; + } + + error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load); + if (error) + goto error; + error = aafs_create(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace); + if (error) + goto error; + error = aafs_create(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove); + if (error) + goto error; + + /* TODO: add support for apparmorfs_null and apparmorfs_mnt */ + + /* Report that AppArmor fs is enabled */ + aa_info_message("AppArmor Filesystem Enabled"); + return 0; + +error: + aa_destroy_aafs(); + AA_ERROR("Error creating AppArmor securityfs\n"); + return error; +} + +fs_initcall(aa_create_aafs); diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..96502b22b268 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -0,0 +1,215 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor auditing functions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +const char *op_table[] = { + "null", + + "sysctl", + "capable", + + "unlink", + "mkdir", + "rmdir", + "mknod", + "truncate", + "link", + "symlink", + "rename_src", + "rename_dest", + "chmod", + "chown", + "getattr", + "open", + + "file_perm", + "file_lock", + "file_mmap", + "file_mprotect", + + "create", + "post_create", + "bind", + "connect", + "listen", + "accept", + "sendmsg", + "recvmsg", + "getsockname", + "getpeername", + "getsockopt", + "setsockopt", + "socket_shutdown", + + "ptrace", + + "exec", + "change_hat", + "change_profile", + "change_onexec", + + "setprocattr", + "setrlimit", + + "profile_replace", + "profile_load", + "profile_remove" +}; + +const char *audit_mode_names[] = { + "normal", + "quiet_denied", + "quiet", + "noquiet", + "all" +}; + +static char *aa_audit_type[] = { + "AUDIT", + "ALLOWED", + "DENIED", + "HINT", + "STATUS", + "ERROR", + "KILLED" +}; + +/* + * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework. + * + * TODO: + * netlink interface for complain mode + * user auditing, - send user auditing to netlink interface + * system control of whether user audit messages go to system log + */ + +/** + * audit_base - core AppArmor function. + * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL) + * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) + * + * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa + */ +static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = ca; + struct task_struct *tsk = sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current; + + if (aa_g_audit_header) { + audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor="); + audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad.type]); + } + + if (sa->aad.op) { + audit_log_format(ab, " operation="); + audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad.op]); + } + + if (sa->aad.info) { + audit_log_format(ab, " info="); + audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad.info); + if (sa->aad.error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad.error); + } + + if (sa->aad.profile) { + struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile; + pid_t pid; + rcu_read_lock(); + pid = tsk->real_parent->pid; + rcu_read_unlock(); + audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%d", pid); + if (profile->ns != root_ns) { + audit_log_format(ab, " namespace="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->ns->base.hname); + } + audit_log_format(ab, " profile="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname); + } + + if (sa->aad.name) { + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.name); + } +} + +/** + * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem + * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL) + * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) + */ +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + sa->aad.type = type; + sa->lsm_pre_audit = audit_pre; + sa->lsm_post_audit = cb; + common_lsm_audit(sa); +} + +/** + * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem + * @type: audit type for the message + * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL) + * @gfp: allocation flags to use + * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL) + * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags + * + * Returns: error on failure + */ +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, + struct common_audit_data *sa, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) +{ + BUG_ON(!profile); + + if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { + if (likely(!sa->aad.error)) { + if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) + return 0; + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED; + else + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; + } + if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || + (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET)) + return sa->aad.error; + + if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + + if (!unconfined(profile)) + sa->aad.profile = profile; + + aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); + + if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current); + + if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(sa->aad.error); + + return sa->aad.error; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9982c48def4e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation functions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/gfp.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/capability.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/audit.h" + +/* + * Table of capability names: we generate it from capabilities.h. + */ +#include "capability_names.h" + +struct audit_cache { + struct aa_profile *profile; + kernel_cap_t caps; +}; + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache); + +/** + * audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct + * @ab - audit buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va - audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL) + */ +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + audit_log_format(ab, " capname="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, capability_names[sa->u.cap]); +} + +/** + * audit_caps - audit a capability + * @profile: profile confining task (NOT NULL) + * @task: task capability test was performed against (NOT NULL) + * @cap: capability tested + * @error: error code returned by test + * + * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching + * and duplicate message elimination. + * + * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure + */ +static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task, + int cap, int error) +{ + struct audit_cache *ent; + int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; + struct common_audit_data sa; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP); + sa.tsk = task; + sa.u.cap = cap; + sa.aad.op = OP_CAPABLE; + sa.aad.error = error; + + if (likely(!error)) { + /* test if auditing is being forced */ + if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) && + !cap_raised(profile->caps.audit, cap))) + return 0; + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + } else if (KILL_MODE(profile) || + cap_raised(profile->caps.kill, cap)) { + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + } else if (cap_raised(profile->caps.quiet, cap) && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) { + /* quiet auditing */ + return error; + } + + /* Do simple duplicate message elimination */ + ent = &get_cpu_var(audit_cache); + if (profile == ent->profile && cap_raised(ent->caps, cap)) { + put_cpu_var(audit_cache); + if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + return complain_error(error); + return error; + } else { + aa_put_profile(ent->profile); + ent->profile = aa_get_profile(profile); + cap_raise(ent->caps, cap); + } + put_cpu_var(audit_cache); + + return aa_audit(type, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb); +} + +/** + * profile_capable - test if profile allows use of capability @cap + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) + * @cap: capability to test if allowed + * + * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM + */ +static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap) +{ + return cap_raised(profile->caps.allow, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; +} + +/** + * aa_capable - test permission to use capability + * @task: task doing capability test against (NOT NULL) + * @profile: profile confining @task (NOT NULL) + * @cap: capability to be tested + * @audit: whether an audit record should be generated + * + * Look up capability in profile capability set. + * + * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. + */ +int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, + int audit) +{ + int error = profile_capable(profile, cap); + + if (!audit) { + if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + return complain_error(error); + return error; + } + + return audit_caps(profile, task, cap, error); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8a9b5027c813 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/context.c @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security + * contexts. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * + * AppArmor sets confinement on every task, via the the aa_task_cxt and + * the aa_task_cxt.profile, both of which are required and are not allowed + * to be NULL. The aa_task_cxt is not reference counted and is unique + * to each cred (which is reference count). The profile pointed to by + * the task_cxt is reference counted. + * + * TODO + * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old + * cred or task context but instead creates a new one. Ideally the task + * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified. + * + */ + +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +/** + * aa_alloc_task_context - allocate a new task_cxt + * @flags: gfp flags for allocation + * + * Returns: allocated buffer or NULL on failure + */ +struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags) +{ + return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_cxt), flags); +} + +/** + * aa_free_task_context - free a task_cxt + * @cxt: task_cxt to free (MAYBE NULL) + */ +void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt) +{ + if (cxt) { + aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); + aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); + aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); + + kzfree(cxt); + } +} + +/** + * aa_dup_task_context - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts + * @new: a blank task context (NOT NULL) + * @old: the task context to copy (NOT NULL) + */ +void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old) +{ + *new = *old; + aa_get_profile(new->profile); + aa_get_profile(new->previous); + aa_get_profile(new->onexec); +} + +/** + * aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles + * @profile: new profile (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: 0 or error on failure + */ +int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security; + struct cred *new; + BUG_ON(!profile); + + if (cxt->profile == profile) + return 0; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + cxt = new->security; + if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) { + /* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace + * clear out context state + */ + aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); + aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); + cxt->previous = NULL; + cxt->onexec = NULL; + cxt->token = 0; + } + /* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it + * is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby is the reference keeping + * @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before dropping + * the reference on cxt->profile */ + aa_get_profile(profile); + aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); + cxt->profile = profile; + + commit_creds(new); + return 0; +} + +/** + * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec + * @profile: system profile to set at exec (MAYBE NULL to clear value) + * + * Returns: 0 or error on failure + */ +int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; + struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + cxt = new->security; + aa_get_profile(profile); + aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); + cxt->onexec = profile; + + commit_creds(new); + return 0; +} + +/** + * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat + * @profile: profile to set as the current hat (NOT NULL) + * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat + * + * Do switch of tasks hat. If the task is currently in a hat + * validate the token to match. + * + * Returns: 0 or error on failure + */ +int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token) +{ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; + struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + BUG_ON(!profile); + + cxt = new->security; + if (!cxt->previous) { + /* transfer refcount */ + cxt->previous = cxt->profile; + cxt->token = token; + } else if (cxt->token == token) { + aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); + } else { + /* previous_profile && cxt->token != token */ + abort_creds(new); + return -EACCES; + } + cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(profile)); + /* clear exec on switching context */ + aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); + cxt->onexec = NULL; + + commit_creds(new); + return 0; +} + +/** + * aa_restore_previous_profile - exit from hat context restoring the profile + * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context + * + * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous profile. The token + * must match the stored token value. + * + * Returns: 0 or error of failure + */ +int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token) +{ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; + struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + cxt = new->security; + if (cxt->token != token) { + abort_creds(new); + return -EACCES; + } + /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */ + if (!cxt->previous) { + abort_creds(new); + return 0; + } + + aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); + cxt->profile = aa_newest_version(cxt->previous); + BUG_ON(!cxt->profile); + if (unlikely(cxt->profile != cxt->previous)) { + aa_get_profile(cxt->profile); + aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); + } + /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */ + cxt->previous = NULL; + cxt->token = 0; + aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); + cxt->onexec = NULL; + + commit_creds(new); + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c825c6e0b636 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -0,0 +1,823 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor policy attachment and domain transitions + * + * Copyright (C) 2002-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/fdtable.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/tracehook.h> +#include <linux/personality.h> + +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/apparmorfs.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/domain.h" +#include "include/file.h" +#include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/match.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +/** + * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table + * @domain: the domain table to free (MAYBE NULL) + */ +void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain) +{ + int i; + if (domain) { + if (!domain->table) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++) + kzfree(domain->table[i]); + kzfree(domain->table); + domain->table = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task + * @task: task we want to change profile of (NOT NULL) + * @to_profile: profile to change to (NOT NULL) + * + * Check if the task is ptraced and if so if the tracing task is allowed + * to trace the new domain + * + * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed + */ +static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task, + struct aa_profile *to_profile) +{ + struct task_struct *tracer; + const struct cred *cred = NULL; + struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL; + int error = 0; + + rcu_read_lock(); + tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(task); + if (tracer) { + /* released below */ + cred = get_task_cred(tracer); + tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* not ptraced */ + if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp)) + goto out; + + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracerp, to_profile, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); + +out: + if (cred) + put_cred(cred); + + return error; +} + +/** + * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile + * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL) + * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL) + * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL) + * @request: requested perms + * @start: state to start matching in + * + * Returns: permission set + */ +static struct file_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_namespace *ns, + const char *name, u32 request, + unsigned int start) +{ + struct file_perms perms; + struct path_cond cond = { }; + unsigned int state; + + if (unconfined(profile)) { + perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC; + perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0; + return perms; + } else if (!profile->file.dfa) { + return nullperms; + } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) { + /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */ + aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms); + if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request) + return perms; + } + + /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); + aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); + + return perms; +} + +/** + * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match + * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) + * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) + * + * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching + * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses + * expressions to match, and matching expressions with the greatest + * xmatch_len are preferred. + * + * Requires: @head not be shared or have appropriate locks held + * + * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found + */ +static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, + struct list_head *head) +{ + int len = 0; + struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL; + + list_for_each_entry(profile, head, base.list) { + if (profile->flags & PFLAG_NULL) + continue; + if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) { + unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, + DFA_START, name); + u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); + /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ + if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { + candidate = profile; + len = profile->xmatch_len; + } + } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) + /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */ + return profile; + } + + return candidate; +} + +/** + * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes + * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) + * @list: list to search (NOT NULL) + * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found + */ +static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_namespace *ns, + struct list_head *list, const char *name) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + + read_lock(&ns->lock); + profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list)); + read_unlock(&ns->lock); + + return profile; +} + +/** + * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names + * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL) + * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL) + * + * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the + * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a : + * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and + * isn't re-split on every lookup. + * + * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace + * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results + * in the following possible encodings: + * profile_name\0 + * :ns_name\0profile_name\0 + * :ns_name\0\0 + * + * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table + * + * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL + */ +static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name) +{ + const char *name; + + if (fqname[0] == ':') { + /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators + * in the string. They are verified at load time by + * by unpack_trans_table + */ + *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */ + name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1; + if (!*name) + name = NULL; + } else { + *ns_name = NULL; + name = fqname; + } + + return name; +} + +static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) +{ + return NULL; +} + +/** + * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table + * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) + * @xindex: index into x transition table + * + * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) + */ +static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) +{ + struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; + struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; + u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; + int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; + const char *name; + + /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */ + for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name; + name = next_name(xtype, name)) { + struct aa_namespace *new_ns; + const char *xname = NULL; + + new_ns = NULL; + if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) { + /* release by caller */ + new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name); + continue; + } else if (*name == ':') { + /* switching namespace */ + const char *ns_name; + xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name); + if (!xname) + /* no name so use profile name */ + xname = profile->base.hname; + if (*ns_name == '@') { + /* TODO: variable support */ + ; + } + /* released below */ + new_ns = aa_find_namespace(ns, ns_name); + if (!new_ns) + continue; + } else if (*name == '@') { + /* TODO: variable support */ + continue; + } else { + /* basic namespace lookup */ + xname = name; + } + + /* released by caller */ + new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname); + aa_put_namespace(new_ns); + } + + /* released by caller */ + return new_profile; +} + +/** + * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex + * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) + * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL) + * @xindex: index into x transition table + * + * find profile for a transition index + * + * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available + */ +static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile, + const char *name, u32 xindex) +{ + struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; + struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; + u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; + + switch (xtype) { + case AA_X_NONE: + /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */ + return NULL; + case AA_X_NAME: + if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) + /* released by caller */ + new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, + name); + else + /* released by caller */ + new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, + name); + break; + case AA_X_TABLE: + /* released by caller */ + new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex); + break; + } + + /* released by caller */ + return new_profile; +} + +/** + * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct + * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %0 or error on failure + */ +int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; + struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL; + struct aa_namespace *ns; + char *buffer = NULL; + unsigned int state; + struct file_perms perms = {}; + struct path_cond cond = { + bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode + }; + const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL; + int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); + if (error) + return error; + + if (bprm->cred_prepared) + return 0; + + cxt = bprm->cred->security; + BUG_ON(!cxt); + + profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)); + /* + * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement + * can change the namespace + */ + ns = profile->ns; + state = profile->file.start; + + /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */ + error = aa_get_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer, + &name); + if (error) { + if (profile->flags & + (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED)) + error = 0; + info = "Exec failed name resolution"; + name = bprm->filename; + goto audit; + } + + /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other + * x transitions. + */ + if (unconfined(profile)) { + /* unconfined task */ + if (cxt->onexec) + /* change_profile on exec already been granted */ + new_profile = aa_get_profile(cxt->onexec); + else + new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name); + if (!new_profile) + goto cleanup; + goto apply; + } + + /* find exec permissions for name */ + state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); + if (cxt->onexec) { + struct file_perms cp; + info = "change_profile onexec"; + if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) + goto audit; + + /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec. + * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing + * exec\0change_profile + */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state); + cp = change_profile_perms(profile, cxt->onexec->ns, name, + AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state); + + if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) + goto audit; + new_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec)); + goto apply; + } + + if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) { + /* exec permission determine how to transition */ + new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex); + if (!new_profile) { + if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) { + /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do + * use the newest version, which was picked + * up above when getting profile + */ + info = "ix fallback"; + new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile); + goto x_clear; + } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) { + new_profile = aa_get_profile(ns->unconfined); + info = "ux fallback"; + } else { + error = -ENOENT; + info = "profile not found"; + } + } + } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { + /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */ + new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0); + if (!new_profile) { + error = -ENOMEM; + info = "could not create null profile"; + } else { + error = -EACCES; + target = new_profile->base.hname; + } + perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE; + } else + /* fail exec */ + error = -EACCES; + + if (!new_profile) + goto audit; + + if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { + /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */ + ; + } + + if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, new_profile); + if (error) { + aa_put_profile(new_profile); + goto audit; + } + } + + /* Determine if secure exec is needed. + * Can be at this point for the following reasons: + * 1. unconfined switching to confined + * 2. confined switching to different confinement + * 3. confined switching to unconfined + * + * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec + * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec") + * + * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission + * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec + */ + if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { + AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n", + name, new_profile->base.hname); + bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED; + } +apply: + target = new_profile->base.hname; + /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */ + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + +x_clear: + aa_put_profile(cxt->profile); + /* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */ + cxt->profile = new_profile; + + /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */ + aa_put_profile(cxt->previous); + aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec); + cxt->previous = NULL; + cxt->onexec = NULL; + cxt->token = 0; + +audit: + error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, + name, target, cond.uid, info, error); + +cleanup: + aa_put_profile(profile); + kfree(buffer); + + return error; +} + +/** + * apparmor_bprm_secureexec - determine if secureexec is needed + * @bprm: binprm for exec (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %1 if secureexec is needed else %0 + */ +int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm); + + /* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds + * and stored in bprm->unsafe. + */ + if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)) + ret = 1; + + return ret; +} + +/** + * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds + * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) + */ +void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); + struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security; + + /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */ + if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) || + (unconfined(new_cxt->profile))) + return; + + current->pdeath_signal = 0; + + /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new profile */ + __aa_transition_rlimits(profile, new_cxt->profile); +} + +/** + * apparmor_bprm_commited_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed + * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) + */ +void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */ + return; +} + +/* + * Functions for self directed profile change + */ + +/** + * new_compound_name - create an hname with @n2 appended to @n1 + * @n1: base of hname (NOT NULL) + * @n2: name to append (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: new name or NULL on error + */ +static char *new_compound_name(const char *n1, const char *n2) +{ + char *name = kmalloc(strlen(n1) + strlen(n2) + 3, GFP_KERNEL); + if (name) + sprintf(name, "%s//%s", n1, n2); + return name; +} + +/** + * aa_change_hat - change hat to/from subprofile + * @hats: vector of hat names to try changing into (MAYBE NULL if @count == 0) + * @count: number of hat names in @hats + * @token: magic value to validate the hat change + * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test + * + * Change to the first profile specified in @hats that exists, and store + * the @hat_magic in the current task context. If the count == 0 and the + * @token matches that stored in the current task context, return to the + * top level profile. + * + * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise. + */ +int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest) +{ + const struct cred *cred; + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; + struct aa_profile *profile, *previous_profile, *hat = NULL; + char *name = NULL; + int i; + struct file_perms perms = {}; + const char *target = NULL, *info = NULL; + int error = 0; + + /* released below */ + cred = get_current_cred(); + cxt = cred->security; + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + previous_profile = cxt->previous; + + if (unconfined(profile)) { + info = "unconfined"; + error = -EPERM; + goto audit; + } + + if (count) { + /* attempting to change into a new hat or switch to a sibling */ + struct aa_profile *root; + root = PROFILE_IS_HAT(profile) ? profile->parent : profile; + + /* find first matching hat */ + for (i = 0; i < count && !hat; i++) + /* released below */ + hat = aa_find_child(root, hats[i]); + if (!hat) { + if (!COMPLAIN_MODE(root) || permtest) { + if (list_empty(&root->base.profiles)) + error = -ECHILD; + else + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + + /* + * In complain mode and failed to match any hats. + * Audit the failure is based off of the first hat + * supplied. This is done due how userspace + * interacts with change_hat. + * + * TODO: Add logging of all failed hats + */ + + /* freed below */ + name = new_compound_name(root->base.hname, hats[0]); + target = name; + /* released below */ + hat = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 1); + if (!hat) { + info = "failed null profile create"; + error = -ENOMEM; + goto audit; + } + } else { + target = hat->base.hname; + if (!PROFILE_IS_HAT(hat)) { + info = "target not hat"; + error = -EPERM; + goto audit; + } + } + + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, hat); + if (error) { + info = "ptraced"; + error = -EPERM; + goto audit; + } + + if (!permtest) { + error = aa_set_current_hat(hat, token); + if (error == -EACCES) + /* kill task in case of brute force attacks */ + perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT; + else if (name && !error) + /* reset error for learning of new hats */ + error = -ENOENT; + } + } else if (previous_profile) { + /* Return to saved profile. Kill task if restore fails + * to avoid brute force attacks + */ + target = previous_profile->base.hname; + error = aa_restore_previous_profile(token); + perms.kill = AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT; + } else + /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */ + goto out; + +audit: + if (!permtest) + error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, + OP_CHANGE_HAT, AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT, NULL, + target, 0, info, error); + +out: + aa_put_profile(hat); + kfree(name); + put_cred(cred); + + return error; +} + +/** + * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition + * @ns_name: name of the profile namespace to change to (MAYBE NULL) + * @hname: name of profile to change to (MAYBE NULL) + * @onexec: whether this transition is to take place immediately or at exec + * @permtest: true if this is just a permission test + * + * Change to new profile @name. Unlike with hats, there is no way + * to change back. If @name isn't specified the current profile name is + * used. + * If @onexec then the transition is delayed until + * the next exec. + * + * Returns %0 on success, error otherwise. + */ +int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec, + bool permtest) +{ + const struct cred *cred; + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; + struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL; + struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL; + struct file_perms perms = {}; + const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; + int op, error = 0; + u32 request; + + if (!hname && !ns_name) + return -EINVAL; + + if (onexec) { + request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC; + op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC; + } else { + request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE; + op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE; + } + + cred = get_current_cred(); + cxt = cred->security; + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + + if (ns_name) { + /* released below */ + ns = aa_find_namespace(profile->ns, ns_name); + if (!ns) { + /* we don't create new namespace in complain mode */ + name = ns_name; + info = "namespace not found"; + error = -ENOENT; + goto audit; + } + } else + /* released below */ + ns = aa_get_namespace(profile->ns); + + /* if the name was not specified, use the name of the current profile */ + if (!hname) { + if (unconfined(profile)) + hname = ns->unconfined->base.hname; + else + hname = profile->base.hname; + } + + perms = change_profile_perms(profile, ns, hname, request, + profile->file.start); + if (!(perms.allow & request)) { + error = -EACCES; + goto audit; + } + + /* released below */ + target = aa_lookup_profile(ns, hname); + if (!target) { + info = "profile not found"; + error = -ENOENT; + if (permtest || !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + goto audit; + /* released below */ + target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, 0); + if (!target) { + info = "failed null profile create"; + error = -ENOMEM; + goto audit; + } + } + + /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */ + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(current, target); + if (error) { + info = "ptrace prevents transition"; + goto audit; + } + + if (permtest) + goto audit; + + if (onexec) + error = aa_set_current_onexec(target); + else + error = aa_replace_current_profile(target); + +audit: + if (!permtest) + error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, + name, hname, 0, info, error); + + aa_put_namespace(ns); + aa_put_profile(target); + put_cred(cred); + + return error; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7312db741219 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -0,0 +1,457 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/file.h" +#include "include/match.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +struct file_perms nullperms; + + +/** + * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string + * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL) + * @mask: permission mask to convert + */ +static void audit_file_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) +{ + char str[10]; + + char *m = str; + + if (mask & AA_EXEC_MMAP) + *m++ = 'm'; + if (mask & (MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ)) + *m++ = 'r'; + if (mask & (MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CHMOD | + AA_MAY_CHOWN)) + *m++ = 'w'; + else if (mask & MAY_APPEND) + *m++ = 'a'; + if (mask & AA_MAY_CREATE) + *m++ = 'c'; + if (mask & AA_MAY_DELETE) + *m++ = 'd'; + if (mask & AA_MAY_LINK) + *m++ = 'l'; + if (mask & AA_MAY_LOCK) + *m++ = 'k'; + if (mask & MAY_EXEC) + *m++ = 'x'; + *m = '\0'; + + audit_log_string(ab, str); +} + +/** + * file_audit_cb - call back for file specific audit fields + * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) + */ +static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); + + if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); + audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.request); + } + if (sa->aad.fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); + audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.denied); + } + if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid); + audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad.fs.ouid); + } + + if (sa->aad.fs.target) { + audit_log_format(ab, " target="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.fs.target); + } +} + +/** + * aa_audit_file - handle the auditing of file operations + * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL) + * @gfp: allocation flags + * @op: operation being mediated + * @request: permissions requested + * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL) + * @target: name of target (MAYBE NULL) + * @ouid: object uid + * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL) + * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code + * + * Returns: %0 or error on failure + */ +int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, + gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, + const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error) +{ + int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; + struct common_audit_data sa; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad.op = op, + sa.aad.fs.request = request; + sa.aad.name = name; + sa.aad.fs.target = target; + sa.aad.fs.ouid = ouid; + sa.aad.info = info; + sa.aad.error = error; + + if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) { + u32 mask = perms->audit; + + if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) + mask = 0xffff; + + /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ + sa.aad.fs.request &= mask; + + if (likely(!sa.aad.fs.request)) + return 0; + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + } else { + /* only report permissions that were denied */ + sa.aad.fs.request = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow; + + if (sa.aad.fs.request & perms->kill) + type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + + /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ + if ((sa.aad.fs.request & perms->quiet) && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) + sa.aad.fs.request &= ~perms->quiet; + + if (!sa.aad.fs.request) + return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error; + } + + sa.aad.fs.denied = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow; + return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb); +} + +/** + * map_old_perms - map old file perms layout to the new layout + * @old: permission set in old mapping + * + * Returns: new permission mapping + */ +static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old) +{ + u32 new = old & 0xf; + if (old & MAY_READ) + new |= AA_MAY_META_READ; + if (old & MAY_WRITE) + new |= AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE | + AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN; + if (old & 0x10) + new |= AA_MAY_LINK; + /* the old mapping lock and link_subset flags where overlaid + * and use was determined by part of a pair that they were in + */ + if (old & 0x20) + new |= AA_MAY_LOCK | AA_LINK_SUBSET; + if (old & 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */ + new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; + + new |= AA_MAY_META_READ; + + return new; +} + +/** + * compute_perms - convert dfa compressed perms to internal perms + * @dfa: dfa to compute perms for (NOT NULL) + * @state: state in dfa + * @cond: conditions to consider (NOT NULL) + * + * TODO: convert from dfa + state to permission entry, do computation conversion + * at load time. + * + * Returns: computed permission set + */ +static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, + struct path_cond *cond) +{ + struct file_perms perms; + + /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format + * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format + * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be + * done at profile load + */ + perms.kill = 0; + + if (current_fsuid() == cond->uid) { + perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state)); + perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_user_audit(dfa, state)); + perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state)); + perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state); + } else { + perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_other_allow(dfa, state)); + perms.audit = map_old_perms(dfa_other_audit(dfa, state)); + perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state)); + perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state); + } + + /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */ + if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000) + perms.allow |= AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE; + + return perms; +} + +/** + * aa_str_perms - find permission that match @name + * @dfa: to match against (MAYBE NULL) + * @state: state to start matching in + * @name: string to match against dfa (NOT NULL) + * @cond: conditions to consider for permission set computation (NOT NULL) + * @perms: Returns - the permissions found when matching @name + * + * Returns: the final state in @dfa when beginning @start and walking @name + */ +unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *name, struct path_cond *cond, + struct file_perms *perms) +{ + unsigned int state; + if (!dfa) { + *perms = nullperms; + return DFA_NOMATCH; + } + + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, name); + *perms = compute_perms(dfa, state, cond); + + return state; +} + +/** + * is_deleted - test if a file has been completely unlinked + * @dentry: dentry of file to test for deletion (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %1 if deleted else %0 + */ +static inline bool is_deleted(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (d_unlinked(dentry) && dentry->d_inode->i_nlink == 0) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/** + * aa_path_perm - do permissions check & audit for @path + * @op: operation being checked + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @path: path to check permissions of (NOT NULL) + * @flags: any additional path flags beyond what the profile specifies + * @request: requested permissions + * @cond: conditional info for this request (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %0 else error if access denied or other error + */ +int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, + int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond) +{ + char *buffer = NULL; + struct file_perms perms = {}; + const char *name, *info = NULL; + int error; + + flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0); + error = aa_get_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name); + if (error) { + if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) { + /* Access to open files that are deleted are + * give a pass (implicit delegation) + */ + error = 0; + perms.allow = request; + } else if (error == -ENOENT) + info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry"; + else if (error == -ESTALE) + info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path"; + else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG) + info = "Failed name lookup - name too long"; + else + info = "Failed name lookup"; + } else { + aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond, + &perms); + if (request & ~perms.allow) + error = -EACCES; + } + error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, op, request, name, + NULL, cond->uid, info, error); + kfree(buffer); + + return error; +} + +/** + * xindex_is_subset - helper for aa_path_link + * @link: link permission set + * @target: target permission set + * + * test target x permissions are equal OR a subset of link x permissions + * this is done as part of the subset test, where a hardlink must have + * a subset of permissions that the target has. + * + * Returns: %1 if subset else %0 + */ +static inline bool xindex_is_subset(u32 link, u32 target) +{ + if (((link & ~AA_X_UNSAFE) != (target & ~AA_X_UNSAFE)) || + ((link & AA_X_UNSAFE) && !(target & AA_X_UNSAFE))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/** + * aa_path_link - Handle hard link permission check + * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @old_dentry: the target dentry (NOT NULL) + * @new_dir: directory the new link will be created in (NOT NULL) + * @new_dentry: the link being created (NOT NULL) + * + * Handle the permission test for a link & target pair. Permission + * is encoded as a pair where the link permission is determined + * first, and if allowed, the target is tested. The target test + * is done from the point of the link match (not start of DFA) + * making the target permission dependent on the link permission match. + * + * The subset test if required forces that permissions granted + * on link are a subset of the permission granted to target. + * + * Returns: %0 if allowed else error + */ +int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + struct path link = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; + struct path target = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; + struct path_cond cond = { + old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode + }; + char *buffer = NULL, *buffer2 = NULL; + const char *lname, *tname = NULL, *info = NULL; + struct file_perms lperms, perms; + u32 request = AA_MAY_LINK; + unsigned int state; + int error; + + lperms = nullperms; + + /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */ + error = aa_get_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname); + if (error) + goto audit; + + /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */ + error = aa_get_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname); + if (error) + goto audit; + + error = -EACCES; + /* aa_str_perms - handles the case of the dfa being NULL */ + state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, lname, + &cond, &lperms); + + if (!(lperms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) + goto audit; + + /* test to see if target can be paired with link */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state); + aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, tname, &cond, &perms); + + /* force audit/quiet masks for link are stored in the second entry + * in the link pair. + */ + lperms.audit = perms.audit; + lperms.quiet = perms.quiet; + lperms.kill = perms.kill; + + if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_LINK)) { + info = "target restricted"; + goto audit; + } + + /* done if link subset test is not required */ + if (!(perms.allow & AA_LINK_SUBSET)) + goto done_tests; + + /* Do link perm subset test requiring allowed permission on link are a + * subset of the allowed permissions on target. + */ + aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, tname, &cond, + &perms); + + /* AA_MAY_LINK is not considered in the subset test */ + request = lperms.allow & ~AA_MAY_LINK; + lperms.allow &= perms.allow | AA_MAY_LINK; + + request |= AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK & (lperms.allow & ~perms.allow); + if (request & ~lperms.allow) { + goto audit; + } else if ((lperms.allow & MAY_EXEC) && + !xindex_is_subset(lperms.xindex, perms.xindex)) { + lperms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; + request |= MAY_EXEC; + info = "link not subset of target"; + goto audit; + } + +done_tests: + error = 0; + +audit: + error = aa_audit_file(profile, &lperms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_LINK, request, + lname, tname, cond.uid, info, error); + kfree(buffer); + kfree(buffer2); + + return error; +} + +/** + * aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file + * @op: operation being checked + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @file: file to revalidate access permissions on (NOT NULL) + * @request: requested permissions + * + * Returns: %0 if access allowed else error + */ +int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file, + u32 request) +{ + struct path_cond cond = { + .uid = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + .mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode + }; + + return aa_path_perm(op, profile, &file->f_path, PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED, + request, &cond); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..38ccaea08204 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor basic global and lib definitions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __APPARMOR_H +#define __APPARMOR_H + +#include <linux/fs.h> + +#include "match.h" + +/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ +extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; +extern int aa_g_audit_header; +extern int aa_g_debug; +extern int aa_g_lock_policy; +extern int aa_g_logsyscall; +extern int aa_g_paranoid_load; +extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max; + +/* + * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl + * which is not related to profile accesses. + */ + +#define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...) \ + do { \ + if (aa_g_debug && printk_ratelimit()) \ + printk(KERN_DEBUG "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \ + } while (0) + +#define AA_ERROR(fmt, args...) \ + do { \ + if (printk_ratelimit()) \ + printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor: " fmt, ##args); \ + } while (0) + +/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ +extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata; + +/* fn's in lib */ +char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name); +void aa_info_message(const char *str); +void *kvmalloc(size_t size); +void kvfree(void *buffer); + + +/** + * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring + * @str: a null terminated string + * @sub: a substring, not necessarily null terminated + * @len: length of @sub to compare + * + * The @str string must be full consumed for this to be considered a match + */ +static inline bool aa_strneq(const char *str, const char *sub, int len) +{ + return !strncmp(str, sub, len) && !str[len]; +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_null_transition - step to next state after null character + * @dfa: the dfa to match against + * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in + * + * aa_dfa_null_transition transitions to the next state after a null + * character which is not used in standard matching and is only + * used to separate pairs. + */ +static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, + unsigned int start) +{ + /* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */ + return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, "", 1); +} + +static inline bool mediated_filesystem(struct inode *inode) +{ + return !(inode->i_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER); +} + +#endif /* __APPARMOR_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cb1e93a114d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor filesystem definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H +#define __AA_APPARMORFS_H + +extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void); + +#endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1951786d32e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor auditing function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_AUDIT_H +#define __AA_AUDIT_H + +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/lsm_audit.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> + +#include "file.h" + +struct aa_profile; + +extern const char *audit_mode_names[]; +#define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5 + +#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO 0 /* auto choose audit message type */ + +enum audit_mode { + AUDIT_NORMAL, /* follow normal auditing of accesses */ + AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED, /* quiet all denied access messages */ + AUDIT_QUIET, /* quiet all messages */ + AUDIT_NOQUIET, /* do not quiet audit messages */ + AUDIT_ALL /* audit all accesses */ +}; + +enum audit_type { + AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT, + AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED, + AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, + AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT, + AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, + AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR, + AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL +}; + +extern const char *op_table[]; +enum aa_ops { + OP_NULL, + + OP_SYSCTL, + OP_CAPABLE, + + OP_UNLINK, + OP_MKDIR, + OP_RMDIR, + OP_MKNOD, + OP_TRUNC, + OP_LINK, + OP_SYMLINK, + OP_RENAME_SRC, + OP_RENAME_DEST, + OP_CHMOD, + OP_CHOWN, + OP_GETATTR, + OP_OPEN, + + OP_FPERM, + OP_FLOCK, + OP_FMMAP, + OP_FMPROT, + + OP_CREATE, + OP_POST_CREATE, + OP_BIND, + OP_CONNECT, + OP_LISTEN, + OP_ACCEPT, + OP_SENDMSG, + OP_RECVMSG, + OP_GETSOCKNAME, + OP_GETPEERNAME, + OP_GETSOCKOPT, + OP_SETSOCKOPT, + OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, + + OP_PTRACE, + + OP_EXEC, + OP_CHANGE_HAT, + OP_CHANGE_PROFILE, + OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC, + + OP_SETPROCATTR, + OP_SETRLIMIT, + + OP_PROF_REPL, + OP_PROF_LOAD, + OP_PROF_RM, +}; + + +/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data portion of common_audit_data */ +#define aad apparmor_audit_data + +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)); +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, + struct common_audit_data *sa, + void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)); + +static inline int complain_error(int error) +{ + if (error == -EPERM || error == -EACCES) + return 0; + return error; +} + +#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/capability.h b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c24d2959ea02 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/capability.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor capability mediation definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_CAPABILITY_H +#define __AA_CAPABILITY_H + +#include <linux/sched.h> + +struct aa_profile; + +/* aa_caps - confinement data for capabilities + * @allowed: capabilities mask + * @audit: caps that are to be audited + * @quiet: caps that should not be audited + * @kill: caps that when requested will result in the task being killed + * @extended: caps that are subject finer grained mediation + */ +struct aa_caps { + kernel_cap_t allow; + kernel_cap_t audit; + kernel_cap_t quiet; + kernel_cap_t kill; + kernel_cap_t extended; +}; + +int aa_capable(struct task_struct *task, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, + int audit); + +static inline void aa_free_cap_rules(struct aa_caps *caps) +{ + /* NOP */ +} + +#endif /* __AA_CAPBILITY_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a9cbee4d9e48 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H +#define __AA_CONTEXT_H + +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> + +#include "policy.h" + +/* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in + * @perms: the permission the file was opened with + * + * The file_cxt could currently be directly stored in file->f_security + * as the profile reference is now stored in the f_cred. However the + * cxt struct will expand in the future so we keep the struct. + */ +struct aa_file_cxt { + u16 allow; +}; + +/** + * aa_alloc_file_context - allocate file_cxt + * @gfp: gfp flags for allocation + * + * Returns: file_cxt or NULL on failure + */ +static inline struct aa_file_cxt *aa_alloc_file_context(gfp_t gfp) +{ + return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_cxt), gfp); +} + +/** + * aa_free_file_context - free a file_cxt + * @cxt: file_cxt to free (MAYBE_NULL) + */ +static inline void aa_free_file_context(struct aa_file_cxt *cxt) +{ + if (cxt) + kzfree(cxt); +} + +/** + * struct aa_task_cxt - primary label for confined tasks + * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL) + * @exec: profile to transition to on next exec (MAYBE NULL) + * @previous: profile the task may return to (MAYBE NULL) + * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile + * + * Contains the task's current profile (which could change due to + * change_hat). Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat. + * + * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts + */ +struct aa_task_cxt { + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_profile *onexec; + struct aa_profile *previous; + u64 token; +}; + +struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags); +void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt); +void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, + const struct aa_task_cxt *old); +int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile); +int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile); +int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token); +int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie); + +/** + * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement + * @task: task to check confinement of (NOT NULL) + * + * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section + */ +static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security; + + BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile); + if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/** + * aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles + * @cred: cred to obtain profiles from (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: confining profile + * + * does NOT increment reference count + */ +static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred) +{ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security; + BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile); + return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile); +} + +/** + * __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile + * + * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL) + * + * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version + * of the profile so it is safe to call when inside of locks. + */ +static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void) +{ + return aa_cred_profile(current_cred()); +} + +/** + * aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile and do updates + * + * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL) + * + * This fn will update the tasks cred structure if the profile has been + * replaced. Not safe to call inside locks + */ +static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void) +{ + const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security; + struct aa_profile *profile; + BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile); + + profile = aa_newest_version(cxt->profile); + /* + * Whether or not replacement succeeds, use newest profile so + * there is no need to update it after replacement. + */ + if (unlikely((cxt->profile != profile))) + aa_replace_current_profile(profile); + + return profile; +} + +#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..de04464f0a3f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor security domain transition function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/binfmts.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H +#define __AA_DOMAIN_H + +struct aa_domain { + int size; + char **table; +}; + +int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); + +void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain); +int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest); +int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *name, bool onexec, + bool permtest); + +#endif /* __AA_DOMAIN_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..be36feabb16a --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_FILE_H +#define __AA_FILE_H + +#include <linux/path.h> + +#include "domain.h" +#include "match.h" + +struct aa_profile; + +/* + * We use MAY_EXEC, MAY_WRITE, MAY_READ, MAY_APPEND and the following flags + * for profile permissions + */ +#define AA_MAY_CREATE 0x0010 +#define AA_MAY_DELETE 0x0020 +#define AA_MAY_META_WRITE 0x0040 +#define AA_MAY_META_READ 0x0080 + +#define AA_MAY_CHMOD 0x0100 +#define AA_MAY_CHOWN 0x0200 +#define AA_MAY_LOCK 0x0400 +#define AA_EXEC_MMAP 0x0800 + +#define AA_MAY_LINK 0x1000 +#define AA_LINK_SUBSET AA_MAY_LOCK /* overlaid */ +#define AA_MAY_ONEXEC 0x40000000 /* exec allows onexec */ +#define AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE 0x80000000 +#define AA_MAY_CHANGEHAT 0x80000000 /* ctrl auditing only */ + +#define AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND |\ + AA_MAY_CREATE | AA_MAY_DELETE | \ + AA_MAY_META_READ | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | \ + AA_MAY_CHMOD | AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_LOCK | \ + AA_EXEC_MMAP | AA_MAY_LINK) + +/* + * The xindex is broken into 3 parts + * - index - an index into either the exec name table or the variable table + * - exec type - which determines how the executable name and index are used + * - flags - which modify how the destination name is applied + */ +#define AA_X_INDEX_MASK 0x03ff + +#define AA_X_TYPE_MASK 0x0c00 +#define AA_X_TYPE_SHIFT 10 +#define AA_X_NONE 0x0000 +#define AA_X_NAME 0x0400 /* use executable name px */ +#define AA_X_TABLE 0x0800 /* use a specified name ->n# */ + +#define AA_X_UNSAFE 0x1000 +#define AA_X_CHILD 0x2000 /* make >AA_X_NONE apply to children */ +#define AA_X_INHERIT 0x4000 +#define AA_X_UNCONFINED 0x8000 + +/* AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED - is passed in the bprm->unsafe field */ +#define AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED 0x8000 + +/* need to make conditional which ones are being set */ +struct path_cond { + uid_t uid; + umode_t mode; +}; + +/* struct file_perms - file permission + * @allow: mask of permissions that are allowed + * @audit: mask of permissions to force an audit message for + * @quiet: mask of permissions to quiet audit messages for + * @kill: mask of permissions that when matched will kill the task + * @xindex: exec transition index if @allow contains MAY_EXEC + * + * The @audit and @queit mask should be mutually exclusive. + */ +struct file_perms { + u32 allow; + u32 audit; + u32 quiet; + u32 kill; + u16 xindex; +}; + +extern struct file_perms nullperms; + +#define COMBINED_PERM_MASK(X) ((X).allow | (X).audit | (X).quiet | (X).kill) + +/* FIXME: split perms from dfa and match this to description + * also add delegation info. + */ +static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask) +{ + u16 old_index = (mask >> 10) & 0xf; + u16 index = 0; + + if (mask & 0x100) + index |= AA_X_UNSAFE; + if (mask & 0x200) + index |= AA_X_INHERIT; + if (mask & 0x80) + index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED; + + if (old_index == 1) { + index |= AA_X_UNCONFINED; + } else if (old_index == 2) { + index |= AA_X_NAME; + } else if (old_index == 3) { + index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD; + } else { + index |= AA_X_TABLE; + index |= old_index - 4; + } + + return index; +} + +/* + * map old dfa inline permissions to new format + */ +#define dfa_user_allow(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) | \ + ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000)) +#define dfa_user_audit(dfa, state) ((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) & 0x7f) +#define dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) & 0x7f) +#define dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state) \ + (dfa_map_xindex(ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x3fff)) + +#define dfa_other_allow(dfa, state) ((((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & \ + 0x7f) | \ + ((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state]) & 0x80000000)) +#define dfa_other_audit(dfa, state) (((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 14) & 0x7f) +#define dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state) \ + ((((ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[state]) >> 7) >> 14) & 0x7f) +#define dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state) \ + dfa_map_xindex((ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] >> 14) & 0x3fff) + +int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, + gfp_t gfp, int op, u32 request, const char *name, + const char *target, uid_t ouid, const char *info, int error); + +/** + * struct aa_file_rules - components used for file rule permissions + * @dfa: dfa to match path names and conditionals against + * @perms: permission table indexed by the matched state accept entry of @dfa + * @trans: transition table for indexed by named x transitions + * + * File permission are determined by matching a path against @dfa and then + * then using the value of the accept entry for the matching state as + * an index into @perms. If a named exec transition is required it is + * looked up in the transition table. + */ +struct aa_file_rules { + unsigned int start; + struct aa_dfa *dfa; + /* struct perms perms; */ + struct aa_domain trans; + /* TODO: add delegate table */ +}; + +unsigned int aa_str_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *name, struct path_cond *cond, + struct file_perms *perms); + +int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, + int flags, u32 request, struct path_cond *cond); + +int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry); + +int aa_file_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct file *file, + u32 request); + +static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules) +{ + aa_put_dfa(rules->dfa); + aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans); +} + +#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40)) + +/* from namei.c */ +#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x)) + +/** + * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions + * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions + * + * Returns: apparmor permission set for the file + */ +static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file) +{ + int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags); + u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode); + + if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE)) + perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND; + /* trunc implies write permission */ + if (flags & O_TRUNC) + perms |= MAY_WRITE; + if (flags & O_CREAT) + perms |= AA_MAY_CREATE; + + return perms; +} + +#endif /* __AA_FILE_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aeda0fbc8b2f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_IPC_H +#define __AA_IPC_H + +#include <linux/sched.h> + +struct aa_profile; + +int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer, + struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode); + +int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee, + unsigned int mode); + +#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..734a6d35112c --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_MATCH_H +#define __AA_MATCH_H + +#include <linux/workqueue.h> + +#define DFA_NOMATCH 0 +#define DFA_START 1 + +#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK 0xffffffff +#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK 0xffffffff + +/** + * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table + * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex + * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number + * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D insted of 0xF13C57B1 though, because + * the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used + * slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package). + */ + +#define YYTH_MAGIC 0x1B5E783D +#define YYTH_DEF_RECURSE 0x1 /* DEF Table is recursive */ + +struct table_set_header { + u32 th_magic; /* YYTH_MAGIC */ + u32 th_hsize; + u32 th_ssize; + u16 th_flags; + char th_version[]; +}; + +/* The YYTD_ID are one less than flex table mappings. The flex id + * has 1 subtracted at table load time, this allows us to directly use the + * ID's as indexes. + */ +#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT 0 +#define YYTD_ID_BASE 1 +#define YYTD_ID_CHK 2 +#define YYTD_ID_DEF 3 +#define YYTD_ID_EC 4 +#define YYTD_ID_META 5 +#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6 +#define YYTD_ID_NXT 7 +#define YYTD_ID_TSIZE 8 + +#define YYTD_DATA8 1 +#define YYTD_DATA16 2 +#define YYTD_DATA32 4 +#define YYTD_DATA64 8 + +/* Each ACCEPT2 table gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the + * first flags + */ +#define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f) +#define ACCEPT2_FLAGS(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS((X) >> YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2) +#define TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(X) ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) +#define TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(X) (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) << YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2) +#define DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES 0x1000 + +struct table_header { + u16 td_id; + u16 td_flags; + u32 td_hilen; + u32 td_lolen; + char td_data[]; +}; + +#define DEFAULT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_data)) +#define BASE_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_data)) +#define NEXT_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_data)) +#define CHECK_TABLE(DFA) ((u16 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_data)) +#define EQUIV_TABLE(DFA) ((u8 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_data)) +#define ACCEPT_TABLE(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_data)) +#define ACCEPT_TABLE2(DFA) ((u32 *)((DFA)->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_data)) + +struct aa_dfa { + struct kref count; + u16 flags; + struct table_header *tables[YYTD_ID_TSIZE]; +}; + +#define byte_to_byte(X) (X) + +#define UNPACK_ARRAY(TABLE, BLOB, LEN, TYPE, NTOHX) \ + do { \ + typeof(LEN) __i; \ + TYPE *__t = (TYPE *) TABLE; \ + TYPE *__b = (TYPE *) BLOB; \ + for (__i = 0; __i < LEN; __i++) { \ + __t[__i] = NTOHX(__b[__i]); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +static inline size_t table_size(size_t len, size_t el_size) +{ + return ALIGN(sizeof(struct table_header) + len * el_size, 8); +} + +struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags); +unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, int len); +unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str); +void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref); + +/** + * aa_put_dfa - put a dfa refcount + * @dfa: dfa to put refcount (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Requires: if @dfa != NULL that a valid refcount be held + */ +static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa) +{ + if (dfa) + kref_put(&dfa->count, aa_dfa_free_kref); +} + +#endif /* __AA_MATCH_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..27b327a7fae5 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor basic path manipulation function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_PATH_H +#define __AA_PATH_H + + +enum path_flags { + PATH_IS_DIR = 0x1, /* path is a directory */ + PATH_CONNECT_PATH = 0x4, /* connect disconnected paths to / */ + PATH_CHROOT_REL = 0x8, /* do path lookup relative to chroot */ + PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT = 0x10, /* connect paths that are at ns root */ + + PATH_DELEGATE_DELETED = 0x08000, /* delegate deleted files */ + PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate deleted paths */ +}; + +int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name); + +#endif /* __AA_PATH_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..aeda5cf56904 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -0,0 +1,305 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor policy definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_POLICY_H +#define __AA_POLICY_H + +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/socket.h> + +#include "apparmor.h" +#include "audit.h" +#include "capability.h" +#include "domain.h" +#include "file.h" +#include "resource.h" + +extern const char *profile_mode_names[]; +#define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3 + +#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) \ + ((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || \ + ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)) + +#define KILL_MODE(_profile) \ + ((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || \ + ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL)) + +#define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT) + +/* + * FIXME: currently need a clean way to replace and remove profiles as a + * set. It should be done at the namespace level. + * Either, with a set of profiles loaded at the namespace level or via + * a mark and remove marked interface. + */ +enum profile_mode { + APPARMOR_ENFORCE, /* enforce access rules */ + APPARMOR_COMPLAIN, /* allow and log access violations */ + APPARMOR_KILL, /* kill task on access violation */ +}; + +enum profile_flags { + PFLAG_HAT = 1, /* profile is a hat */ + PFLAG_UNCONFINED = 2, /* profile is an unconfined profile */ + PFLAG_NULL = 4, /* profile is null learning profile */ + PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR = 8, /* fallback to ix on name lookup fail */ + PFLAG_IMMUTABLE = 0x10, /* don't allow changes/replacement */ + PFLAG_USER_DEFINED = 0x20, /* user based profile - lower privs */ + PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF = 0x40, /* list doesn't keep profile ref */ + PFLAG_OLD_NULL_TRANS = 0x100, /* use // as the null transition */ + + /* These flags must correspond with PATH_flags */ + PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate instead delegate deleted */ +}; + +struct aa_profile; + +/* struct aa_policy - common part of both namespaces and profiles + * @name: name of the object + * @hname - The hierarchical name + * @count: reference count of the obj + * @list: list policy object is on + * @profiles: head of the profiles list contained in the object + */ +struct aa_policy { + char *name; + char *hname; + struct kref count; + struct list_head list; + struct list_head profiles; +}; + +/* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace + * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace + * @max_count: maximum number of profiles that can be in this namespace + * @size: current size of profiles + * @count: current count of profiles (includes null profiles) + */ +struct aa_ns_acct { + int max_size; + int max_count; + int size; + int count; +}; + +/* struct aa_namespace - namespace for a set of profiles + * @base: common policy + * @parent: parent of namespace + * @lock: lock for modifying the object + * @acct: accounting for the namespace + * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace + * @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace. + * + * An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine + * which profile to attach to a task. Profiles can not be shared between + * aa_namespaces and profile names within a namespace are guaranteed to be + * unique. When profiles in separate namespaces have the same name they + * are NOT considered to be equivalent. + * + * Namespaces are hierarchical and only namespaces and profiles below the + * current namespace are visible. + * + * Namespace names must be unique and can not contain the characters :/\0 + * + * FIXME TODO: add vserver support of namespaces (can it all be done in + * userspace?) + */ +struct aa_namespace { + struct aa_policy base; + struct aa_namespace *parent; + rwlock_t lock; + struct aa_ns_acct acct; + struct aa_profile *unconfined; + struct list_head sub_ns; +}; + +/* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data + * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...) + * @parent: parent of profile + * @ns: namespace the profile is in + * @replacedby: is set to the profile that replaced this profile + * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed + * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names + * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority + * @sid: the unique security id number of this profile + * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile + * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile + * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior + * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior + * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules + * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions + * @caps: capabilities for the profile + * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile + * + * The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data. Each profile + * has a name, and exists in a namespace. The @name and @exec_match are + * used to determine profile attachment against unconfined tasks. All other + * attachments are determined by profile X transition rules. + * + * The @replacedby field is write protected by the profile lock. Reads + * are assumed to be atomic, and are done without locking. + * + * Profiles have a hierarchy where hats and children profiles keep + * a reference to their parent. + * + * Profile names can not begin with a : and can not contain the \0 + * character. If a profile name begins with / it will be considered when + * determining profile attachment on "unconfined" tasks. + */ +struct aa_profile { + struct aa_policy base; + struct aa_profile *parent; + + struct aa_namespace *ns; + struct aa_profile *replacedby; + const char *rename; + + struct aa_dfa *xmatch; + int xmatch_len; + u32 sid; + enum audit_mode audit; + enum profile_mode mode; + u32 flags; + u32 path_flags; + int size; + + struct aa_file_rules file; + struct aa_caps caps; + struct aa_rlimit rlimits; +}; + +extern struct aa_namespace *root_ns; +extern enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode; + +void aa_add_profile(struct aa_policy *common, struct aa_profile *profile); + +bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_namespace *curr, struct aa_namespace *view); +const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_namespace *parent, struct aa_namespace *child); +int aa_alloc_root_ns(void); +void aa_free_root_ns(void); +void aa_free_namespace_kref(struct kref *kref); + +struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root, + const char *name); + +static inline struct aa_policy *aa_get_common(struct aa_policy *c) +{ + if (c) + kref_get(&c->count); + + return c; +} + +/** + * aa_get_namespace - increment references count on @ns + * @ns: namespace to increment reference count of (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Returns: pointer to @ns, if @ns is NULL returns NULL + * Requires: @ns must be held with valid refcount when called + */ +static inline struct aa_namespace *aa_get_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns) +{ + if (ns) + kref_get(&(ns->base.count)); + + return ns; +} + +/** + * aa_put_namespace - decrement refcount on @ns + * @ns: namespace to put reference of + * + * Decrement reference count of @ns and if no longer in use free it + */ +static inline void aa_put_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns) +{ + if (ns) + kref_put(&ns->base.count, aa_free_namespace_kref); +} + +struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *name); +struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat); +void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref); +struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name); +struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name); +struct aa_profile *aa_match_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *name); + +ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace); +ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *name, size_t size); + +#define PROF_ADD 1 +#define PROF_REPLACE 0 + +#define unconfined(X) ((X)->flags & PFLAG_UNCONFINED) + +/** + * aa_newest_version - find the newest version of @profile + * @profile: the profile to check for newer versions of (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: newest version of @profile, if @profile is the newest version + * return @profile. + * + * NOTE: the profile returned is not refcounted, The refcount on @profile + * must be held until the caller decides what to do with the returned newest + * version. + */ +static inline struct aa_profile *aa_newest_version(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + while (profile->replacedby) + profile = profile->replacedby; + + return profile; +} + +/** + * aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p + * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Returns: pointer to @p if @p is NULL will return NULL + * Requires: @p must be held with valid refcount when called + */ +static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile(struct aa_profile *p) +{ + if (p) + kref_get(&(p->base.count)); + + return p; +} + +/** + * aa_put_profile - decrement refcount on profile @p + * @p: profile (MAYBE NULL) + */ +static inline void aa_put_profile(struct aa_profile *p) +{ + if (p) + kref_put(&p->base.count, aa_free_profile_kref); +} + +static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + if (aa_g_audit != AUDIT_NORMAL) + return aa_g_audit; + + return profile->audit; +} + +bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op); + +#endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a2dcccac45aa --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor policy loading interface function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __POLICY_INTERFACE_H +#define __POLICY_INTERFACE_H + +struct aa_profile *aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, const char **ns); + +#endif /* __POLICY_INTERFACE_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..544aa6b766a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H +#define __AA_PROCATTR_H + +#define AA_DO_TEST 1 +#define AA_ONEXEC 1 + +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string); +int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test); +int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test); +int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname); + +#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3c88be946494 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor resource limits function definitions. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_RESOURCE_H +#define __AA_RESOURCE_H + +#include <linux/resource.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> + +struct aa_profile; + +/* struct aa_rlimit - rlimit settings for the profile + * @mask: which hard limits to set + * @limits: rlimit values that override task limits + * + * AppArmor rlimits are used to set confined task rlimits. Only the + * limits specified in @mask will be controlled by apparmor. + */ +struct aa_rlimit { + unsigned int mask; + struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS]; +}; + +int aa_map_resource(int resource); +int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim); + +void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new); + +static inline void aa_free_rlimit_rules(struct aa_rlimit *rlims) +{ + /* NOP */ +} + +#endif /* __AA_RESOURCE_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sid.h b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..020db35c3010 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) definitions + * + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_SID_H +#define __AA_SID_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct aa_profile; + +u32 aa_alloc_sid(void); +void aa_free_sid(u32 sid); + +#endif /* __AA_SID_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..649fad88869b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> + +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/capability.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +/* call back to audit ptrace fields */ +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + audit_log_format(ab, " target="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.target); +} + +/** + * aa_audit_ptrace - do auditing for ptrace + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @target: profile being traced (NOT NULL) + * @error: error condition + * + * Returns: %0 or error code + */ +static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_profile *target, int error) +{ + struct common_audit_data sa; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad.op = OP_PTRACE; + sa.aad.target = target; + sa.aad.error = error; + + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, + audit_cb); +} + +/** + * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee + * @tracer_task: task who will do the tracing (NOT NULL) + * @tracer: profile of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL) + * @tracee: task to be traced + * @mode: whether PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error + */ +int aa_may_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer_task, struct aa_profile *tracer, + struct aa_profile *tracee, unsigned int mode) +{ + /* TODO: currently only based on capability, not extended ptrace + * rules, + * Test mode for PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH + */ + + if (unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee) + return 0; + /* log this capability request */ + return aa_capable(tracer_task, tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); +} + +/** + * aa_ptrace - do ptrace permission check and auditing + * @tracer: task doing the tracing (NOT NULL) + * @tracee: task being traced (NOT NULL) + * @mode: ptrace mode either PTRACE_MODE_READ || PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error + */ +int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee, + unsigned int mode) +{ + /* + * tracer can ptrace tracee when + * - tracer is unconfined || + * - tracer is in complain mode + * - tracer has rules allowing it to trace tracee currently this is: + * - confined by the same profile || + * - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE + */ + + struct aa_profile *tracer_p; + /* cred released below */ + const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer); + int error = 0; + tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred); + + if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) { + /* lcred released below */ + const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee); + struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred); + + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode); + error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error); + + put_cred(lcred); + } + put_cred(cred); + + return error; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6e85cdb4303f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains basic common functions used in AppArmor + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> + +#include "include/audit.h" + + +/** + * aa_split_fqname - split a fqname into a profile and namespace name + * @fqname: a full qualified name in namespace profile format (NOT NULL) + * @ns_name: pointer to portion of the string containing the ns name (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: profile name or NULL if one is not specified + * + * Split a namespace name from a profile name (see policy.c for naming + * description). If a portion of the name is missing it returns NULL for + * that portion. + * + * NOTE: may modify the @fqname string. The pointers returned point + * into the @fqname string. + */ +char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name) +{ + char *name = strim(fqname); + + *ns_name = NULL; + if (name[0] == ':') { + char *split = strchr(&name[1], ':'); + if (split) { + /* overwrite ':' with \0 */ + *split = 0; + name = skip_spaces(split + 1); + } else + /* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */ + name = NULL; + *ns_name = &name[1]; + } + if (name && *name == 0) + name = NULL; + + return name; +} + +/** + * aa_info_message - log a none profile related status message + * @str: message to log + */ +void aa_info_message(const char *str) +{ + if (audit_enabled) { + struct common_audit_data sa; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad.info = str; + aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL); + } + printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str); +} + +/** + * kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc + * @size: size of allocation + * + * Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed + * + * It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than + * what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc. + */ +void *kvmalloc(size_t size) +{ + void *buffer = NULL; + + if (size == 0) + return NULL; + + /* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */ + if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE)) + buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN); + if (!buffer) { + /* see kvfree for why size must be at least work_struct size + * when allocated via vmalloc + */ + if (size < sizeof(struct work_struct)) + size = sizeof(struct work_struct); + buffer = vmalloc(size); + } + return buffer; +} + +/** + * do_vfree - workqueue routine for freeing vmalloced memory + * @work: data to be freed + * + * The work_struct is overlaid to the data being freed, as at the point + * the work is scheduled the data is no longer valid, be its freeing + * needs to be delayed until safe. + */ +static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work) +{ + vfree(work); +} + +/** + * kvfree - free an allocation do by kvmalloc + * @buffer: buffer to free (MAYBE_NULL) + * + * Free a buffer allocated by kvmalloc + */ +void kvfree(void *buffer) +{ + if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) { + /* Data is no longer valid so just use the allocated space + * as the work_struct + */ + struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *) buffer; + INIT_WORK(work, do_vfree); + schedule_work(work); + } else + kfree(buffer); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8db33a8b50c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -0,0 +1,938 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/mman.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> +#include <net/sock.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/apparmorfs.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/capability.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/file.h" +#include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/procattr.h" + +/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ +int apparmor_initialized __initdata; + +/* + * LSM hook functions + */ + +/* + * free the associated aa_task_cxt and put its profiles + */ +static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred) +{ + aa_free_task_context(cred->security); + cred->security = NULL; +} + +/* + * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials + */ +static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) +{ + /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); + if (!cxt) + return -ENOMEM; + + cred->security = cxt; + return 0; +} + +/* + * prepare new aa_task_cxt for modification by prepare_cred block + */ +static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */ + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp); + if (!cxt) + return -ENOMEM; + + aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security); + new->security = cxt; + return 0; +} + +/* + * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds + */ +static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ + const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security; + struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security; + + aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt); +} + +static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, + unsigned int mode) +{ + int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode); + if (error) + return error; + + return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode); +} + +static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); + if (error) + return error; + + return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); +} + +/* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */ +static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + const struct cred *cred; + + rcu_read_lock(); + cred = __task_cred(target); + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + + *effective = cred->cap_effective; + *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; + *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; + + if (!unconfined(profile)) { + *effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow); + *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow); + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return 0; +} + +static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred, + int cap, int audit) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */ + int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit); + if (!error) { + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + if (!unconfined(profile)) + error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit); + } + return error; +} + +/** + * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths + * @op: operation being checked + * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL) + * @mask: requested permissions mask + * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied + */ +static int common_perm(int op, struct path *path, u32 mask, + struct path_cond *cond) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + int error = 0; + + profile = __aa_current_profile(); + if (!unconfined(profile)) + error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond); + + return error; +} + +/** + * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry + * @op: operation being checked + * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL) + * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) + * @mask: requested permissions mask + * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied + */ +static int common_perm_dir_dentry(int op, struct path *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, + struct path_cond *cond) +{ + struct path path = { dir->mnt, dentry }; + + return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond); +} + +/** + * common_perm_mnt_dentry - common permission wrapper when mnt, dentry + * @op: operation being checked + * @mnt: mount point of dentry (NOT NULL) + * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL) + * @mask: requested permissions mask + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied + */ +static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt, + struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) +{ + struct path path = { mnt, dentry }; + struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + dentry->d_inode->i_mode + }; + + return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond); +} + +/** + * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm + * @op: operation being checked + * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL) + * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL) + * @mask: requested permission mask + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied + */ +static int common_perm_rm(int op, struct path *dir, + struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct path_cond cond = { }; + + if (!inode || !dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(inode)) + return 0; + + cond.uid = inode->i_uid; + cond.mode = inode->i_mode; + + return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); +} + +/** + * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create + * @op: operation being checked + * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL) + * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL) + * @mask: request permission mask + * @mode: created file mode + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied + */ +static int common_perm_create(int op, struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + u32 mask, umode_t mode) +{ + struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode }; + + if (!dir->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond); +} + +static int apparmor_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); +} + +static int apparmor_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + int mode) +{ + return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, + S_IFDIR); +} + +static int apparmor_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE); +} + +static int apparmor_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + int mode, unsigned int dev) +{ + return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode); +} + +static int apparmor_path_truncate(struct path *path) +{ + struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode + }; + + if (!path->mnt || !mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + return common_perm(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE, + &cond); +} + +static int apparmor_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + const char *old_name) +{ + return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, + S_IFLNK); +} + +static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, + struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + int error = 0; + + if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + profile = aa_current_profile(); + if (!unconfined(profile)) + error = aa_path_link(profile, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, + struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + int error = 0; + + if (!mediated_filesystem(old_dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + profile = aa_current_profile(); + if (!unconfined(profile)) { + struct path old_path = { old_dir->mnt, old_dentry }; + struct path new_path = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry }; + struct path_cond cond = { old_dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode + }; + + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, profile, &old_path, 0, + MAY_READ | AA_MAY_META_READ | MAY_WRITE | + AA_MAY_META_WRITE | AA_MAY_DELETE, + &cond); + if (!error) + error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, profile, &new_path, + 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_META_WRITE | + AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond); + + } + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, + mode_t mode) +{ + if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_CHMOD, mnt, dentry, AA_MAY_CHMOD); +} + +static int apparmor_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) +{ + struct path_cond cond = { path->dentry->d_inode->i_uid, + path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode + }; + + if (!mediated_filesystem(path->dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + return common_perm(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN, &cond); +} + +static int apparmor_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + if (!mediated_filesystem(dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + return common_perm_mnt_dentry(OP_GETATTR, mnt, dentry, + AA_MAY_META_READ); +} + +static int apparmor_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) +{ + struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; + struct aa_profile *profile; + int error = 0; + + if (!mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks. + * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with + * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to + * actually execute the image. + */ + if (current->in_execve) { + fcxt->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP; + return 0; + } + + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + if (!unconfined(profile)) { + struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode }; + + error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, profile, &file->f_path, 0, + aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond); + /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */ + fcxt->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file); + } + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) +{ + /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */ + file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_context(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!file->f_security) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; + +} + +static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file) +{ + struct aa_file_cxt *cxt = file->f_security; + + aa_free_file_context(cxt); +} + +static int common_file_perm(int op, struct file *file, u32 mask) +{ + struct aa_file_cxt *fcxt = file->f_security; + struct aa_profile *profile, *fprofile = aa_cred_profile(file->f_cred); + int error = 0; + + BUG_ON(!fprofile); + + if (!file->f_path.mnt || + !mediated_filesystem(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)) + return 0; + + profile = __aa_current_profile(); + + /* revalidate access, if task is unconfined, or the cached cred + * doesn't match or if the request is for more permissions than + * was granted. + * + * Note: the test for !unconfined(fprofile) is to handle file + * delegation from unconfined tasks + */ + if (!unconfined(profile) && !unconfined(fprofile) && + ((fprofile != profile) || (mask & ~fcxt->allow))) + error = aa_file_perm(op, profile, file, mask); + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) +{ + return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask); +} + +static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) +{ + u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK; + + if (cmd == F_WRLCK) + mask |= MAY_WRITE; + + return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask); +} + +static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct dentry *dentry; + int mask = 0; + + if (!file || !file->f_security) + return 0; + + if (prot & PROT_READ) + mask |= MAY_READ; + /* + * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't + * write back to the files + */ + if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE)) + mask |= MAY_WRITE; + if (prot & PROT_EXEC) + mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP; + + dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + return common_file_perm(op, file, mask); +} + +static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, + unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) +{ + int rc = 0; + + /* do DAC check */ + rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); + if (rc || addr_only) + return rc; + + return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags); +} + +static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot) +{ + return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot, + !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); +} + +static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, + char **value) +{ + int error = -ENOENT; + struct aa_profile *profile; + /* released below */ + const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task); + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security; + profile = aa_cred_profile(cred); + + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) + error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile), + value); + else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous) + error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->previous), + value); + else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec) + error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->onexec), + value); + else + error = -EINVAL; + + put_cred(cred); + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, + void *value, size_t size) +{ + char *command, *args = value; + size_t arg_size; + int error; + + if (size == 0) + return -EINVAL; + /* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that + * the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1 + * so that AppArmor can null terminate them + */ + if (args[size - 1] != '\0') { + if (size == PAGE_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + args[size] = '\0'; + } + + /* task can only write its own attributes */ + if (current != task) + return -EACCES; + + args = value; + args = strim(args); + command = strsep(&args, " "); + if (!args) + return -EINVAL; + args = skip_spaces(args); + if (!*args) + return -EINVAL; + + arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value); + if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) { + if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) { + error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, + !AA_DO_TEST); + } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) { + error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size, + AA_DO_TEST); + } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) { + error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, + !AA_DO_TEST); + } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) { + error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC, + AA_DO_TEST); + } else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) { + error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args); + } else { + struct common_audit_data sa; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; + sa.aad.info = name; + sa.aad.error = -EINVAL; + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL, + &sa, NULL); + } + } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) { + error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC, + !AA_DO_TEST); + } else { + /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */ + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!error) + error = size; + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = aa_current_profile(); + int error = 0; + + if (!unconfined(profile)) + error = aa_task_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim); + + return error; +} + +static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = { + .name = "apparmor", + + .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check, + .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme, + .capget = apparmor_capget, + .capable = apparmor_capable, + + .path_link = apparmor_path_link, + .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink, + .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink, + .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir, + .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir, + .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod, + .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename, + .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod, + .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown, + .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate, + .dentry_open = apparmor_dentry_open, + .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr, + + .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission, + .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security, + .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security, + .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap, + .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect, + .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock, + + .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr, + .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr, + + .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank, + .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free, + .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare, + .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer, + + .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds, + .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds, + .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds, + .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec, + + .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit, +}; + +/* + * AppArmor sysfs module parameters + */ + +static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +#define param_check_aabool(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) + +static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +#define param_check_aauint(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) + +static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +#define param_check_aalockpolicy(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) + +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) + +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int) + +/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters + * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. + */ + +/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ +enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; +module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, + &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* Debug mode */ +int aa_g_debug; +module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* Audit mode */ +enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; +module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, + &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This + * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running + */ +int aa_g_audit_header = 1; +module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* lock out loading/removal of policy + * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to + * load policy, if lock_policy is set + */ +int aa_g_lock_policy; +module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* Syscall logging mode */ +int aa_g_logsyscall; +module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ +unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; +module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification + * on the loaded policy is done. + */ +int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; +module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, + S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + +/* Boot time disable flag */ +static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR); + +static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) +{ + unsigned long enabled; + int error = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled); + if (!error) + apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; + return 1; +} + +__setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup); + +/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */ +static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + if (aa_g_lock_policy) + return -EACCES; + return param_set_bool(val, kp); +} + +static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); +} + +static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return param_set_bool(val, kp); +} + +static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return param_get_bool(buffer, kp); +} + +static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return param_set_uint(val, kp); +} + +static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); +} + +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (!apparmor_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + + return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); +} + +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + int i; + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (!apparmor_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!val) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) { + if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) { + aa_g_audit = i; + return 0; + } + } + + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (!apparmor_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + + return sprintf(buffer, "%s", profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); +} + +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + int i; + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (!apparmor_enabled) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!val) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) { + if (strcmp(val, profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) { + aa_g_profile_mode = i; + return 0; + } + } + + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* + * AppArmor init functions + */ + +/** + * set_init_cxt - set a task context and profile on the first task. + * + * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined + */ +static int __init set_init_cxt(void) +{ + struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred; + struct aa_task_cxt *cxt; + + cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!cxt) + return -ENOMEM; + + cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined); + cred->security = cxt; + + return 0; +} + +static int __init apparmor_init(void) +{ + int error; + + if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) { + aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); + apparmor_enabled = 0; + return 0; + } + + error = aa_alloc_root_ns(); + if (error) { + AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n"); + goto alloc_out; + } + + error = set_init_cxt(); + if (error) { + AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n"); + goto register_security_out; + } + + error = register_security(&apparmor_ops); + if (error) { + AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n"); + goto register_security_out; + } + + /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ + apparmor_initialized = 1; + if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) + aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled"); + else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) + aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled"); + else + aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized"); + + return error; + +register_security_out: + aa_free_root_ns(); + +alloc_out: + aa_destroy_aafs(); + + apparmor_enabled = 0; + return error; + +} + +security_initcall(apparmor_init); diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5cb4dc1f6992 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/match.c @@ -0,0 +1,353 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/kref.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/match.h" + +/** + * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check) + * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL) + * @bsize: size of blob + * + * Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure + * + * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kmalloc) + */ +static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize) +{ + struct table_header *table = NULL; + struct table_header th; + size_t tsize; + + if (bsize < sizeof(struct table_header)) + goto out; + + /* loaded td_id's start at 1, subtract 1 now to avoid doing + * it every time we use td_id as an index + */ + th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob)) - 1; + th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2)); + th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8)); + blob += sizeof(struct table_header); + + if (!(th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16 || th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32 || + th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)) + goto out; + + tsize = table_size(th.td_lolen, th.td_flags); + if (bsize < tsize) + goto out; + + table = kvmalloc(tsize); + if (table) { + *table = th; + if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8) + UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen, + u8, byte_to_byte); + else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA16) + UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen, + u16, be16_to_cpu); + else if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA32) + UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen, + u32, be32_to_cpu); + else + goto fail; + } + +out: + /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced + * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus. + */ + if (is_vmalloc_addr(table)) + vm_unmap_aliases(); + return table; +fail: + kvfree(table); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * verify_dfa - verify that transitions and states in the tables are in bounds. + * @dfa: dfa to test (NOT NULL) + * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept table are acceptable + * + * Assumes dfa has gone through the first pass verification done by unpacking + * NOTE: this does not valid accept table values + * + * Returns: %0 else error code on failure to verify + */ +static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags) +{ + size_t i, state_count, trans_count; + int error = -EPROTO; + + /* check that required tables exist */ + if (!(dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF] && + dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE] && + dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT] && dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK])) + goto out; + + /* accept.size == default.size == base.size */ + state_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen; + if (ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags)) { + if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]) + goto out; + if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen) + goto out; + } + if (ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags)) { + if (!dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]) + goto out; + if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2]->td_lolen) + goto out; + } + if (state_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_DEF]->td_lolen) + goto out; + + /* next.size == chk.size */ + trans_count = dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_NXT]->td_lolen; + if (trans_count != dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_CHK]->td_lolen) + goto out; + + /* if equivalence classes then its table size must be 256 */ + if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC] && + dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]->td_lolen != 256) + goto out; + + if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) { + for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) { + if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) + goto out; + /* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */ + if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) { + printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper " + "bounds error\n"); + goto out; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < trans_count; i++) { + if (NEXT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) + goto out; + if (CHECK_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count) + goto out; + } + } + + error = 0; +out: + return error; +} + +/** + * dfa_free - free a dfa allocated by aa_dfa_unpack + * @dfa: the dfa to free (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Requires: reference count to dfa == 0 + */ +static void dfa_free(struct aa_dfa *dfa) +{ + if (dfa) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dfa->tables); i++) { + kvfree(dfa->tables[i]); + dfa->tables[i] = NULL; + } + kfree(dfa); + } +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_free_kref - free aa_dfa by kref (called by aa_put_dfa) + * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a dfa (NOT NULL) + */ +void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct aa_dfa *dfa = container_of(kref, struct aa_dfa, count); + dfa_free(dfa); +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_unpack - unpack the binary tables of a serialized dfa + * @blob: aligned serialized stream of data to unpack (NOT NULL) + * @size: size of data to unpack + * @flags: flags controlling what type of accept tables are acceptable + * + * Unpack a dfa that has been serialized. To find information on the dfa + * format look in Documentation/apparmor.txt + * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundry + * + * Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure + */ +struct aa_dfa *aa_dfa_unpack(void *blob, size_t size, int flags) +{ + int hsize; + int error = -ENOMEM; + char *data = blob; + struct table_header *table = NULL; + struct aa_dfa *dfa = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_dfa), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dfa) + goto fail; + + kref_init(&dfa->count); + + error = -EPROTO; + + /* get dfa table set header */ + if (size < sizeof(struct table_set_header)) + goto fail; + + if (ntohl(*(u32 *) data) != YYTH_MAGIC) + goto fail; + + hsize = ntohl(*(u32 *) (data + 4)); + if (size < hsize) + goto fail; + + dfa->flags = ntohs(*(u16 *) (data + 12)); + data += hsize; + size -= hsize; + + while (size > 0) { + table = unpack_table(data, size); + if (!table) + goto fail; + + switch (table->td_id) { + case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT: + if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT1_FLAGS(flags))) + goto fail; + break; + case YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2: + if (!(table->td_flags & ACCEPT2_FLAGS(flags))) + goto fail; + break; + case YYTD_ID_BASE: + if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA32) + goto fail; + break; + case YYTD_ID_DEF: + case YYTD_ID_NXT: + case YYTD_ID_CHK: + if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA16) + goto fail; + break; + case YYTD_ID_EC: + if (table->td_flags != YYTD_DATA8) + goto fail; + break; + default: + goto fail; + } + /* check for duplicate table entry */ + if (dfa->tables[table->td_id]) + goto fail; + dfa->tables[table->td_id] = table; + data += table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags); + size -= table_size(table->td_lolen, table->td_flags); + table = NULL; + } + + error = verify_dfa(dfa, flags); + if (error) + goto fail; + + return dfa; + +fail: + kvfree(table); + dfa_free(dfa); + return ERR_PTR(error); +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_match_len - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at + * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) + * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in + * @str: the string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) + * @len: length of the string of bytes to match + * + * aa_dfa_match_len will match @str against the dfa and return the state it + * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting + * label, or as the start state of a continuing match. + * + * This function will happily match again the 0 byte and only finishes + * when @len input is consumed. + * + * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed + */ +unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str, int len) +{ + u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa); + u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa); + u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa); + unsigned int state = start, pos; + + if (state == 0) + return 0; + + /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */ + if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) { + /* Equivalence class table defined */ + u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa); + /* default is direct to next state */ + for (; len; len--) { + pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++]; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + } + } else { + /* default is direct to next state */ + for (; len; len--) { + pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++; + if (check[pos] == state) + state = next[pos]; + else + state = def[state]; + } + } + + return state; +} + +/** + * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at + * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against (NOT NULL) + * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in + * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL) + * + * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it + * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting + * label, or as the start state of a continuing match. + * + * Returns: final state reached after input is consumed + */ +unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *str) +{ + return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, str, strlen(str)); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..96bab9469d48 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/path.c @@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor function for pathnames + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/magic.h> +#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/nsproxy.h> +#include <linux/path.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + + +/* modified from dcache.c */ +static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen) +{ + buflen -= namelen; + if (buflen < 0) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + *buffer -= namelen; + memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen); + return 0; +} + +#define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT) + +/** + * d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path + * @path: path to lookup (NOT NULL) + * @buf: buffer to store path to (NOT NULL) + * @buflen: length of @buf + * @name: Returns - pointer for start of path name with in @buf (NOT NULL) + * @flags: flags controlling path lookup + * + * Handle path name lookup. + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if path lookup fails + * When no error the path name is returned in @name which points to + * to a position in @buf + */ +static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen, + char **name, int flags) +{ + struct path root, tmp; + char *res; + int deleted, connected; + int error = 0; + + /* Get the root we want to resolve too */ + if (flags & PATH_CHROOT_REL) { + /* resolve paths relative to chroot */ + read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); + root = current->fs->root; + /* released below */ + path_get(&root); + read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); + } else { + /* resolve paths relative to namespace */ + root.mnt = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root; + root.dentry = root.mnt->mnt_root; + /* released below */ + path_get(&root); + } + + spin_lock(&dcache_lock); + /* There is a race window between path lookup here and the + * need to strip the " (deleted) string that __d_path applies + * Detect the race and relookup the path + * + * The stripping of (deleted) is a hack that could be removed + * with an updated __d_path + */ + do { + tmp = root; + deleted = d_unlinked(path->dentry); + res = __d_path(path, &tmp, buf, buflen); + + } while (deleted != d_unlinked(path->dentry)); + spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); + + *name = res; + /* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to + * be returned. + */ + if (IS_ERR(res)) { + error = PTR_ERR(res); + *name = buf; + goto out; + } + if (deleted) { + /* On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the + * security_path hooks as a deleted dentry except without an + * inode allocated. + * + * Remove the appended deleted text and return as string for + * normal mediation, or auditing. The (deleted) string is + * guaranteed to be added in this case, so just strip it. + */ + buf[buflen - 11] = 0; /* - (len(" (deleted)") +\0) */ + + if (path->dentry->d_inode && !(flags & PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED)) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* Determine if the path is connected to the expected root */ + connected = tmp.dentry == root.dentry && tmp.mnt == root.mnt; + + /* If the path is not connected, + * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any + * leading / that __d_path may have returned. + * Unless + * specifically directed to connect the path, + * OR + * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path + * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside + * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to + * namespace root. + */ + if (!connected) { + /* is the disconnect path a sysctl? */ + if (tmp.dentry->d_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC && + strncmp(*name, "/sys/", 5) == 0) { + /* TODO: convert over to using a per namespace + * control instead of hard coded /proc + */ + error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5); + } else if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) && + !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) && + (tmp.mnt == current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root && + tmp.dentry == tmp.mnt->mnt_root))) { + /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting + * with '/' + */ + error = -ESTALE; + if (*res == '/') + *name = res + 1; + } + } + +out: + path_put(&root); + + return error; +} + +/** + * get_name_to_buffer - get the pathname to a buffer ensure dir / is appended + * @path: path to get name for (NOT NULL) + * @flags: flags controlling path lookup + * @buffer: buffer to put name in (NOT NULL) + * @size: size of buffer + * @name: Returns - contains position of path name in @buffer (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %0 else error on failure + */ +static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer, + int size, char **name) +{ + int adjust = (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) ? 1 : 0; + int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, size - adjust, name, flags); + + if (!error && (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) && (*name)[1] != '\0') + /* + * Append "/" to the pathname. The root directory is a special + * case; it already ends in slash. + */ + strcpy(&buffer[size - 2], "/"); + + return error; +} + +/** + * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file + * @path: path the file (NOT NULL) + * @flags: flags controlling path name generation + * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated (NOT NULL) + * @name: Returns - the generated path name if !error (NOT NULL) + * + * @name is a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs + * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL. If there is an error @name + * may contain a partial or invalid name that can be used for audit purposes, + * but it can not be used for mediation. + * + * We need PATH_IS_DIR to indicate whether the file is a directory or not + * because the file may not yet exist, and so we cannot check the inode's + * file type. + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if could retrieve name + */ +int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name) +{ + char *buf, *str = NULL; + int size = 256; + int error; + + *name = NULL; + *buffer = NULL; + for (;;) { + /* freed by caller */ + buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str); + if (error != -ENAMETOOLONG) + break; + + kfree(buf); + size <<= 1; + if (size > aa_g_path_max) + return -ENAMETOOLONG; + } + *buffer = buf; + *name = str; + + return error; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3cdc1ad0787e --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,1184 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor policy manipulation functions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * + * AppArmor policy is based around profiles, which contain the rules a + * task is confined by. Every task in the system has a profile attached + * to it determined either by matching "unconfined" tasks against the + * visible set of profiles or by following a profiles attachment rules. + * + * Each profile exists in a profile namespace which is a container of + * visible profiles. Each namespace contains a special "unconfined" profile, + * which doesn't enforce any confinement on a task beyond DAC. + * + * Namespace and profile names can be written together in either + * of two syntaxes. + * :namespace:profile - used by kernel interfaces for easy detection + * namespace://profile - used by policy + * + * Profile names can not start with : or @ or ^ and may not contain \0 + * + * Reserved profile names + * unconfined - special automatically generated unconfined profile + * inherit - special name to indicate profile inheritance + * null-XXXX-YYYY - special automatically generated learning profiles + * + * Namespace names may not start with / or @ and may not contain \0 or : + * Reserved namespace names + * user-XXXX - user defined profiles + * + * a // in a profile or namespace name indicates a hierarchical name with the + * name before the // being the parent and the name after the child. + * + * Profile and namespace hierarchies serve two different but similar purposes. + * The namespace contains the set of visible profiles that are considered + * for attachment. The hierarchy of namespaces allows for virtualizing + * the namespace so that for example a chroot can have its own set of profiles + * which may define some local user namespaces. + * The profile hierarchy severs two distinct purposes, + * - it allows for sub profiles or hats, which allows an application to run + * subprograms under its own profile with different restriction than it + * self, and not have it use the system profile. + * eg. if a mail program starts an editor, the policy might make the + * restrictions tighter on the editor tighter than the mail program, + * and definitely different than general editor restrictions + * - it allows for binary hierarchy of profiles, so that execution history + * is preserved. This feature isn't exploited by AppArmor reference policy + * but is allowed. NOTE: this is currently suboptimal because profile + * aliasing is not currently implemented so that a profile for each + * level must be defined. + * eg. /bin/bash///bin/ls as a name would indicate /bin/ls was started + * from /bin/bash + * + * A profile or namespace name that can contain one or more // separators + * is referred to as an hname (hierarchical). + * eg. /bin/bash//bin/ls + * + * An fqname is a name that may contain both namespace and profile hnames. + * eg. :ns:/bin/bash//bin/ls + * + * NOTES: + * - locking of profile lists is currently fairly coarse. All profile + * lists within a namespace use the namespace lock. + * FIXME: move profile lists to using rcu_lists + */ + +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/capability.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/file.h" +#include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/match.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/policy_unpack.h" +#include "include/resource.h" +#include "include/sid.h" + + +/* root profile namespace */ +struct aa_namespace *root_ns; + +const char *profile_mode_names[] = { + "enforce", + "complain", + "kill", +}; + +/** + * hname_tail - find the last component of an hname + * @name: hname to find the base profile name component of (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: the tail (base profile name) name component of an hname + */ +static const char *hname_tail(const char *hname) +{ + char *split; + hname = strim((char *)hname); + for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split; split = strstr(hname, "//")) + hname = split + 2; + + return hname; +} + +/** + * policy_init - initialize a policy structure + * @policy: policy to initialize (NOT NULL) + * @prefix: prefix name if any is required. (MAYBE NULL) + * @name: name of the policy, init will make a copy of it (NOT NULL) + * + * Note: this fn creates a copy of strings passed in + * + * Returns: true if policy init successful + */ +static bool policy_init(struct aa_policy *policy, const char *prefix, + const char *name) +{ + /* freed by policy_free */ + if (prefix) { + policy->hname = kmalloc(strlen(prefix) + strlen(name) + 3, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (policy->hname) + sprintf(policy->hname, "%s//%s", prefix, name); + } else + policy->hname = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!policy->hname) + return 0; + /* base.name is a substring of fqname */ + policy->name = (char *)hname_tail(policy->hname); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->list); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->profiles); + kref_init(&policy->count); + + return 1; +} + +/** + * policy_destroy - free the elements referenced by @policy + * @policy: policy that is to have its elements freed (NOT NULL) + */ +static void policy_destroy(struct aa_policy *policy) +{ + /* still contains profiles -- invalid */ + if (!list_empty(&policy->profiles)) { + AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, " + "policy '%s' still contains profiles\n", + __func__, policy->name); + BUG(); + } + if (!list_empty(&policy->list)) { + AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, policy '%s' still on list\n", + __func__, policy->name); + BUG(); + } + + /* don't free name as its a subset of hname */ + kzfree(policy->hname); +} + +/** + * __policy_find - find a policy by @name on a policy list + * @head: list to search (NOT NULL) + * @name: name to search for (NOT NULL) + * + * Requires: correct locks for the @head list be held + * + * Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @name or NULL if not found + */ +static struct aa_policy *__policy_find(struct list_head *head, const char *name) +{ + struct aa_policy *policy; + + list_for_each_entry(policy, head, list) { + if (!strcmp(policy->name, name)) + return policy; + } + return NULL; +} + +/** + * __policy_strn_find - find a policy that's name matches @len chars of @str + * @head: list to search (NOT NULL) + * @str: string to search for (NOT NULL) + * @len: length of match required + * + * Requires: correct locks for the @head list be held + * + * Returns: unrefcounted policy that match @str or NULL if not found + * + * if @len == strlen(@strlen) then this is equiv to __policy_find + * other wise it allows searching for policy by a partial match of name + */ +static struct aa_policy *__policy_strn_find(struct list_head *head, + const char *str, int len) +{ + struct aa_policy *policy; + + list_for_each_entry(policy, head, list) { + if (aa_strneq(policy->name, str, len)) + return policy; + } + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Routines for AppArmor namespaces + */ + +static const char *hidden_ns_name = "---"; +/** + * aa_ns_visible - test if @view is visible from @curr + * @curr: namespace to treat as the parent (NOT NULL) + * @view: namespace to test if visible from @curr (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: true if @view is visible from @curr else false + */ +bool aa_ns_visible(struct aa_namespace *curr, struct aa_namespace *view) +{ + if (curr == view) + return true; + + for ( ; view; view = view->parent) { + if (view->parent == curr) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/** + * aa_na_name - Find the ns name to display for @view from @curr + * @curr - current namespace (NOT NULL) + * @view - namespace attempting to view (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: name of @view visible from @curr + */ +const char *aa_ns_name(struct aa_namespace *curr, struct aa_namespace *view) +{ + /* if view == curr then the namespace name isn't displayed */ + if (curr == view) + return ""; + + if (aa_ns_visible(curr, view)) { + /* at this point if a ns is visible it is in a view ns + * thus the curr ns.hname is a prefix of its name. + * Only output the virtualized portion of the name + * Add + 2 to skip over // separating curr hname prefix + * from the visible tail of the views hname + */ + return view->base.hname + strlen(curr->base.hname) + 2; + } else + return hidden_ns_name; +} + +/** + * alloc_namespace - allocate, initialize and return a new namespace + * @prefix: parent namespace name (MAYBE NULL) + * @name: a preallocated name (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: refcounted namespace or NULL on failure. + */ +static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix, + const char *name) +{ + struct aa_namespace *ns; + + ns = kzalloc(sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL); + AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, ns); + if (!ns) + return NULL; + if (!policy_init(&ns->base, prefix, name)) + goto fail_ns; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->sub_ns); + rwlock_init(&ns->lock); + + /* released by free_namespace */ + ns->unconfined = aa_alloc_profile("unconfined"); + if (!ns->unconfined) + goto fail_unconfined; + + ns->unconfined->sid = aa_alloc_sid(); + ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_UNCONFINED | PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | + PFLAG_IMMUTABLE; + + /* + * released by free_namespace, however __remove_namespace breaks + * the cyclic references (ns->unconfined, and unconfined->ns) and + * replaces with refs to parent namespace unconfined + */ + ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns); + + return ns; + +fail_unconfined: + kzfree(ns->base.name); +fail_ns: + kzfree(ns); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * free_namespace - free a profile namespace + * @ns: the namespace to free (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Requires: All references to the namespace must have been put, if the + * namespace was referenced by a profile confining a task, + */ +static void free_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns) +{ + if (!ns) + return; + + policy_destroy(&ns->base); + aa_put_namespace(ns->parent); + + if (ns->unconfined && ns->unconfined->ns == ns) + ns->unconfined->ns = NULL; + + aa_put_profile(ns->unconfined); + kzfree(ns); +} + +/** + * aa_free_namespace_kref - free aa_namespace by kref (see aa_put_namespace) + * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a namespace (NOT NULL) + */ +void aa_free_namespace_kref(struct kref *kref) +{ + free_namespace(container_of(kref, struct aa_namespace, base.count)); +} + +/** + * __aa_find_namespace - find a namespace on a list by @name + * @head: list to search for namespace on (NOT NULL) + * @name: name of namespace to look for (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: unrefcounted namespace + * + * Requires: ns lock be held + */ +static struct aa_namespace *__aa_find_namespace(struct list_head *head, + const char *name) +{ + return (struct aa_namespace *)__policy_find(head, name); +} + +/** + * aa_find_namespace - look up a profile namespace on the namespace list + * @root: namespace to search in (NOT NULL) + * @name: name of namespace to find (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: a refcounted namespace on the list, or NULL if no namespace + * called @name exists. + * + * refcount released by caller + */ +struct aa_namespace *aa_find_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root, + const char *name) +{ + struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL; + + read_lock(&root->lock); + ns = aa_get_namespace(__aa_find_namespace(&root->sub_ns, name)); + read_unlock(&root->lock); + + return ns; +} + +/** + * aa_prepare_namespace - find an existing or create a new namespace of @name + * @name: the namespace to find or add (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Returns: refcounted namespace or NULL if failed to create one + */ +static struct aa_namespace *aa_prepare_namespace(const char *name) +{ + struct aa_namespace *ns, *root; + + root = aa_current_profile()->ns; + + write_lock(&root->lock); + + /* if name isn't specified the profile is loaded to the current ns */ + if (!name) { + /* released by caller */ + ns = aa_get_namespace(root); + goto out; + } + + /* try and find the specified ns and if it doesn't exist create it */ + /* released by caller */ + ns = aa_get_namespace(__aa_find_namespace(&root->sub_ns, name)); + if (!ns) { + /* namespace not found */ + struct aa_namespace *new_ns; + write_unlock(&root->lock); + new_ns = alloc_namespace(root->base.hname, name); + if (!new_ns) + return NULL; + write_lock(&root->lock); + /* test for race when new_ns was allocated */ + ns = __aa_find_namespace(&root->sub_ns, name); + if (!ns) { + /* add parent ref */ + new_ns->parent = aa_get_namespace(root); + + list_add(&new_ns->base.list, &root->sub_ns); + /* add list ref */ + ns = aa_get_namespace(new_ns); + } else { + /* raced so free the new one */ + free_namespace(new_ns); + /* get reference on namespace */ + aa_get_namespace(ns); + } + } +out: + write_unlock(&root->lock); + + /* return ref */ + return ns; +} + +/** + * __list_add_profile - add a profile to a list + * @list: list to add it to (NOT NULL) + * @profile: the profile to add (NOT NULL) + * + * refcount @profile, should be put by __list_remove_profile + * + * Requires: namespace lock be held, or list not be shared + */ +static void __list_add_profile(struct list_head *list, + struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + list_add(&profile->base.list, list); + /* get list reference */ + aa_get_profile(profile); +} + +/** + * __list_remove_profile - remove a profile from the list it is on + * @profile: the profile to remove (NOT NULL) + * + * remove a profile from the list, warning generally removal should + * be done with __replace_profile as most profile removals are + * replacements to the unconfined profile. + * + * put @profile list refcount + * + * Requires: namespace lock be held, or list not have been live + */ +static void __list_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + list_del_init(&profile->base.list); + if (!(profile->flags & PFLAG_NO_LIST_REF)) + /* release list reference */ + aa_put_profile(profile); +} + +/** + * __replace_profile - replace @old with @new on a list + * @old: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL) + * @new: profile to replace @old with (NOT NULL) + * + * Will duplicate and refcount elements that @new inherits from @old + * and will inherit @old children. + * + * refcount @new for list, put @old list refcount + * + * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared + */ +static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new) +{ + struct aa_policy *policy; + struct aa_profile *child, *tmp; + + if (old->parent) + policy = &old->parent->base; + else + policy = &old->ns->base; + + /* released when @new is freed */ + new->parent = aa_get_profile(old->parent); + new->ns = aa_get_namespace(old->ns); + new->sid = old->sid; + __list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, new); + /* inherit children */ + list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &old->base.profiles, base.list) { + aa_put_profile(child->parent); + child->parent = aa_get_profile(new); + /* list refcount transferred to @new*/ + list_move(&child->base.list, &new->base.profiles); + } + + /* released by free_profile */ + old->replacedby = aa_get_profile(new); + __list_remove_profile(old); +} + +static void __profile_list_release(struct list_head *head); + +/** + * __remove_profile - remove old profile, and children + * @profile: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL) + * + * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared + */ +static void __remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + /* release any children lists first */ + __profile_list_release(&profile->base.profiles); + /* released by free_profile */ + profile->replacedby = aa_get_profile(profile->ns->unconfined); + __list_remove_profile(profile); +} + +/** + * __profile_list_release - remove all profiles on the list and put refs + * @head: list of profiles (NOT NULL) + * + * Requires: namespace lock be held + */ +static void __profile_list_release(struct list_head *head) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile, *tmp; + list_for_each_entry_safe(profile, tmp, head, base.list) + __remove_profile(profile); +} + +static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head); + +/** + * destroy_namespace - remove everything contained by @ns + * @ns: namespace to have it contents removed (NOT NULL) + */ +static void destroy_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns) +{ + if (!ns) + return; + + write_lock(&ns->lock); + /* release all profiles in this namespace */ + __profile_list_release(&ns->base.profiles); + + /* release all sub namespaces */ + __ns_list_release(&ns->sub_ns); + + write_unlock(&ns->lock); +} + +/** + * __remove_namespace - remove a namespace and all its children + * @ns: namespace to be removed (NOT NULL) + * + * Requires: ns->parent->lock be held and ns removed from parent. + */ +static void __remove_namespace(struct aa_namespace *ns) +{ + struct aa_profile *unconfined = ns->unconfined; + + /* remove ns from namespace list */ + list_del_init(&ns->base.list); + + /* + * break the ns, unconfined profile cyclic reference and forward + * all new unconfined profiles requests to the parent namespace + * This will result in all confined tasks that have a profile + * being removed, inheriting the parent->unconfined profile. + */ + if (ns->parent) + ns->unconfined = aa_get_profile(ns->parent->unconfined); + + destroy_namespace(ns); + + /* release original ns->unconfined ref */ + aa_put_profile(unconfined); + /* release ns->base.list ref, from removal above */ + aa_put_namespace(ns); +} + +/** + * __ns_list_release - remove all profile namespaces on the list put refs + * @head: list of profile namespaces (NOT NULL) + * + * Requires: namespace lock be held + */ +static void __ns_list_release(struct list_head *head) +{ + struct aa_namespace *ns, *tmp; + list_for_each_entry_safe(ns, tmp, head, base.list) + __remove_namespace(ns); + +} + +/** + * aa_alloc_root_ns - allocate the root profile namespace + * + * Returns: %0 on success else error + * + */ +int __init aa_alloc_root_ns(void) +{ + /* released by aa_free_root_ns - used as list ref*/ + root_ns = alloc_namespace(NULL, "root"); + if (!root_ns) + return -ENOMEM; + + return 0; +} + + /** + * aa_free_root_ns - free the root profile namespace + */ +void __init aa_free_root_ns(void) + { + struct aa_namespace *ns = root_ns; + root_ns = NULL; + + destroy_namespace(ns); + aa_put_namespace(ns); +} + +/** + * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile + * @hname: name of the profile (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + + /* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */ + profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!profile) + return NULL; + + if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) { + kzfree(profile); + return NULL; + } + + /* refcount released by caller */ + return profile; +} + +/** + * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile + * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL) + * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat + * + * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The name of + * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-sid. + * + * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not + * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when + * not in use. + * + * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + char *name; + u32 sid = aa_alloc_sid(); + + /* freed below */ + name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!name) + goto fail; + sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, sid); + + profile = aa_alloc_profile(name); + kfree(name); + if (!profile) + goto fail; + + profile->sid = sid; + profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; + profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL; + if (hat) + profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT; + + /* released on free_profile */ + profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent); + profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns); + + write_lock(&profile->ns->lock); + __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile); + write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock); + + /* refcount released by caller */ + return profile; + +fail: + aa_free_sid(sid); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * free_profile - free a profile + * @profile: the profile to free (MAYBE NULL) + * + * Free a profile, its hats and null_profile. All references to the profile, + * its hats and null_profile must have been put. + * + * If the profile was referenced from a task context, free_profile() will + * be called from an rcu callback routine, so we must not sleep here. + */ +static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + AA_DEBUG("%s(%p)\n", __func__, profile); + + if (!profile) + return; + + if (!list_empty(&profile->base.list)) { + AA_ERROR("%s: internal error, " + "profile '%s' still on ns list\n", + __func__, profile->base.name); + BUG(); + } + + /* free children profiles */ + policy_destroy(&profile->base); + aa_put_profile(profile->parent); + + aa_put_namespace(profile->ns); + kzfree(profile->rename); + + aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file); + aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps); + aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits); + + aa_free_sid(profile->sid); + aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch); + + aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby); + + kzfree(profile); +} + +/** + * aa_free_profile_kref - free aa_profile by kref (called by aa_put_profile) + * @kr: kref callback for freeing of a profile (NOT NULL) + */ +void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct aa_profile *p = container_of(kref, struct aa_profile, + base.count); + + free_profile(p); +} + +/* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */ + +/** + * __find_child - find a profile on @head list with a name matching @name + * @head: list to search (NOT NULL) + * @name: name of profile (NOT NULL) + * + * Requires: ns lock protecting list be held + * + * Returns: unrefcounted profile ptr, or NULL if not found + */ +static struct aa_profile *__find_child(struct list_head *head, const char *name) +{ + return (struct aa_profile *)__policy_find(head, name); +} + +/** + * __strn_find_child - find a profile on @head list using substring of @name + * @head: list to search (NOT NULL) + * @name: name of profile (NOT NULL) + * @len: length of @name substring to match + * + * Requires: ns lock protecting list be held + * + * Returns: unrefcounted profile ptr, or NULL if not found + */ +static struct aa_profile *__strn_find_child(struct list_head *head, + const char *name, int len) +{ + return (struct aa_profile *)__policy_strn_find(head, name, len); +} + +/** + * aa_find_child - find a profile by @name in @parent + * @parent: profile to search (NOT NULL) + * @name: profile name to search for (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: a refcounted profile or NULL if not found + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + + read_lock(&parent->ns->lock); + profile = aa_get_profile(__find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name)); + read_unlock(&parent->ns->lock); + + /* refcount released by caller */ + return profile; +} + +/** + * __lookup_parent - lookup the parent of a profile of name @hname + * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL) + * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL) + * + * Lookups up the parent of a fully qualified profile name, the profile + * that matches hname does not need to exist, in general this + * is used to load a new profile. + * + * Requires: ns->lock be held + * + * Returns: unrefcounted policy or NULL if not found + */ +static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_namespace *ns, + const char *hname) +{ + struct aa_policy *policy; + struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + char *split; + + policy = &ns->base; + + for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split;) { + profile = __strn_find_child(&policy->profiles, hname, + split - hname); + if (!profile) + return NULL; + policy = &profile->base; + hname = split + 2; + split = strstr(hname, "//"); + } + if (!profile) + return &ns->base; + return &profile->base; +} + +/** + * __lookup_profile - lookup the profile matching @hname + * @base: base list to start looking up profile name from (NOT NULL) + * @hname: hierarchical profile name (NOT NULL) + * + * Requires: ns->lock be held + * + * Returns: unrefcounted profile pointer or NULL if not found + * + * Do a relative name lookup, recursing through profile tree. + */ +static struct aa_profile *__lookup_profile(struct aa_policy *base, + const char *hname) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + char *split; + + for (split = strstr(hname, "//"); split;) { + profile = __strn_find_child(&base->profiles, hname, + split - hname); + if (!profile) + return NULL; + + base = &profile->base; + hname = split + 2; + split = strstr(hname, "//"); + } + + profile = __find_child(&base->profiles, hname); + + return profile; +} + +/** + * aa_lookup_profile - find a profile by its full or partial name + * @ns: the namespace to start from (NOT NULL) + * @hname: name to do lookup on. Does not contain namespace prefix (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_lookup_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + + read_lock(&ns->lock); + profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, hname)); + read_unlock(&ns->lock); + + /* refcount released by caller */ + return profile; +} + +/** + * replacement_allowed - test to see if replacement is allowed + * @profile: profile to test if it can be replaced (MAYBE NULL) + * @noreplace: true if replacement shouldn't be allowed but addition is okay + * @info: Returns - info about why replacement failed (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %0 if replacement allowed else error code + */ +static int replacement_allowed(struct aa_profile *profile, int noreplace, + const char **info) +{ + if (profile) { + if (profile->flags & PFLAG_IMMUTABLE) { + *info = "cannot replace immutible profile"; + return -EPERM; + } else if (noreplace) { + *info = "profile already exists"; + return -EEXIST; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * __add_new_profile - simple wrapper around __list_add_profile + * @ns: namespace that profile is being added to (NOT NULL) + * @policy: the policy container to add the profile to (NOT NULL) + * @profile: profile to add (NOT NULL) + * + * add a profile to a list and do other required basic allocations + */ +static void __add_new_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_policy *policy, + struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + if (policy != &ns->base) + /* released on profile replacement or free_profile */ + profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *) policy); + __list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, profile); + /* released on free_profile */ + profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid(); + profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns); +} + +/** + * aa_audit_policy - Do auditing of policy changes + * @op: policy operation being performed + * @gfp: memory allocation flags + * @name: name of profile being manipulated (NOT NULL) + * @info: any extra information to be audited (MAYBE NULL) + * @error: error code + * + * Returns: the error to be returned after audit is done + */ +static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info, + int error) +{ + struct common_audit_data sa; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad.op = op; + sa.aad.name = name; + sa.aad.info = info; + sa.aad.error = error; + + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, __aa_current_profile(), gfp, + &sa, NULL); +} + +/** + * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy + * @op: the policy manipulation operation being done + * + * Returns: true if the task is allowed to manipulate policy + */ +bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op) +{ + /* check if loading policy is locked out */ + if (aa_g_lock_policy) { + audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "policy_locked", -EACCES); + return 0; + } + + if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/** + * aa_replace_profiles - replace profile(s) on the profile list + * @udata: serialized data stream (NOT NULL) + * @size: size of the serialized data stream + * @noreplace: true if only doing addition, no replacement allowed + * + * unpack and replace a profile on the profile list and uses of that profile + * by any aa_task_cxt. If the profile does not exist on the profile list + * it is added. + * + * Returns: size of data consumed else error code on failure. + */ +ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace) +{ + struct aa_policy *policy; + struct aa_profile *old_profile = NULL, *new_profile = NULL; + struct aa_profile *rename_profile = NULL; + struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL; + const char *ns_name, *name = NULL, *info = NULL; + int op = OP_PROF_REPL; + ssize_t error; + + /* released below */ + new_profile = aa_unpack(udata, size, &ns_name); + if (IS_ERR(new_profile)) { + error = PTR_ERR(new_profile); + new_profile = NULL; + goto fail; + } + + /* released below */ + ns = aa_prepare_namespace(ns_name); + if (!ns) { + info = "failed to prepare namespace"; + error = -ENOMEM; + name = ns_name; + goto fail; + } + + name = new_profile->base.hname; + + write_lock(&ns->lock); + /* no ref on policy only use inside lock */ + policy = __lookup_parent(ns, new_profile->base.hname); + + if (!policy) { + info = "parent does not exist"; + error = -ENOENT; + goto audit; + } + + old_profile = __find_child(&policy->profiles, new_profile->base.name); + /* released below */ + aa_get_profile(old_profile); + + if (new_profile->rename) { + rename_profile = __lookup_profile(&ns->base, + new_profile->rename); + /* released below */ + aa_get_profile(rename_profile); + + if (!rename_profile) { + info = "profile to rename does not exist"; + name = new_profile->rename; + error = -ENOENT; + goto audit; + } + } + + error = replacement_allowed(old_profile, noreplace, &info); + if (error) + goto audit; + + error = replacement_allowed(rename_profile, noreplace, &info); + if (error) + goto audit; + +audit: + if (!old_profile && !rename_profile) + op = OP_PROF_LOAD; + + error = audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, name, info, error); + + if (!error) { + if (rename_profile) + __replace_profile(rename_profile, new_profile); + if (old_profile) { + /* when there are both rename and old profiles + * inherit old profiles sid + */ + if (rename_profile) + aa_free_sid(new_profile->sid); + __replace_profile(old_profile, new_profile); + } + if (!(old_profile || rename_profile)) + __add_new_profile(ns, policy, new_profile); + } + write_unlock(&ns->lock); + +out: + aa_put_namespace(ns); + aa_put_profile(rename_profile); + aa_put_profile(old_profile); + aa_put_profile(new_profile); + if (error) + return error; + return size; + +fail: + error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error); + goto out; +} + +/** + * aa_remove_profiles - remove profile(s) from the system + * @fqname: name of the profile or namespace to remove (NOT NULL) + * @size: size of the name + * + * Remove a profile or sub namespace from the current namespace, so that + * they can not be found anymore and mark them as replaced by unconfined + * + * NOTE: removing confinement does not restore rlimits to preconfinemnet values + * + * Returns: size of data consume else error code if fails + */ +ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size) +{ + struct aa_namespace *root, *ns = NULL; + struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + const char *name = fqname, *info = NULL; + ssize_t error = 0; + + if (*fqname == 0) { + info = "no profile specified"; + error = -ENOENT; + goto fail; + } + + root = aa_current_profile()->ns; + + if (fqname[0] == ':') { + char *ns_name; + name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name); + if (ns_name) { + /* released below */ + ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name); + if (!ns) { + info = "namespace does not exist"; + error = -ENOENT; + goto fail; + } + } + } else + /* released below */ + ns = aa_get_namespace(root); + + write_lock(&ns->lock); + if (!name) { + /* remove namespace - can only happen if fqname[0] == ':' */ + __remove_namespace(ns); + } else { + /* remove profile */ + profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, name)); + if (!profile) { + error = -ENOENT; + info = "profile does not exist"; + goto fail_ns_lock; + } + name = profile->base.hname; + __remove_profile(profile); + } + write_unlock(&ns->lock); + + /* don't fail removal if audit fails */ + (void) audit_policy(OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error); + aa_put_namespace(ns); + aa_put_profile(profile); + return size; + +fail_ns_lock: + write_unlock(&ns->lock); + aa_put_namespace(ns); + +fail: + (void) audit_policy(OP_PROF_RM, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error); + return error; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..eb3700e9fd37 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -0,0 +1,703 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor functions for unpacking policy loaded from + * userspace. + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * AppArmor uses a serialized binary format for loading policy. + * To find policy format documentation look in Documentation/apparmor.txt + * All policy is validated before it is used. + */ + +#include <asm/unaligned.h> +#include <linux/ctype.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/match.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/policy_unpack.h" +#include "include/sid.h" + +/* + * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the + * actual data. The interface has the notion of a a named entry + * which has a name (AA_NAME typecode followed by name string) followed by + * the entries typecode and data. Named types allow for optional + * elements and extensions to be added and tested for without breaking + * backwards compatibility. + */ + +enum aa_code { + AA_U8, + AA_U16, + AA_U32, + AA_U64, + AA_NAME, /* same as string except it is items name */ + AA_STRING, + AA_BLOB, + AA_STRUCT, + AA_STRUCTEND, + AA_LIST, + AA_LISTEND, + AA_ARRAY, + AA_ARRAYEND, +}; + +/* + * aa_ext is the read of the buffer containing the serialized profile. The + * data is copied into a kernel buffer in apparmorfs and then handed off to + * the unpack routines. + */ +struct aa_ext { + void *start; + void *end; + void *pos; /* pointer to current position in the buffer */ + u32 version; +}; + +/* audit callback for unpack fields */ +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + if (sa->aad.iface.target) { + struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad.iface.target; + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname); + } + if (sa->aad.iface.pos) + audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad.iface.pos); +} + +/** + * audit_iface - do audit message for policy unpacking/load/replace/remove + * @new: profile if it has been allocated (MAYBE NULL) + * @name: name of the profile being manipulated (MAYBE NULL) + * @info: any extra info about the failure (MAYBE NULL) + * @e: buffer position info (NOT NULL) + * @error: error code + * + * Returns: %0 or error + */ +static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name, + const char *info, struct aa_ext *e, int error) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); + struct common_audit_data sa; + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; + sa.aad.iface.target = new; + sa.aad.name = name; + sa.aad.info = info; + sa.aad.error = error; + + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, + audit_cb); +} + +/* test if read will be in packed data bounds */ +static bool inbounds(struct aa_ext *e, size_t size) +{ + return (size <= e->end - e->pos); +} + +/** + * aa_u16_chunck - test and do bounds checking for a u16 size based chunk + * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL) + * @chunk: start address for chunk of data (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: the size of chunk found with the read head at the end of the chunk. + */ +static size_t unpack_u16_chunk(struct aa_ext *e, char **chunk) +{ + size_t size = 0; + + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16))) + return 0; + size = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos)); + e->pos += sizeof(u16); + if (!inbounds(e, size)) + return 0; + *chunk = e->pos; + e->pos += size; + return size; +} + +/* unpack control byte */ +static bool unpack_X(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code) +{ + if (!inbounds(e, 1)) + return 0; + if (*(u8 *) e->pos != code) + return 0; + e->pos++; + return 1; +} + +/** + * unpack_nameX - check is the next element is of type X with a name of @name + * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL) + * @code: type code + * @name: name to match to the serialized element. (MAYBE NULL) + * + * check that the next serialized data element is of type X and has a tag + * name @name. If @name is specified then there must be a matching + * name element in the stream. If @name is NULL any name element will be + * skipped and only the typecode will be tested. + * + * Returns 1 on success (both type code and name tests match) and the read + * head is advanced past the headers + * + * Returns: 0 if either match fails, the read head does not move + */ +static bool unpack_nameX(struct aa_ext *e, enum aa_code code, const char *name) +{ + /* + * May need to reset pos if name or type doesn't match + */ + void *pos = e->pos; + /* + * Check for presence of a tagname, and if present name size + * AA_NAME tag value is a u16. + */ + if (unpack_X(e, AA_NAME)) { + char *tag = NULL; + size_t size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &tag); + /* if a name is specified it must match. otherwise skip tag */ + if (name && (!size || strcmp(name, tag))) + goto fail; + } else if (name) { + /* if a name is specified and there is no name tag fail */ + goto fail; + } + + /* now check if type code matches */ + if (unpack_X(e, code)) + return 1; + +fail: + e->pos = pos; + return 0; +} + +static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name) +{ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) { + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u32))) + return 0; + if (data) + *data = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *) e->pos)); + e->pos += sizeof(u32); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static bool unpack_u64(struct aa_ext *e, u64 *data, const char *name) +{ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U64, name)) { + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u64))) + return 0; + if (data) + *data = le64_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u64 *) e->pos)); + e->pos += sizeof(u64); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static size_t unpack_array(struct aa_ext *e, const char *name) +{ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAY, name)) { + int size; + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16))) + return 0; + size = (int)le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos)); + e->pos += sizeof(u16); + return size; + } + return 0; +} + +static size_t unpack_blob(struct aa_ext *e, char **blob, const char *name) +{ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_BLOB, name)) { + u32 size; + if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u32))) + return 0; + size = le32_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u32 *) e->pos)); + e->pos += sizeof(u32); + if (inbounds(e, (size_t) size)) { + *blob = e->pos; + e->pos += size; + return size; + } + } + return 0; +} + +static int unpack_str(struct aa_ext *e, const char **string, const char *name) +{ + char *src_str; + size_t size = 0; + void *pos = e->pos; + *string = NULL; + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRING, name)) { + size = unpack_u16_chunk(e, &src_str); + if (size) { + /* strings are null terminated, length is size - 1 */ + if (src_str[size - 1] != 0) + goto fail; + *string = src_str; + } + } + return size; + +fail: + e->pos = pos; + return 0; +} + +static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name) +{ + const char *tmp; + void *pos = e->pos; + int res = unpack_str(e, &tmp, name); + *string = NULL; + + if (!res) + return 0; + + *string = kmemdup(tmp, res, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*string) { + e->pos = pos; + return 0; + } + + return res; +} + +/** + * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa + * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL) + * @flags: flags governing dfa + * + * Returns: 1 if valid accept tables else 0 if error + */ +static bool verify_accept(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags) +{ + int i; + + /* verify accept permissions */ + for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) { + int mode = ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[i]; + + if (mode & ~DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK) + return 0; + + if (ACCEPT_TABLE2(dfa)[i] & ~DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * unpack_dfa - unpack a file rule dfa + * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL) + * + * returns dfa or ERR_PTR or NULL if no dfa + */ +static struct aa_dfa *unpack_dfa(struct aa_ext *e) +{ + char *blob = NULL; + size_t size; + struct aa_dfa *dfa = NULL; + + size = unpack_blob(e, &blob, "aadfa"); + if (size) { + /* + * The dfa is aligned with in the blob to 8 bytes + * from the beginning of the stream. + */ + size_t sz = blob - (char *)e->start; + size_t pad = ALIGN(sz, 8) - sz; + int flags = TO_ACCEPT1_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32) | + TO_ACCEPT2_FLAG(YYTD_DATA32); + + + if (aa_g_paranoid_load) + flags |= DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES; + + dfa = aa_dfa_unpack(blob + pad, size - pad, flags); + + if (IS_ERR(dfa)) + return dfa; + + if (!verify_accept(dfa, flags)) + goto fail; + } + + return dfa; + +fail: + aa_put_dfa(dfa); + return ERR_PTR(-EPROTO); +} + +/** + * unpack_trans_table - unpack a profile transition table + * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL) + * @profile: profile to add the accept table to (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: 1 if table succesfully unpacked + */ +static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + void *pos = e->pos; + + /* exec table is optional */ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) { + int i, size; + + size = unpack_array(e, NULL); + /* currently 4 exec bits and entries 0-3 are reserved iupcx */ + if (size > 16 - 4) + goto fail; + profile->file.trans.table = kzalloc(sizeof(char *) * size, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!profile->file.trans.table) + goto fail; + + profile->file.trans.size = size; + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + char *str; + int c, j, size = unpack_strdup(e, &str, NULL); + /* unpack_strdup verifies that the last character is + * null termination byte. + */ + if (!size) + goto fail; + profile->file.trans.table[i] = str; + /* verify that name doesn't start with space */ + if (isspace(*str)) + goto fail; + + /* count internal # of internal \0 */ + for (c = j = 0; j < size - 2; j++) { + if (!str[j]) + c++; + } + if (*str == ':') { + /* beginning with : requires an embedded \0, + * verify that exactly 1 internal \0 exists + * trailing \0 already verified by unpack_strdup + */ + if (c != 1) + goto fail; + /* first character after : must be valid */ + if (!str[1]) + goto fail; + } else if (c) + /* fail - all other cases with embedded \0 */ + goto fail; + } + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + } + return 1; + +fail: + aa_free_domain_entries(&profile->file.trans); + e->pos = pos; + return 0; +} + +static bool unpack_rlimits(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + void *pos = e->pos; + + /* rlimits are optional */ + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "rlimits")) { + int i, size; + u32 tmp = 0; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + profile->rlimits.mask = tmp; + + size = unpack_array(e, NULL); + if (size > RLIM_NLIMITS) + goto fail; + for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { + u64 tmp = 0; + int a = aa_map_resource(i); + if (!unpack_u64(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + profile->rlimits.limits[a].rlim_max = tmp; + } + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + } + return 1; + +fail: + e->pos = pos; + return 0; +} + +/** + * unpack_profile - unpack a serialized profile + * @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL) + * + * NOTE: unpack profile sets audit struct if there is a failure + */ +static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + const char *name = NULL; + int error = -EPROTO; + kernel_cap_t tmpcap; + u32 tmp; + + /* check that we have the right struct being passed */ + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "profile")) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_str(e, &name, NULL)) + goto fail; + + profile = aa_alloc_profile(name); + if (!profile) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + /* profile renaming is optional */ + (void) unpack_str(e, &profile->rename, "rename"); + + /* xmatch is optional and may be NULL */ + profile->xmatch = unpack_dfa(e); + if (IS_ERR(profile->xmatch)) { + error = PTR_ERR(profile->xmatch); + profile->xmatch = NULL; + goto fail; + } + /* xmatch_len is not optional if xmatch is set */ + if (profile->xmatch) { + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + profile->xmatch_len = tmp; + } + + /* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */ + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + if (tmp) + profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + if (tmp) + profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) + goto fail; + if (tmp) + profile->audit = AUDIT_ALL; + + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + + /* path_flags is optional */ + if (unpack_u32(e, &profile->path_flags, "path_flags")) + profile->path_flags |= profile->flags & PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED; + else + /* set a default value if path_flags field is not present */ + profile->path_flags = PFLAG_MEDIATE_DELETED; + + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[0]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL)) + goto fail; + + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) { + /* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */ + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[1]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.quiet.cap[1]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(tmpcap.cap[1]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + } + + if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) { + /* optional extended caps mediation mask */ + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL)) + goto fail; + if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL)) + goto fail; + } + + if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) + goto fail; + + /* get file rules */ + profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e); + if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) { + error = PTR_ERR(profile->file.dfa); + profile->file.dfa = NULL; + goto fail; + } + + if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->file.start, "dfa_start")) + /* default start state */ + profile->file.start = DFA_START; + + if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile)) + goto fail; + + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + goto fail; + + return profile; + +fail: + if (profile) + name = NULL; + else if (!name) + name = "unknown"; + audit_iface(profile, name, "failed to unpack profile", e, error); + aa_put_profile(profile); + + return ERR_PTR(error); +} + +/** + * verify_head - unpack serialized stream header + * @e: serialized data read head (NOT NULL) + * @ns: Returns - namespace if one is specified else NULL (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: error or 0 if header is good + */ +static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, const char **ns) +{ + int error = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; + /* get the interface version */ + if (!unpack_u32(e, &e->version, "version")) { + audit_iface(NULL, NULL, "invalid profile format", e, error); + return error; + } + + /* check that the interface version is currently supported */ + if (e->version != 5) { + audit_iface(NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version", e, + error); + return error; + } + + /* read the namespace if present */ + if (!unpack_str(e, ns, "namespace")) + *ns = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size) +{ + int index, xtype; + xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; + index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; + if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index > table_size) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* verify dfa xindexes are in range of transition tables */ +static bool verify_dfa_xindex(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int table_size) +{ + int i; + for (i = 0; i < dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_ACCEPT]->td_lolen; i++) { + if (!verify_xindex(dfa_user_xindex(dfa, i), table_size)) + return 0; + if (!verify_xindex(dfa_other_xindex(dfa, i), table_size)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * verify_profile - Do post unpack analysis to verify profile consistency + * @profile: profile to verify (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: 0 if passes verification else error + */ +static int verify_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) +{ + if (aa_g_paranoid_load) { + if (profile->file.dfa && + !verify_dfa_xindex(profile->file.dfa, + profile->file.trans.size)) { + audit_iface(profile, NULL, "Invalid named transition", + NULL, -EPROTO); + return -EPROTO; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * aa_unpack - unpack packed binary profile data loaded from user space + * @udata: user data copied to kmem (NOT NULL) + * @size: the size of the user data + * @ns: Returns namespace profile is in if specified else NULL (NOT NULL) + * + * Unpack user data and return refcounted allocated profile or ERR_PTR + * + * Returns: profile else error pointer if fails to unpack + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, const char **ns) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; + int error; + struct aa_ext e = { + .start = udata, + .end = udata + size, + .pos = udata, + }; + + error = verify_header(&e, ns); + if (error) + return ERR_PTR(error); + + profile = unpack_profile(&e); + if (IS_ERR(profile)) + return profile; + + error = verify_profile(profile); + if (error) { + aa_put_profile(profile); + profile = ERR_PTR(error); + } + + /* return refcount */ + return profile; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..04a2cf8d1b65 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/ interface functions + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/domain.h" + + +/** + * aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile + * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL) + * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure + * + * Requires: profile != NULL + * + * Creates a string containing the namespace_name://profile_name for + * @profile. + * + * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure + */ +int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string) +{ + char *str; + int len = 0, mode_len = 0, ns_len = 0, name_len; + const char *mode_str = profile_mode_names[profile->mode]; + const char *ns_name = NULL; + struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns; + struct aa_namespace *current_ns = __aa_current_profile()->ns; + char *s; + + if (!aa_ns_visible(current_ns, ns)) + return -EACCES; + + ns_name = aa_ns_name(current_ns, ns); + ns_len = strlen(ns_name); + + /* if the visible ns_name is > 0 increase size for : :// seperator */ + if (ns_len) + ns_len += 4; + + /* unconfined profiles don't have a mode string appended */ + if (!unconfined(profile)) + mode_len = strlen(mode_str) + 3; /* + 3 for _() */ + + name_len = strlen(profile->base.hname); + len = mode_len + ns_len + name_len + 1; /* + 1 for \n */ + s = str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); /* + 1 \0 */ + if (!str) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (ns_len) { + /* skip over prefix current_ns->base.hname and separating // */ + sprintf(s, ":%s://", ns_name); + s += ns_len; + } + if (unconfined(profile)) + /* mode string not being appended */ + sprintf(s, "%s\n", profile->base.hname); + else + sprintf(s, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname, mode_str); + *string = str; + + /* NOTE: len does not include \0 of string, not saved as part of file */ + return len; +} + +/** + * split_token_from_name - separate a string of form <token>^<name> + * @op: operation being checked + * @args: string to parse (NOT NULL) + * @token: stores returned parsed token value (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: start position of name after token else NULL on failure + */ +static char *split_token_from_name(int op, char *args, u64 * token) +{ + char *name; + + *token = simple_strtoull(args, &name, 16); + if ((name == args) || *name != '^') { + AA_ERROR("%s: Invalid input '%s'", op_table[op], args); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + + name++; /* skip ^ */ + if (!*name) + name = NULL; + return name; +} + +/** + * aa_setprocattr_chagnehat - handle procattr interface to change_hat + * @args: args received from writing to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL) + * @size: size of the args + * @test: true if this is a test of change_hat permissions + * + * Returns: %0 or error code if change_hat fails + */ +int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test) +{ + char *hat; + u64 token; + const char *hats[16]; /* current hard limit on # of names */ + int count = 0; + + hat = split_token_from_name(OP_CHANGE_HAT, args, &token); + if (IS_ERR(hat)) + return PTR_ERR(hat); + + if (!hat && !token) { + AA_ERROR("change_hat: Invalid input, NULL hat and NULL magic"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (hat) { + /* set up hat name vector, args guaranteed null terminated + * at args[size] by setprocattr. + * + * If there are multiple hat names in the buffer each is + * separated by a \0. Ie. userspace writes them pre tokenized + */ + char *end = args + size; + for (count = 0; (hat < end) && count < 16; ++count) { + char *next = hat + strlen(hat) + 1; + hats[count] = hat; + hat = next; + } + } + + AA_DEBUG("%s: Magic 0x%llx Hat '%s'\n", + __func__, token, hat ? hat : NULL); + + return aa_change_hat(hats, count, token, test); +} + +/** + * aa_setprocattr_changeprofile - handle procattr interface to changeprofile + * @fqname: args received from writting to /proc/<pid>/attr/current (NOT NULL) + * @onexec: true if change_profile should be delayed until exec + * @test: true if this is a test of change_profile permissions + * + * Returns: %0 or error code if change_profile fails + */ +int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test) +{ + char *name, *ns_name; + + name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name); + return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test); +} + +int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname) +{ + /* TODO: add ipc permission querying */ + return -ENOTSUPP; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4a368f1fd36d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor resource mediation and attachment + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/audit.h> + +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/resource.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + +/* + * Table of rlimit names: we generate it from resource.h. + */ +#include "rlim_names.h" + +/* audit callback for resource specific fields */ +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu", + rlim_names[sa->aad.rlim.rlim], sa->aad.rlim.max); +} + +/** + * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit + * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @resoure: rlimit being auditing + * @value: value being set + * @error: error value + * + * Returns: 0 or sa->error else other error code on failure + */ +static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, + unsigned long value, int error) +{ + struct common_audit_data sa; + + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT, + sa.aad.rlim.rlim = resource; + sa.aad.rlim.max = value; + sa.aad.error = error; + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, + audit_cb); +} + +/** + * aa_map_resouce - map compiled policy resource to internal # + * @resource: flattened policy resource number + * + * Returns: resource # for the current architecture. + * + * rlimit resource can vary based on architecture, map the compiled policy + * resource # to the internal representation for the architecture. + */ +int aa_map_resource(int resource) +{ + return rlim_map[resource]; +} + +/** + * aa_task_setrlimit - test permission to set an rlimit + * @profile - profile confining the task (NOT NULL) + * @resource - the resource being set + * @new_rlim - the new resource limit (NOT NULL) + * + * Control raising the processes hard limit. + * + * Returns: 0 or error code if setting resource failed + */ +int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, + struct rlimit *new_rlim) +{ + int error = 0; + + if (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) && + new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max) + + error = audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, + -EACCES); + + return error; +} + +/** + * __aa_transition_rlimits - apply new profile rlimits + * @old: old profile on task (NOT NULL) + * @new: new profile with rlimits to apply (NOT NULL) + */ +void __aa_transition_rlimits(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new) +{ + unsigned int mask = 0; + struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; + int i; + + /* for any rlimits the profile controlled reset the soft limit + * to the less of the tasks hard limit and the init tasks soft limit + */ + if (old->rlimits.mask) { + for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) { + if (old->rlimits.mask & mask) { + rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; + initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; + rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, + initrlim->rlim_cur); + } + } + } + + /* set any new hard limits as dictated by the new profile */ + if (!new->rlimits.mask) + return; + for (i = 0, mask = 1; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++, mask <<= 1) { + if (!(new->rlimits.mask & mask)) + continue; + + rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; + rlim->rlim_max = min(rlim->rlim_max, + new->rlimits.limits[i].rlim_max); + /* soft limit should not exceed hard limit */ + rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_cur, rlim->rlim_max); + } +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/sid.c b/security/apparmor/sid.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f0b34f76ebef --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/sid.c @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor security identifier (sid) manipulation fns + * + * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + * + * + * AppArmor allocates a unique sid for every profile loaded. If a profile + * is replaced it receives the sid of the profile it is replacing. + * + * The sid value of 0 is invalid. + */ + +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/err.h> + +#include "include/sid.h" + +/* global counter from which sids are allocated */ +static u32 global_sid; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sid_lock); + +/* TODO FIXME: add sid to profile mapping, and sid recycling */ + +/** + * aa_alloc_sid - allocate a new sid for a profile + */ +u32 aa_alloc_sid(void) +{ + u32 sid; + + /* + * TODO FIXME: sid recycling - part of profile mapping table + */ + spin_lock(&sid_lock); + sid = (++global_sid); + spin_unlock(&sid_lock); + return sid; +} + +/** + * aa_free_sid - free a sid + * @sid: sid to free + */ +void aa_free_sid(u32 sid) +{ + ; /* NOP ATM */ +} diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 8168e3ecd5bf..a0bbf30fb6dc 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) return 0; } -static int cap_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static int cap_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return 0; } @@ -268,8 +268,7 @@ static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry, return 0; } -static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs) +static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path) { return 0; } diff --git a/security/inode.c b/security/inode.c index 1c812e874504..8c777f022ad1 100644 --- a/security/inode.c +++ b/security/inode.c @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) { struct inode *inode; - int error = -EPERM; + int error = -ENOMEM; if (dentry->d_inode) return -EEXIST; @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ static int create_by_name(const char *name, mode_t mode, error = mkdir(parent->d_inode, *dentry, mode); else error = create(parent->d_inode, *dentry, mode); + if (error) + dput(*dentry); } else error = PTR_ERR(*dentry); mutex_unlock(&parent->d_inode->i_mutex); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 8fe736aabe71..ef21b96a0b42 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, } static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = { - .read = ima_show_htable_violations + .read = ima_show_htable_violations, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, @@ -57,7 +58,8 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, } static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { - .read = ima_show_measurements_count + .read = ima_show_measurements_count, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; /* returns pointer to hlist_node */ @@ -319,7 +321,8 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { .open = ima_open_policy, .write = ima_write_policy, - .release = ima_release_policy + .release = ima_release_policy, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; int __init ima_fs_init(void) diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 38783dcf6c61..addb67b169f4 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -114,6 +114,10 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, const void *description, key_match_func_t match); +extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, + const void *description, + key_match_func_t match, + const struct cred *cred); extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, const void *description, key_match_func_t match, @@ -134,6 +138,7 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, struct key *dest_keyring, unsigned long flags); +extern int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target); extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags, key_perm_t perm); #define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE 0x01 diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 6261745e4459..b2b0998d6abd 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -505,13 +505,11 @@ okay: ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1, "%s;%d;%d;%08x;%s", - key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->type->name, - key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->uid, - key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->gid, - key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->perm, - key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->description ? - key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->description : "" - ); + key->type->name, + key->uid, + key->gid, + key->perm, + key->description ?: ""); /* include a NUL char at the end of the data */ if (ret > PAGE_SIZE - 1) @@ -1091,7 +1089,7 @@ error: long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout) { struct timespec now; - struct key *key; + struct key *key, *instkey; key_ref_t key_ref; time_t expiry; long ret; @@ -1099,10 +1097,25 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout) key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_SETATTR); if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { + /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted + * if we have the authorisation token handy */ + if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) { + instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id); + if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) { + key_put(instkey); + key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, + KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, + 0); + if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) + goto okay; + } + } + ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); goto error; } +okay: key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */ diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 068b66ea2f1b..70373966816e 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -184,20 +184,36 @@ static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v) static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { + const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); struct timespec now; unsigned long timo; + key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; char xbuf[12]; int rc; + key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0); + + /* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can + * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it + */ + if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) { + skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key, + lookup_user_key_possessed, + cred); + if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) { + key_ref_put(skey_ref); + key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1); + } + } + /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming * non-possession) * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our * access to __current_cred() safe */ - rc = key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, 0), current_cred(), - KEY_VIEW); + rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, KEY_VIEW); if (rc < 0) return 0; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 6b8e4ff4cc68..f8e7251ae2c8 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -309,22 +309,19 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk) /*****************************************************************************/ /* - * search the process keyrings for the first matching key + * search only my process keyrings for the first matching key * - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other * feature of interest) matches * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key * - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys */ -key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, - const void *description, - key_match_func_t match, - const struct cred *cred) +key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, + const void *description, + key_match_func_t match, + const struct cred *cred) { - struct request_key_auth *rka; key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err; - might_sleep(); - /* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key; * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if @@ -424,6 +421,36 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, } } + /* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */ + key_ref = ret ? ret : err; + +found: + return key_ref; +} + +/*****************************************************************************/ +/* + * search the process keyrings for the first matching key + * - we use the supplied match function to see if the description (or other + * feature of interest) matches + * - we return -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key + * - we return -ENOKEY if we found only negative matching keys + */ +key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, + const void *description, + key_match_func_t match, + const struct cred *cred) +{ + struct request_key_auth *rka; + key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err; + + might_sleep(); + + key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(type, description, match, cred); + if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) + goto found; + err = key_ref; + /* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method @@ -446,24 +473,19 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct key_type *type, if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) goto found; - switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) { - case -EAGAIN: /* no key */ - if (ret) - break; - case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */ - ret = key_ref; - break; - default: - err = key_ref; - break; - } + ret = key_ref; } else { up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); } } /* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */ - key_ref = ret ? ret : err; + if (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY)) + key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); + else if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES)) + key_ref = ret; + else + key_ref = err; found: return key_ref; @@ -474,7 +496,7 @@ found: /* * see if the key we're looking at is the target key */ -static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target) +int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target) { return key == target; diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index f5ec9ac5d57c..0d26f689bd77 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ static int call_sbin_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, prkey = 0; if (cred->tgcred->process_keyring) prkey = cred->tgcred->process_keyring->serial; + sprintf(keyring_str[1], "%d", prkey); rcu_read_lock(); session = rcu_dereference(cred->tgcred->session_keyring); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 351942a4ca0e..e8c87b8601b4 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -417,12 +417,11 @@ int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, new_dentry); } -int security_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs) +int security_path_truncate(struct path *path) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode))) return 0; - return security_ops->path_truncate(path, length, time_attrs); + return security_ops->path_truncate(path); } int security_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 7f1a304712a9..9da6420e2056 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) if (!node) goto out; - INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead); INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list); avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations); @@ -489,9 +488,29 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, struct common_audit_data stack_data; u32 denied, audited; denied = requested & ~avd->allowed; - if (denied) + if (denied) { audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; - else if (result) + /* + * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in + * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if + * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that + * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the + * actual permissions that were denied. As an example lets + * assume: + * + * denied == READ + * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) + * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 + * + * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied + * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for + * ACCESS + */ + if (a && + a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny && + !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) + audited = 0; + } else if (result) audited = denied = requested; else audited = requested & avd->auditallow; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 5c9f25ba1c95..9b40f4c0ac70 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -87,9 +87,6 @@ #include "netlabel.h" #include "audit.h" -#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" -#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX - #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); @@ -188,7 +185,7 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) */ static inline u32 current_sid(void) { - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); return tsec->sid; } @@ -279,32 +276,6 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) kfree(sbsec); } -static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) -{ - struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - - sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); - if (!sksec) - return -ENOMEM; - - sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - sk->sk_security = sksec; - - selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); - - return 0; -} - -static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) -{ - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - - sk->sk_security = NULL; - selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); - kfree(sksec); -} - /* The security server must be initialized before any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */ extern int ss_initialized; @@ -1584,8 +1555,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, u16 tclass) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; @@ -1806,27 +1776,9 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) { u32 av = file_to_av(file); - if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { - mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode; - /* - * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' - */ - if (S_ISREG(mode)) - av |= FILE__OPEN; - else if (S_ISCHR(mode)) - av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN; - else if (S_ISBLK(mode)) - av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN; - else if (S_ISFIFO(mode)) - av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN; - else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) - av |= DIR__OPEN; - else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) - av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN; - else - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with " - "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode); - } + if (selinux_policycap_openperm) + av |= FILE__OPEN; + return av; } @@ -2183,8 +2135,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); u32 sid, osid; int atsecure = 0; @@ -2559,8 +2510,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, char **name, void **value, size_t *len) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); struct inode_security_struct *dsec; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid, clen; @@ -2676,14 +2626,26 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); + struct common_audit_data ad; + u32 perms; + bool from_access; - if (!mask) { - /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ + from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; + mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); + + /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ + if (!mask) return 0; - } - return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, - file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); + COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS); + ad.u.fs.inode = inode; + + if (from_access) + ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; + + perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); + + return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) @@ -3671,71 +3633,54 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) } /* socket security operations */ -static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock, - u32 perms) + +static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec; - struct common_audit_data ad; - u32 sid; - int err = 0; + return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid; +} - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; +static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct common_audit_data ad; + u32 tsid = task_sid(task); - if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) - goto out; - sid = task_sid(task); + if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) + return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); - ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk; - err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); + ad.u.net.sk = sk; -out: - return err; + return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; - u32 sid, newsid; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + u32 newsid; u16 secclass; - int err = 0; if (kern) - goto out; - - sid = tsec->sid; - newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid; + return 0; + newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec); secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); - err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); - -out: - return err; + return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); } static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; - struct inode_security_struct *isec; + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); + struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - u32 sid, newsid; int err = 0; - sid = tsec->sid; - newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; - - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - if (kern) isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; - else if (newsid) - isec->sid = newsid; else - isec->sid = sid; + isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec); isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); isec->initialized = 1; @@ -3756,10 +3701,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { + struct sock *sk = sock->sk; u16 family; int err; - err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND); + err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND); if (err) goto out; @@ -3768,19 +3714,16 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just * check the first address now. */ - family = sock->sk->sk_family; + family = sk->sk_family; if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { char *addrp; - struct inode_security_struct *isec; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; - struct sock *sk = sock->sk; u32 sid, node_perm; - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - if (family == PF_INET) { addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); @@ -3804,15 +3747,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = family; - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, - isec->sclass, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, + sksec->sclass, SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); if (err) goto out; } } - switch (isec->sclass) { + switch (sksec->sclass) { case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; break; @@ -3843,8 +3786,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in else ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr); - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, - isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, + sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; } @@ -3855,19 +3798,18 @@ out: static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct inode_security_struct *isec; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; int err; - err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT); + err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); if (err) return err; /* * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. */ - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || - isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { + if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || + sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; @@ -3890,13 +3832,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, if (err) goto out; - perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? + perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad); + err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); if (err) goto out; } @@ -3909,7 +3851,7 @@ out: static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN); + return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); } static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) @@ -3918,7 +3860,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct inode_security_struct *newisec; - err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT); + err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); if (err) return err; @@ -3935,30 +3877,30 @@ static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE); + return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); } static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ); + return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); } static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); + return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR); + return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); } static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { int err; - err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT); + err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); if (err) return err; @@ -3968,68 +3910,58 @@ static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT); + return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); } static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) { - return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); + return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); } static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - struct inode_security_struct *isec; - struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; int err; - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; - COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass, + err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, + sksec_other->sclass, UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); if (err) return err; - /* connecting socket */ - sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; - sksec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid; - /* server child socket */ - sksec = newsk->sk_security; - sksec->peer_sid = isec->sid; - err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, sksec->peer_sid, &sksec->sid); + sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; + err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, + &sksec_new->sid); + if (err) + return err; - return err; + /* connecting socket */ + sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; + + return 0; } static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec; - struct inode_security_struct *other_isec; + struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; - int err; - - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; - err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid, - isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad); - if (err) - return err; - - return 0; + return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, + &ad); } static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family, @@ -4168,26 +4100,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op int err = 0; char *scontext; u32 scontext_len; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - struct inode_security_struct *isec; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; - - if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || - isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) { - sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || + sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; - } - if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) { - err = -ENOPROTOOPT; - goto out; - } + if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) + return -ENOPROTOOPT; err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); - if (err) - goto out; + return err; if (scontext_len > len) { err = -ERANGE; @@ -4200,9 +4124,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op out_len: if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) err = -EFAULT; - kfree(scontext); -out: return err; } @@ -4234,12 +4156,27 @@ out: static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { - return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec; + + sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); + if (!sksec) + return -ENOMEM; + + sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); + sk->sk_security = sksec; + + return 0; } static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { - sk_free_security(sk); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + + sk->sk_security = NULL; + selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); + kfree(sksec); } static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) @@ -4399,8 +4336,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) int err = 0; u32 perm; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; - struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket; - struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) { err = -EINVAL; @@ -4408,13 +4344,13 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) } nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); - err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); + err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); if (err) { if (err == -EINVAL) { audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message" " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n", - nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass); + nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass); if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) err = 0; } @@ -4425,7 +4361,7 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) goto out; } - err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm); + err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm); out: return err; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 8b32e959bb2e..b4c9eb4bd6f9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append" #define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \ - "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton" + "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \ + "open", "execmod" #define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \ "listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \ @@ -43,22 +44,21 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "quotaget", NULL } }, { "file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, - "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } }, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } }, { "dir", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", - "reparent", "search", "rmdir", "open", NULL } }, + "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } }, { "fd", { "use", NULL } }, { "lnk_file", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { "chr_file", - { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, - "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execmod", "open", NULL } }, + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { "blk_file", - { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } }, + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { "sock_file", - { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } }, + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { "fifo_file", - { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "open", NULL } }, + { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } }, { "socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, { "tcp_socket", diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index dc92792271f1..65ebfe954f85 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -183,8 +183,6 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node) BUG(); } - INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rcu); - /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds */ list_add_rcu(&node->list, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 0293843f7eda..79a1bb635662 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = { .read = sel_read_enforce, .write = sel_write_enforce, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, @@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = { .read = sel_read_handle_unknown, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE @@ -251,6 +253,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = { .write = sel_write_disable, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, @@ -265,6 +268,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = { .read = sel_read_policyvers, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; /* declaration for sel_write_load */ @@ -289,6 +293,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static const struct file_operations sel_mls_ops = { .read = sel_read_mls, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, @@ -356,6 +361,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = { .write = sel_write_load, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) @@ -437,6 +443,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_checkreqprot_ops = { .read = sel_read_checkreqprot, .write = sel_write_checkreqprot, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; /* @@ -482,6 +489,7 @@ static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = { .write = selinux_transaction_write, .read = simple_transaction_read, .release = simple_transaction_release, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; /* @@ -883,6 +891,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_bool_ops = { .read = sel_read_bool, .write = sel_write_bool, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, @@ -935,6 +944,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_commit_bools_ops = { .write = sel_commit_bools_write, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de) @@ -1127,10 +1137,12 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = { .read = sel_read_avc_cache_threshold, .write = sel_write_avc_cache_threshold, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static const struct file_operations sel_avc_hash_stats_ops = { .read = sel_read_avc_hash_stats, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS @@ -1255,6 +1267,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf, static const struct file_operations sel_initcon_ops = { .read = sel_read_initcon, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir) @@ -1330,6 +1343,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = { .read = sel_read_class, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf, @@ -1354,6 +1368,7 @@ out: static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = { .read = sel_read_perm, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf, @@ -1372,6 +1387,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf, static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = { .read = sel_read_policycap, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index 1215b8e47dba..929480c6c430 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -342,20 +342,20 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) { rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) { + if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); - return -1; + return rc; } items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]); if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2); - if (rc < 0) { + if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); - return -1; + return rc; } items = 0; @@ -363,19 +363,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, key.source_type = (u16)val; if (key.source_type != val) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]); key.target_type = (u16)val; if (key.target_type != val) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]); key.target_class = (u16)val; if (key.target_class != val) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]); @@ -383,12 +383,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: null entry\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } if ((val & AVTAB_AV) && (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) { @@ -403,15 +403,15 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, if (items != items2) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } return 0; } rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4); - if (rc < 0) { + if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); - return -1; + return rc; } items = 0; @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) || !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } set = 0; @@ -434,19 +434,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol, } if (!set || set > 1) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) { + if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n"); - return -1; + return rc; } datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32); if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) && !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n"); - return -1; + return -EINVAL; } return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p); } @@ -487,8 +487,7 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol) printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n"); else if (rc == -EEXIST) printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n"); - else - rc = -EINVAL; + goto bad; } } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c index 4a4e35cac22b..c91e150c3087 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c @@ -117,10 +117,14 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node) int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p) { + int rc; + p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL; p->cond_list = NULL; - if (avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab)) - return -1; + + rc = avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab); + if (rc) + return rc; return 0; } @@ -219,34 +223,37 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!booldatum) - return -1; + return -ENOMEM; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); - if (rc < 0) + if (rc) goto err; booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + rc = -EINVAL; if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum)) goto err; len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); + rc = -ENOMEM; key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) goto err; rc = next_entry(key, fp, len); - if (rc < 0) + if (rc) goto err; key[len] = '\0'; - if (hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum)) + rc = hashtab_insert(h, key, booldatum); + if (rc) goto err; return 0; err: cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL); - return -1; + return rc; } struct cond_insertf_data { @@ -263,7 +270,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum struct cond_av_list *other = data->other, *list, *cur; struct avtab_node *node_ptr; u8 found; - + int rc = -EINVAL; /* * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any @@ -313,12 +320,15 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d); if (!node_ptr) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: could not insert rule.\n"); + rc = -ENOMEM; goto err; } list = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!list) + if (!list) { + rc = -ENOMEM; goto err; + } list->node = node_ptr; if (!data->head) @@ -331,7 +341,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum err: cond_av_list_destroy(data->head); data->head = NULL; - return -1; + return rc; } static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list, struct cond_av_list *other) @@ -345,8 +355,8 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list * len = 0; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - return -1; + if (rc) + return rc; len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); if (len == 0) @@ -361,7 +371,6 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list * &data); if (rc) return rc; - } *ret_list = data.head; @@ -390,24 +399,25 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp) struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - return -1; + if (rc) + return rc; node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); len = 0; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - return -1; + if (rc) + return rc; /* expr */ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2); - if (rc < 0) + if (rc) goto err; + rc = -ENOMEM; expr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL); if (!expr) goto err; @@ -416,6 +426,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp) expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) { + rc = -EINVAL; kfree(expr); goto err; } @@ -427,14 +438,16 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp) last = expr; } - if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL) != 0) + rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL); + if (rc) goto err; - if (cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list) != 0) + rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list); + if (rc) goto err; return 0; err: cond_node_destroy(node); - return -1; + return rc; } int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp) @@ -445,8 +458,8 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp) int rc; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); - if (rc < 0) - return -1; + if (rc) + return rc; len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); @@ -455,11 +468,13 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp) goto err; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + rc = -ENOMEM; node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL); if (!node) goto err; - if (cond_read_node(p, node, fp) != 0) + rc = cond_read_node(p, node, fp); + if (rc) goto err; if (i == 0) @@ -472,7 +487,7 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp) err: cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list); p->cond_list = NULL; - return -1; + return rc; } /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index c57802a164d5..3a29704be8ce 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/flex_array.h> #include "security.h" #include "policydb.h" @@ -655,6 +656,9 @@ static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p) static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i) { + if (!c) + return; + context_destroy(&c->context[0]); context_destroy(&c->context[1]); if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS || @@ -736,11 +740,17 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) hashtab_map(p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL); hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr); - if (p->type_attr_map) { - for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) - ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map[i]); + if (p->type_attr_map_array) { + for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) { + struct ebitmap *e; + + e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i); + if (!e) + continue; + ebitmap_destroy(e); + } + flex_array_free(p->type_attr_map_array); } - kfree(p->type_attr_map); ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps); ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map); @@ -1701,6 +1711,333 @@ u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name) return 1U << (perdatum->value-1); } +static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) +{ + struct range_trans *rt = NULL; + struct mls_range *r = NULL; + int i, rc; + __le32 buf[2]; + u32 nel; + + if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) + return 0; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rt) + goto out; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + } else + rt->target_class = p->process_class; + + rc = -EINVAL; + if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) || + !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) || + !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class)) + goto out; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!r) + goto out; + + rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = -EINVAL; + if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n"); + goto out; + } + + rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rt = NULL; + r = NULL; + } + rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr); + rc = 0; +out: + kfree(rt); + kfree(r); + return rc; +} + +static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) +{ + int i, j, rc; + u32 nel, nel2, len, len2; + __le32 buf[1]; + struct ocontext *l, *c; + struct ocontext *newc = NULL; + struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs; + struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + rc = -ENOMEM; + newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!newgenfs) + goto out; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!newgenfs->fstype) + goto out; + + rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len); + if (rc) + goto out; + + newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0; + + for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs; + genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) { + rc = -EINVAL; + if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) { + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n", + newgenfs->fstype); + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0) + break; + } + newgenfs->next = genfs; + if (genfs_p) + genfs_p->next = newgenfs; + else + p->genfs = newgenfs; + genfs = newgenfs; + newgenfs = NULL; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + rc = -ENOMEM; + newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!newc) + goto out; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!newc->u.name) + goto out; + + rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len); + if (rc) + goto out; + newc->u.name[len] = 0; + + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + + for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c; + l = c, c = c->next) { + rc = -EINVAL; + if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) && + (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass || + newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n", + genfs->fstype, c->u.name); + goto out; + } + len = strlen(newc->u.name); + len2 = strlen(c->u.name); + if (len > len2) + break; + } + + newc->next = c; + if (l) + l->next = newc; + else + genfs->head = newc; + newc = NULL; + } + } + rc = 0; +out: + if (newgenfs) + kfree(newgenfs->fstype); + kfree(newgenfs); + ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE); + + return rc; +} + +static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info, + void *fp) +{ + int i, j, rc; + u32 nel, len; + __le32 buf[3]; + struct ocontext *l, *c; + u32 nodebuf[8]; + + for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) { + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + l = NULL; + for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!c) + goto out; + if (l) + l->next = c; + else + p->ocontexts[i] = c; + l = c; + + switch (i) { + case OCON_ISID: + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + + c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + break; + case OCON_FS: + case OCON_NETIF: + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); + if (rc) + goto out; + len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + + rc = -ENOMEM; + c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!c->u.name) + goto out; + + rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len); + if (rc) + goto out; + + c->u.name[len] = 0; + rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + break; + case OCON_PORT: + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3); + if (rc) + goto out; + c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); + rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + break; + case OCON_NODE: + rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2); + if (rc) + goto out; + c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */ + c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */ + rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + break; + case OCON_FSUSE: + rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = -EINVAL; + c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); + if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE) + goto out; + + rc = -ENOMEM; + len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!c->u.name) + goto out; + + rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len); + if (rc) + goto out; + c->u.name[len] = 0; + rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + break; + case OCON_NODE6: { + int k; + + rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8); + if (rc) + goto out; + for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) + c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k]; + for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) + c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4]; + rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); + if (rc) + goto out; + break; + } + } + } + } + rc = 0; +out: + return rc; +} + /* * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary * representation file into a policy database structure. @@ -1709,16 +2046,12 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) { struct role_allow *ra, *lra; struct role_trans *tr, *ltr; - struct ocontext *l, *c, *newc; - struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs, *newgenfs; int i, j, rc; __le32 buf[4]; - u32 nodebuf[8]; - u32 len, len2, nprim, nel, nel2; + u32 len, nprim, nel; + char *policydb_str; struct policydb_compat_info *info; - struct range_trans *rt; - struct mls_range *r; rc = policydb_init(p); if (rc) @@ -1919,294 +2252,45 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) if (!p->process_trans_perms) goto bad; - for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) { - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - l = NULL; - for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) { - c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!c) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad; - } - if (l) - l->next = c; - else - p->ocontexts[i] = c; - l = c; - rc = -EINVAL; - switch (i) { - case OCON_ISID: - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); - if (rc) - goto bad; - break; - case OCON_FS: - case OCON_NETIF: - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!c->u.name) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad; - } - rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - c->u.name[len] = 0; - rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); - if (rc) - goto bad; - rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp); - if (rc) - goto bad; - break; - case OCON_PORT: - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); - c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]); - rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); - if (rc) - goto bad; - break; - case OCON_NODE: - rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */ - c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */ - rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); - if (rc) - goto bad; - break; - case OCON_FSUSE: - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE) - goto bad; - len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); - c->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!c->u.name) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad; - } - rc = next_entry(c->u.name, fp, len); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - c->u.name[len] = 0; - rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp); - if (rc) - goto bad; - break; - case OCON_NODE6: { - int k; - - rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) - c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k]; - for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) - c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4]; - if (context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp)) - goto bad; - break; - } - } - } - } - - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) + rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp); + if (rc) goto bad; - nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - genfs_p = NULL; - rc = -EINVAL; - for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!newgenfs) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad; - } - newgenfs->fstype = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!newgenfs->fstype) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - kfree(newgenfs); - goto bad; - } - rc = next_entry(newgenfs->fstype, fp, len); - if (rc < 0) { - kfree(newgenfs->fstype); - kfree(newgenfs); - goto bad; - } - newgenfs->fstype[len] = 0; - for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs; - genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) { - if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs " - "fstype %s\n", newgenfs->fstype); - kfree(newgenfs->fstype); - kfree(newgenfs); - goto bad; - } - if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0) - break; - } - newgenfs->next = genfs; - if (genfs_p) - genfs_p->next = newgenfs; - else - p->genfs = newgenfs; - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) { - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - - newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!newc) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad; - } - - newc->u.name = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!newc->u.name) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad_newc; - } - rc = next_entry(newc->u.name, fp, len); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad_newc; - newc->u.name[len] = 0; - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad_newc; - newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - if (context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp)) - goto bad_newc; - for (l = NULL, c = newgenfs->head; c; - l = c, c = c->next) { - if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) && - (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass || - newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) { - printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs " - "entry (%s,%s)\n", - newgenfs->fstype, c->u.name); - goto bad_newc; - } - len = strlen(newc->u.name); - len2 = strlen(c->u.name); - if (len > len2) - break; - } + rc = genfs_read(p, fp); + if (rc) + goto bad; - newc->next = c; - if (l) - l->next = newc; - else - newgenfs->head = newc; - } - } + rc = range_read(p, fp); + if (rc) + goto bad; - if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) { - int new_rangetr = p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS; - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) - goto bad; - nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { - rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rt) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad; - } - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2)); - if (rc < 0) { - kfree(rt); - goto bad; - } - rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); - if (new_rangetr) { - rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); - if (rc < 0) { - kfree(rt); - goto bad; - } - rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); - } else - rt->target_class = p->process_class; - if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) || - !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) || - !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class)) { - kfree(rt); - rc = -EINVAL; - goto bad; - } - r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!r) { - kfree(rt); - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto bad; - } - rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp); - if (rc) { - kfree(rt); - kfree(r); - goto bad; - } - if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n"); - kfree(rt); - kfree(r); - goto bad; - } - rc = hashtab_insert(p->range_tr, rt, r); - if (rc) { - kfree(rt); - kfree(r); - goto bad; - } - } - rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr); - } + rc = -ENOMEM; + p->type_attr_map_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct ebitmap), + p->p_types.nprim, + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (!p->type_attr_map_array) + goto bad; - p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!p->type_attr_map) + /* preallocate so we don't have to worry about the put ever failing */ + rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_attr_map_array, 0, p->p_types.nprim - 1, + GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + if (rc) goto bad; for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) { - ebitmap_init(&p->type_attr_map[i]); + struct ebitmap *e = flex_array_get(p->type_attr_map_array, i); + + BUG_ON(!e); + ebitmap_init(e); if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) { - if (ebitmap_read(&p->type_attr_map[i], fp)) + rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp); + if (rc) goto bad; } /* add the type itself as the degenerate case */ - if (ebitmap_set_bit(&p->type_attr_map[i], i, 1)) - goto bad; + rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1); + if (rc) + goto bad; } rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p); @@ -2216,8 +2300,6 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = 0; out: return rc; -bad_newc: - ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE); bad: if (!rc) rc = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index 26d9adf8542b..310e94442cb8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_ #define _SS_POLICYDB_H_ +#include <linux/flex_array.h> + #include "symtab.h" #include "avtab.h" #include "sidtab.h" @@ -246,7 +248,7 @@ struct policydb { struct hashtab *range_tr; /* type -> attribute reverse mapping */ - struct ebitmap *type_attr_map; + struct flex_array *type_attr_map_array; struct ebitmap policycaps; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 1de60ce90d9a..9ea2feca3cd4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/selinux.h> +#include <linux/flex_array.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include "flask.h" @@ -626,8 +627,10 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, */ avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV; - sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1]; - tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1]; + sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1); + BUG_ON(!sattr); + tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1); + BUG_ON(!tattr); ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) { ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) { avkey.source_type = i + 1; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c index bcf9f620426e..160326ee99e5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size) { s->table = hashtab_create(symhash, symcmp, size); if (!s->table) - return -1; + return -ENOMEM; s->nprim = 0; return 0; } diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index c6e9acae72e4..43ae747a5aa4 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -123,16 +123,6 @@ struct smack_known { #define SMK_FSHAT "smackfshat=" #define SMK_FSROOT "smackfsroot=" -/* - * xattr names - */ -#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX "SMACK64" -#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN "SMACK64IPIN" -#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN -#define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT - #define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION "-CIPSO" /* diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 0f2fc480fc61..9192ba366a4c 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -598,6 +598,8 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { struct smk_audit_info ad; + + mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); /* * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there. */ @@ -2191,7 +2193,7 @@ static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid) /** * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode - * @opt_dentry: unused + * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached * @inode: the object * * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already. @@ -2310,20 +2312,10 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) /* * Get the dentry for xattr. */ - if (opt_dentry == NULL) { - dp = d_find_alias(inode); - if (dp == NULL) - break; - } else { - dp = dget(opt_dentry); - if (dp == NULL) - break; - } - + dp = dget(opt_dentry); fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp); if (fetched != NULL) final = fetched; - dput(dp); break; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile index 4fb39030f6bd..91640e96bd06 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile +++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile @@ -1 +1 @@ -obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o gc.o path_group.o +obj-y = common.o domain.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index b5dbdc9ff73c..ef43995119a4 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -3,974 +3,424 @@ * * Common functions for TOMOYO. * - * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION - * - * Version: 2.2.0 2009/04/01 - * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION */ #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> -#include <linux/hardirq.h> #include "common.h" -/* Lock for protecting policy. */ -DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_policy_lock); +static struct tomoyo_profile tomoyo_default_profile = { + .learning = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference, + .permissive = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference, + .enforcing = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference, + .preference.enforcing_verbose = true, + .preference.learning_max_entry = 2048, + .preference.learning_verbose = false, + .preference.permissive_verbose = true +}; + +/* Profile version. Currently only 20090903 is defined. */ +static unsigned int tomoyo_profile_version; -/* Has loading policy done? */ -bool tomoyo_policy_loaded; +/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */ +static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_profile_ptr[TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES]; /* String table for functionality that takes 4 modes. */ -static const char *tomoyo_mode_4[4] = { +static const char *tomoyo_mode[4] = { "disabled", "learning", "permissive", "enforcing" }; -/* String table for functionality that takes 2 modes. */ -static const char *tomoyo_mode_2[4] = { - "disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled" -}; -/* - * tomoyo_control_array is a static data which contains - * - * (1) functionality name used by /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile . - * (2) initial values for "struct tomoyo_profile". - * (3) max values for "struct tomoyo_profile". - */ -static struct { - const char *keyword; - unsigned int current_value; - const unsigned int max_value; -} tomoyo_control_array[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX] = { - [TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE] = { "MAC_FOR_FILE", 0, 3 }, - [TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY] = { "MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY", 2048, INT_MAX }, - [TOMOYO_VERBOSE] = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE", 1, 1 }, +/* String table for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */ +static const char *tomoyo_mac_keywords[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX] = { + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE] = "file::execute", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN] = "file::open", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CREATE] = "file::create", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UNLINK] = "file::unlink", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKDIR] = "file::mkdir", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RMDIR] = "file::rmdir", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKFIFO] = "file::mkfifo", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKSOCK] = "file::mksock", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_TRUNCATE] = "file::truncate", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SYMLINK] = "file::symlink", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_REWRITE] = "file::rewrite", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKBLOCK] = "file::mkblock", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR] = "file::mkchar", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK] = "file::link", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME] = "file::rename", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD] = "file::chmod", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN] = "file::chown", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP] = "file::chgrp", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_IOCTL] = "file::ioctl", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHROOT] = "file::chroot", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT] = "file::mount", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UMOUNT] = "file::umount", + [TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT] = "file::pivot_root", + [TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE] = "file", }; -/* - * tomoyo_profile is a structure which is used for holding the mode of access - * controls. TOMOYO has 4 modes: disabled, learning, permissive, enforcing. - * An administrator can define up to 256 profiles. - * The ->profile of "struct tomoyo_domain_info" is used for remembering - * the profile's number (0 - 255) assigned to that domain. - */ -static struct tomoyo_profile { - unsigned int value[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX]; - const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment; -} *tomoyo_profile_ptr[TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES]; - /* Permit policy management by non-root user? */ static bool tomoyo_manage_by_non_root; /* Utility functions. */ -/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ -static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file); -/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ -static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file); -/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ -static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, - const int buffer_len); -/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ -static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, - const int buffer_len); - /** - * tomoyo_parse_name_union - Parse a tomoyo_name_union. + * tomoyo_yesno - Return "yes" or "no". * - * @filename: Name or name group. - * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + * @value: Bool value. */ -bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename, - struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) +static const char *tomoyo_yesno(const unsigned int value) { - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0)) - return false; - if (filename[0] == '@') { - ptr->group = tomoyo_get_path_group(filename + 1); - ptr->is_group = true; - return ptr->group != NULL; - } - ptr->filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename); - ptr->is_group = false; - return ptr->filename != NULL; + return value ? "yes" : "no"; } -/** - * tomoyo_print_name_union - Print a tomoyo_name_union. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - */ -static bool tomoyo_print_name_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, - const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) +static void tomoyo_addprintf(char *buffer, int len, const char *fmt, ...) { - int pos = head->read_avail; - if (pos && head->read_buf[pos - 1] == ' ') - head->read_avail--; - if (ptr->is_group) - return tomoyo_io_printf(head, " @%s", - ptr->group->group_name->name); - return tomoyo_io_printf(head, " %s", ptr->filename->name); + va_list args; + const int pos = strlen(buffer); + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buffer + pos, len - pos - 1, fmt, args); + va_end(args); } /** - * tomoyo_is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value. - * - * @str: Pointer to the string. + * tomoyo_flush - Flush queued string to userspace's buffer. * - * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise. + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * - * TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF. - * This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range. + * Returns true if all data was flushed, false otherwise. */ -static inline bool tomoyo_is_byte_range(const char *str) +static bool tomoyo_flush(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' && - *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' && - *str >= '0' && *str <= '7'; + while (head->r.w_pos) { + const char *w = head->r.w[0]; + int len = strlen(w); + if (len) { + if (len > head->read_user_buf_avail) + len = head->read_user_buf_avail; + if (!len) + return false; + if (copy_to_user(head->read_user_buf, w, len)) + return false; + head->read_user_buf_avail -= len; + head->read_user_buf += len; + w += len; + } + if (*w) { + head->r.w[0] = w; + return false; + } + /* Add '\0' for query. */ + if (head->poll) { + if (!head->read_user_buf_avail || + copy_to_user(head->read_user_buf, "", 1)) + return false; + head->read_user_buf_avail--; + head->read_user_buf++; + } + head->r.w_pos--; + for (len = 0; len < head->r.w_pos; len++) + head->r.w[len] = head->r.w[len + 1]; + } + head->r.avail = 0; + return true; } /** - * tomoyo_is_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet. + * tomoyo_set_string - Queue string to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure. * - * @c: The character to check. + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @string: String to print. * - * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise. + * Note that @string has to be kept valid until @head is kfree()d. + * This means that char[] allocated on stack memory cannot be passed to + * this function. Use tomoyo_io_printf() for char[] allocated on stack memory. */ -static inline bool tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(const char c) +static void tomoyo_set_string(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *string) { - return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'); + if (head->r.w_pos < TOMOYO_MAX_IO_READ_QUEUE) { + head->r.w[head->r.w_pos++] = string; + tomoyo_flush(head); + } else + WARN_ON(1); } /** - * tomoyo_make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters. + * tomoyo_io_printf - printf() to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure. * - * @c1: The first character. - * @c2: The second character. - * @c3: The third character. - * - * Returns byte value. + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters. */ -static inline u8 tomoyo_make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3) +void tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...) { - return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0'); + va_list args; + int len; + int pos = head->r.avail; + int size = head->readbuf_size - pos; + if (size <= 0) + return; + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args) + 1; + va_end(args); + if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size) { + WARN_ON(1); + return; + } + head->r.avail += len; + tomoyo_set_string(head, head->read_buf + pos); } -/** - * tomoyo_str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword. - * - * @src: Pointer to pointer to the string. - * @find: Pointer to the keyword. - * - * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise. - * - * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find - * if @src starts with @find. - */ -static bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find) +static void tomoyo_set_space(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - const int len = strlen(find); - char *tmp = *src; - - if (strncmp(tmp, find, len)) - return false; - tmp += len; - *src = tmp; - return true; + tomoyo_set_string(head, " "); } -/** - * tomoyo_normalize_line - Format string. - * - * @buffer: The line to normalize. - * - * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed. - * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space. - * - * Returns nothing. - */ -static void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer) +static bool tomoyo_set_lf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - unsigned char *sp = buffer; - unsigned char *dp = buffer; - bool first = true; - - while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp)) - sp++; - while (*sp) { - if (!first) - *dp++ = ' '; - first = false; - while (tomoyo_is_valid(*sp)) - *dp++ = *sp++; - while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp)) - sp++; - } - *dp = '\0'; + tomoyo_set_string(head, "\n"); + return !head->r.w_pos; } /** - * tomoyo_tokenize - Tokenize string. - * - * @buffer: The line to tokenize. - * @w: Pointer to "char *". - * @size: Sizeof @w . + * tomoyo_print_name_union - Print a tomoyo_name_union. * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union". */ -bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size) +static void tomoyo_print_name_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) { - int count = size / sizeof(char *); - int i; - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) - w[i] = ""; - for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - char *cp = strchr(buffer, ' '); - if (cp) - *cp = '\0'; - w[i] = buffer; - if (!cp) - break; - buffer = cp + 1; + tomoyo_set_space(head); + if (ptr->is_group) { + tomoyo_set_string(head, "@"); + tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->group->group_name->name); + } else { + tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->filename->name); } - return i < count || !*buffer; } /** - * tomoyo_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname. - * @filename: The pathname to check. - * @start_type: Should the pathname start with '/'? - * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care - * @pattern_type: Can the pathname contain a wildcard? - * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care - * @end_type: Should the pathname end with '/'? - * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care - * - * Check whether the given filename follows the naming rules. - * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + * tomoyo_print_number_union - Print a tomoyo_number_union. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union". */ -bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type, - const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type) +static void tomoyo_print_number_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr) { - const char *const start = filename; - bool in_repetition = false; - bool contains_pattern = false; - unsigned char c; - unsigned char d; - unsigned char e; - - if (!filename) - goto out; - c = *filename; - if (start_type == 1) { /* Must start with '/' */ - if (c != '/') - goto out; - } else if (start_type == -1) { /* Must not start with '/' */ - if (c == '/') - goto out; - } - if (c) - c = *(filename + strlen(filename) - 1); - if (end_type == 1) { /* Must end with '/' */ - if (c != '/') - goto out; - } else if (end_type == -1) { /* Must not end with '/' */ - if (c == '/') - goto out; - } - while (1) { - c = *filename++; - if (!c) - break; - if (c == '\\') { - c = *filename++; - switch (c) { - case '\\': /* "\\" */ - continue; - case '$': /* "\$" */ - case '+': /* "\+" */ - case '?': /* "\?" */ - case '*': /* "\*" */ - case '@': /* "\@" */ - case 'x': /* "\x" */ - case 'X': /* "\X" */ - case 'a': /* "\a" */ - case 'A': /* "\A" */ - case '-': /* "\-" */ - if (pattern_type == -1) - break; /* Must not contain pattern */ - contains_pattern = true; - continue; - case '{': /* "/\{" */ - if (filename - 3 < start || - *(filename - 3) != '/') - break; - if (pattern_type == -1) - break; /* Must not contain pattern */ - contains_pattern = true; - in_repetition = true; - continue; - case '}': /* "\}/" */ - if (*filename != '/') - break; - if (!in_repetition) - break; - in_repetition = false; - continue; - case '0': /* "\ooo" */ - case '1': - case '2': - case '3': - d = *filename++; - if (d < '0' || d > '7') - break; - e = *filename++; - if (e < '0' || e > '7') - break; - c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e); - if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) - continue; /* pattern is not \000 */ + tomoyo_set_space(head); + if (ptr->is_group) { + tomoyo_set_string(head, "@"); + tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->group->group_name->name); + } else { + int i; + unsigned long min = ptr->values[0]; + const unsigned long max = ptr->values[1]; + u8 min_type = ptr->min_type; + const u8 max_type = ptr->max_type; + char buffer[128]; + buffer[0] = '\0'; + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + switch (min_type) { + case TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL: + tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + "0x%lX", min); + break; + case TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL: + tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + "0%lo", min); + break; + default: + tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), + "%lu", min); + break; } - goto out; - } else if (in_repetition && c == '/') { - goto out; - } else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) { - goto out; + if (min == max && min_type == max_type) + break; + tomoyo_addprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "-"); + min_type = max_type; + min = max; } + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s", buffer); } - if (pattern_type == 1) { /* Must contain pattern */ - if (!contains_pattern) - goto out; - } - if (in_repetition) - goto out; - return true; - out: - return false; } /** - * tomoyo_is_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules. - * @domainname: The domainname to check. + * tomoyo_assign_profile - Create a new profile. * - * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + * @profile: Profile number to create. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise. */ -bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname) +static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_assign_profile(const unsigned int profile) { - unsigned char c; - unsigned char d; - unsigned char e; - - if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, - TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN)) + struct tomoyo_profile *ptr; + struct tomoyo_profile *entry; + if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) + return NULL; + ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]; + if (ptr) + return ptr; + entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS); + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) goto out; - domainname += TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN; - if (!*domainname) - return true; - do { - if (*domainname++ != ' ') - goto out; - if (*domainname++ != '/') - goto out; - while ((c = *domainname) != '\0' && c != ' ') { - domainname++; - if (c == '\\') { - c = *domainname++; - switch ((c)) { - case '\\': /* "\\" */ - continue; - case '0': /* "\ooo" */ - case '1': - case '2': - case '3': - d = *domainname++; - if (d < '0' || d > '7') - break; - e = *domainname++; - if (e < '0' || e > '7') - break; - c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e); - if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) - /* pattern is not \000 */ - continue; - } - goto out; - } else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) { - goto out; - } - } - } while (*domainname); - return true; + ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]; + if (!ptr && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) { + ptr = entry; + ptr->learning = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference; + ptr->permissive = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference; + ptr->enforcing = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference; + ptr->default_config = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED; + memset(ptr->config, TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT, + sizeof(ptr->config)); + mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */ + tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr; + entry = NULL; + } + mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); out: - return false; + kfree(entry); + return ptr; } /** - * tomoyo_is_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname. + * tomoyo_profile - Find a profile. * - * @buffer: The token to check. + * @profile: Profile number to find. * - * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise. + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile". */ -bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer) +struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_profile(const u8 profile) { - return !strncmp(buffer, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN); + struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]; + if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) + return &tomoyo_default_profile; + BUG_ON(!ptr); + return ptr; } -/** - * tomoyo_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name. - * - * @domainname: The domainname to find. - * - * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname) +static s8 tomoyo_find_yesno(const char *string, const char *find) { - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; - struct tomoyo_path_info name; - - name.name = domainname; - tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { - if (!domain->is_deleted && - !tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname)) - return domain; + const char *cp = strstr(string, find); + if (cp) { + cp += strlen(find); + if (!strncmp(cp, "=yes", 4)) + return 1; + else if (!strncmp(cp, "=no", 3)) + return 0; } - return NULL; + return -1; } -/** - * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token. - * - * @filename: The string to evaluate. - * - * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename. - */ -static int tomoyo_const_part_length(const char *filename) +static void tomoyo_set_bool(bool *b, const char *string, const char *find) { - char c; - int len = 0; - - if (!filename) - return 0; - while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') { - if (c != '\\') { - len++; - continue; - } - c = *filename++; - switch (c) { - case '\\': /* "\\" */ - len += 2; - continue; - case '0': /* "\ooo" */ - case '1': - case '2': - case '3': - c = *filename++; - if (c < '0' || c > '7') - break; - c = *filename++; - if (c < '0' || c > '7') - break; - len += 4; - continue; - } + switch (tomoyo_find_yesno(string, find)) { + case 1: + *b = true; + break; + case 0: + *b = false; break; } - return len; } -/** - * tomoyo_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members. - * - * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" to fill in. - * - * The caller sets "struct tomoyo_path_info"->name. - */ -void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr) +static void tomoyo_set_uint(unsigned int *i, const char *string, + const char *find) { - const char *name = ptr->name; - const int len = strlen(name); - - ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name); - ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/'); - ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len); - ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len); + const char *cp = strstr(string, find); + if (cp) + sscanf(cp + strlen(find), "=%u", i); } -/** - * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character - * and "\-" pattern. - * - * @filename: The start of string to check. - * @filename_end: The end of string to check. - * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare. - * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare. - * - * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise. - */ -static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(const char *filename, - const char *filename_end, - const char *pattern, - const char *pattern_end) +static void tomoyo_set_pref(const char *name, const char *value, + const bool use_default, + struct tomoyo_profile *profile) { - while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) { - char c; - if (*pattern != '\\') { - if (*filename++ != *pattern++) - return false; - continue; + struct tomoyo_preference **pref; + bool *verbose; + if (!strcmp(name, "enforcing")) { + if (use_default) { + pref = &profile->enforcing; + goto set_default; } - c = *filename; - pattern++; - switch (*pattern) { - int i; - int j; - case '?': - if (c == '/') { - return false; - } else if (c == '\\') { - if (filename[1] == '\\') - filename++; - else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1)) - filename += 3; - else - return false; - } - break; - case '\\': - if (c != '\\') - return false; - if (*++filename != '\\') - return false; - break; - case '+': - if (!isdigit(c)) - return false; - break; - case 'x': - if (!isxdigit(c)) - return false; - break; - case 'a': - if (!tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(c)) - return false; - break; - case '0': - case '1': - case '2': - case '3': - if (c == '\\' && tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1) - && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) { - filename += 3; - pattern += 2; - break; - } - return false; /* Not matched. */ - case '*': - case '@': - for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) { - if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2( - filename + i, filename_end, - pattern + 1, pattern_end)) - return true; - c = filename[i]; - if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@') - break; - if (c != '\\') - continue; - if (filename[i + 1] == '\\') - i++; - else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + i + 1)) - i += 3; - else - break; /* Bad pattern. */ - } - return false; /* Not matched. */ - default: - j = 0; - c = *pattern; - if (c == '$') { - while (isdigit(filename[j])) - j++; - } else if (c == 'X') { - while (isxdigit(filename[j])) - j++; - } else if (c == 'A') { - while (tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(filename[j])) - j++; - } - for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) { - if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2( - filename + i, filename_end, - pattern + 1, pattern_end)) - return true; - } - return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */ - } - filename++; - pattern++; - } - while (*pattern == '\\' && - (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@')) - pattern += 2; - return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character. - * - * @filename: The start of string to check. - * @filename_end: The end of string to check. - * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare. - * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare. - * - * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise. - */ -static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(const char *filename, - const char *filename_end, - const char *pattern, - const char *pattern_end) -{ - const char *pattern_start = pattern; - bool first = true; - bool result; - - while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) { - /* Split at "\-" pattern. */ - if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-') - continue; - result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename, - filename_end, - pattern_start, - pattern - 2); - if (first) - result = !result; - if (result) - return false; - first = false; - pattern_start = pattern; + profile->enforcing = &profile->preference; + verbose = &profile->preference.enforcing_verbose; + goto set_verbose; } - result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename, filename_end, - pattern_start, pattern_end); - return first ? result : !result; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2 - Do pathname pattern matching. - * - * @f: The start of string to check. - * @p: The start of pattern to compare. - * - * Returns true if @f matches @p, false otherwise. - */ -static bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(const char *f, const char *p) -{ - const char *f_delimiter; - const char *p_delimiter; - - while (*f && *p) { - f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/'); - if (!f_delimiter) - f_delimiter = f + strlen(f); - p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/'); - if (!p_delimiter) - p_delimiter = p + strlen(p); - if (*p == '\\' && *(p + 1) == '{') - goto recursive; - if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p, - p_delimiter)) - return false; - f = f_delimiter; - if (*f) - f++; - p = p_delimiter; - if (*p) - p++; + if (!strcmp(name, "permissive")) { + if (use_default) { + pref = &profile->permissive; + goto set_default; + } + profile->permissive = &profile->preference; + verbose = &profile->preference.permissive_verbose; + goto set_verbose; } - /* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */ - while (*p == '\\' && - (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@')) - p += 2; - return !*f && !*p; - recursive: - /* - * The "\{" pattern is permitted only after '/' character. - * This guarantees that below "*(p - 1)" is safe. - * Also, the "\}" pattern is permitted only before '/' character - * so that "\{" + "\}" pair will not break the "\-" operator. - */ - if (*(p - 1) != '/' || p_delimiter <= p + 3 || *p_delimiter != '/' || - *(p_delimiter - 1) != '}' || *(p_delimiter - 2) != '\\') - return false; /* Bad pattern. */ - do { - /* Compare current component with pattern. */ - if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p + 2, - p_delimiter - 2)) - break; - /* Proceed to next component. */ - f = f_delimiter; - if (!*f) - break; - f++; - /* Continue comparison. */ - if (tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p_delimiter + 1)) - return true; - f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/'); - } while (f_delimiter); - return false; /* Not matched. */ -} - -/** - * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. - * - * @filename: The filename to check. - * @pattern: The pattern to compare. - * - * Returns true if matches, false otherwise. - * - * The following patterns are available. - * \\ \ itself. - * \ooo Octal representation of a byte. - * \* Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/'. - * \@ Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/' or '.'. - * \? 1 byte character other than '/'. - * \$ One or more repetitions of decimal digits. - * \+ 1 decimal digit. - * \X One or more repetitions of hexadecimal digits. - * \x 1 hexadecimal digit. - * \A One or more repetitions of alphabet characters. - * \a 1 alphabet character. - * - * \- Subtraction operator. - * - * /\{dir\}/ '/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/ - * /dir/dir/dir/ ). - */ -bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern) -{ - const char *f = filename->name; - const char *p = pattern->name; - const int len = pattern->const_len; - - /* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */ - if (!pattern->is_patterned) - return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern); - /* Don't compare directory and non-directory. */ - if (filename->is_dir != pattern->is_dir) - return false; - /* Compare the initial length without patterns. */ - if (strncmp(f, p, len)) - return false; - f += len; - p += len; - return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters. - * - * Returns true if output was written, false otherwise. - * - * The snprintf() will truncate, but tomoyo_io_printf() won't. - */ -bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...) -{ - va_list args; - int len; - int pos = head->read_avail; - int size = head->readbuf_size - pos; - - if (size <= 0) - return false; - va_start(args, fmt); - len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args); - va_end(args); - if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size) - return false; - head->read_avail += len; - return true; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_get_exe - Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process. - * - * Returns the tomoyo_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise. - * - * This function uses kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree() - * if this function didn't return NULL. - */ -static const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void) -{ - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - const char *cp = NULL; - - if (!mm) - return NULL; - down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { - if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) { - cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path); - break; + if (!strcmp(name, "learning")) { + if (use_default) { + pref = &profile->learning; + goto set_default; } + profile->learning = &profile->preference; + tomoyo_set_uint(&profile->preference.learning_max_entry, value, + "max_entry"); + verbose = &profile->preference.learning_verbose; + goto set_verbose; } - up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); - return cp; + return; + set_default: + *pref = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference; + return; + set_verbose: + tomoyo_set_bool(verbose, value, "verbose"); } -/** - * tomoyo_get_msg - Get warning message. - * - * @is_enforce: Is it enforcing mode? - * - * Returns "ERROR" or "WARNING". - */ -const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce) +static int tomoyo_set_mode(char *name, const char *value, + const bool use_default, + struct tomoyo_profile *profile) { - if (is_enforce) - return "ERROR"; - else - return "WARNING"; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @index: The functionality to check mode. - * - * TOMOYO checks only process context. - * This code disables TOMOYO's enforcement in case the function is called from - * interrupt context. - */ -unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const u8 index) -{ - const u8 profile = domain->profile; - - if (WARN_ON(in_interrupt())) - return 0; - return tomoyo_policy_loaded && index < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX -#if TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES != 256 - && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES -#endif - && tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] ? - tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_verbose_mode - Check whether TOMOYO is verbose mode. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * - * Returns true if domain policy violation warning should be printed to - * console. - */ -bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) -{ - return tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_VERBOSE) != 0; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok - Check for domain's quota. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * - * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain) -{ - unsigned int count = 0; - struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; - - if (!domain) - return true; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { - switch (ptr->type) { - struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl; - u32 perm; - u8 i; - case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL: - acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head); - perm = acl->perm | (((u32) acl->perm_high) << 16); - for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; i++) - if (perm & (1 << i)) - count++; - if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)) - count -= 2; - break; - case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL: - perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head) - ->perm; - for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; i++) - if (perm & (1 << i)) - count++; + u8 i; + u8 config; + if (!strcmp(name, "CONFIG")) { + i = TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX; + config = profile->default_config; + } else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&name, "CONFIG::")) { + config = 0; + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX; i++) { + if (strcmp(name, tomoyo_mac_keywords[i])) + continue; + config = profile->config[i]; break; } + if (i == TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX) + return -EINVAL; + } else { + return -EINVAL; } - if (count < tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY)) - return true; - if (!domain->quota_warned) { - domain->quota_warned = true; - printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: " - "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. " - "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name); - } - return false; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile. - * - * @profile: Profile number to create. - * - * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise. - */ -static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned - int profile) -{ - struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = NULL; - int i; - - if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) - return NULL; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - return NULL; - ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]; - if (ptr) - goto ok; - ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), GFP_NOFS); - if (!tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) { - kfree(ptr); - ptr = NULL; - goto ok; + if (use_default) { + config = TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT; + } else { + u8 mode; + for (mode = 0; mode < 4; mode++) + if (strstr(value, tomoyo_mode[mode])) + /* + * Update lower 3 bits in order to distinguish + * 'config' from 'TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEAFULT'. + */ + config = (config & ~7) | mode; } - for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) - ptr->value[i] = tomoyo_control_array[i].current_value; - mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */ - tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr; - ok: - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - return ptr; + if (i < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX) + profile->config[i] = config; + else if (config != TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT) + profile->default_config = config; + return 0; } /** - * tomoyo_write_profile - Write to profile table. + * tomoyo_write_profile - Write profile table. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * @@ -980,153 +430,165 @@ static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { char *data = head->write_buf; unsigned int i; - unsigned int value; + bool use_default = false; char *cp; struct tomoyo_profile *profile; - unsigned long num; - - cp = strchr(data, '-'); - if (cp) - *cp = '\0'; - if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &num)) - return -EINVAL; - if (cp) + if (sscanf(data, "PROFILE_VERSION=%u", &tomoyo_profile_version) == 1) + return 0; + i = simple_strtoul(data, &cp, 10); + if (data == cp) { + profile = &tomoyo_default_profile; + } else { + if (*cp != '-') + return -EINVAL; data = cp + 1; - profile = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(num); - if (!profile) - return -EINVAL; + profile = tomoyo_assign_profile(i); + if (!profile) + return -EINVAL; + } cp = strchr(data, '='); if (!cp) return -EINVAL; - *cp = '\0'; + *cp++ = '\0'; + if (profile != &tomoyo_default_profile) + use_default = strstr(cp, "use_default") != NULL; + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, "PREFERENCE::")) { + tomoyo_set_pref(data, cp, use_default, profile); + return 0; + } + if (profile == &tomoyo_default_profile) + return -EINVAL; if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) { const struct tomoyo_path_info *old_comment = profile->comment; - profile->comment = tomoyo_get_name(cp + 1); + profile->comment = tomoyo_get_name(cp); tomoyo_put_name(old_comment); return 0; } - for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) { - if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_control_array[i].keyword)) - continue; - if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &value) != 1) { - int j; - const char **modes; - switch (i) { - case TOMOYO_VERBOSE: - modes = tomoyo_mode_2; - break; - default: - modes = tomoyo_mode_4; - break; - } - for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { - if (strcmp(cp + 1, modes[j])) - continue; - value = j; - break; - } - if (j == 4) - return -EINVAL; - } else if (value > tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value) { - value = tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value; - } - profile->value[i] = value; - return 0; + return tomoyo_set_mode(data, cp, use_default, profile); +} + +static void tomoyo_print_preference(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + const int idx) +{ + struct tomoyo_preference *pref = &tomoyo_default_profile.preference; + const struct tomoyo_profile *profile = idx >= 0 ? + tomoyo_profile_ptr[idx] : NULL; + char buffer[16] = ""; + if (profile) { + buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0'; + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, "%u-", idx); } - return -EINVAL; + if (profile) { + pref = profile->learning; + if (pref == &tomoyo_default_profile.preference) + goto skip1; + } + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%sPREFERENCE::%s={ " + "verbose=%s max_entry=%u }\n", + buffer, "learning", + tomoyo_yesno(pref->learning_verbose), + pref->learning_max_entry); + skip1: + if (profile) { + pref = profile->permissive; + if (pref == &tomoyo_default_profile.preference) + goto skip2; + } + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%sPREFERENCE::%s={ verbose=%s }\n", + buffer, "permissive", + tomoyo_yesno(pref->permissive_verbose)); + skip2: + if (profile) { + pref = profile->enforcing; + if (pref == &tomoyo_default_profile.preference) + return; + } + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%sPREFERENCE::%s={ verbose=%s }\n", + buffer, "enforcing", + tomoyo_yesno(pref->enforcing_verbose)); +} + +static void tomoyo_print_config(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const u8 config) +{ + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "={ mode=%s }\n", tomoyo_mode[config & 3]); } /** - * tomoyo_read_profile - Read from profile table. + * tomoyo_read_profile - Read profile table. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns 0. */ -static int tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static void tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - static const int total = TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX + 1; - int step; - - if (head->read_eof) - return 0; - for (step = head->read_step; step < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total; - step++) { - const u8 index = step / total; - u8 type = step % total; - const struct tomoyo_profile *profile - = tomoyo_profile_ptr[index]; - head->read_step = step; - if (!profile) - continue; - if (!type) { /* Print profile' comment tag. */ - if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=%s\n", - index, profile->comment ? - profile->comment->name : "")) + u8 index; + const struct tomoyo_profile *profile; + next: + index = head->r.index; + profile = tomoyo_profile_ptr[index]; + switch (head->r.step) { + case 0: + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "PROFILE_VERSION=%s\n", "20090903"); + tomoyo_print_preference(head, -1); + head->r.step++; + break; + case 1: + for ( ; head->r.index < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES; + head->r.index++) + if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[head->r.index]) break; - continue; + if (head->r.index == TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) + return; + head->r.step++; + break; + case 2: + { + const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment = + profile->comment; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=", index); + tomoyo_set_string(head, comment ? comment->name : ""); + tomoyo_set_lf(head); + head->r.step++; } - type--; - if (type < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX) { - const unsigned int value = profile->value[type]; - const char **modes = NULL; - const char *keyword - = tomoyo_control_array[type].keyword; - switch (tomoyo_control_array[type].max_value) { - case 3: - modes = tomoyo_mode_4; - break; - case 1: - modes = tomoyo_mode_2; - break; - } - if (modes) { - if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%s\n", index, - keyword, modes[value])) - break; - } else { - if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%u\n", index, - keyword, value)) - break; - } + break; + case 3: + { + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s", index, "CONFIG"); + tomoyo_print_config(head, profile->default_config); + head->r.bit = 0; + head->r.step++; + } + break; + case 4: + for ( ; head->r.bit < TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX; head->r.bit++) { + const u8 i = head->r.bit; + const u8 config = profile->config[i]; + if (config == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT) + continue; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s%s", index, "CONFIG::", + tomoyo_mac_keywords[i]); + tomoyo_print_config(head, config); + head->r.bit++; + break; + } + if (head->r.bit == TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX) { + tomoyo_print_preference(head, index); + head->r.index++; + head->r.step = 1; } + break; } - if (step == TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total) - head->read_eof = true; - return 0; + if (tomoyo_flush(head)) + goto next; } -/* - * tomoyo_policy_manager_list is used for holding list of domainnames or - * programs which are permitted to modify configuration via - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * - * An entry is added by - * - * # echo '<kernel> /sbin/mingetty /bin/login /bin/bash' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager - * (if you want to specify by a domainname) - * - * or - * - * # echo '/usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy' > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager - * (if you want to specify by a program's location) - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # echo 'delete <kernel> /sbin/mingetty /bin/login /bin/bash' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager - * - * or - * - * # echo 'delete /usr/lib/ccs/editpolicy' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager - * - * and all entries are retrieved by - * - * # cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager - */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list); +static bool tomoyo_same_manager(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) +{ + return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_manager, head)->manager == + container_of(b, struct tomoyo_manager, head)->manager; +} /** * tomoyo_update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry. @@ -1141,47 +603,29 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list); static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager, const bool is_delete) { - struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr; - struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry e = { }; - int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_manager e = { }; + int error; - if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(manager)) { - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(manager)) + if (tomoyo_domain_def(manager)) { + if (!tomoyo_correct_domain(manager)) return -EINVAL; e.is_domain = true; } else { - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1)) + if (!tomoyo_correct_path(manager)) return -EINVAL; } e.manager = tomoyo_get_name(manager); if (!e.manager) return -ENOMEM; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) { - if (ptr->manager != e.manager) - continue; - ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, - &tomoyo_policy_manager_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - out: + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER], + tomoyo_same_manager); tomoyo_put_name(e.manager); return error; } /** - * tomoyo_write_manager_policy - Write manager policy. + * tomoyo_write_manager - Write manager policy. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * @@ -1189,7 +633,7 @@ static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_write_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static int tomoyo_write_manager(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { char *data = head->write_buf; bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE); @@ -1202,47 +646,41 @@ static int tomoyo_write_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) } /** - * tomoyo_read_manager_policy - Read manager policy. + * tomoyo_read_manager - Read manager policy. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * - * Returns 0. - * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_read_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static void tomoyo_read_manager(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; - - if (head->read_eof) - return 0; - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, - &tomoyo_policy_manager_list) { - struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr; - ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry, - list); - if (ptr->is_deleted) + if (head->r.eof) + return; + list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, + &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER]) { + struct tomoyo_manager *ptr = + list_entry(head->r.acl, typeof(*ptr), head.list); + if (ptr->head.is_deleted) continue; - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name); - if (!done) - break; + if (!tomoyo_flush(head)) + return; + tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->manager->name); + tomoyo_set_lf(head); } - head->read_eof = done; - return 0; + head->r.eof = true; } /** - * tomoyo_is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager. + * tomoyo_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager. * * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void) +static bool tomoyo_manager(void) { - struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr; + struct tomoyo_manager *ptr; const char *exe; const struct task_struct *task = current; const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname = tomoyo_domain()->domainname; @@ -1252,8 +690,9 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void) return true; if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid)) return false; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER], + head.list) { + if (!ptr->head.is_deleted && ptr->is_domain && !tomoyo_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager)) { found = true; break; @@ -1264,8 +703,9 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void) exe = tomoyo_get_exe(); if (!exe) return false; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER], + head.list) { + if (!ptr->head.is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain && !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name)) { found = true; break; @@ -1285,7 +725,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void) } /** - * tomoyo_is_select_one - Parse select command. + * tomoyo_select_one - Parse select command. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * @data: String to parse. @@ -1294,23 +734,31 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, - const char *data) +static bool tomoyo_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *data) { unsigned int pid; struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; + bool global_pid = false; - if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) { + if (!strcmp(data, "allow_execute")) { + head->r.print_execute_only = true; + return true; + } + if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1 || + (global_pid = true, sscanf(data, "global-pid=%u", &pid) == 1)) { struct task_struct *p; rcu_read_lock(); read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (global_pid) + p = find_task_by_pid_ns(pid, &init_pid_ns); + else + p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); if (p) domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); rcu_read_unlock(); } else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) { - if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data + 7)) + if (tomoyo_domain_def(data + 7)) domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data + 7); } else return false; @@ -1318,24 +766,13 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, /* Accessing read_buf is safe because head->io_sem is held. */ if (!head->read_buf) return true; /* Do nothing if open(O_WRONLY). */ - head->read_avail = 0; + memset(&head->r, 0, sizeof(head->r)); + head->r.print_this_domain_only = true; + head->r.eof = !domain; + head->r.domain = &domain->list; tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data); - head->read_single_domain = true; - head->read_eof = !domain; - if (domain) { - struct tomoyo_domain_info *d; - head->read_var1 = NULL; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(d, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { - if (d == domain) - break; - head->read_var1 = &d->list; - } - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_bit = 0; - head->read_step = 0; - if (domain->is_deleted) - tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n"); - } + if (domain && domain->is_deleted) + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n"); return true; } @@ -1373,7 +810,7 @@ static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname) } /** - * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy. + * tomoyo_write_domain2 - Write domain policy. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * @@ -1381,7 +818,24 @@ static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_write_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static int tomoyo_write_domain2(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete) +{ + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_MOUNT)) + return tomoyo_write_mount(data, domain, is_delete); + return tomoyo_write_file(data, domain, is_delete); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_domain - Write domain policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +static int tomoyo_write_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { char *data = head->write_buf; struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = head->write_var1; @@ -1393,19 +847,19 @@ static int tomoyo_write_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) is_delete = true; else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT)) is_select = true; - if (is_select && tomoyo_is_select_one(head, data)) + if (is_select && tomoyo_select_one(head, data)) return 0; /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */ - if (!tomoyo_is_policy_manager()) + if (!tomoyo_manager()) return -EPERM; - if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data)) { + if (tomoyo_domain_def(data)) { domain = NULL; if (is_delete) tomoyo_delete_domain(data); else if (is_select) domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data); else - domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(data, 0); + domain = tomoyo_assign_domain(data, 0); head->write_var1 = domain; return 0; } @@ -1422,179 +876,198 @@ static int tomoyo_write_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) domain->ignore_global_allow_read = !is_delete; return 0; } - return tomoyo_write_file_policy(data, domain, is_delete); + if (!strcmp(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_QUOTA_EXCEEDED)) { + domain->quota_warned = !is_delete; + return 0; + } + if (!strcmp(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_TRANSITION_FAILED)) { + domain->transition_failed = !is_delete; + return 0; + } + return tomoyo_write_domain2(data, domain, is_delete); } /** - * tomoyo_print_path_acl - Print a single path ACL entry. + * tomoyo_fns - Find next set bit. * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_acl". + * @perm: 8 bits value. + * @bit: First bit to find. * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + * Returns next on-bit on success, 8 otherwise. */ -static bool tomoyo_print_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, - struct tomoyo_path_acl *ptr) +static u8 tomoyo_fns(const u8 perm, u8 bit) { - int pos; - u8 bit; - const u32 perm = ptr->perm | (((u32) ptr->perm_high) << 16); - - for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) { - if (!(perm & (1 << bit))) - continue; - /* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */ - if ((bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ || bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE) - && (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))) - continue; - pos = head->read_avail; - if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s ", - tomoyo_path2keyword(bit)) || - !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name) || - !tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n")) - goto out; - } - head->read_bit = 0; - return true; - out: - head->read_bit = bit; - head->read_avail = pos; - return false; + for ( ; bit < 8; bit++) + if (perm & (1 << bit)) + break; + return bit; } /** - * tomoyo_print_path2_acl - Print a double path ACL entry. + * tomoyo_print_entry - Print an ACL entry. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path2_acl". + * @acl: Pointer to an ACL entry. * * Returns true on success, false otherwise. */ -static bool tomoyo_print_path2_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, - struct tomoyo_path2_acl *ptr) +static bool tomoyo_print_entry(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl) { - int pos; - const u8 perm = ptr->perm; + const u8 acl_type = acl->type; u8 bit; - for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; bit++) { - if (!(perm & (1 << bit))) - continue; - pos = head->read_avail; - if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s ", - tomoyo_path22keyword(bit)) || - !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name1) || - !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name2) || - !tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n")) - goto out; + if (acl->is_deleted) + return true; + next: + bit = head->r.bit; + if (!tomoyo_flush(head)) + return false; + else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL) { + struct tomoyo_path_acl *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + const u16 perm = ptr->perm; + for ( ; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) { + if (!(perm & (1 << bit))) + continue; + if (head->r.print_execute_only && + bit != TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE) + continue; + /* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */ + if ((bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ || + bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE) + && (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))) + continue; + break; + } + if (bit >= TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION) + goto done; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s", tomoyo_path_keyword[bit]); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name); + } else if (head->r.print_execute_only) { + return true; + } else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL) { + struct tomoyo_path2_acl *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + bit = tomoyo_fns(ptr->perm, bit); + if (bit >= TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION) + goto done; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s", tomoyo_path2_keyword[bit]); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name1); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name2); + } else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL) { + struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + bit = tomoyo_fns(ptr->perm, bit); + if (bit >= TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION) + goto done; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s", + tomoyo_path_number_keyword[bit]); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name); + tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->number); + } else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL) { + struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + bit = tomoyo_fns(ptr->perm, bit); + if (bit >= TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION) + goto done; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s", tomoyo_mkdev_keyword[bit]); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name); + tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->mode); + tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->major); + tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->minor); + } else if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL) { + struct tomoyo_mount_acl *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_mount"); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->dev_name); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->dir_name); + tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->fs_type); + tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &ptr->flags); } - head->read_bit = 0; + head->r.bit = bit + 1; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n"); + if (acl_type != TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL) + goto next; + done: + head->r.bit = 0; return true; - out: - head->read_bit = bit; - head->read_avail = pos; - return false; } /** - * tomoyo_print_entry - Print an ACL entry. + * tomoyo_read_domain2 - Read domain policy. * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * @ptr: Pointer to an ACL entry. + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). * * Returns true on success, false otherwise. */ -static bool tomoyo_print_entry(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, - struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) +static bool tomoyo_read_domain2(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) { - const u8 acl_type = ptr->type; - - if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL) { - struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl - = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head); - return tomoyo_print_path_acl(head, acl); - } - if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL) { - struct tomoyo_path2_acl *acl - = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head); - return tomoyo_print_path2_acl(head, acl); + list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, &domain->acl_info_list) { + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr = + list_entry(head->r.acl, typeof(*ptr), list); + if (!tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr)) + return false; } - BUG(); /* This must not happen. */ - return false; + head->r.acl = NULL; + return true; } /** - * tomoyo_read_domain_policy - Read domain policy. + * tomoyo_read_domain - Read domain policy. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * - * Returns 0. - * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_read_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static void tomoyo_read_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - struct list_head *dpos; - struct list_head *apos; - bool done = true; - - if (head->read_eof) - return 0; - if (head->read_step == 0) - head->read_step = 1; - list_for_each_cookie(dpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) { - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; - const char *quota_exceeded = ""; - const char *transition_failed = ""; - const char *ignore_global_allow_read = ""; - domain = list_entry(dpos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list); - if (head->read_step != 1) - goto acl_loop; - if (domain->is_deleted && !head->read_single_domain) - continue; - /* Print domainname and flags. */ - if (domain->quota_warned) - quota_exceeded = "quota_exceeded\n"; - if (domain->transition_failed) - transition_failed = "transition_failed\n"; - if (domain->ignore_global_allow_read) - ignore_global_allow_read - = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n"; - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE - "%u\n%s%s%s\n", - domain->domainname->name, - domain->profile, quota_exceeded, - transition_failed, - ignore_global_allow_read); - if (!done) - break; - head->read_step = 2; -acl_loop: - if (head->read_step == 3) - goto tail_mark; - /* Print ACL entries in the domain. */ - list_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2, - &domain->acl_info_list) { - struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr - = list_entry(apos, struct tomoyo_acl_info, - list); - done = tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr); - if (!done) - break; + if (head->r.eof) + return; + list_for_each_cookie(head->r.domain, &tomoyo_domain_list) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = + list_entry(head->r.domain, typeof(*domain), list); + switch (head->r.step) { + case 0: + if (domain->is_deleted && + !head->r.print_this_domain_only) + continue; + /* Print domainname and flags. */ + tomoyo_set_string(head, domain->domainname->name); + tomoyo_set_lf(head); + tomoyo_io_printf(head, + TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n", + domain->profile); + if (domain->quota_warned) + tomoyo_set_string(head, "quota_exceeded\n"); + if (domain->transition_failed) + tomoyo_set_string(head, "transition_failed\n"); + if (domain->ignore_global_allow_read) + tomoyo_set_string(head, + TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ + "\n"); + head->r.step++; + tomoyo_set_lf(head); + /* fall through */ + case 1: + if (!tomoyo_read_domain2(head, domain)) + return; + head->r.step++; + if (!tomoyo_set_lf(head)) + return; + /* fall through */ + case 2: + head->r.step = 0; + if (head->r.print_this_domain_only) + goto done; } - if (!done) - break; - head->read_step = 3; -tail_mark: - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n"); - if (!done) - break; - head->read_step = 1; - if (head->read_single_domain) - break; } - head->read_eof = done; - return 0; + done: + head->r.eof = true; } /** @@ -1607,7 +1080,7 @@ tail_mark: * This is equivalent to doing * * ( echo "select " $domainname; echo "use_profile " $profile ) | - * /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy -d + * /usr/sbin/tomoyo-loadpolicy -d * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ @@ -1646,25 +1119,22 @@ static int tomoyo_write_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static void tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; - - if (head->read_eof) - return 0; - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) { - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; - domain = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list); + if (head->r.eof) + return; + list_for_each_cookie(head->r.domain, &tomoyo_domain_list) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = + list_entry(head->r.domain, typeof(*domain), list); if (domain->is_deleted) continue; - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile, - domain->domainname->name); - if (!done) - break; + if (!tomoyo_flush(head)) + return; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u ", domain->profile); + tomoyo_set_string(head, domain->domainname->name); + tomoyo_set_lf(head); } - head->read_eof = done; - return 0; + head->r.eof = true; } /** @@ -1676,11 +1146,7 @@ static int tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) */ static int tomoyo_write_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - unsigned long pid; - /* No error check. */ - strict_strtoul(head->write_buf, 10, &pid); - head->read_step = (int) pid; - head->read_eof = false; + head->r.eof = false; return 0; } @@ -1694,29 +1160,57 @@ static int tomoyo_write_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * The PID is specified by tomoyo_write_pid() so that the user can obtain * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface. */ -static int tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static void tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - if (head->read_avail == 0 && !head->read_eof) { - const int pid = head->read_step; - struct task_struct *p; - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; - rcu_read_lock(); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (p) - domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p); - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - rcu_read_unlock(); - if (domain) - tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile, - domain->domainname->name); - head->read_eof = true; + char *buf = head->write_buf; + bool global_pid = false; + unsigned int pid; + struct task_struct *p; + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; + + /* Accessing write_buf is safe because head->io_sem is held. */ + if (!buf) { + head->r.eof = true; + return; /* Do nothing if open(O_RDONLY). */ } - return 0; + if (head->r.w_pos || head->r.eof) + return; + head->r.eof = true; + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&buf, "global-pid ")) + global_pid = true; + pid = (unsigned int) simple_strtoul(buf, NULL, 10); + rcu_read_lock(); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + if (global_pid) + p = find_task_by_pid_ns(pid, &init_pid_ns); + else + p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (p) + domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!domain) + return; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %u ", pid, domain->profile); + tomoyo_set_string(head, domain->domainname->name); } +static const char *tomoyo_transition_type[TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE] = { + [TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_INITIALIZE] + = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN, + [TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE] + = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN, + [TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_KEEP] = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN, + [TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP] = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN +}; + +static const char *tomoyo_group_name[TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP] = { + [TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP] = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP, + [TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP] = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NUMBER_GROUP +}; + /** - * tomoyo_write_exception_policy - Write exception policy. + * tomoyo_write_exception - Write exception policy. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". * @@ -1724,186 +1218,523 @@ static int tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_write_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static int tomoyo_write_exception(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { char *data = head->write_buf; bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE); - - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN)) - return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, false, - is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN)) - return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, true, is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN)) - return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, false, - is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN)) - return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, true, - is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS)) - return tomoyo_write_alias_policy(data, is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ)) - return tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(data, is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN)) - return tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE)) - return tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete); - if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP)) - return tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(data, is_delete); + u8 i; + static const struct { + const char *keyword; + int (*write) (char *, const bool); + } tomoyo_callback[4] = { + { TOMOYO_KEYWORD_AGGREGATOR, tomoyo_write_aggregator }, + { TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN, tomoyo_write_pattern }, + { TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE, tomoyo_write_no_rewrite }, + { TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ, tomoyo_write_globally_readable }, + }; + + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE; i++) + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, tomoyo_transition_type[i])) + return tomoyo_write_transition_control(data, is_delete, + i); + for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, tomoyo_callback[i].keyword)) + return tomoyo_callback[i].write(data, is_delete); + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; i++) + if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, tomoyo_group_name[i])) + return tomoyo_write_group(data, is_delete, i); return -EINVAL; } /** - * tomoyo_read_exception_policy - Read exception policy. + * tomoyo_read_group - Read "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group" list. * * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @idx: Index number. * - * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise. + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_read_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static bool tomoyo_read_group(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const int idx) { - if (!head->read_eof) { - switch (head->read_step) { - case 0: - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 1; - case 1: - if (!tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(head)) - break; - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 2; - case 2: - if (!tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(head)) - break; - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 3; - case 3: - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 4; - case 4: - if (!tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(head)) - break; - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 5; - case 5: - if (!tomoyo_read_alias_policy(head)) - break; - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 6; - case 6: - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 7; - case 7: - if (!tomoyo_read_file_pattern(head)) - break; - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 8; - case 8: - if (!tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(head)) - break; - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 9; - case 9: - if (!tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(head)) - break; - head->read_var1 = NULL; - head->read_var2 = NULL; - head->read_step = 10; - case 10: - head->read_eof = true; + list_for_each_cookie(head->r.group, &tomoyo_group_list[idx]) { + struct tomoyo_group *group = + list_entry(head->r.group, typeof(*group), list); + list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, &group->member_list) { + struct tomoyo_acl_head *ptr = + list_entry(head->r.acl, typeof(*ptr), list); + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_flush(head)) + return false; + tomoyo_set_string(head, tomoyo_group_name[idx]); + tomoyo_set_string(head, group->group_name->name); + if (idx == TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP) { + tomoyo_set_space(head); + tomoyo_set_string(head, container_of + (ptr, struct tomoyo_path_group, + head)->member_name->name); + } else if (idx == TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP) { + tomoyo_print_number_union(head, &container_of + (ptr, + struct tomoyo_number_group, + head)->number); + } + tomoyo_set_lf(head); + } + head->r.acl = NULL; + } + head->r.group = NULL; + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_..._entry" list. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @idx: Index number. + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +static bool tomoyo_read_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const int idx) +{ + list_for_each_cookie(head->r.acl, &tomoyo_policy_list[idx]) { + struct tomoyo_acl_head *acl = + container_of(head->r.acl, typeof(*acl), list); + if (acl->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_flush(head)) + return false; + switch (idx) { + case TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL: + { + struct tomoyo_transition_control *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + tomoyo_set_string(head, + tomoyo_transition_type + [ptr->type]); + if (ptr->program) + tomoyo_set_string(head, + ptr->program->name); + if (ptr->program && ptr->domainname) + tomoyo_set_string(head, " from "); + if (ptr->domainname) + tomoyo_set_string(head, + ptr->domainname-> + name); + } + break; + case TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE: + { + struct tomoyo_readable_file *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + tomoyo_set_string(head, + TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ); + tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->filename->name); + } + break; + case TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR: + { + struct tomoyo_aggregator *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + tomoyo_set_string(head, + TOMOYO_KEYWORD_AGGREGATOR); + tomoyo_set_string(head, + ptr->original_name->name); + tomoyo_set_space(head); + tomoyo_set_string(head, + ptr->aggregated_name->name); + } + break; + case TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN: + { + struct tomoyo_no_pattern *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + tomoyo_set_string(head, + TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN); + tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->pattern->name); + } + break; + case TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE: + { + struct tomoyo_no_rewrite *ptr = + container_of(acl, typeof(*ptr), head); + tomoyo_set_string(head, + TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE); + tomoyo_set_string(head, ptr->pattern->name); + } break; default: - return -EINVAL; + continue; } + tomoyo_set_lf(head); } - return 0; + head->r.acl = NULL; + return true; } -/* path to policy loader */ -static const char *tomoyo_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init"; +/** + * tomoyo_read_exception - Read exception policy. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +static void tomoyo_read_exception(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + if (head->r.eof) + return; + while (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY && + tomoyo_read_policy(head, head->r.step)) + head->r.step++; + if (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY) + return; + while (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY + TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP && + tomoyo_read_group(head, head->r.step - TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY)) + head->r.step++; + if (head->r.step < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY + TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP) + return; + head->r.eof = true; +} /** - * tomoyo_policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists. + * tomoyo_print_header - Get header line of audit log. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". * - * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise. + * Returns string representation. + * + * This function uses kmalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function + * didn't return NULL. */ -static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void) +static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) { - /* - * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist. - * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not - * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since - * policies are not loaded yet. - * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime. - */ - struct path path; + struct timeval tv; + const pid_t gpid = task_pid_nr(current); + static const int tomoyo_buffer_len = 4096; + char *buffer = kmalloc(tomoyo_buffer_len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!buffer) + return NULL; + do_gettimeofday(&tv); + snprintf(buffer, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1, + "#timestamp=%lu profile=%u mode=%s (global-pid=%u)" + " task={ pid=%u ppid=%u uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u" + " egid=%u suid=%u sgid=%u fsuid=%u fsgid=%u }", + tv.tv_sec, r->profile, tomoyo_mode[r->mode], gpid, + (pid_t) sys_getpid(), (pid_t) sys_getppid(), + current_uid(), current_gid(), current_euid(), + current_egid(), current_suid(), current_sgid(), + current_fsuid(), current_fsgid()); + return buffer; +} - if (kern_path(tomoyo_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) { - printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now " - "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tomoyo_loader); - return false; +/** + * tomoyo_init_audit_log - Allocate buffer for audit logs. + * + * @len: Required size. + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". + * + * Returns pointer to allocated memory. + * + * The @len is updated to add the header lines' size on success. + * + * This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function + * didn't return NULL. + */ +static char *tomoyo_init_audit_log(int *len, struct tomoyo_request_info *r) +{ + char *buf = NULL; + const char *header; + const char *domainname; + if (!r->domain) + r->domain = tomoyo_domain(); + domainname = r->domain->domainname->name; + header = tomoyo_print_header(r); + if (!header) + return NULL; + *len += strlen(domainname) + strlen(header) + 10; + buf = kzalloc(*len, GFP_NOFS); + if (buf) + snprintf(buf, (*len) - 1, "%s\n%s\n", header, domainname); + kfree(header); + return buf; +} + +/* Wait queue for tomoyo_query_list. */ +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(tomoyo_query_wait); + +/* Lock for manipulating tomoyo_query_list. */ +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tomoyo_query_list_lock); + +/* Structure for query. */ +struct tomoyo_query { + struct list_head list; + char *query; + int query_len; + unsigned int serial; + int timer; + int answer; +}; + +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_query". */ +static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_query_list); + +/* + * Number of "struct file" referring /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query + * interface. + */ +static atomic_t tomoyo_query_observers = ATOMIC_INIT(0); + +/** + * tomoyo_supervisor - Ask for the supervisor's decision. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". + * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters. + * + * Returns 0 if the supervisor decided to permit the access request which + * violated the policy in enforcing mode, TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST if the + * supervisor decided to retry the access request which violated the policy in + * enforcing mode, 0 if it is not in enforcing mode, -EPERM otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_supervisor(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int error = -EPERM; + int pos; + int len; + static unsigned int tomoyo_serial; + struct tomoyo_query *entry = NULL; + bool quota_exceeded = false; + char *header; + switch (r->mode) { + char *buffer; + case TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING: + if (!tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(r)) + return 0; + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vsnprintf((char *) &pos, sizeof(pos) - 1, fmt, args) + 4; + va_end(args); + buffer = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!buffer) + return 0; + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buffer, len - 1, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + tomoyo_normalize_line(buffer); + tomoyo_write_domain2(buffer, r->domain, false); + kfree(buffer); + /* fall through */ + case TOMOYO_CONFIG_PERMISSIVE: + return 0; } - path_put(&path); - return true; + if (!r->domain) + r->domain = tomoyo_domain(); + if (!atomic_read(&tomoyo_query_observers)) + return -EPERM; + va_start(args, fmt); + len = vsnprintf((char *) &pos, sizeof(pos) - 1, fmt, args) + 32; + va_end(args); + header = tomoyo_init_audit_log(&len, r); + if (!header) + goto out; + entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS); + if (!entry) + goto out; + entry->query = kzalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!entry->query) + goto out; + len = ksize(entry->query); + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + if (tomoyo_quota_for_query && tomoyo_query_memory_size + len + + sizeof(*entry) >= tomoyo_quota_for_query) { + quota_exceeded = true; + } else { + tomoyo_query_memory_size += len + sizeof(*entry); + entry->serial = tomoyo_serial++; + } + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + if (quota_exceeded) + goto out; + pos = snprintf(entry->query, len - 1, "Q%u-%hu\n%s", + entry->serial, r->retry, header); + kfree(header); + header = NULL; + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(entry->query + pos, len - 1 - pos, fmt, args); + entry->query_len = strlen(entry->query) + 1; + va_end(args); + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &tomoyo_query_list); + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + /* Give 10 seconds for supervisor's opinion. */ + for (entry->timer = 0; + atomic_read(&tomoyo_query_observers) && entry->timer < 100; + entry->timer++) { + wake_up(&tomoyo_query_wait); + set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); + schedule_timeout(HZ / 10); + if (entry->answer) + break; + } + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + list_del(&entry->list); + tomoyo_query_memory_size -= len + sizeof(*entry); + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + switch (entry->answer) { + case 3: /* Asked to retry by administrator. */ + error = TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST; + r->retry++; + break; + case 1: + /* Granted by administrator. */ + error = 0; + break; + case 0: + /* Timed out. */ + break; + default: + /* Rejected by administrator. */ + break; + } + out: + if (entry) + kfree(entry->query); + kfree(entry); + kfree(header); + return error; } /** - * tomoyo_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy. + * tomoyo_poll_query - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query. * - * @filename: The program about to start. + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". * - * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so - * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init - * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init. - * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and - * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces. + * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM when ready to read, 0 otherwise. * - * Returns nothing. + * Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode. */ -void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename) +static int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { - char *argv[2]; - char *envp[3]; + struct list_head *tmp; + bool found = false; + u8 i; + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { + struct tomoyo_query *ptr = + list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); + if (ptr->answer) + continue; + found = true; + break; + } + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + if (found) + return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; + if (i) + break; + poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait); + } + return 0; +} - if (tomoyo_policy_loaded) +/** + * tomoyo_read_query - Read access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + */ +static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + struct list_head *tmp; + int pos = 0; + int len = 0; + char *buf; + if (head->r.w_pos) return; - /* - * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start. - * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't - * be passed. - * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by - * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start". - */ - if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") && - strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start")) + if (head->read_buf) { + kfree(head->read_buf); + head->read_buf = NULL; + } + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { + struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); + if (ptr->answer) + continue; + if (pos++ != head->r.query_index) + continue; + len = ptr->query_len; + break; + } + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + if (!len) { + head->r.query_index = 0; return; - if (!tomoyo_policy_loader_exists()) + } + buf = kzalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!buf) return; + pos = 0; + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { + struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); + if (ptr->answer) + continue; + if (pos++ != head->r.query_index) + continue; + /* + * Some query can be skipped because tomoyo_query_list + * can change, but I don't care. + */ + if (len == ptr->query_len) + memmove(buf, ptr->query, len); + break; + } + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + if (buf[0]) { + head->read_buf = buf; + head->r.w[head->r.w_pos++] = buf; + head->r.query_index++; + } else { + kfree(buf); + } +} - printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n", - tomoyo_loader); - argv[0] = (char *) tomoyo_loader; - argv[1] = NULL; - envp[0] = "HOME=/"; - envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin"; - envp[2] = NULL; - call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1); - - printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0 2009/04/01\n"); - printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n"); - tomoyo_policy_loaded = true; - { /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */ - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { - const u8 profile = domain->profile; - if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]) - continue; - panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n", - profile, domain->domainname->name); - } +/** + * tomoyo_write_answer - Write the supervisor's decision. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_write_answer(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + struct list_head *tmp; + unsigned int serial; + unsigned int answer; + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { + struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); + ptr->timer = 0; + } + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + if (sscanf(data, "A%u=%u", &serial, &answer) != 2) + return -EINVAL; + spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) { + struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list); + if (ptr->serial != serial) + continue; + if (!ptr->answer) + ptr->answer = answer; + break; } + spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock); + return 0; } /** @@ -1913,13 +1744,12 @@ void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename) * * Returns version information. */ -static int tomoyo_read_version(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static void tomoyo_read_version(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - if (!head->read_eof) { - tomoyo_io_printf(head, "2.2.0"); - head->read_eof = true; + if (!head->r.eof) { + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "2.3.0"); + head->r.eof = true; } - return 0; } /** @@ -1929,18 +1759,17 @@ static int tomoyo_read_version(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * * Returns the current process's domainname. */ -static int tomoyo_read_self_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static void tomoyo_read_self_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) { - if (!head->read_eof) { + if (!head->r.eof) { /* * tomoyo_domain()->domainname != NULL * because every process belongs to a domain and * the domain's name cannot be NULL. */ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s", tomoyo_domain()->domainname->name); - head->read_eof = true; + head->r.eof = true; } - return 0; } /** @@ -1953,23 +1782,24 @@ static int tomoyo_read_self_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * * Caller acquires tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) +int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) { struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = kzalloc(sizeof(*head), GFP_NOFS); if (!head) return -ENOMEM; mutex_init(&head->io_sem); + head->type = type; switch (type) { case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY: /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */ - head->write = tomoyo_write_domain_policy; - head->read = tomoyo_read_domain_policy; + head->write = tomoyo_write_domain; + head->read = tomoyo_read_domain; break; case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY: /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */ - head->write = tomoyo_write_exception_policy; - head->read = tomoyo_read_exception_policy; + head->write = tomoyo_write_exception; + head->read = tomoyo_read_exception; break; case TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN: /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain */ @@ -2001,10 +1831,15 @@ static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) head->write = tomoyo_write_profile; head->read = tomoyo_read_profile; break; + case TOMOYO_QUERY: /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query */ + head->poll = tomoyo_poll_query; + head->write = tomoyo_write_answer; + head->read = tomoyo_read_query; + break; case TOMOYO_MANAGER: /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */ - head->write = tomoyo_write_manager_policy; - head->read = tomoyo_read_manager_policy; + head->write = tomoyo_write_manager; + head->read = tomoyo_read_manager; break; } if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) { @@ -2013,7 +1848,9 @@ static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) * for reading. */ head->read = NULL; - } else { + head->poll = NULL; + } else if (!head->poll) { + /* Don't allocate read_buf for poll() access. */ if (!head->readbuf_size) head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2; head->read_buf = kzalloc(head->readbuf_size, GFP_NOFS); @@ -2037,7 +1874,8 @@ static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) return -ENOMEM; } } - head->reader_idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); + if (type != TOMOYO_QUERY) + head->reader_idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); file->private_data = head; /* * Call the handler now if the file is @@ -2048,10 +1886,35 @@ static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) */ if (type == TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN) tomoyo_read_control(file, NULL, 0); + /* + * If the file is /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query , increment the + * observer counter. + * The obserber counter is used by tomoyo_supervisor() to see if + * there is some process monitoring /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query. + */ + else if (type == TOMOYO_QUERY) + atomic_inc(&tomoyo_query_observers); return 0; } /** + * tomoyo_poll_control - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". + * + * Waits for read readiness. + * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query is handled by /usr/sbin/tomoyo-queryd . + */ +int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +{ + struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; + if (!head->poll) + return -ENOSYS; + return head->poll(file, wait); +} + +/** * tomoyo_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. * * @file: Pointer to "struct file". @@ -2062,36 +1925,23 @@ static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, - const int buffer_len) +int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len) { - int len = 0; + int len; struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; - char *cp; if (!head->read) return -ENOSYS; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem)) return -EINTR; - /* Call the policy handler. */ - len = head->read(head); - if (len < 0) - goto out; - /* Write to buffer. */ - len = head->read_avail; - if (len > buffer_len) - len = buffer_len; - if (!len) - goto out; - /* head->read_buf changes by some functions. */ - cp = head->read_buf; - if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len)) { - len = -EFAULT; - goto out; - } - head->read_avail -= len; - memmove(cp, cp + len, head->read_avail); - out: + head->read_user_buf = buffer; + head->read_user_buf_avail = buffer_len; + if (tomoyo_flush(head)) + /* Call the policy handler. */ + head->read(head); + tomoyo_flush(head); + len = head->read_user_buf - buffer; mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem); return len; } @@ -2107,8 +1957,8 @@ static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, - const int buffer_len) +int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len) { struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; int error = buffer_len; @@ -2121,8 +1971,7 @@ static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, return -EFAULT; /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */ if (head->write != tomoyo_write_pid && - head->write != tomoyo_write_domain_policy && - !tomoyo_is_policy_manager()) + head->write != tomoyo_write_domain && !tomoyo_manager()) return -EPERM; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem)) return -EINTR; @@ -2159,12 +2008,19 @@ static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, * * Caller looses tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file) +int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file) { struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; const bool is_write = !!head->write_buf; - tomoyo_read_unlock(head->reader_idx); + /* + * If the file is /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query , decrement the + * observer counter. + */ + if (head->type == TOMOYO_QUERY) + atomic_dec(&tomoyo_query_observers); + else + tomoyo_read_unlock(head->reader_idx); /* Release memory used for policy I/O. */ kfree(head->read_buf); head->read_buf = NULL; @@ -2179,129 +2035,25 @@ static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file) } /** - * tomoyo_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * - * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode". - * @file: Pointer to "struct file". - * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. - */ -static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - const int key = ((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private) - - ((u8 *) NULL); - return tomoyo_open_control(key, file); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * - * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode". - * @file: Pointer to "struct file". - * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. - */ -static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - return tomoyo_close_control(file); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * - * @file: Pointer to "struct file". - * @buf: Pointer to buffer. - * @count: Size of @buf. - * @ppos: Unused. - * - * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise. + * tomoyo_check_profile - Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */ -static ssize_t tomoyo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, - loff_t *ppos) +void tomoyo_check_profile(void) { - return tomoyo_read_control(file, buf, count); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * - * @file: Pointer to "struct file". - * @buf: Pointer to buffer. - * @count: Size of @buf. - * @ppos: Unused. - * - * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise. - */ -static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) -{ - return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count); -} - -/* - * tomoyo_operations is a "struct file_operations" which is used for handling - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * - * Some files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory accept open(O_RDWR). - * See tomoyo_io_buffer for internals. - */ -static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = { - .open = tomoyo_open, - .release = tomoyo_release, - .read = tomoyo_read, - .write = tomoyo_write, -}; - -/** - * tomoyo_create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory. - * - * @name: The name of the interface file. - * @mode: The permission of the interface file. - * @parent: The parent directory. - * @key: Type of interface. - * - * Returns nothing. - */ -static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode, - struct dentry *parent, const u8 key) -{ - securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key, - &tomoyo_operations); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * - * Returns 0. - */ -static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void) -{ - struct dentry *tomoyo_dir; - - /* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */ - if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain) - return 0; - - tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL); - tomoyo_create_entry("domain_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY); - tomoyo_create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY); - tomoyo_create_entry("self_domain", 0400, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN); - tomoyo_create_entry(".domain_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS); - tomoyo_create_entry(".process_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS); - tomoyo_create_entry("meminfo", 0600, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_MEMINFO); - tomoyo_create_entry("profile", 0600, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_PROFILE); - tomoyo_create_entry("manager", 0600, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_MANAGER); - tomoyo_create_entry("version", 0400, tomoyo_dir, - TOMOYO_VERSION); - return 0; + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + const int idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); + tomoyo_policy_loaded = true; + /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */ + list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + const u8 profile = domain->profile; + if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]) + continue; + panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n", + profile, domain->domainname->name); + } + tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); + if (tomoyo_profile_version != 20090903) + panic("Profile version %u is not supported.\n", + tomoyo_profile_version); + printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.3.0\n"); + printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n"); } - -fs_initcall(tomoyo_initerface_init); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index 9f1ae5e3ba51..04454cb7b24a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/poll.h> struct linux_binprm; /********** Constants definitions. **********/ @@ -32,20 +33,44 @@ struct linux_binprm; #define TOMOYO_HASH_BITS 8 #define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH (1u<<TOMOYO_HASH_BITS) -/* - * This is the max length of a token. - * - * A token consists of only ASCII printable characters. - * Non printable characters in a token is represented in \ooo style - * octal string. Thus, \ itself is represented as \\. - */ -#define TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000 +#define TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE 4096 /* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */ #define TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES 256 +enum tomoyo_mode_index { + TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED, + TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING, + TOMOYO_CONFIG_PERMISSIVE, + TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING, + TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT = 255 +}; + +enum tomoyo_policy_id { + TOMOYO_ID_GROUP, + TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP, + TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP, + TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL, + TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR, + TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE, + TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN, + TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE, + TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER, + TOMOYO_ID_NAME, + TOMOYO_ID_ACL, + TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN, + TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY +}; + +enum tomoyo_group_id { + TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP, + TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP, + TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP +}; + /* Keywords for ACLs. */ -#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "alias " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_AGGREGATOR "aggregator " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_MOUNT "allow_mount " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "allow_read " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE "delete " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "deny_rewrite " @@ -55,36 +80,51 @@ struct linux_binprm; #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "no_initialize_domain " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN "no_keep_domain " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP "path_group " +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NUMBER_GROUP "number_group " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT "select " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "use_profile " #define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "ignore_global_allow_read" +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_QUOTA_EXCEEDED "quota_exceeded" +#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_TRANSITION_FAILED "transition_failed" /* A domain definition starts with <kernel>. */ #define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME "<kernel>" #define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN (sizeof(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) - 1) -/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */ -enum tomoyo_mac_index { - TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE, /* domain_policy.conf */ - TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY, - TOMOYO_VERBOSE, - TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX +/* Value type definition. */ +#define TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_INVALID 0 +#define TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL 1 +#define TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL 2 +#define TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL 3 + +enum tomoyo_transition_type { + /* Do not change this order, */ + TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_INITIALIZE, + TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE, + TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_KEEP, + TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP, + TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE }; /* Index numbers for Access Controls. */ enum tomoyo_acl_entry_type_index { TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL, TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL, + TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL, + TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL, + TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL, }; /* Index numbers for File Controls. */ /* - * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set - * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and - * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set. - * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or - * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are - * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared. + * TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE is special. TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE is automatically + * set if both TOMOYO_TYPE_READ and TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE are set. + * Both TOMOYO_TYPE_READ and TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE are automatically set if + * TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE is set. + * TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE is automatically cleared if either TOMOYO_TYPE_READ + * or TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE is cleared. + * Both TOMOYO_TYPE_READ and TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE are automatically cleared if + * TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE is cleared. */ enum tomoyo_path_acl_index { @@ -92,27 +132,24 @@ enum tomoyo_path_acl_index { TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE, TOMOYO_TYPE_READ, TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE, - TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE, TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK, - TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR, - TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO, - TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK, - TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK, - TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR, TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK, TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE, - TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, - TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, - TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, - TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT, - TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT, TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT, TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION }; +#define TOMOYO_RW_MASK ((1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ) | (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE)) + +enum tomoyo_mkdev_acl_index { + TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK, + TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR, + TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION +}; + enum tomoyo_path2_acl_index { TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK, TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME, @@ -120,6 +157,18 @@ enum tomoyo_path2_acl_index { TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION }; +enum tomoyo_path_number_acl_index { + TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE, + TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, + TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO, + TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK, + TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, + TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, + TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, + TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, + TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION +}; + enum tomoyo_securityfs_interface_index { TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY, TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY, @@ -129,20 +178,109 @@ enum tomoyo_securityfs_interface_index { TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN, TOMOYO_VERSION, TOMOYO_PROFILE, + TOMOYO_QUERY, TOMOYO_MANAGER }; +enum tomoyo_mac_index { + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CREATE, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UNLINK, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKDIR, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RMDIR, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKFIFO, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKSOCK, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_TRUNCATE, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SYMLINK, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_REWRITE, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKBLOCK, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_IOCTL, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHROOT, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UMOUNT, + TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT, + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX +}; + +enum tomoyo_mac_category_index { + TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE, + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX +}; + +#define TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST 1 /* Retry this request. */ + /********** Structure definitions. **********/ /* - * tomoyo_page_buffer is a structure which is used for holding a pathname - * obtained from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount" pair. - * As of now, it is 4096 bytes. If users complain that 4096 bytes is too small - * (because TOMOYO escapes non ASCII printable characters using \ooo format), - * we will make the buffer larger. + * tomoyo_acl_head is a structure which is used for holding elements not in + * domain policy. + * It has following fields. + * + * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_policy_list[] . + * (2) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false + * otherwise. */ -struct tomoyo_page_buffer { - char buffer[4096]; +struct tomoyo_acl_head { + struct list_head list; + bool is_deleted; +} __packed; + +/* + * tomoyo_request_info is a structure which is used for holding + * + * (1) Domain information of current process. + * (2) How many retries are made for this request. + * (3) Profile number used for this request. + * (4) Access control mode of the profile. + */ +struct tomoyo_request_info { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + /* For holding parameters. */ + union { + struct { + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename; + /* For using wildcards at tomoyo_find_next_domain(). */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *matched_path; + u8 operation; + } path; + struct { + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2; + u8 operation; + } path2; + struct { + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename; + unsigned int mode; + unsigned int major; + unsigned int minor; + u8 operation; + } mkdev; + struct { + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename; + unsigned long number; + u8 operation; + } path_number; + struct { + const struct tomoyo_path_info *type; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *dir; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *dev; + unsigned long flags; + int need_dev; + } mount; + } param; + u8 param_type; + bool granted; + u8 retry; + u8 profile; + u8 mode; /* One of tomoyo_mode_index . */ + u8 type; }; /* @@ -174,45 +312,31 @@ struct tomoyo_path_info { }; /* - * tomoyo_name_entry is a structure which is used for linking + * tomoyo_name is a structure which is used for linking * "struct tomoyo_path_info" into tomoyo_name_list . */ -struct tomoyo_name_entry { +struct tomoyo_name { struct list_head list; atomic_t users; struct tomoyo_path_info entry; }; -/* - * tomoyo_path_info_with_data is a structure which is used for holding a - * pathname obtained from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount" pair. - * - * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" consists of "struct tomoyo_path_info" - * and buffer for the pathname, while "struct tomoyo_page_buffer" consists of - * buffer for the pathname only. - * - * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data" is intended to allow TOMOYO to release - * both "struct tomoyo_path_info" and buffer for the pathname by single kfree() - * so that we don't need to return two pointers to the caller. If the caller - * puts "struct tomoyo_path_info" on stack memory, we will be able to remove - * "struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data". - */ -struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data { - /* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to kfree(). */ - struct tomoyo_path_info head; - char barrier1[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */ - char body[TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN]; - char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */ -}; - struct tomoyo_name_union { const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename; - struct tomoyo_path_group *group; + struct tomoyo_group *group; u8 is_group; }; -/* Structure for "path_group" directive. */ -struct tomoyo_path_group { +struct tomoyo_number_union { + unsigned long values[2]; + struct tomoyo_group *group; + u8 min_type; + u8 max_type; + u8 is_group; +}; + +/* Structure for "path_group"/"number_group" directive. */ +struct tomoyo_group { struct list_head list; const struct tomoyo_path_info *group_name; struct list_head member_list; @@ -220,28 +344,35 @@ struct tomoyo_path_group { }; /* Structure for "path_group" directive. */ -struct tomoyo_path_group_member { - struct list_head list; - bool is_deleted; +struct tomoyo_path_group { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; const struct tomoyo_path_info *member_name; }; +/* Structure for "number_group" directive. */ +struct tomoyo_number_group { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; + struct tomoyo_number_union number; +}; + /* * tomoyo_acl_info is a structure which is used for holding * * (1) "list" which is linked to the ->acl_info_list of * "struct tomoyo_domain_info" - * (2) "type" which tells type of the entry (either - * "struct tomoyo_path_acl" or "struct tomoyo_path2_acl"). + * (2) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if this domain is marked as + * "deleted", false otherwise. + * (3) "type" which tells type of the entry. * * Packing "struct tomoyo_acl_info" allows - * "struct tomoyo_path_acl" to embed "u8" + "u16" and - * "struct tomoyo_path2_acl" to embed "u8" - * without enlarging their structure size. + * "struct tomoyo_path_acl" to embed "u16" and "struct tomoyo_path2_acl" + * "struct tomoyo_path_number_acl" "struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl" to embed + * "u8" without enlarging their structure size. */ struct tomoyo_acl_info { struct list_head list; - u8 type; + bool is_deleted; + u8 type; /* = one of values in "enum tomoyo_acl_entry_type_index". */ } __packed; /* @@ -299,20 +430,62 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info { * (3) "name" is the pathname. * * Directives held by this structure are "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", - * "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", - * "allow_rmdir", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", - * "allow_mkchar", "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", - * "allow_chmod", "allow_chown", "allow_chgrp", "allow_chroot", "allow_mount" - * and "allow_unmount". + * "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_unlink", "allow_rmdir", + * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_chroot" and + * "allow_unmount". */ struct tomoyo_path_acl { struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL */ - u8 perm_high; u16 perm; struct tomoyo_name_union name; }; /* + * tomoyo_path_number_acl is a structure which is used for holding an + * entry with one pathname and one number operation. + * It has following fields. + * + * (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info". + * (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations. + * (3) "name" is the pathname. + * (4) "number" is the numeric value. + * + * Directives held by this structure are "allow_create", "allow_mkdir", + * "allow_ioctl", "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_chmod", "allow_chown" + * and "allow_chgrp". + * + */ +struct tomoyo_path_number_acl { + struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL */ + u8 perm; + struct tomoyo_name_union name; + struct tomoyo_number_union number; +}; + +/* + * tomoyo_mkdev_acl is a structure which is used for holding an + * entry with one pathname and three numbers operation. + * It has following fields. + * + * (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info". + * (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations. + * (3) "mode" is the create mode. + * (4) "major" is the major number of device node. + * (5) "minor" is the minor number of device node. + * + * Directives held by this structure are "allow_mkchar", "allow_mkblock". + * + */ +struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl { + struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL */ + u8 perm; + struct tomoyo_name_union name; + struct tomoyo_number_union mode; + struct tomoyo_number_union major; + struct tomoyo_number_union minor; +}; + +/* * tomoyo_path2_acl is a structure which is used for holding an * entry with two pathnames operation (i.e. link(), rename() and pivot_root()). * It has following fields. @@ -333,53 +506,61 @@ struct tomoyo_path2_acl { }; /* - * tomoyo_io_buffer is a structure which is used for reading and modifying - * configuration via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. - * It has many fields. ->read_var1 , ->read_var2 , ->write_var1 are used as - * cursors. + * tomoyo_mount_acl is a structure which is used for holding an + * entry for mount operation. + * It has following fields. * - * Since the content of /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy is a list of - * "struct tomoyo_domain_info" entries and each "struct tomoyo_domain_info" - * entry has a list of "struct tomoyo_acl_info", we need two cursors when - * reading (one is for traversing tomoyo_domain_list and the other is for - * traversing "struct tomoyo_acl_info"->acl_info_list ). + * (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info". + * (2) "dev_name" is the device name. + * (3) "dir_name" is the mount point. + * (4) "fs_type" is the filesystem type. + * (5) "flags" is the mount flags. * - * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with - * "select ", TOMOYO seeks the cursor ->read_var1 and ->write_var1 to the - * domain with the domainname specified by the rest of that line (NULL is set - * if seek failed). - * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with - * "delete ", TOMOYO deletes an entry or a domain specified by the rest of that - * line (->write_var1 is set to NULL if a domain was deleted). - * If a line written to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy starts with - * neither "select " nor "delete ", an entry or a domain specified by that line - * is appended. + * Directive held by this structure is "allow_mount". + */ +struct tomoyo_mount_acl { + struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL */ + struct tomoyo_name_union dev_name; + struct tomoyo_name_union dir_name; + struct tomoyo_name_union fs_type; + struct tomoyo_number_union flags; +}; + +#define TOMOYO_MAX_IO_READ_QUEUE 32 + +/* + * Structure for reading/writing policy via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo + * interfaces. */ struct tomoyo_io_buffer { - int (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); + void (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); + int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait); /* Exclusive lock for this structure. */ struct mutex io_sem; /* Index returned by tomoyo_read_lock(). */ int reader_idx; - /* The position currently reading from. */ - struct list_head *read_var1; - /* Extra variables for reading. */ - struct list_head *read_var2; + char __user *read_user_buf; + int read_user_buf_avail; + struct { + struct list_head *domain; + struct list_head *group; + struct list_head *acl; + int avail; + int step; + int query_index; + u16 index; + u8 bit; + u8 w_pos; + bool eof; + bool print_this_domain_only; + bool print_execute_only; + const char *w[TOMOYO_MAX_IO_READ_QUEUE]; + } r; /* The position currently writing to. */ struct tomoyo_domain_info *write_var1; - /* The step for reading. */ - int read_step; /* Buffer for reading. */ char *read_buf; - /* EOF flag for reading. */ - bool read_eof; - /* Read domain ACL of specified PID? */ - bool read_single_domain; - /* Extra variable for reading. */ - u8 read_bit; - /* Bytes available for reading. */ - int read_avail; /* Size of read buffer. */ int readbuf_size; /* Buffer for writing. */ @@ -388,215 +569,203 @@ struct tomoyo_io_buffer { int write_avail; /* Size of write buffer. */ int writebuf_size; + /* Type of this interface. */ + u8 type; }; /* - * tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry is a structure which is used for holding + * tomoyo_readable_file is a structure which is used for holding * "allow_read" entries. * It has following fields. * - * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_globally_readable_list . + * (1) "head" is "struct tomoyo_acl_head". * (2) "filename" is a pathname which is allowed to open(O_RDONLY). - * (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false - * otherwise. */ -struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry { - struct list_head list; +struct tomoyo_readable_file { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename; - bool is_deleted; }; /* - * tomoyo_pattern_entry is a structure which is used for holding - * "tomoyo_pattern_list" entries. + * tomoyo_no_pattern is a structure which is used for holding + * "file_pattern" entries. * It has following fields. * - * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_pattern_list . + * (1) "head" is "struct tomoyo_acl_head". * (2) "pattern" is a pathname pattern which is used for converting pathnames * to pathname patterns during learning mode. - * (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false - * otherwise. */ -struct tomoyo_pattern_entry { - struct list_head list; +struct tomoyo_no_pattern { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern; - bool is_deleted; }; /* - * tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry is a structure which is used for holding + * tomoyo_no_rewrite is a structure which is used for holding * "deny_rewrite" entries. * It has following fields. * - * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_no_rewrite_list . + * (1) "head" is "struct tomoyo_acl_head". * (2) "pattern" is a pathname which is by default not permitted to modify * already existing content. - * (3) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false - * otherwise. */ -struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry { - struct list_head list; +struct tomoyo_no_rewrite { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern; - bool is_deleted; }; /* - * tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry is a structure which is used for holding - * "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entries. + * tomoyo_transition_control is a structure which is used for holding + * "initialize_domain"/"no_initialize_domain"/"keep_domain"/"no_keep_domain" + * entries. * It has following fields. * - * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_initializer_list . - * (2) "domainname" which is "a domainname" or "the last component of a - * domainname". This field is NULL if "from" clause is not specified. - * (3) "program" which is a program's pathname. - * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false - * otherwise. - * (5) "is_not" is a bool which is true if "no_initialize_domain", false - * otherwise. - * (6) "is_last_name" is a bool which is true if "domainname" is "the last + * (1) "head" is "struct tomoyo_acl_head". + * (2) "type" is type of this entry. + * (3) "is_last_name" is a bool which is true if "domainname" is "the last * component of a domainname", false otherwise. - */ -struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry { - struct list_head list; - const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; /* This may be NULL */ - const struct tomoyo_path_info *program; - bool is_deleted; - bool is_not; /* True if this entry is "no_initialize_domain". */ - /* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */ - bool is_last_name; -}; - -/* - * tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry is a structure which is used for holding - * "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entries. - * It has following fields. - * - * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_domain_keeper_list . - * (2) "domainname" which is "a domainname" or "the last component of a + * (4) "domainname" which is "a domainname" or "the last component of a * domainname". - * (3) "program" which is a program's pathname. - * This field is NULL if "from" clause is not specified. - * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false - * otherwise. - * (5) "is_not" is a bool which is true if "no_initialize_domain", false - * otherwise. - * (6) "is_last_name" is a bool which is true if "domainname" is "the last - * component of a domainname", false otherwise. + * (5) "program" which is a program's pathname. */ -struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry { - struct list_head list; - const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; - const struct tomoyo_path_info *program; /* This may be NULL */ - bool is_deleted; - bool is_not; /* True if this entry is "no_keep_domain". */ +struct tomoyo_transition_control { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; + u8 type; /* One of values in "enum tomoyo_transition_type". */ /* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */ bool is_last_name; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; /* Maybe NULL */ + const struct tomoyo_path_info *program; /* Maybe NULL */ }; /* - * tomoyo_alias_entry is a structure which is used for holding "alias" entries. + * tomoyo_aggregator is a structure which is used for holding + * "aggregator" entries. * It has following fields. * - * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_alias_list . - * (2) "original_name" which is a dereferenced pathname. - * (3) "aliased_name" which is a symlink's pathname. - * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false - * otherwise. + * (1) "head" is "struct tomoyo_acl_head". + * (2) "original_name" which is originally requested name. + * (3) "aggregated_name" which is name to rewrite. */ -struct tomoyo_alias_entry { - struct list_head list; +struct tomoyo_aggregator { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; const struct tomoyo_path_info *original_name; - const struct tomoyo_path_info *aliased_name; - bool is_deleted; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *aggregated_name; }; /* - * tomoyo_policy_manager_entry is a structure which is used for holding list of + * tomoyo_manager is a structure which is used for holding list of * domainnames or programs which are permitted to modify configuration via * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. * It has following fields. * - * (1) "list" which is linked to tomoyo_policy_manager_list . - * (2) "manager" is a domainname or a program's pathname. - * (3) "is_domain" is a bool which is true if "manager" is a domainname, false - * otherwise. - * (4) "is_deleted" is a bool which is true if marked as deleted, false + * (1) "head" is "struct tomoyo_acl_head". + * (2) "is_domain" is a bool which is true if "manager" is a domainname, false * otherwise. + * (3) "manager" is a domainname or a program's pathname. */ -struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry { - struct list_head list; +struct tomoyo_manager { + struct tomoyo_acl_head head; + bool is_domain; /* True if manager is a domainname. */ /* A path to program or a domainname. */ const struct tomoyo_path_info *manager; - bool is_domain; /* True if manager is a domainname. */ - bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */ +}; + +struct tomoyo_preference { + unsigned int learning_max_entry; + bool enforcing_verbose; + bool learning_verbose; + bool permissive_verbose; +}; + +struct tomoyo_profile { + const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment; + struct tomoyo_preference *learning; + struct tomoyo_preference *permissive; + struct tomoyo_preference *enforcing; + struct tomoyo_preference preference; + u8 default_config; + u8 config[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX + TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_CATEGORY_INDEX]; }; /********** Function prototypes. **********/ -/* Check whether the given name matches the given name_union. */ -bool tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name, - const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr); +extern asmlinkage long sys_getpid(void); +extern asmlinkage long sys_getppid(void); + +/* Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword. */ +bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find); +/* Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process. */ +const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void); +/* Format string. */ +void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer); +/* Print warning or error message on console. */ +void tomoyo_warn_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))); +/* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */ +void tomoyo_check_profile(void); +/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file); +/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file); +/* Poll operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); +/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len); +/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */ +int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer, + const int buffer_len); /* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */ -bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain); -/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */ -bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...) +bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_request_info *r); +/* Print out of memory warning message. */ +void tomoyo_warn_oom(const char *function); +/* Check whether the given name matches the given name_union. */ +const struct tomoyo_path_info * +tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name, + const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr); +/* Check whether the given number matches the given number_union. */ +bool tomoyo_compare_number_union(const unsigned long value, + const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr); +int tomoyo_get_mode(const u8 profile, const u8 index); +void tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))); /* Check whether the domainname is correct. */ -bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname); +bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname); /* Check whether the token is correct. */ -bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type, - const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type); +bool tomoyo_correct_path(const char *filename); +bool tomoyo_correct_word(const char *string); /* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */ -bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer); +bool tomoyo_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer); bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename, struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr); /* Check whether the given filename matches the given path_group. */ -bool tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname, - const struct tomoyo_path_group *group, - const bool may_use_pattern); +const struct tomoyo_path_info * +tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname, + const struct tomoyo_group *group); +/* Check whether the given value matches the given number_group. */ +bool tomoyo_number_matches_group(const unsigned long min, + const unsigned long max, + const struct tomoyo_group *group); /* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */ bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern); -/* Read "alias" entry in exception policy. */ -bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); -/* - * Read "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry - * in exception policy. - */ -bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); -/* Read "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */ -bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); -/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */ -bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); -/* Read "path_group" entry in exception policy. */ -bool tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); -/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */ -bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); -/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */ -bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); + +bool tomoyo_parse_number_union(char *data, struct tomoyo_number_union *num); /* Tokenize a line. */ bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size); /* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */ bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain); -/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */ -const char *tomoyo_path22keyword(const u8 operation); -/* Get the last component of the given domainname. */ -const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain); -/* Get warning message. */ -const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce); -/* Convert single path operation to operation name. */ -const char *tomoyo_path2keyword(const u8 operation); -/* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */ -int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); -/* - * Create "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry - * in exception policy. - */ -int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, - const bool is_delete); -/* Create "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */ -int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, - const bool is_delete); +/* Fill "struct tomoyo_request_info". */ +int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const u8 index); +/* Check permission for mount operation. */ +int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, + unsigned long flags, void *data_page); +/* Create "aggregator" entry in exception policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_aggregator(char *data, const bool is_delete); +int tomoyo_write_transition_control(char *data, const bool is_delete, + const u8 type); /* * Create "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", "allow_write", * "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir", @@ -604,25 +773,31 @@ int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_rename" and * "allow_link" entry in domain policy. */ -int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const bool is_delete); +int tomoyo_write_file(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete); /* Create "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */ -int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); +int tomoyo_write_globally_readable(char *data, const bool is_delete); +/* Create "allow_mount" entry in domain policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_mount(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete); /* Create "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */ -int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); +int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite(char *data, const bool is_delete); /* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */ -int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); -/* Create "path_group" entry in exception policy. */ -int tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete); +int tomoyo_write_pattern(char *data, const bool is_delete); +/* Create "path_group"/"number_group" entry in exception policy. */ +int tomoyo_write_group(char *data, const bool is_delete, const u8 type); +int tomoyo_supervisor(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3))); /* Find a domain by the given name. */ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname); /* Find or create a domain by the given name. */ -struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char * - domainname, - const u8 profile); - -/* Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group". */ -struct tomoyo_path_group *tomoyo_get_path_group(const char *group_name); +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_assign_domain(const char *domainname, + const u8 profile); +struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_profile(const u8 profile); +/* + * Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group". + */ +struct tomoyo_group *tomoyo_get_group(const char *group_name, const u8 type); /* Check mode for specified functionality. */ unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, @@ -632,25 +807,23 @@ void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr); /* Run policy loader when /sbin/init starts. */ void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename); -/* Convert binary string to ascii string. */ -int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str); +void tomoyo_put_number_union(struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr); -/* Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. */ -int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname, - int newname_len); +/* Convert binary string to ascii string. */ +char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str); /* - * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. - * These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree() - * if these functions didn't return NULL. + * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname except that + * ignores chroot'ed root and does not follow the final symlink. */ -char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname); +char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname); /* - * Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that it doesn't follow the final symlink. + * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname except that + * ignores chroot'ed root and the pathname is already solved. */ -char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname); -/* Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that the pathname is already solved. */ char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path); +/* Get patterned pathname. */ +const char *tomoyo_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename); /* Check memory quota. */ bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr); @@ -663,23 +836,29 @@ void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size); const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name); /* Check for memory usage. */ -int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); +void tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); /* Set memory quota. */ int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head); -/* Initialize realpath related code. */ -void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void); -int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, +/* Initialize mm related code. */ +void __init tomoyo_mm_init(void); +int tomoyo_path_permission(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, u8 operation, const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename); int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, struct path *path, const int flag); +int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, + unsigned long number); +int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, + const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev); int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path); int tomoyo_path2_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path1, struct path *path2); -int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct file *filp); int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +void tomoyo_print_ulong(char *buffer, const int buffer_len, + const unsigned long value, const u8 type); + /* Drop refcount on tomoyo_name_union. */ void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr); @@ -688,6 +867,25 @@ void tomoyo_run_gc(void); void tomoyo_memory_free(void *ptr); +int tomoyo_update_domain(struct tomoyo_acl_info *new_entry, const int size, + bool is_delete, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + bool (*check_duplicate) (const struct tomoyo_acl_info + *, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info + *), + bool (*merge_duplicate) (struct tomoyo_acl_info *, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *, + const bool)); +int tomoyo_update_policy(struct tomoyo_acl_head *new_entry, const int size, + bool is_delete, struct list_head *list, + bool (*check_duplicate) (const struct tomoyo_acl_head + *, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head + *)); +void tomoyo_check_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + bool (*check_entry) (struct tomoyo_request_info *, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *)); + /********** External variable definitions. **********/ /* Lock for GC. */ @@ -696,14 +894,8 @@ extern struct srcu_struct tomoyo_ss; /* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */ extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_path_group_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_initializer_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_keeper_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_alias_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_globally_readable_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_pattern_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_no_rewrite_list; -extern struct list_head tomoyo_policy_manager_list; +extern struct list_head tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY]; +extern struct list_head tomoyo_group_list[TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP]; extern struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]; /* Lock for protecting policy. */ @@ -715,6 +907,14 @@ extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded; /* The kernel's domain. */ extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain; +extern const char *tomoyo_path_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION]; +extern const char *tomoyo_mkdev_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION]; +extern const char *tomoyo_path2_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION]; +extern const char *tomoyo_path_number_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION]; + +extern unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_query; +extern unsigned int tomoyo_query_memory_size; + /********** Inlined functions. **********/ static inline int tomoyo_read_lock(void) @@ -735,25 +935,25 @@ static inline bool tomoyo_pathcmp(const struct tomoyo_path_info *a, } /** - * tomoyo_is_valid - Check whether the character is a valid char. + * tomoyo_valid - Check whether the character is a valid char. * * @c: The character to check. * * Returns true if @c is a valid character, false otherwise. */ -static inline bool tomoyo_is_valid(const unsigned char c) +static inline bool tomoyo_valid(const unsigned char c) { return c > ' ' && c < 127; } /** - * tomoyo_is_invalid - Check whether the character is an invalid char. + * tomoyo_invalid - Check whether the character is an invalid char. * * @c: The character to check. * * Returns true if @c is an invalid character, false otherwise. */ -static inline bool tomoyo_is_invalid(const unsigned char c) +static inline bool tomoyo_invalid(const unsigned char c) { return c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127); } @@ -761,13 +961,13 @@ static inline bool tomoyo_is_invalid(const unsigned char c) static inline void tomoyo_put_name(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name) { if (name) { - struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr = - container_of(name, struct tomoyo_name_entry, entry); + struct tomoyo_name *ptr = + container_of(name, typeof(*ptr), entry); atomic_dec(&ptr->users); } } -static inline void tomoyo_put_path_group(struct tomoyo_path_group *group) +static inline void tomoyo_put_group(struct tomoyo_group *group) { if (group) atomic_dec(&group->users); @@ -784,75 +984,35 @@ static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct return task_cred_xxx(task, security); } -static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *p1, +static inline bool tomoyo_same_acl_head(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *p1, const struct tomoyo_acl_info *p2) { return p1->type == p2->type; } -static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_name_union +static inline bool tomoyo_same_name_union (const struct tomoyo_name_union *p1, const struct tomoyo_name_union *p2) { return p1->filename == p2->filename && p1->group == p2->group && p1->is_group == p2->is_group; } -static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p1, - const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p2) -{ - return tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) && - tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name); -} - -static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_path2_acl(const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p1, - const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p2) +static inline bool tomoyo_same_number_union +(const struct tomoyo_number_union *p1, const struct tomoyo_number_union *p2) { - return tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) && - tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name1, &p2->name1) && - tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name2, &p2->name2); -} - -static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_domain_initializer_entry -(const struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *p1, - const struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *p2) -{ - return p1->is_not == p2->is_not && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name - && p1->domainname == p2->domainname - && p1->program == p2->program; -} - -static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_domain_keeper_entry -(const struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *p1, - const struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *p2) -{ - return p1->is_not == p2->is_not && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name - && p1->domainname == p2->domainname - && p1->program == p2->program; -} - -static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_alias_entry -(const struct tomoyo_alias_entry *p1, const struct tomoyo_alias_entry *p2) -{ - return p1->original_name == p2->original_name && - p1->aliased_name == p2->aliased_name; + return p1->values[0] == p2->values[0] && p1->values[1] == p2->values[1] + && p1->group == p2->group && p1->min_type == p2->min_type && + p1->max_type == p2->max_type && p1->is_group == p2->is_group; } /** * list_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie. * @pos: the &struct list_head to use as a loop cursor. - * @cookie: the &struct list_head to use as a cookie. * @head: the head for your list. - * - * Same with list_for_each_rcu() except that this primitive uses @cookie - * so that we can continue iteration. - * @cookie must be NULL when iteration starts, and @cookie will become - * NULL when iteration finishes. */ -#define list_for_each_cookie(pos, cookie, head) \ - for (({ if (!cookie) \ - cookie = head; }), \ - pos = rcu_dereference((cookie)->next); \ - prefetch(pos->next), pos != (head) || ((cookie) = NULL); \ - (cookie) = pos, pos = rcu_dereference(pos->next)) +#define list_for_each_cookie(pos, head) \ + if (!pos) \ + pos = srcu_dereference((head)->next, &tomoyo_ss); \ + for ( ; pos != (head); pos = srcu_dereference(pos->next, &tomoyo_ss)) #endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */ diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c index cd8ba4446763..35388408e475 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c @@ -1,12 +1,9 @@ /* * security/tomoyo/domain.c * - * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control. - * - * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION - * - * Version: 2.2.0 2009/04/01 + * Domain transition functions for TOMOYO. * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION */ #include "common.h" @@ -18,366 +15,191 @@ /* The initial domain. */ struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain; -/* - * tomoyo_domain_list is used for holding list of domains. - * The ->acl_info_list of "struct tomoyo_domain_info" is used for holding - * permissions (e.g. "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so") given to each domain. - * - * An entry is added by - * - * # ( echo "<kernel>"; echo "allow_execute /sbin/init" ) > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # ( echo "<kernel>"; echo "delete allow_execute /sbin/init" ) > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy - * - * and all entries are retrieved by - * - * # cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy - * - * A domain is added by - * - * # echo "<kernel>" > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # echo "delete <kernel>" > /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy - * - * and all domains are retrieved by - * - * # grep '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy - * - * Normally, a domainname is monotonically getting longer because a domainname - * which the process will belong to if an execve() operation succeeds is - * defined as a concatenation of "current domainname" + "pathname passed to - * execve()". - * See tomoyo_domain_initializer_list and tomoyo_domain_keeper_list for - * exceptions. - */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list); - /** - * tomoyo_get_last_name - Get last component of a domainname. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * - * Returns the last component of the domainname. - */ -const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) -{ - const char *cp0 = domain->domainname->name; - const char *cp1 = strrchr(cp0, ' '); - - if (cp1) - return cp1 + 1; - return cp0; -} - -/* - * tomoyo_domain_initializer_list is used for holding list of programs which - * triggers reinitialization of domainname. Normally, a domainname is - * monotonically getting longer. But sometimes, we restart daemon programs. - * It would be convenient for us that "a daemon started upon system boot" and - * "the daemon restarted from console" belong to the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO - * provides a way to shorten domainnames. + * tomoyo_update_policy - Update an entry for exception policy. * - * An entry is added by - * - * # echo 'initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # echo 'delete initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and all entries are retrieved by - * - * # grep ^initialize_domain /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * In the example above, /usr/sbin/httpd will belong to - * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain. - * - * You may specify a domainname using "from" keyword. - * "initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd from <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd" - * will cause "/usr/sbin/httpd" executed from "<kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd" - * domain to belong to "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain. - * - * You may add "no_" prefix to "initialize_domain". - * "initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd" and - * "no_initialize_domain /usr/sbin/httpd from <kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd" - * will cause "/usr/sbin/httpd" to belong to "<kernel> /usr/sbin/httpd" domain - * unless executed from "<kernel> /etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd" domain. - */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list); - -/** - * tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list. - * - * @domainname: The name of domain. May be NULL. - * @program: The name of program. - * @is_not: True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry. - * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * @new_entry: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info". + * @size: Size of @new_entry in bytes. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * @list: Pointer to "struct list_head". + * @check_duplicate: Callback function to find duplicated entry. * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname, - const char *program, - const bool is_not, - const bool is_delete) +int tomoyo_update_policy(struct tomoyo_acl_head *new_entry, const int size, + bool is_delete, struct list_head *list, + bool (*check_duplicate) (const struct tomoyo_acl_head + *, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head + *)) { - struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr; - struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry e = { .is_not = is_not }; int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_acl_head *entry; - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1)) - return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */ - if (domainname) { - if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) && - tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1)) - e.is_last_name = true; - else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname)) - return -EINVAL; - e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname); - if (!e.domainname) - goto out; - } - e.program = tomoyo_get_name(program); - if (!e.program) - goto out; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) { - if (!tomoyo_is_same_domain_initializer_entry(ptr, &e)) + return -ENOMEM; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, list, list) { + if (!check_duplicate(entry, new_entry)) continue; - ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; + entry->is_deleted = is_delete; error = 0; break; } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); + if (error && !is_delete) { + entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(new_entry, size); if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, - &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list); + list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); error = 0; } } mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - out: - tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname); - tomoyo_put_name(e.program); return error; } /** - * tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list. + * tomoyo_update_domain - Update an entry for domain policy. * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * @new_entry: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_acl_info". + * @size: Size of @new_entry in bytes. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @check_duplicate: Callback function to find duplicated entry. + * @merge_duplicate: Callback function to merge duplicated entry. * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +int tomoyo_update_domain(struct tomoyo_acl_info *new_entry, const int size, + bool is_delete, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + bool (*check_duplicate) (const struct tomoyo_acl_info + *, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info + *), + bool (*merge_duplicate) (struct tomoyo_acl_info *, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *, + const bool)) { - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; + int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *entry; - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, - &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list) { - const char *no; - const char *from = ""; - const char *domain = ""; - struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr; - ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry, - list); - if (ptr->is_deleted) + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) + return error; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (!check_duplicate(entry, new_entry)) continue; - no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : ""; - if (ptr->domainname) { - from = " from "; - domain = ptr->domainname->name; + if (merge_duplicate) + entry->is_deleted = merge_duplicate(entry, new_entry, + is_delete); + else + entry->is_deleted = is_delete; + error = 0; + break; + } + if (error && !is_delete) { + entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(new_entry, size); + if (entry) { + list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &domain->acl_info_list); + error = 0; } - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, - "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN - "%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name, - from, domain); - if (!done) - break; } - return done; + mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); + return error; } -/** - * tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list. - * - * @data: String to parse. - * @is_not: True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry. - * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. - * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, - const bool is_delete) +void tomoyo_check_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + bool (*check_entry) (struct tomoyo_request_info *, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *)) { - char *cp = strstr(data, " from "); + const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = r->domain; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; - if (cp) { - *cp = '\0'; - return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(cp + 6, data, - is_not, - is_delete); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_deleted || ptr->type != r->param_type) + continue; + if (check_entry(r, ptr)) { + r->granted = true; + return; + } } - return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, data, is_not, - is_delete); + r->granted = false; } +/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */ +LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list); + +struct list_head tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY]; +struct list_head tomoyo_group_list[TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP]; + /** - * tomoyo_is_domain_initializer - Check whether the given program causes domainname reinitialization. - * - * @domainname: The name of domain. - * @program: The name of program. - * @last_name: The last component of @domainname. + * tomoyo_last_word - Get last component of a domainname. * - * Returns true if executing @program reinitializes domain transition, - * false otherwise. + * @domainname: Domainname to check. * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + * Returns the last word of @domainname. */ -static bool tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(const struct tomoyo_path_info * - domainname, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *program, - const struct tomoyo_path_info * - last_name) +static const char *tomoyo_last_word(const char *name) { - struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr; - bool flag = false; - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) { - if (ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (ptr->domainname) { - if (!ptr->is_last_name) { - if (ptr->domainname != domainname) - continue; - } else { - if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name)) - continue; - } - } - if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program)) - continue; - if (ptr->is_not) { - flag = false; - break; - } - flag = true; - } - return flag; + const char *cp = strrchr(name, ' '); + if (cp) + return cp + 1; + return name; } -/* - * tomoyo_domain_keeper_list is used for holding list of domainnames which - * suppresses domain transition. Normally, a domainname is monotonically - * getting longer. But sometimes, we want to suppress domain transition. - * It would be convenient for us that programs executed from a login session - * belong to the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO provides a way to suppress domain - * transition. - * - * An entry is added by - * - * # echo 'keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # echo 'delete keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and all entries are retrieved by - * - * # grep ^keep_domain /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * In the example above, any process which belongs to - * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" domain will remain in that domain, - * unless explicitly specified by "initialize_domain" or "no_keep_domain". - * - * You may specify a program using "from" keyword. - * "keep_domain /bin/pwd from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" - * will cause "/bin/pwd" executed from "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" - * domain to remain in "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" domain. - * - * You may add "no_" prefix to "keep_domain". - * "keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" and - * "no_keep_domain /usr/bin/passwd from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" will - * cause "/usr/bin/passwd" to belong to - * "<kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash /usr/bin/passwd" domain, unless - * explicitly specified by "initialize_domain". - */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list); +static bool tomoyo_same_transition_control(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) +{ + const struct tomoyo_transition_control *p1 = container_of(a, + typeof(*p1), + head); + const struct tomoyo_transition_control *p2 = container_of(b, + typeof(*p2), + head); + return p1->type == p2->type && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name + && p1->domainname == p2->domainname + && p1->program == p2->program; +} /** - * tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list. + * tomoyo_update_transition_control_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_transition_control" list. * - * @domainname: The name of domain. - * @program: The name of program. May be NULL. - * @is_not: True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry. + * @domainname: The name of domain. Maybe NULL. + * @program: The name of program. Maybe NULL. + * @type: Type of transition. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname, - const char *program, - const bool is_not, - const bool is_delete) +static int tomoyo_update_transition_control_entry(const char *domainname, + const char *program, + const u8 type, + const bool is_delete) { - struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr; - struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry e = { .is_not = is_not }; + struct tomoyo_transition_control e = { .type = type }; int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; - - if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) && - tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1)) - e.is_last_name = true; - else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname)) - return -EINVAL; if (program) { - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1)) + if (!tomoyo_correct_path(program)) return -EINVAL; e.program = tomoyo_get_name(program); if (!e.program) goto out; } - e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname); - if (!e.domainname) - goto out; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) { - if (!tomoyo_is_same_domain_keeper_entry(ptr, &e)) - continue; - ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, - &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list); - error = 0; + if (domainname) { + if (!tomoyo_correct_domain(domainname)) { + if (!tomoyo_correct_path(domainname)) + goto out; + e.is_last_name = true; } + e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname); + if (!e.domainname) + goto out; } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + &tomoyo_policy_list + [TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL], + tomoyo_same_transition_control); out: tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname); tomoyo_put_name(e.program); @@ -385,219 +207,133 @@ static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname, } /** - * tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list. + * tomoyo_write_transition_control - Write "struct tomoyo_transition_control" list. * * @data: String to parse. - * @is_not: True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * @type: Type of this entry. * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not, - const bool is_delete) -{ - char *cp = strstr(data, " from "); - - if (cp) { - *cp = '\0'; - return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(cp + 6, data, is_not, - is_delete); - } - return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(data, NULL, is_not, is_delete); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +int tomoyo_write_transition_control(char *data, const bool is_delete, + const u8 type) { - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; - - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, - &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list) { - struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr; - const char *no; - const char *from = ""; - const char *program = ""; - - ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry, list); - if (ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : ""; - if (ptr->program) { - from = " from "; - program = ptr->program->name; - } - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, - "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN - "%s%s%s\n", no, program, from, - ptr->domainname->name); - if (!done) - break; + char *domainname = strstr(data, " from "); + if (domainname) { + *domainname = '\0'; + domainname += 6; + } else if (type == TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_KEEP || + type == TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP) { + domainname = data; + data = NULL; } - return done; + return tomoyo_update_transition_control_entry(domainname, data, type, + is_delete); } /** - * tomoyo_is_domain_keeper - Check whether the given program causes domain transition suppression. + * tomoyo_transition_type - Get domain transition type. * * @domainname: The name of domain. * @program: The name of program. - * @last_name: The last component of @domainname. * - * Returns true if executing @program supresses domain transition, - * false otherwise. + * Returns TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE if executing @program + * reinitializes domain transition, TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP if executing + * @program suppresses domain transition, others otherwise. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static bool tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *program, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *last_name) +static u8 tomoyo_transition_type(const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *program) { - struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr; - bool flag = false; - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) { - if (ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (!ptr->is_last_name) { - if (ptr->domainname != domainname) + const struct tomoyo_transition_control *ptr; + const char *last_name = tomoyo_last_word(domainname->name); + u8 type; + for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_TRANSITION_TYPE; type++) { + next: + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_list + [TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL], + head.list) { + if (ptr->head.is_deleted || ptr->type != type) continue; - } else { - if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name)) + if (ptr->domainname) { + if (!ptr->is_last_name) { + if (ptr->domainname != domainname) + continue; + } else { + /* + * Use direct strcmp() since this is + * unlikely used. + */ + if (strcmp(ptr->domainname->name, + last_name)) + continue; + } + } + if (ptr->program && + tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program)) continue; + if (type == TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_INITIALIZE) { + /* + * Do not check for initialize_domain if + * no_initialize_domain matched. + */ + type = TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_NO_KEEP; + goto next; + } + goto done; } - if (ptr->program && tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program)) - continue; - if (ptr->is_not) { - flag = false; - break; - } - flag = true; } - return flag; + done: + return type; } -/* - * tomoyo_alias_list is used for holding list of symlink's pathnames which are - * allowed to be passed to an execve() request. Normally, the domainname which - * the current process will belong to after execve() succeeds is calculated - * using dereferenced pathnames. But some programs behave differently depending - * on the name passed to argv[0]. For busybox, calculating domainname using - * dereferenced pathnames will cause all programs in the busybox to belong to - * the same domain. Thus, TOMOYO provides a way to allow use of symlink's - * pathname for checking execve()'s permission and calculating domainname which - * the current process will belong to after execve() succeeds. - * - * An entry is added by - * - * # echo 'alias /bin/busybox /bin/cat' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # echo 'delete alias /bin/busybox /bin/cat' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and all entries are retrieved by - * - * # grep ^alias /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * In the example above, if /bin/cat is a symlink to /bin/busybox and execution - * of /bin/cat is requested, permission is checked for /bin/cat rather than - * /bin/busybox and domainname which the current process will belong to after - * execve() succeeds is calculated using /bin/cat rather than /bin/busybox . - */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_alias_list); +static bool tomoyo_same_aggregator(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) +{ + const struct tomoyo_aggregator *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head); + const struct tomoyo_aggregator *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head); + return p1->original_name == p2->original_name && + p1->aggregated_name == p2->aggregated_name; +} /** - * tomoyo_update_alias_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list. + * tomoyo_update_aggregator_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_aggregator" list. * - * @original_name: The original program's real name. - * @aliased_name: The symbolic program's symbolic link's name. - * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * @original_name: The original program's name. + * @aggregated_name: The program name to use. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name, - const char *aliased_name, - const bool is_delete) +static int tomoyo_update_aggregator_entry(const char *original_name, + const char *aggregated_name, + const bool is_delete) { - struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr; - struct tomoyo_alias_entry e = { }; + struct tomoyo_aggregator e = { }; int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(original_name, 1, -1, -1) || - !tomoyo_is_correct_path(aliased_name, 1, -1, -1)) - return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */ + if (!tomoyo_correct_path(original_name) || + !tomoyo_correct_path(aggregated_name)) + return -EINVAL; e.original_name = tomoyo_get_name(original_name); - e.aliased_name = tomoyo_get_name(aliased_name); - if (!e.original_name || !e.aliased_name) + e.aggregated_name = tomoyo_get_name(aggregated_name); + if (!e.original_name || !e.aggregated_name || + e.aggregated_name->is_patterned) /* No patterns allowed. */ goto out; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) { - if (!tomoyo_is_same_alias_entry(ptr, &e)) - continue; - ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_alias_entry *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR], + tomoyo_same_aggregator); out: tomoyo_put_name(e.original_name); - tomoyo_put_name(e.aliased_name); + tomoyo_put_name(e.aggregated_name); return error; } /** - * tomoyo_read_alias_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) -{ - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; - - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_alias_list) { - struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr; - - ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_alias_entry, list); - if (ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n", - ptr->original_name->name, - ptr->aliased_name->name); - if (!done) - break; - } - return done; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_write_alias_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list. + * tomoyo_write_aggregator - Write "struct tomoyo_aggregator" list. * * @data: String to parse. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. @@ -606,18 +342,18 @@ bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +int tomoyo_write_aggregator(char *data, const bool is_delete) { char *cp = strchr(data, ' '); if (!cp) return -EINVAL; *cp++ = '\0'; - return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete); + return tomoyo_update_aggregator_entry(data, cp, is_delete); } /** - * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain. + * tomoyo_assign_domain - Create a domain. * * @domainname: The name of domain. * @profile: Profile number to assign if the domain was newly created. @@ -626,16 +362,15 @@ int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char * - domainname, - const u8 profile) +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_assign_domain(const char *domainname, + const u8 profile) { struct tomoyo_domain_info *entry; struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname; bool found = false; - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname)) + if (!tomoyo_correct_domain(domainname)) return NULL; saved_domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname); if (!saved_domainname) @@ -678,116 +413,118 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char * */ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - /* - * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by - * tomoyo_realpath() = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN. - */ - struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_NOFS); + struct tomoyo_request_info r; + char *tmp = kzalloc(TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE, GFP_NOFS); struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain(); struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL; - const char *old_domain_name = old_domain->domainname->name; const char *original_name = bprm->filename; - char *new_domain_name = NULL; - char *real_program_name = NULL; - char *symlink_program_name = NULL; - const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(old_domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); - const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + u8 mode; + bool is_enforce; int retval = -ENOMEM; - struct tomoyo_path_info r; /* real name */ - struct tomoyo_path_info s; /* symlink name */ - struct tomoyo_path_info l; /* last name */ - static bool initialized; + bool need_kfree = false; + struct tomoyo_path_info rn = { }; /* real name */ + mode = tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE); + is_enforce = (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING); if (!tmp) goto out; - if (!initialized) { - /* - * Built-in initializers. This is needed because policies are - * not loaded until starting /sbin/init. - */ - tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/hotplug", - false, false); - tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/modprobe", - false, false); - initialized = true; + retry: + if (need_kfree) { + kfree(rn.name); + need_kfree = false; } - - /* Get tomoyo_realpath of program. */ + /* Get symlink's pathname of program. */ retval = -ENOENT; - /* I hope tomoyo_realpath() won't fail with -ENOMEM. */ - real_program_name = tomoyo_realpath(original_name); - if (!real_program_name) - goto out; - /* Get tomoyo_realpath of symbolic link. */ - symlink_program_name = tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(original_name); - if (!symlink_program_name) + rn.name = tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(original_name); + if (!rn.name) goto out; - - r.name = real_program_name; - tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r); - s.name = symlink_program_name; - tomoyo_fill_path_info(&s); - l.name = tomoyo_get_last_name(old_domain); - tomoyo_fill_path_info(&l); - - /* Check 'alias' directive. */ - if (tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, &s)) { - struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr; - /* Is this program allowed to be called via symbolic links? */ - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) { - if (ptr->is_deleted || - tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, ptr->original_name) || - tomoyo_pathcmp(&s, ptr->aliased_name)) + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rn); + need_kfree = true; + + /* Check 'aggregator' directive. */ + { + struct tomoyo_aggregator *ptr; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_list + [TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR], head.list) { + if (ptr->head.is_deleted || + !tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(&rn, + ptr->original_name)) continue; - memset(real_program_name, 0, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN); - strncpy(real_program_name, ptr->aliased_name->name, - TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1); - tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r); + kfree(rn.name); + need_kfree = false; + /* This is OK because it is read only. */ + rn = *ptr->aggregated_name; break; } } /* Check execute permission. */ - retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r); + retval = tomoyo_path_permission(&r, TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE, &rn); + if (retval == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST) + goto retry; if (retval < 0) goto out; + /* + * To be able to specify domainnames with wildcards, use the + * pathname specified in the policy (which may contain + * wildcard) rather than the pathname passed to execve() + * (which never contains wildcard). + */ + if (r.param.path.matched_path) { + if (need_kfree) + kfree(rn.name); + need_kfree = false; + /* This is OK because it is read only. */ + rn = *r.param.path.matched_path; + } - new_domain_name = tmp->buffer; - if (tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) { + /* Calculate domain to transit to. */ + switch (tomoyo_transition_type(old_domain->domainname, &rn)) { + case TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE: /* Transit to the child of tomoyo_kernel_domain domain. */ - snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1, - TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME " " "%s", real_program_name); - } else if (old_domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain && - !tomoyo_policy_loaded) { - /* - * Needn't to transit from kernel domain before starting - * /sbin/init. But transit from kernel domain if executing - * initializers because they might start before /sbin/init. - */ - domain = old_domain; - } else if (tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) { + snprintf(tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME " " + "%s", rn.name); + break; + case TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_KEEP: /* Keep current domain. */ domain = old_domain; - } else { - /* Normal domain transition. */ - snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1, - "%s %s", old_domain_name, real_program_name); + break; + default: + if (old_domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain && + !tomoyo_policy_loaded) { + /* + * Needn't to transit from kernel domain before + * starting /sbin/init. But transit from kernel domain + * if executing initializers because they might start + * before /sbin/init. + */ + domain = old_domain; + } else { + /* Normal domain transition. */ + snprintf(tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "%s %s", + old_domain->domainname->name, rn.name); + } + break; } - if (domain || strlen(new_domain_name) >= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) + if (domain || strlen(tmp) >= TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 10) goto done; - domain = tomoyo_find_domain(new_domain_name); + domain = tomoyo_find_domain(tmp); if (domain) goto done; - if (is_enforce) - goto done; - domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(new_domain_name, - old_domain->profile); + if (is_enforce) { + int error = tomoyo_supervisor(&r, "# wants to create domain\n" + "%s\n", tmp); + if (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST) + goto retry; + if (error < 0) + goto done; + } + domain = tomoyo_assign_domain(tmp, old_domain->profile); done: if (domain) goto out; - printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-ERROR: Domain '%s' not defined.\n", - new_domain_name); + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-ERROR: Domain '%s' not defined.\n", tmp); if (is_enforce) retval = -EPERM; else @@ -798,8 +535,8 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* Update reference count on "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */ atomic_inc(&domain->users); bprm->cred->security = domain; - kfree(real_program_name); - kfree(symlink_program_name); + if (need_kfree) + kfree(rn.name); kfree(tmp); return retval; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c index 1c6f8238ec47..9d32f182301e 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/file.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c @@ -1,48 +1,88 @@ /* * security/tomoyo/file.c * - * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control. - * - * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION - * - * Version: 2.2.0 2009/04/01 + * Pathname restriction functions. * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION */ #include "common.h" #include <linux/slab.h> -/* Keyword array for single path operations. */ -static const char *tomoyo_path_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION] = { +/* Keyword array for operations with one pathname. */ +const char *tomoyo_path_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION] = { [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE] = "read/write", [TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE] = "execute", [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ] = "read", [TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE] = "write", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE] = "create", [TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK] = "unlink", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR] = "mkdir", [TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR] = "rmdir", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO] = "mkfifo", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK] = "mksock", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK] = "mkblock", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR] = "mkchar", [TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE] = "truncate", [TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK] = "symlink", [TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE] = "rewrite", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT] = "chroot", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT] = "unmount", +}; + +/* Keyword array for operations with one pathname and three numbers. */ +const char *tomoyo_mkdev_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK] = "mkblock", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR] = "mkchar", +}; + +/* Keyword array for operations with two pathnames. */ +const char *tomoyo_path2_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK] = "link", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME] = "rename", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT] = "pivot_root", +}; + +/* Keyword array for operations with one pathname and one number. */ +const char *tomoyo_path_number_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE] = "create", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR] = "mkdir", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO] = "mkfifo", + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK] = "mksock", [TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL] = "ioctl", [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD] = "chmod", [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN] = "chown", [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP] = "chgrp", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT] = "chroot", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT] = "mount", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT] = "unmount", }; -/* Keyword array for double path operations. */ -static const char *tomoyo_path2_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION] = { - [TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK] = "link", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME] = "rename", - [TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT] = "pivot_root", +static const u8 tomoyo_p2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_EXECUTE, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UNLINK, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RMDIR, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_TRUNCATE, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_SYMLINK, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_REWRITE, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHROOT, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_UMOUNT, +}; + +static const u8 tomoyo_pnnn2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKBLOCK, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKCHAR, +}; + +static const u8 tomoyo_pp2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_LINK, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_RENAME, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_PIVOT_ROOT, +}; + +static const u8 tomoyo_pn2mac[TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION] = { + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CREATE, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKDIR, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKFIFO, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MKSOCK, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_IOCTL, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHMOD, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHOWN, + [TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP] = TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_CHGRP, }; void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) @@ -50,56 +90,45 @@ void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) if (!ptr) return; if (ptr->is_group) - tomoyo_put_path_group(ptr->group); + tomoyo_put_group(ptr->group); else tomoyo_put_name(ptr->filename); } -bool tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name, - const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) +const struct tomoyo_path_info * +tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name, + const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) { if (ptr->is_group) - return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group, 1); - return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename); + return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group); + if (tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename)) + return ptr->filename; + return NULL; } -static bool tomoyo_compare_name_union_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info - *name, - const struct tomoyo_name_union - *ptr, const bool may_use_pattern) +void tomoyo_put_number_union(struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr) { - if (ptr->is_group) - return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group, - may_use_pattern); - if (may_use_pattern || !ptr->filename->is_patterned) - return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename); - return false; + if (ptr && ptr->is_group) + tomoyo_put_group(ptr->group); } -/** - * tomoyo_path2keyword - Get the name of single path operation. - * - * @operation: Type of operation. - * - * Returns the name of single path operation. - */ -const char *tomoyo_path2keyword(const u8 operation) +bool tomoyo_compare_number_union(const unsigned long value, + const struct tomoyo_number_union *ptr) { - return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION) - ? tomoyo_path_keyword[operation] : NULL; + if (ptr->is_group) + return tomoyo_number_matches_group(value, value, ptr->group); + return value >= ptr->values[0] && value <= ptr->values[1]; } -/** - * tomoyo_path22keyword - Get the name of double path operation. - * - * @operation: Type of operation. - * - * Returns the name of double path operation. - */ -const char *tomoyo_path22keyword(const u8 operation) +static void tomoyo_add_slash(struct tomoyo_path_info *buf) { - return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION) - ? tomoyo_path2_keyword[operation] : NULL; + if (buf->is_dir) + return; + /* + * This is OK because tomoyo_encode() reserves space for appending "/". + */ + strcat((char *) buf->name, "/"); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf); } /** @@ -121,69 +150,134 @@ static bool tomoyo_strendswith(const char *name, const char *tail) } /** - * tomoyo_get_path - Get realpath. + * tomoyo_get_realpath - Get realpath. * + * @buf: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info". * @path: Pointer to "struct path". * - * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise. + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. */ -static struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_path(struct path *path) +static bool tomoyo_get_realpath(struct tomoyo_path_info *buf, struct path *path) { - int error; - struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(*buf), - GFP_NOFS); - - if (!buf) - return NULL; - /* Reserve one byte for appending "/". */ - error = tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf->body, - sizeof(buf->body) - 2); - if (!error) { - buf->head.name = buf->body; - tomoyo_fill_path_info(&buf->head); - return &buf->head; + buf->name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(path); + if (buf->name) { + tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf); + return true; } - kfree(buf); - return NULL; + return false; } -static int tomoyo_update_path2_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1, - const char *filename2, - struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain, - const bool is_delete); -static int tomoyo_update_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, - struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain, - const bool is_delete); - -/* - * tomoyo_globally_readable_list is used for holding list of pathnames which - * are by default allowed to be open()ed for reading by any process. +/** + * tomoyo_audit_path_log - Audit path request log. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". * - * An entry is added by + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_audit_path_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) +{ + const char *operation = tomoyo_path_keyword[r->param.path.operation]; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename = r->param.path.filename; + if (r->granted) + return 0; + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "%s %s", operation, filename->name); + return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "allow_%s %s\n", operation, + tomoyo_pattern(filename)); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_audit_path2_log - Audit path/path request log. * - * # echo 'allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". * - * and is deleted by + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_audit_path2_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) +{ + const char *operation = tomoyo_path2_keyword[r->param.path2.operation]; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1 = r->param.path2.filename1; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2 = r->param.path2.filename2; + if (r->granted) + return 0; + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "%s %s %s", operation, filename1->name, + filename2->name); + return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "allow_%s %s %s\n", operation, + tomoyo_pattern(filename1), + tomoyo_pattern(filename2)); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_audit_mkdev_log - Audit path/number/number/number request log. * - * # echo 'delete allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". * - * and all entries are retrieved by + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_audit_mkdev_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) +{ + const char *operation = tomoyo_mkdev_keyword[r->param.mkdev.operation]; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename = r->param.mkdev.filename; + const unsigned int major = r->param.mkdev.major; + const unsigned int minor = r->param.mkdev.minor; + const unsigned int mode = r->param.mkdev.mode; + if (r->granted) + return 0; + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "%s %s 0%o %u %u", operation, filename->name, mode, + major, minor); + return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "allow_%s %s 0%o %u %u\n", operation, + tomoyo_pattern(filename), mode, major, minor); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_audit_path_number_log - Audit path/number request log. * - * # grep ^allow_read /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". + * @error: Error code. * - * In the example above, any process is allowed to - * open("/lib/libc-2.5.so", O_RDONLY). - * One exception is, if the domain which current process belongs to is marked - * as "ignore_global_allow_read", current process can't do so unless explicitly - * given "allow_read /lib/libc-2.5.so" to the domain which current process - * belongs to. + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list); +static int tomoyo_audit_path_number_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) +{ + const u8 type = r->param.path_number.operation; + u8 radix; + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename = r->param.path_number.filename; + const char *operation = tomoyo_path_number_keyword[type]; + char buffer[64]; + if (r->granted) + return 0; + switch (type) { + case TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE: + case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR: + case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO: + case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK: + case TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD: + radix = TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL; + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL: + radix = TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL; + break; + default: + radix = TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL; + break; + } + tomoyo_print_ulong(buffer, sizeof(buffer), r->param.path_number.number, + radix); + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "%s %s %s", operation, filename->name, buffer); + return tomoyo_supervisor(r, "allow_%s %s %s\n", operation, + tomoyo_pattern(filename), buffer); +} + +static bool tomoyo_same_globally_readable(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) +{ + return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_readable_file, + head)->filename == + container_of(b, struct tomoyo_readable_file, + head)->filename; +} /** - * tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list. + * tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_readable_file" list. * * @filename: Filename unconditionally permitted to open() for reading. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. @@ -195,41 +289,24 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list); static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename, const bool is_delete) { - struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr; - struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry e = { }; - int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_readable_file e = { }; + int error; - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 1, 0, -1)) + if (!tomoyo_correct_word(filename)) return -EINVAL; e.filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename); if (!e.filename) return -ENOMEM; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) { - if (ptr->filename != e.filename) - continue; - ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, - &tomoyo_globally_readable_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - out: + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + &tomoyo_policy_list + [TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE], + tomoyo_same_globally_readable); tomoyo_put_name(e.filename); return error; } /** - * tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file - Check if the file is unconditionnaly permitted to be open()ed for reading. + * tomoyo_globally_readable_file - Check if the file is unconditionnaly permitted to be open()ed for reading. * * @filename: The filename to check. * @@ -237,14 +314,15 @@ static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static bool tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info * +static bool tomoyo_globally_readable_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info * filename) { - struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr; + struct tomoyo_readable_file *ptr; bool found = false; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted && + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_list + [TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE], head.list) { + if (!ptr->head.is_deleted && tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->filename)) { found = true; break; @@ -254,7 +332,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info * } /** - * tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list. + * tomoyo_write_globally_readable - Write "struct tomoyo_readable_file" list. * * @data: String to parse. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. @@ -263,74 +341,20 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info * * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +int tomoyo_write_globally_readable(char *data, const bool is_delete) { return tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(data, is_delete); } -/** - * tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static bool tomoyo_same_pattern(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) { - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; - - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, - &tomoyo_globally_readable_list) { - struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr; - ptr = list_entry(pos, - struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry, - list); - if (ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n", - ptr->filename->name); - if (!done) - break; - } - return done; + return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_no_pattern, head)->pattern == + container_of(b, struct tomoyo_no_pattern, head)->pattern; } -/* tomoyo_pattern_list is used for holding list of pathnames which are used for - * converting pathnames to pathname patterns during learning mode. - * - * An entry is added by - * - * # echo 'file_pattern /proc/\$/mounts' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # echo 'delete file_pattern /proc/\$/mounts' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and all entries are retrieved by - * - * # grep ^file_pattern /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * In the example above, if a process which belongs to a domain which is in - * learning mode requested open("/proc/1/mounts", O_RDONLY), - * "allow_read /proc/\$/mounts" is automatically added to the domain which that - * process belongs to. - * - * It is not a desirable behavior that we have to use /proc/\$/ instead of - * /proc/self/ when current process needs to access only current process's - * information. As of now, LSM version of TOMOYO is using __d_path() for - * calculating pathname. Non LSM version of TOMOYO is using its own function - * which pretends as if /proc/self/ is not a symlink; so that we can forbid - * current process from accessing other process's information. - */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list); - /** - * tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list. + * tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_no_pattern" list. * * @pattern: Pathname pattern. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. @@ -342,39 +366,23 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list); static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern, const bool is_delete) { - struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr; - struct tomoyo_pattern_entry e = { .pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern) }; - int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_no_pattern e = { }; + int error; + if (!tomoyo_correct_word(pattern)) + return -EINVAL; + e.pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern); if (!e.pattern) - return error; - if (!e.pattern->is_patterned) - goto out; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) { - if (e.pattern != ptr->pattern) - continue; - ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - out: + return -ENOMEM; + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN], + tomoyo_same_pattern); tomoyo_put_name(e.pattern); return error; } /** - * tomoyo_get_file_pattern - Get patterned pathname. + * tomoyo_pattern - Get patterned pathname. * * @filename: The filename to find patterned pathname. * @@ -382,14 +390,14 @@ static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static const struct tomoyo_path_info * -tomoyo_get_file_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) +const char *tomoyo_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) { - struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr; + struct tomoyo_no_pattern *ptr; const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern = NULL; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) { - if (ptr->is_deleted) + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN], + head.list) { + if (ptr->head.is_deleted) continue; if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern)) continue; @@ -403,11 +411,11 @@ tomoyo_get_file_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) } if (pattern) filename = pattern; - return filename; + return filename->name; } /** - * tomoyo_write_pattern_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list. + * tomoyo_write_pattern - Write "struct tomoyo_no_pattern" list. * * @data: String to parse. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. @@ -416,71 +424,21 @@ tomoyo_get_file_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +int tomoyo_write_pattern(char *data, const bool is_delete) { return tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(data, is_delete); } -/** - * tomoyo_read_file_pattern - Read "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static bool tomoyo_same_no_rewrite(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) { - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; - - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_pattern_list) { - struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr; - ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_pattern_entry, list); - if (ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN - "%s\n", ptr->pattern->name); - if (!done) - break; - } - return done; + return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite, head)->pattern + == container_of(b, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite, head) + ->pattern; } -/* - * tomoyo_no_rewrite_list is used for holding list of pathnames which are by - * default forbidden to modify already written content of a file. - * - * An entry is added by - * - * # echo 'deny_rewrite /var/log/messages' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and is deleted by - * - * # echo 'delete deny_rewrite /var/log/messages' > \ - * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * and all entries are retrieved by - * - * # grep ^deny_rewrite /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy - * - * In the example above, if a process requested to rewrite /var/log/messages , - * the process can't rewrite unless the domain which that process belongs to - * has "allow_rewrite /var/log/messages" entry. - * - * It is not a desirable behavior that we have to add "\040(deleted)" suffix - * when we want to allow rewriting already unlink()ed file. As of now, - * LSM version of TOMOYO is using __d_path() for calculating pathname. - * Non LSM version of TOMOYO is using its own function which doesn't append - * " (deleted)" suffix if the file is already unlink()ed; so that we don't - * need to worry whether the file is already unlink()ed or not. - */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list); - /** - * tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list. + * tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite" list. * * @pattern: Pathname pattern that are not rewritable by default. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. @@ -492,41 +450,23 @@ LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list); static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern, const bool is_delete) { - struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr; - struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry e = { }; - int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_no_rewrite e = { }; + int error; - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 0, 0)) + if (!tomoyo_correct_word(pattern)) return -EINVAL; e.pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern); if (!e.pattern) - return error; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) { - if (ptr->pattern != e.pattern) - continue; - ptr->is_deleted = is_delete; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, - &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - out: + return -ENOMEM; + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE], + tomoyo_same_no_rewrite); tomoyo_put_name(e.pattern); return error; } /** - * tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file - Check if the given pathname is not permitted to be rewrited. + * tomoyo_no_rewrite_file - Check if the given pathname is not permitted to be rewrited. * * @filename: Filename to check. * @@ -535,13 +475,14 @@ static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static bool tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) +static bool tomoyo_no_rewrite_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) { - struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr; + struct tomoyo_no_rewrite *ptr; bool found = false; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) { - if (ptr->is_deleted) + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_list[TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE], + head.list) { + if (ptr->head.is_deleted) continue; if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern)) continue; @@ -552,7 +493,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) } /** - * tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list. + * tomoyo_write_no_rewrite - Write "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite" list. * * @data: String to parse. * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. @@ -561,214 +502,103 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) +int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite(char *data, const bool is_delete) { return tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(data, is_delete); } -/** - * tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +static bool tomoyo_check_path_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) { - struct list_head *pos; - bool done = true; - - list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list) { - struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr; - ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry, list); - if (ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - done = tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE - "%s\n", ptr->pattern->name); - if (!done) - break; + const struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl = container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), + head); + if (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.path.operation)) { + r->param.path.matched_path = + tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path.filename, + &acl->name); + return r->param.path.matched_path != NULL; } - return done; + return false; } -/** - * tomoyo_update_file_acl - Update file's read/write/execute ACL. - * - * @filename: Filename. - * @perm: Permission (between 1 to 7). - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. - * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. - * - * This is legacy support interface for older policy syntax. - * Current policy syntax uses "allow_read/write" instead of "6", - * "allow_read" instead of "4", "allow_write" instead of "2", - * "allow_execute" instead of "1". - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -static int tomoyo_update_file_acl(const char *filename, u8 perm, - struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, - const bool is_delete) +static bool tomoyo_check_path_number_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) { - if (perm > 7 || !perm) { - printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid permission '%d %s'\n", - __func__, perm, filename); - return -EINVAL; - } - if (filename[0] != '@' && tomoyo_strendswith(filename, "/")) - /* - * Only 'allow_mkdir' and 'allow_rmdir' are valid for - * directory permissions. - */ - return 0; - if (perm & 4) - tomoyo_update_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ, filename, domain, - is_delete); - if (perm & 2) - tomoyo_update_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE, filename, domain, - is_delete); - if (perm & 1) - tomoyo_update_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE, filename, domain, - is_delete); - return 0; + const struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *acl = + container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head); + return (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.path_number.operation)) && + tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.path_number.number, + &acl->number) && + tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path_number.filename, + &acl->name); } -/** - * tomoyo_path_acl2 - Check permission for single path operation. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @filename: Filename to check. - * @perm: Permission. - * @may_use_pattern: True if patterned ACL is permitted. - * - * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -static int tomoyo_path_acl2(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, - const u32 perm, const bool may_use_pattern) +static bool tomoyo_check_path2_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) { - struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; - int error = -EPERM; - - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { - struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl; - if (ptr->type != TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL) - continue; - acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head); - if (perm <= 0xFFFF) { - if (!(acl->perm & perm)) - continue; - } else { - if (!(acl->perm_high & (perm >> 16))) - continue; - } - if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union_pattern(filename, &acl->name, - may_use_pattern)) - continue; - error = 0; - break; - } - return error; + const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *acl = + container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head); + return (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.path2.operation)) && + tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path2.filename1, &acl->name1) + && tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.path2.filename2, + &acl->name2); } -/** - * tomoyo_check_file_acl - Check permission for opening files. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @filename: Filename to check. - * @operation: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute"). - * - * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -static int tomoyo_check_file_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, - const u8 operation) +static bool tomoyo_check_mkdev_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) { - u32 perm = 0; - - if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE)) - return 0; - if (operation == 6) - perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE; - else if (operation == 4) - perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ; - else if (operation == 2) - perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE; - else if (operation == 1) - perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE; - else - BUG(); - return tomoyo_path_acl2(domain, filename, perm, operation != 1); + const struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *acl = + container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head); + return (acl->perm & (1 << r->param.mkdev.operation)) && + tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mkdev.mode, + &acl->mode) && + tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mkdev.major, + &acl->major) && + tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mkdev.minor, + &acl->minor) && + tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mkdev.filename, + &acl->name); } -/** - * tomoyo_check_file_perm2 - Check permission for opening files. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @filename: Filename to check. - * @perm: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute"). - * @operation: Operation name passed used for verbose mode. - * @mode: Access control mode. - * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -static int tomoyo_check_file_perm2(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, - const u8 perm, const char *operation, - const u8 mode) +static bool tomoyo_same_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b) { - const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); - const char *msg = "<unknown>"; - int error = 0; + const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head); + const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head); + return tomoyo_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) && + tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name); +} - if (!filename) - return 0; - error = tomoyo_check_file_acl(domain, filename, perm); - if (error && perm == 4 && !domain->ignore_global_allow_read - && tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(filename)) - error = 0; - if (perm == 6) - msg = tomoyo_path2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE); - else if (perm == 4) - msg = tomoyo_path2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ); - else if (perm == 2) - msg = tomoyo_path2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE); - else if (perm == 1) - msg = tomoyo_path2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE); - else - BUG(); - if (!error) - return 0; - if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain)) - printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s(%s) %s' denied " - "for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, operation, - filename->name, tomoyo_get_last_name(domain)); - if (is_enforce) - return error; - if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) { - /* Don't use patterns for execute permission. */ - const struct tomoyo_path_info *patterned_file = (perm != 1) ? - tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename) : filename; - tomoyo_update_file_acl(patterned_file->name, perm, - domain, false); +static bool tomoyo_merge_path_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *b, + const bool is_delete) +{ + u16 * const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head) + ->perm; + u16 perm = *a_perm; + const u16 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head)->perm; + if (is_delete) { + perm &= ~b_perm; + if ((perm & TOMOYO_RW_MASK) != TOMOYO_RW_MASK) + perm &= ~(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE); + else if (!(perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))) + perm &= ~TOMOYO_RW_MASK; + } else { + perm |= b_perm; + if ((perm & TOMOYO_RW_MASK) == TOMOYO_RW_MASK) + perm |= (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE); + else if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)) + perm |= TOMOYO_RW_MASK; } - return 0; + *a_perm = perm; + return !perm; } /** - * tomoyo_write_file_policy - Update file related list. + * tomoyo_update_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_path_acl" list. * - * @data: String to parse. + * @type: Type of operation. + * @filename: Filename. * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. * @@ -776,48 +606,65 @@ static int tomoyo_check_file_perm2(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const bool is_delete) +static int tomoyo_update_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, + const bool is_delete) { - char *filename = strchr(data, ' '); - char *filename2; - unsigned int perm; - u8 type; - - if (!filename) + struct tomoyo_path_acl e = { + .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL, + .perm = 1 << type + }; + int error; + if (e.perm == (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)) + e.perm |= TOMOYO_RW_MASK; + if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename, &e.name)) return -EINVAL; - *filename++ = '\0'; - if (sscanf(data, "%u", &perm) == 1) - return tomoyo_update_file_acl(filename, (u8) perm, domain, - is_delete); - if (strncmp(data, "allow_", 6)) - goto out; - data += 6; - for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; type++) { - if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_path_keyword[type])) - continue; - return tomoyo_update_path_acl(type, filename, domain, - is_delete); - } - filename2 = strchr(filename, ' '); - if (!filename2) - goto out; - *filename2++ = '\0'; - for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; type++) { - if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_path2_keyword[type])) - continue; - return tomoyo_update_path2_acl(type, filename, filename2, - domain, is_delete); - } - out: - return -EINVAL; + error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, domain, + tomoyo_same_path_acl, + tomoyo_merge_path_acl); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name); + return error; +} + +static bool tomoyo_same_mkdev_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b) +{ + const struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), + head); + const struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), + head); + return tomoyo_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) + && tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name) + && tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->mode, &p2->mode) + && tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->major, &p2->major) + && tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->minor, &p2->minor); +} + +static bool tomoyo_merge_mkdev_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *b, + const bool is_delete) +{ + u8 *const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl, + head)->perm; + u8 perm = *a_perm; + const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl, head) + ->perm; + if (is_delete) + perm &= ~b_perm; + else + perm |= b_perm; + *a_perm = perm; + return !perm; } /** - * tomoyo_update_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_path_acl" list. + * tomoyo_update_mkdev_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl" list. * * @type: Type of operation. * @filename: Filename. + * @mode: Create mode. + * @major: Device major number. + * @minor: Device minor number. * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. * @@ -825,71 +672,58 @@ int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_update_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, - struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain, - const bool is_delete) +static int tomoyo_update_mkdev_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, + char *mode, char *major, char *minor, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * const + domain, const bool is_delete) { - static const u32 tomoyo_rw_mask = - (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ) | (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE); - const u32 perm = 1 << type; - struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; - struct tomoyo_path_acl e = { - .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL, - .perm_high = perm >> 16, - .perm = perm + struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl e = { + .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL, + .perm = 1 << type }; int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; - - if (type == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE) - e.perm |= tomoyo_rw_mask; - if (!domain) - return -EINVAL; - if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename, &e.name)) - return -EINVAL; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) + if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename, &e.name) || + !tomoyo_parse_number_union(mode, &e.mode) || + !tomoyo_parse_number_union(major, &e.major) || + !tomoyo_parse_number_union(minor, &e.minor)) goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { - struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl = - container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head); - if (!tomoyo_is_same_path_acl(acl, &e)) - continue; - if (is_delete) { - if (perm <= 0xFFFF) - acl->perm &= ~perm; - else - acl->perm_high &= ~(perm >> 16); - if ((acl->perm & tomoyo_rw_mask) != tomoyo_rw_mask) - acl->perm &= ~(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE); - else if (!(acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))) - acl->perm &= ~tomoyo_rw_mask; - } else { - if (perm <= 0xFFFF) - acl->perm |= perm; - else - acl->perm_high |= (perm >> 16); - if ((acl->perm & tomoyo_rw_mask) == tomoyo_rw_mask) - acl->perm |= 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE; - else if (acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)) - acl->perm |= tomoyo_rw_mask; - } - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list, - &domain->acl_info_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); + error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, domain, + tomoyo_same_mkdev_acl, + tomoyo_merge_mkdev_acl); out: tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.mode); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.major); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.minor); return error; } +static bool tomoyo_same_path2_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b) +{ + const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head); + const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head); + return tomoyo_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) + && tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name1, &p2->name1) + && tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name2, &p2->name2); +} + +static bool tomoyo_merge_path2_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *b, + const bool is_delete) +{ + u8 * const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head) + ->perm; + u8 perm = *a_perm; + const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head)->perm; + if (is_delete) + perm &= ~b_perm; + else + perm |= b_perm; + *a_perm = perm; + return !perm; +} + /** * tomoyo_update_path2_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_path2_acl" list. * @@ -905,46 +739,20 @@ static int tomoyo_update_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, */ static int tomoyo_update_path2_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1, const char *filename2, - struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain, const bool is_delete) { - const u8 perm = 1 << type; struct tomoyo_path2_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL, - .perm = perm + .perm = 1 << type }; - struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; - - if (!domain) - return -EINVAL; if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename1, &e.name1) || !tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename2, &e.name2)) goto out; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { - struct tomoyo_path2_acl *acl = - container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head); - if (!tomoyo_is_same_path2_acl(acl, &e)) - continue; - if (is_delete) - acl->perm &= ~perm; - else - acl->perm |= perm; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list, - &domain->acl_info_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); + error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, domain, + tomoyo_same_path2_acl, + tomoyo_merge_path2_acl); out: tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name1); tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name2); @@ -952,134 +760,158 @@ static int tomoyo_update_path2_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1, } /** - * tomoyo_path_acl - Check permission for single path operation. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @type: Type of operation. - * @filename: Filename to check. - * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -static int tomoyo_path_acl(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, const u8 type, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) -{ - if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE)) - return 0; - return tomoyo_path_acl2(domain, filename, 1 << type, 1); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_path2_acl - Check permission for double path operation. + * tomoyo_path_permission - Check permission for single path operation. * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @type: Type of operation. - * @filename1: First filename to check. - * @filename2: Second filename to check. - * - * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -static int tomoyo_path2_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const u8 type, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2) -{ - struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; - const u8 perm = 1 << type; - int error = -EPERM; - - if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE)) - return 0; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { - struct tomoyo_path2_acl *acl; - if (ptr->type != TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL) - continue; - acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head); - if (!(acl->perm & perm)) - continue; - if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union(filename1, &acl->name1)) - continue; - if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union(filename2, &acl->name2)) - continue; - error = 0; - break; - } - return error; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_path_permission2 - Check permission for single path operation. - * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". * @operation: Type of operation. * @filename: Filename to check. - * @mode: Access control mode. * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. * * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). */ -static int tomoyo_path_permission2(struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain, - u8 operation, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, - const u8 mode) +int tomoyo_path_permission(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, u8 operation, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) { - const char *msg; int error; - const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); - if (!mode) - return 0; next: - error = tomoyo_path_acl(domain, operation, filename); - msg = tomoyo_path2keyword(operation); - if (!error) - goto ok; - if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain)) - printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s' denied for %s\n", - tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, filename->name, - tomoyo_get_last_name(domain)); - if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) { - const char *name = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename)->name; - tomoyo_update_path_acl(operation, name, domain, false); - } - if (!is_enforce) - error = 0; - ok: + r->type = tomoyo_p2mac[operation]; + r->mode = tomoyo_get_mode(r->profile, r->type); + if (r->mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) + return 0; + r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL; + r->param.path.filename = filename; + r->param.path.operation = operation; + do { + tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_path_acl); + if (!r->granted && operation == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ && + !r->domain->ignore_global_allow_read && + tomoyo_globally_readable_file(filename)) + r->granted = true; + error = tomoyo_audit_path_log(r); + /* + * Do not retry for execute request, for alias may have + * changed. + */ + } while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST && + operation != TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE); /* * Since "allow_truncate" doesn't imply "allow_rewrite" permission, * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission if the filename is * specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword. */ if (!error && operation == TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE && - tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(filename)) { + tomoyo_no_rewrite_file(filename)) { operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE; goto next; } return error; } +static bool tomoyo_same_path_number_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b) +{ + const struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), + head); + const struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), + head); + return tomoyo_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) + && tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name) + && tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->number, &p2->number); +} + +static bool tomoyo_merge_path_number_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + struct tomoyo_acl_info *b, + const bool is_delete) +{ + u8 * const a_perm = &container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path_number_acl, + head)->perm; + u8 perm = *a_perm; + const u8 b_perm = container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path_number_acl, head) + ->perm; + if (is_delete) + perm &= ~b_perm; + else + perm |= b_perm; + *a_perm = perm; + return !perm; +} + /** - * tomoyo_check_exec_perm - Check permission for "execute". + * tomoyo_update_path_number_acl - Update ioctl/chmod/chown/chgrp ACL. + * + * @type: Type of operation. + * @filename: Filename. + * @number: Number. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. * - * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". - * @filename: Check permission for "execute". + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_update_path_number_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename, + char *number, + struct tomoyo_domain_info * const + domain, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_path_number_acl e = { + .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL, + .perm = 1 << type + }; + int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename, &e.name)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tomoyo_parse_number_union(number, &e.number)) + goto out; + error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, domain, + tomoyo_same_path_number_acl, + tomoyo_merge_path_number_acl); + out: + tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.number); + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_path_number_perm - Check permission for "create", "mkdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "ioctl", "chmod", "chown", "chgrp". * - * Returns 0 on success, negativevalue otherwise. + * @type: Type of operation. + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * @number: Number. * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, - const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename) +int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 type, struct path *path, + unsigned long number) { - const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); + struct tomoyo_request_info r; + int error = -ENOMEM; + struct tomoyo_path_info buf; + int idx; - if (!mode) + if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_pn2mac[type]) + == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED || !path->mnt || !path->dentry) return 0; - return tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, filename, 1, "do_execve", mode); + idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); + if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) + goto out; + if (type == TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR) + tomoyo_add_slash(&buf); + r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL; + r.param.path_number.operation = type; + r.param.path_number.filename = &buf; + r.param.path_number.number = number; + do { + tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_path_number_acl); + error = tomoyo_audit_path_number_log(&r); + } while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST); + kfree(buf.name); + out: + tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); + if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING) + error = 0; + return error; } /** @@ -1096,24 +928,17 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, { const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag); int error = -ENOMEM; - struct tomoyo_path_info *buf; - const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); - const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + struct tomoyo_path_info buf; + struct tomoyo_request_info r; int idx; - if (!mode || !path->mnt) - return 0; - if (acc_mode == 0) - return 0; - if (path->dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) - /* - * I don't check directories here because mkdir() and rmdir() - * don't call me. - */ + if (!path->mnt || + (path->dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))) return 0; + buf.name = NULL; + r.mode = TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED; idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); - buf = tomoyo_get_path(path); - if (!buf) + if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) goto out; error = 0; /* @@ -1121,28 +946,43 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not * opened for append mode or the filename is truncated at open time. */ - if ((acc_mode & MAY_WRITE) && - ((flag & O_TRUNC) || !(flag & O_APPEND)) && - (tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf))) { - error = tomoyo_path_permission2(domain, TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE, - buf, mode); + if ((acc_mode & MAY_WRITE) && !(flag & O_APPEND) + && tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_REWRITE) + != TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) { + if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + if (tomoyo_no_rewrite_file(&buf)) + error = tomoyo_path_permission(&r, TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE, + &buf); + } + if (!error && acc_mode && + tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_OPEN) + != TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) { + u8 operation; + if (!buf.name && !tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + if (acc_mode == (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)) + operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE; + else if (acc_mode == MAY_READ) + operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_READ; + else + operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE; + error = tomoyo_path_permission(&r, operation, &buf); } - if (!error) - error = tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, buf, acc_mode, "open", - mode); - if (!error && (flag & O_TRUNC)) - error = tomoyo_path_permission2(domain, TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, - buf, mode); out: - kfree(buf); + kfree(buf.name); tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); - if (!is_enforce) + if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING) error = 0; return error; } /** - * tomoyo_path_perm - Check permission for "create", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "mkblock", "mkchar", "truncate", "symlink", "ioctl", "chmod", "chown", "chgrp", "chroot", "mount" and "unmount". + * tomoyo_path_perm - Check permission for "unlink", "rmdir", "truncate", "symlink", "rewrite", "chroot" and "unmount". * * @operation: Type of operation. * @path: Pointer to "struct path". @@ -1152,71 +992,79 @@ int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path) { int error = -ENOMEM; - struct tomoyo_path_info *buf; - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = tomoyo_domain(); - const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); - const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); + struct tomoyo_path_info buf; + struct tomoyo_request_info r; int idx; - if (!mode || !path->mnt) + if (!path->mnt) return 0; + if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_p2mac[operation]) + == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) + return 0; + buf.name = NULL; idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); - buf = tomoyo_get_path(path); - if (!buf) + if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) goto out; switch (operation) { - case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR: + case TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE: + if (!tomoyo_no_rewrite_file(&buf)) { + error = 0; + goto out; + } + break; case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR: case TOMOYO_TYPE_CHROOT: - if (!buf->is_dir) { - /* - * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/." - */ - strcat((char *) buf->name, "/"); - tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf); - } + case TOMOYO_TYPE_UMOUNT: + tomoyo_add_slash(&buf); + break; } - error = tomoyo_path_permission2(domain, operation, buf, mode); + error = tomoyo_path_permission(&r, operation, &buf); out: - kfree(buf); + kfree(buf.name); tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); - if (!is_enforce) + if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING) error = 0; return error; } /** - * tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission - Check permission for "rewrite". + * tomoyo_mkdev_perm - Check permission for "mkblock" and "mkchar". * - * @filp: Pointer to "struct file". + * @operation: Type of operation. (TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR or TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK) + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * @mode: Create mode. + * @dev: Device number. * * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. */ -int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct file *filp) +int tomoyo_mkdev_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path, + const unsigned int mode, unsigned int dev) { + struct tomoyo_request_info r; int error = -ENOMEM; - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = tomoyo_domain(); - const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); - const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); - struct tomoyo_path_info *buf; + struct tomoyo_path_info buf; int idx; - if (!mode || !filp->f_path.mnt) + if (!path->mnt || + tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_pnnn2mac[operation]) + == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) return 0; - idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); - buf = tomoyo_get_path(&filp->f_path); - if (!buf) - goto out; - if (!tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf)) { - error = 0; - goto out; + error = -ENOMEM; + if (tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf, path)) { + dev = new_decode_dev(dev); + r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL; + r.param.mkdev.filename = &buf; + r.param.mkdev.operation = operation; + r.param.mkdev.mode = mode; + r.param.mkdev.major = MAJOR(dev); + r.param.mkdev.minor = MINOR(dev); + tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_mkdev_acl); + error = tomoyo_audit_mkdev_log(&r); + kfree(buf.name); } - error = tomoyo_path_permission2(domain, TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE, buf, mode); - out: - kfree(buf); tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); - if (!is_enforce) + if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING) error = 0; return error; } @@ -1234,56 +1082,99 @@ int tomoyo_path2_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path1, struct path *path2) { int error = -ENOMEM; - struct tomoyo_path_info *buf1, *buf2; - struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = tomoyo_domain(); - const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE); - const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3); - const char *msg; + struct tomoyo_path_info buf1; + struct tomoyo_path_info buf2; + struct tomoyo_request_info r; int idx; - if (!mode || !path1->mnt || !path2->mnt) + if (!path1->mnt || !path2->mnt || + tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, tomoyo_pp2mac[operation]) + == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) return 0; + buf1.name = NULL; + buf2.name = NULL; idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); - buf1 = tomoyo_get_path(path1); - buf2 = tomoyo_get_path(path2); - if (!buf1 || !buf2) - goto out; - { - struct dentry *dentry = path1->dentry; - if (dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) { - /* - * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/." - */ - if (!buf1->is_dir) { - strcat((char *) buf1->name, "/"); - tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf1); - } - if (!buf2->is_dir) { - strcat((char *) buf2->name, "/"); - tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf2); - } - } - } - error = tomoyo_path2_acl(domain, operation, buf1, buf2); - msg = tomoyo_path22keyword(operation); - if (!error) + if (!tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf1, path1) || + !tomoyo_get_realpath(&buf2, path2)) goto out; - if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain)) - printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s %s' " - "denied for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), - msg, buf1->name, buf2->name, - tomoyo_get_last_name(domain)); - if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) { - const char *name1 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf1)->name; - const char *name2 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf2)->name; - tomoyo_update_path2_acl(operation, name1, name2, domain, - false); - } + switch (operation) { + struct dentry *dentry; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME: + case TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK: + dentry = path1->dentry; + if (!dentry->d_inode || !S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) + break; + /* fall through */ + case TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT: + tomoyo_add_slash(&buf1); + tomoyo_add_slash(&buf2); + break; + } + r.param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL; + r.param.path2.operation = operation; + r.param.path2.filename1 = &buf1; + r.param.path2.filename2 = &buf2; + do { + tomoyo_check_acl(&r, tomoyo_check_path2_acl); + error = tomoyo_audit_path2_log(&r); + } while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST); out: - kfree(buf1); - kfree(buf2); + kfree(buf1.name); + kfree(buf2.name); tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); - if (!is_enforce) + if (r.mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING) error = 0; return error; } + +/** + * tomoyo_write_file - Update file related list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +int tomoyo_write_file(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete) +{ + char *w[5]; + u8 type; + if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[1][0]) + return -EINVAL; + if (strncmp(w[0], "allow_", 6)) + goto out; + w[0] += 6; + for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; type++) { + if (strcmp(w[0], tomoyo_path_keyword[type])) + continue; + return tomoyo_update_path_acl(type, w[1], domain, is_delete); + } + if (!w[2][0]) + goto out; + for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; type++) { + if (strcmp(w[0], tomoyo_path2_keyword[type])) + continue; + return tomoyo_update_path2_acl(type, w[1], w[2], domain, + is_delete); + } + for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION; type++) { + if (strcmp(w[0], tomoyo_path_number_keyword[type])) + continue; + return tomoyo_update_path_number_acl(type, w[1], w[2], domain, + is_delete); + } + if (!w[3][0] || !w[4][0]) + goto out; + for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION; type++) { + if (strcmp(w[0], tomoyo_mkdev_keyword[type])) + continue; + return tomoyo_update_mkdev_acl(type, w[1], w[2], w[3], + w[4], domain, is_delete); + } + out: + return -EINVAL; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c index b9cc71b04314..a877e4c3b101 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/gc.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c @@ -11,83 +11,75 @@ #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/slab.h> -enum tomoyo_gc_id { - TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP, - TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER, - TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER, - TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER, - TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS, - TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE, - TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN, - TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE, - TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER, - TOMOYO_ID_NAME, - TOMOYO_ID_ACL, - TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN -}; - -struct tomoyo_gc_entry { +struct tomoyo_gc { struct list_head list; int type; - void *element; + struct list_head *element; }; static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_gc_queue); static DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_gc_mutex); /* Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock mutex. */ -static bool tomoyo_add_to_gc(const int type, void *element) +static bool tomoyo_add_to_gc(const int type, struct list_head *element) { - struct tomoyo_gc_entry *entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC); + struct tomoyo_gc *entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!entry) return false; entry->type = type; entry->element = element; list_add(&entry->list, &tomoyo_gc_queue); + list_del_rcu(element); return true; } -static void tomoyo_del_allow_read -(struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr) +static void tomoyo_del_allow_read(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_readable_file *ptr = + container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list); tomoyo_put_name(ptr->filename); } -static void tomoyo_del_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr) +static void tomoyo_del_file_pattern(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_no_pattern *ptr = + container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list); tomoyo_put_name(ptr->pattern); } -static void tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr) +static void tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_no_rewrite *ptr = + container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list); tomoyo_put_name(ptr->pattern); } -static void tomoyo_del_domain_initializer -(struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr) +static void tomoyo_del_transition_control(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_transition_control *ptr = + container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list); tomoyo_put_name(ptr->domainname); tomoyo_put_name(ptr->program); } -static void tomoyo_del_domain_keeper(struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr) -{ - tomoyo_put_name(ptr->domainname); - tomoyo_put_name(ptr->program); -} - -static void tomoyo_del_alias(struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr) +static void tomoyo_del_aggregator(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_aggregator *ptr = + container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list); tomoyo_put_name(ptr->original_name); - tomoyo_put_name(ptr->aliased_name); + tomoyo_put_name(ptr->aggregated_name); } -static void tomoyo_del_manager(struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr) +static void tomoyo_del_manager(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_manager *ptr = + container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), head.list); tomoyo_put_name(ptr->manager); } -static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl) +static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl = + container_of(element, typeof(*acl), list); switch (acl->type) { case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL: { @@ -104,14 +96,41 @@ static void tomoyo_del_acl(struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl) tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name2); } break; - default: - printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n"); + case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL: + { + struct tomoyo_path_number_acl *entry + = container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->number); + } + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL: + { + struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl *entry + = container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->mode); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->major); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->minor); + } + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL: + { + struct tomoyo_mount_acl *entry + = container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->dev_name); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->dir_name); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->fs_type); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&entry->flags); + } break; } } -static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) +static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = + container_of(element, typeof(*domain), list); struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl; struct tomoyo_acl_info *tmp; /* @@ -139,7 +158,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) if (atomic_read(&domain->users)) return false; list_for_each_entry_safe(acl, tmp, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { - tomoyo_del_acl(acl); + tomoyo_del_acl(&acl->list); tomoyo_memory_free(acl); } tomoyo_put_name(domain->domainname); @@ -147,135 +166,70 @@ static bool tomoyo_del_domain(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) } -static void tomoyo_del_name(const struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr) +static void tomoyo_del_name(struct list_head *element) { + const struct tomoyo_name *ptr = + container_of(element, typeof(*ptr), list); } -static void tomoyo_del_path_group_member(struct tomoyo_path_group_member - *member) +static void tomoyo_del_path_group(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_path_group *member = + container_of(element, typeof(*member), head.list); tomoyo_put_name(member->member_name); } -static void tomoyo_del_path_group(struct tomoyo_path_group *group) +static void tomoyo_del_group(struct list_head *element) { + struct tomoyo_group *group = + container_of(element, typeof(*group), list); tomoyo_put_name(group->group_name); } +static void tomoyo_del_number_group(struct list_head *element) +{ + struct tomoyo_number_group *member = + container_of(element, typeof(*member), head.list); +} + +static bool tomoyo_collect_member(struct list_head *member_list, int id) +{ + struct tomoyo_acl_head *member; + list_for_each_entry(member, member_list, list) { + if (!member->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(id, &member->list)) + return false; + } + return true; +} + +static bool tomoyo_collect_acl(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain) +{ + struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl; + list_for_each_entry(acl, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (!acl->is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ACL, &acl->list)) + return false; + } + return true; +} + static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void) { + int i; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) return; - { - struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, - list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else - break; - } - } - { - struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else - break; - } - } - { - struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else - break; - } - } - { - struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, - list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else - break; - } - } - { - struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else - break; - } - } - { - struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else - break; - } - } - { - struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, - list) { - if (!ptr->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else - break; - } + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY; i++) { + if (!tomoyo_collect_member(&tomoyo_policy_list[i], i)) + goto unlock; } { struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { - struct tomoyo_acl_info *acl; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(acl, &domain->acl_info_list, - list) { - switch (acl->type) { - case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL: - if (container_of(acl, - struct tomoyo_path_acl, - head)->perm || - container_of(acl, - struct tomoyo_path_acl, - head)->perm_high) - continue; - break; - case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL: - if (container_of(acl, - struct tomoyo_path2_acl, - head)->perm) - continue; - break; - default: - continue; - } - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_ACL, acl)) - list_del_rcu(&acl->list); - else - break; - } + if (!tomoyo_collect_acl(domain)) + goto unlock; if (!domain->is_deleted || atomic_read(&domain->users)) continue; /* @@ -283,104 +237,92 @@ static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void) * refer this domain after successful execve(). * We recheck domain->users after SRCU synchronization. */ - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN, domain)) - list_del_rcu(&domain->list); - else - break; + if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN, &domain->list)) + goto unlock; } } - { - int i; - for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) { - struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[i], - list) { - if (atomic_read(&ptr->users)) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NAME, ptr)) - list_del_rcu(&ptr->list); - else { - i = TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; - break; - } - } + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) { + struct tomoyo_name *ptr; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[i], list) { + if (atomic_read(&ptr->users)) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_NAME, &ptr->list)) + goto unlock; } } - { - struct tomoyo_path_group *group; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) { - struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, - list) { - if (!member->is_deleted) - continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER, - member)) - list_del_rcu(&member->list); - else - break; - } + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; i++) { + struct list_head *list = &tomoyo_group_list[i]; + int id; + struct tomoyo_group *group; + switch (i) { + case 0: + id = TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP; + break; + default: + id = TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP; + break; + } + list_for_each_entry(group, list, list) { + if (!tomoyo_collect_member(&group->member_list, id)) + goto unlock; if (!list_empty(&group->member_list) || atomic_read(&group->users)) continue; - if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP, group)) - list_del_rcu(&group->list); - else - break; + if (!tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_GROUP, &group->list)) + goto unlock; } } + unlock: mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); } static void tomoyo_kfree_entry(void) { - struct tomoyo_gc_entry *p; - struct tomoyo_gc_entry *tmp; + struct tomoyo_gc *p; + struct tomoyo_gc *tmp; list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &tomoyo_gc_queue, list) { + struct list_head *element = p->element; switch (p->type) { - case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER: - tomoyo_del_domain_initializer(p->element); - break; - case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER: - tomoyo_del_domain_keeper(p->element); + case TOMOYO_ID_TRANSITION_CONTROL: + tomoyo_del_transition_control(element); break; - case TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS: - tomoyo_del_alias(p->element); + case TOMOYO_ID_AGGREGATOR: + tomoyo_del_aggregator(element); break; case TOMOYO_ID_GLOBALLY_READABLE: - tomoyo_del_allow_read(p->element); + tomoyo_del_allow_read(element); break; case TOMOYO_ID_PATTERN: - tomoyo_del_file_pattern(p->element); + tomoyo_del_file_pattern(element); break; case TOMOYO_ID_NO_REWRITE: - tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(p->element); + tomoyo_del_no_rewrite(element); break; case TOMOYO_ID_MANAGER: - tomoyo_del_manager(p->element); + tomoyo_del_manager(element); break; case TOMOYO_ID_NAME: - tomoyo_del_name(p->element); + tomoyo_del_name(element); break; case TOMOYO_ID_ACL: - tomoyo_del_acl(p->element); + tomoyo_del_acl(element); break; case TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN: - if (!tomoyo_del_domain(p->element)) + if (!tomoyo_del_domain(element)) continue; break; - case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER: - tomoyo_del_path_group_member(p->element); - break; case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP: - tomoyo_del_path_group(p->element); + tomoyo_del_path_group(element); break; - default: - printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n"); + case TOMOYO_ID_GROUP: + tomoyo_del_group(element); + break; + case TOMOYO_ID_NUMBER_GROUP: + tomoyo_del_number_group(element); break; } - tomoyo_memory_free(p->element); + tomoyo_memory_free(element); list_del(&p->list); kfree(p); } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/group.c b/security/tomoyo/group.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e94352ce723f --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/group.c @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/group.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION + */ + +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "common.h" + +static bool tomoyo_same_path_group(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) +{ + return container_of(a, struct tomoyo_path_group, head)->member_name == + container_of(b, struct tomoyo_path_group, head)->member_name; +} + +static bool tomoyo_same_number_group(const struct tomoyo_acl_head *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_head *b) +{ + return !memcmp(&container_of(a, struct tomoyo_number_group, head) + ->number, + &container_of(b, struct tomoyo_number_group, head) + ->number, + sizeof(container_of(a, struct tomoyo_number_group, head) + ->number)); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_group - Write "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * @type: Type of this group. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_write_group(char *data, const bool is_delete, const u8 type) +{ + struct tomoyo_group *group; + struct list_head *member; + char *w[2]; + int error = -EINVAL; + if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[1][0]) + return -EINVAL; + group = tomoyo_get_group(w[0], type); + if (!group) + return -ENOMEM; + member = &group->member_list; + if (type == TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP) { + struct tomoyo_path_group e = { }; + e.member_name = tomoyo_get_name(w[1]); + if (!e.member_name) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + member, tomoyo_same_path_group); + tomoyo_put_name(e.member_name); + } else if (type == TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP) { + struct tomoyo_number_group e = { }; + if (w[1][0] == '@' + || !tomoyo_parse_number_union(w[1], &e.number) + || e.number.values[0] > e.number.values[1]) + goto out; + error = tomoyo_update_policy(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, + member, tomoyo_same_number_group); + /* + * tomoyo_put_number_union() is not needed because + * w[1][0] != '@'. + */ + } + out: + tomoyo_put_group(group); + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_path_matches_group - Check whether the given pathname matches members of the given pathname group. + * + * @pathname: The name of pathname. + * @group: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group". + * + * Returns matched member's pathname if @pathname matches pathnames in @group, + * NULL otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +const struct tomoyo_path_info * +tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname, + const struct tomoyo_group *group) +{ + struct tomoyo_path_group *member; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, head.list) { + if (member->head.is_deleted) + continue; + if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(pathname, member->member_name)) + continue; + return member->member_name; + } + return NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_number_matches_group - Check whether the given number matches members of the given number group. + * + * @min: Min number. + * @max: Max number. + * @group: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_group". + * + * Returns true if @min and @max partially overlaps @group, false otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +bool tomoyo_number_matches_group(const unsigned long min, + const unsigned long max, + const struct tomoyo_group *group) +{ + struct tomoyo_number_group *member; + bool matched = false; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, head.list) { + if (member->head.is_deleted) + continue; + if (min > member->number.values[1] || + max < member->number.values[0]) + continue; + matched = true; + break; + } + return matched; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bbada7ca1b91 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/load_policy.c + * + * Policy loader launcher for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/* path to policy loader */ +static const char *tomoyo_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init"; + +/** + * tomoyo_policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists. + * + * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void) +{ + /* + * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist. + * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not + * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since + * policies are not loaded yet. + * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime. + */ + struct path path; + + if (kern_path(tomoyo_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) { + printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now " + "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tomoyo_loader); + return false; + } + path_put(&path); + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy. + * + * @filename: The program about to start. + * + * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so + * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init + * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init. + * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and + * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename) +{ + char *argv[2]; + char *envp[3]; + + if (tomoyo_policy_loaded) + return; + /* + * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start. + * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't + * be passed. + * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by + * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start". + */ + if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") && + strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start")) + return; + if (!tomoyo_policy_loader_exists()) + return; + + printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n", + tomoyo_loader); + argv[0] = (char *) tomoyo_loader; + argv[1] = NULL; + envp[0] = "HOME=/"; + envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin"; + envp[2] = NULL; + call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1); + tomoyo_check_profile(); +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..297612669c74 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/memory.c + * + * Memory management functions for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION + */ + +#include <linux/hash.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "common.h" + +/** + * tomoyo_warn_oom - Print out of memory warning message. + * + * @function: Function's name. + */ +void tomoyo_warn_oom(const char *function) +{ + /* Reduce error messages. */ + static pid_t tomoyo_last_pid; + const pid_t pid = current->pid; + if (tomoyo_last_pid != pid) { + printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory at %s.\n", + function); + tomoyo_last_pid = pid; + } + if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) + panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n"); +} + +/* Memory allocated for policy. */ +static atomic_t tomoyo_policy_memory_size; +/* Quota for holding policy. */ +static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_policy; + +/** + * tomoyo_memory_ok - Check memory quota. + * + * @ptr: Pointer to allocated memory. + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + * + * Returns true if @ptr is not NULL and quota not exceeded, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr) +{ + size_t s = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0; + atomic_add(s, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size); + if (ptr && (!tomoyo_quota_for_policy || + atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) + <= tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) { + memset(ptr, 0, s); + return true; + } + atomic_sub(s, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size); + tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__); + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_commit_ok - Check memory quota. + * + * @data: Data to copy from. + * @size: Size in byte. + * + * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise. + * @data is zero-cleared on success. + */ +void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size) +{ + void *ptr = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS); + if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) { + memmove(ptr, data, size); + memset(data, 0, size); + return ptr; + } + return NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_memory_free - Free memory for elements. + * + * @ptr: Pointer to allocated memory. + */ +void tomoyo_memory_free(void *ptr) +{ + atomic_sub(ksize(ptr), &tomoyo_policy_memory_size); + kfree(ptr); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_group - Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group"/"struct tomoyo_number_group". + * + * @group_name: The name of address group. + * @idx: Index number. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_group" on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +struct tomoyo_group *tomoyo_get_group(const char *group_name, const u8 idx) +{ + struct tomoyo_group e = { }; + struct tomoyo_group *group = NULL; + bool found = false; + if (!tomoyo_correct_word(group_name) || idx >= TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP) + return NULL; + e.group_name = tomoyo_get_name(group_name); + if (!e.group_name) + return NULL; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) + goto out; + list_for_each_entry(group, &tomoyo_group_list[idx], list) { + if (e.group_name != group->group_name) + continue; + atomic_inc(&group->users); + found = true; + break; + } + if (!found) { + struct tomoyo_group *entry = tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); + if (entry) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->member_list); + atomic_set(&entry->users, 1); + list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, + &tomoyo_group_list[idx]); + group = entry; + found = true; + } + } + mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); + out: + tomoyo_put_name(e.group_name); + return found ? group : NULL; +} + +/* + * tomoyo_name_list is used for holding string data used by TOMOYO. + * Since same string data is likely used for multiple times (e.g. + * "/lib/libc-2.5.so"), TOMOYO shares string data in the form of + * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *". + */ +struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]; + +/** + * tomoyo_get_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data. + * + * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise. + */ +const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name) +{ + struct tomoyo_name *ptr; + unsigned int hash; + int len; + int allocated_len; + struct list_head *head; + + if (!name) + return NULL; + len = strlen(name) + 1; + hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1); + head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)]; + if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) + return NULL; + list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, list) { + if (hash != ptr->entry.hash || strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name)) + continue; + atomic_inc(&ptr->users); + goto out; + } + ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_NOFS); + allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0; + if (!ptr || (tomoyo_quota_for_policy && + atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) + allocated_len + > tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) { + kfree(ptr); + ptr = NULL; + tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__); + goto out; + } + atomic_add(allocated_len, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size); + ptr->entry.name = ((char *) ptr) + sizeof(*ptr); + memmove((char *) ptr->entry.name, name, len); + atomic_set(&ptr->users, 1); + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry); + list_add_tail(&ptr->list, head); + out: + mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); + return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_mm_init - Initialize mm related code. + */ +void __init tomoyo_mm_init(void) +{ + int idx; + + for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY; idx++) + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_policy_list[idx]); + for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_GROUP; idx++) + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_group_list[idx]); + for (idx = 0; idx < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; idx++) + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[idx]); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list); + tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME); + list_add_tail_rcu(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list); + idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); + if (tomoyo_find_domain(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) != &tomoyo_kernel_domain) + panic("Can't register tomoyo_kernel_domain"); + { + /* Load built-in policy. */ + tomoyo_write_transition_control("/sbin/hotplug", false, + TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE); + tomoyo_write_transition_control("/sbin/modprobe", false, + TOMOYO_TRANSITION_CONTROL_INITIALIZE); + } + tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); +} + + +/* Memory allocated for query lists. */ +unsigned int tomoyo_query_memory_size; +/* Quota for holding query lists. */ +unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_query; + +/** + * tomoyo_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage in bytes. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns memory usage. + */ +void tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + if (!head->r.eof) { + const unsigned int policy + = atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size); + const unsigned int query = tomoyo_query_memory_size; + char buffer[64]; + + memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); + if (tomoyo_quota_for_policy) + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, + " (Quota: %10u)", + tomoyo_quota_for_policy); + else + buffer[0] = '\0'; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Policy: %10u%s\n", policy, + buffer); + if (tomoyo_quota_for_query) + snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, + " (Quota: %10u)", + tomoyo_quota_for_query); + else + buffer[0] = '\0'; + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Query lists: %10u%s\n", query, + buffer); + tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total: %10u\n", policy + query); + head->r.eof = true; + } +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota. + * + * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". + * + * Returns 0. + */ +int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) +{ + char *data = head->write_buf; + unsigned int size; + + if (sscanf(data, "Policy: %u", &size) == 1) + tomoyo_quota_for_policy = size; + else if (sscanf(data, "Query lists: %u", &size) == 1) + tomoyo_quota_for_query = size; + return 0; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82bf8c2390bc --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/mount.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION + */ + +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "common.h" + +/* Keywords for mount restrictions. */ + +/* Allow to call 'mount --bind /source_dir /dest_dir' */ +#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD "--bind" +/* Allow to call 'mount --move /old_dir /new_dir ' */ +#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD "--move" +/* Allow to call 'mount -o remount /dir ' */ +#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD "--remount" +/* Allow to call 'mount --make-unbindable /dir' */ +#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD "--make-unbindable" +/* Allow to call 'mount --make-private /dir' */ +#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD "--make-private" +/* Allow to call 'mount --make-slave /dir' */ +#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD "--make-slave" +/* Allow to call 'mount --make-shared /dir' */ +#define TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD "--make-shared" + +/** + * tomoyo_audit_mount_log - Audit mount log. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_audit_mount_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) +{ + const char *dev = r->param.mount.dev->name; + const char *dir = r->param.mount.dir->name; + const char *type = r->param.mount.type->name; + const unsigned long flags = r->param.mount.flags; + if (r->granted) + return 0; + if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD)) + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount -o remount %s 0x%lX", dir, flags); + else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD) + || !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD)) + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount %s %s %s 0x%lX", type, dev, dir, + flags); + else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD) || + !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD) || + !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD) || + !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD)) + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount %s %s 0x%lX", type, dir, flags); + else + tomoyo_warn_log(r, "mount -t %s %s %s 0x%lX", type, dev, dir, + flags); + return tomoyo_supervisor(r, + TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_MOUNT "%s %s %s 0x%lX\n", + tomoyo_pattern(r->param.mount.dev), + tomoyo_pattern(r->param.mount.dir), type, + flags); +} + +static bool tomoyo_check_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr) +{ + const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *acl = + container_of(ptr, typeof(*acl), head); + return tomoyo_compare_number_union(r->param.mount.flags, &acl->flags) && + tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.type, &acl->fs_type) && + tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.dir, &acl->dir_name) && + (!r->param.mount.need_dev || + tomoyo_compare_name_union(r->param.mount.dev, &acl->dev_name)); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_mount_acl - Check permission for mount() operation. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". + * @dev_name: Name of device file. + * @dir: Pointer to "struct path". + * @type: Name of filesystem type. + * @flags: Mount options. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +static int tomoyo_mount_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, char *dev_name, + struct path *dir, char *type, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct path path; + struct file_system_type *fstype = NULL; + const char *requested_type = NULL; + const char *requested_dir_name = NULL; + const char *requested_dev_name = NULL; + struct tomoyo_path_info rtype; + struct tomoyo_path_info rdev; + struct tomoyo_path_info rdir; + int need_dev = 0; + int error = -ENOMEM; + + /* Get fstype. */ + requested_type = tomoyo_encode(type); + if (!requested_type) + goto out; + rtype.name = requested_type; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rtype); + + /* Get mount point. */ + requested_dir_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(dir); + if (!requested_dir_name) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + rdir.name = requested_dir_name; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdir); + + /* Compare fs name. */ + if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD)) { + /* dev_name is ignored. */ + } else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD) || + !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD) || + !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD) || + !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD)) { + /* dev_name is ignored. */ + } else if (!strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD) || + !strcmp(type, TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD)) { + need_dev = -1; /* dev_name is a directory */ + } else { + fstype = get_fs_type(type); + if (!fstype) { + error = -ENODEV; + goto out; + } + if (fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV) + /* dev_name is a block device file. */ + need_dev = 1; + } + if (need_dev) { + /* Get mount point or device file. */ + if (kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path)) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + requested_dev_name = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path); + if (!requested_dev_name) { + error = -ENOENT; + goto out; + } + } else { + /* Map dev_name to "<NULL>" if no dev_name given. */ + if (!dev_name) + dev_name = "<NULL>"; + requested_dev_name = tomoyo_encode(dev_name); + if (!requested_dev_name) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + } + rdev.name = requested_dev_name; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&rdev); + r->param_type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL; + r->param.mount.need_dev = need_dev; + r->param.mount.dev = &rdev; + r->param.mount.dir = &rdir; + r->param.mount.type = &rtype; + r->param.mount.flags = flags; + do { + tomoyo_check_acl(r, tomoyo_check_mount_acl); + error = tomoyo_audit_mount_log(r); + } while (error == TOMOYO_RETRY_REQUEST); + out: + kfree(requested_dev_name); + kfree(requested_dir_name); + if (fstype) + put_filesystem(fstype); + kfree(requested_type); + return error; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_mount_permission - Check permission for mount() operation. + * + * @dev_name: Name of device file. + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". + * @type: Name of filesystem type. May be NULL. + * @flags: Mount options. + * @data_page: Optional data. May be NULL. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, + unsigned long flags, void *data_page) +{ + struct tomoyo_request_info r; + int error; + int idx; + + if (tomoyo_init_request_info(&r, NULL, TOMOYO_MAC_FILE_MOUNT) + == TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED) + return 0; + if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) + flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) { + type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT_KEYWORD; + flags &= ~MS_REMOUNT; + } + if (flags & MS_MOVE) { + type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE_KEYWORD; + flags &= ~MS_MOVE; + } + if (flags & MS_BIND) { + type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND_KEYWORD; + flags &= ~MS_BIND; + } + if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) { + type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE_KEYWORD; + flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE; + } + if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) { + type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE_KEYWORD; + flags &= ~MS_PRIVATE; + } + if (flags & MS_SLAVE) { + type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE_KEYWORD; + flags &= ~MS_SLAVE; + } + if (flags & MS_SHARED) { + type = TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED_KEYWORD; + flags &= ~MS_SHARED; + } + if (!type) + type = "<NULL>"; + idx = tomoyo_read_lock(); + error = tomoyo_mount_acl(&r, dev_name, path, type, flags); + tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); + return error; +} + +static bool tomoyo_same_mount_acl(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *a, + const struct tomoyo_acl_info *b) +{ + const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *p1 = container_of(a, typeof(*p1), head); + const struct tomoyo_mount_acl *p2 = container_of(b, typeof(*p2), head); + return tomoyo_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) && + tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->dev_name, &p2->dev_name) && + tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->dir_name, &p2->dir_name) && + tomoyo_same_name_union(&p1->fs_type, &p2->fs_type) && + tomoyo_same_number_union(&p1->flags, &p2->flags); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write_mount - Write "struct tomoyo_mount_acl" list. + * + * @data: String to parse. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". + * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +int tomoyo_write_mount(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, + const bool is_delete) +{ + struct tomoyo_mount_acl e = { .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT_ACL }; + int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; + char *w[4]; + if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[3][0]) + return -EINVAL; + if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[0], &e.dev_name) || + !tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[1], &e.dir_name) || + !tomoyo_parse_name_union(w[2], &e.fs_type) || + !tomoyo_parse_number_union(w[3], &e.flags)) + goto out; + error = tomoyo_update_domain(&e.head, sizeof(e), is_delete, domain, + tomoyo_same_mount_acl, NULL); + out: + tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dev_name); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.dir_name); + tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.fs_type); + tomoyo_put_number_union(&e.flags); + return error; +} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/path_group.c b/security/tomoyo/path_group.c deleted file mode 100644 index c988041c8e1c..000000000000 --- a/security/tomoyo/path_group.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -/* - * security/tomoyo/path_group.c - * - * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION - */ - -#include <linux/slab.h> -#include "common.h" -/* The list for "struct ccs_path_group". */ -LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_path_group_list); - -/** - * tomoyo_get_path_group - Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group". - * - * @group_name: The name of pathname group. - * - * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group" on success, NULL otherwise. - */ -struct tomoyo_path_group *tomoyo_get_path_group(const char *group_name) -{ - struct tomoyo_path_group *entry = NULL; - struct tomoyo_path_group *group = NULL; - const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_group_name; - int error = -ENOMEM; - if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(group_name, 0, 0, 0) || - !group_name[0]) - return NULL; - saved_group_name = tomoyo_get_name(group_name); - if (!saved_group_name) - return NULL; - entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS); - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) { - if (saved_group_name != group->group_name) - continue; - atomic_inc(&group->users); - error = 0; - break; - } - if (error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) { - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->member_list); - entry->group_name = saved_group_name; - saved_group_name = NULL; - atomic_set(&entry->users, 1); - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_path_group_list); - group = entry; - entry = NULL; - error = 0; - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - out: - tomoyo_put_name(saved_group_name); - kfree(entry); - return !error ? group : NULL; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_write_path_group_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_path_group" list. - * - * @data: String to parse. - * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request. - * - * Returns 0 on success, nagative value otherwise. - */ -int tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete) -{ - struct tomoyo_path_group *group; - struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member; - struct tomoyo_path_group_member e = { }; - int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM; - char *w[2]; - if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[1][0]) - return -EINVAL; - group = tomoyo_get_path_group(w[0]); - if (!group) - return -ENOMEM; - e.member_name = tomoyo_get_name(w[1]); - if (!e.member_name) - goto out; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - goto out; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) { - if (member->member_name != e.member_name) - continue; - member->is_deleted = is_delete; - error = 0; - break; - } - if (!is_delete && error) { - struct tomoyo_path_group_member *entry = - tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e)); - if (entry) { - list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &group->member_list); - error = 0; - } - } - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - out: - tomoyo_put_name(e.member_name); - tomoyo_put_path_group(group); - return error; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_read_path_group_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_path_group" list. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -bool tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) -{ - struct list_head *gpos; - struct list_head *mpos; - list_for_each_cookie(gpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_path_group_list) { - struct tomoyo_path_group *group; - group = list_entry(gpos, struct tomoyo_path_group, list); - list_for_each_cookie(mpos, head->read_var2, - &group->member_list) { - struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member; - member = list_entry(mpos, - struct tomoyo_path_group_member, - list); - if (member->is_deleted) - continue; - if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP - "%s %s\n", - group->group_name->name, - member->member_name->name)) - return false; - } - } - return true; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_path_matches_group - Check whether the given pathname matches members of the given pathname group. - * - * @pathname: The name of pathname. - * @group: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group". - * @may_use_pattern: True if wild card is permitted. - * - * Returns true if @pathname matches pathnames in @group, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). - */ -bool tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname, - const struct tomoyo_path_group *group, - const bool may_use_pattern) -{ - struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member; - bool matched = false; - list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) { - if (member->is_deleted) - continue; - if (!member->member_name->is_patterned) { - if (tomoyo_pathcmp(pathname, member->member_name)) - continue; - } else if (may_use_pattern) { - if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(pathname, - member->member_name)) - continue; - } else - continue; - matched = true; - break; - } - return matched; -} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c index d1b96f019621..ed8ccd680102 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c @@ -1,174 +1,164 @@ /* * security/tomoyo/realpath.c * - * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO. - * - * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION - * - * Version: 2.2.0 2009/04/01 + * Pathname calculation functions for TOMOYO. * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION */ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/mnt_namespace.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> -#include <linux/hash.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #include "common.h" /** * tomoyo_encode: Convert binary string to ascii string. * - * @buffer: Buffer for ASCII string. - * @buflen: Size of @buffer. - * @str: Binary string. + * @str: String in binary format. + * + * Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise. * - * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise. + * This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function + * didn't return NULL. */ -int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str) +char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str) { - while (1) { - const unsigned char c = *(unsigned char *) str++; + int len = 0; + const char *p = str; + char *cp; + char *cp0; - if (tomoyo_is_valid(c)) { - if (--buflen <= 0) - break; - *buffer++ = (char) c; - if (c != '\\') - continue; - if (--buflen <= 0) - break; - *buffer++ = (char) c; - continue; - } - if (!c) { - if (--buflen <= 0) - break; - *buffer = '\0'; - return 0; + if (!p) + return NULL; + while (*p) { + const unsigned char c = *p++; + if (c == '\\') + len += 2; + else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) + len++; + else + len += 4; + } + len++; + /* Reserve space for appending "/". */ + cp = kzalloc(len + 10, GFP_NOFS); + if (!cp) + return NULL; + cp0 = cp; + p = str; + while (*p) { + const unsigned char c = *p++; + + if (c == '\\') { + *cp++ = '\\'; + *cp++ = '\\'; + } else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) { + *cp++ = c; + } else { + *cp++ = '\\'; + *cp++ = (c >> 6) + '0'; + *cp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0'; + *cp++ = (c & 7) + '0'; } - buflen -= 4; - if (buflen <= 0) - break; - *buffer++ = '\\'; - *buffer++ = (c >> 6) + '0'; - *buffer++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0'; - *buffer++ = (c & 7) + '0'; } - return -ENOMEM; + return cp0; } /** - * tomoyo_realpath_from_path2 - Returns realpath(3) of the given dentry but ignores chroot'ed root. + * tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. * - * @path: Pointer to "struct path". - * @newname: Pointer to buffer to return value in. - * @newname_len: Size of @newname. + * @path: Pointer to "struct path". * - * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise. * * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended. * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to * \ooo style octal string. * Character \ is converted to \\ string. + * + * These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree() + * if these functions didn't return NULL. */ -int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname, - int newname_len) +char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path) { - int error = -ENOMEM; + char *buf = NULL; + char *name = NULL; + unsigned int buf_len = PAGE_SIZE / 2; struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; - char *sp; - - if (!dentry || !path->mnt || !newname || newname_len <= 2048) - return -EINVAL; - if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) { + bool is_dir; + if (!dentry) + return NULL; + is_dir = dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode); + while (1) { + struct path ns_root = { .mnt = NULL, .dentry = NULL }; + char *pos; + buf_len <<= 1; + kfree(buf); + buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!buf) + break; + /* Get better name for socket. */ + if (dentry->d_sb && dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) { + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct socket *sock = inode ? SOCKET_I(inode) : NULL; + struct sock *sk = sock ? sock->sk : NULL; + if (sk) { + snprintf(buf, buf_len - 1, "socket:[family=%u:" + "type=%u:protocol=%u]", sk->sk_family, + sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol); + } else { + snprintf(buf, buf_len - 1, "socket:[unknown]"); + } + name = tomoyo_encode(buf); + break; + } /* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */ - static const int offset = 1536; - sp = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, newname + offset, - newname_len - offset); - } else { - struct path ns_root = {.mnt = NULL, .dentry = NULL}; - + if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) { + pos = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, buf, buf_len - 1); + if (IS_ERR(pos)) + continue; + name = tomoyo_encode(pos); + break; + } + /* If we don't have a vfsmount, we can't calculate. */ + if (!path->mnt) + break; spin_lock(&dcache_lock); /* go to whatever namespace root we are under */ - sp = __d_path(path, &ns_root, newname, newname_len); + pos = __d_path(path, &ns_root, buf, buf_len); spin_unlock(&dcache_lock); /* Prepend "/proc" prefix if using internal proc vfs mount. */ - if (!IS_ERR(sp) && (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) && + if (!IS_ERR(pos) && (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) && (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC)) { - sp -= 5; - if (sp >= newname) - memcpy(sp, "/proc", 5); + pos -= 5; + if (pos >= buf) + memcpy(pos, "/proc", 5); else - sp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - } - if (IS_ERR(sp)) - error = PTR_ERR(sp); - else - error = tomoyo_encode(newname, sp - newname, sp); - /* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */ - if (!error && dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode) - && *newname) { - sp = newname + strlen(newname); - if (*(sp - 1) != '/') { - if (sp < newname + newname_len - 4) { - *sp++ = '/'; - *sp = '\0'; - } else { - error = -ENOMEM; - } + pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } + if (IS_ERR(pos)) + continue; + name = tomoyo_encode(pos); + break; } - if (error) - printk(KERN_WARNING "tomoyo_realpath: Pathname too long.\n"); - return error; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. - * - * @path: Pointer to "struct path". - * - * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise. - * - * These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree() - * if these functions didn't return NULL. - */ -char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path) -{ - char *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer), GFP_NOFS); - - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer) - <= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1); - if (!buf) - return NULL; - if (tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf, - TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1) == 0) - return buf; kfree(buf); - return NULL; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_realpath - Get realpath of a pathname. - * - * @pathname: The pathname to solve. - * - * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise. - */ -char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname) -{ - struct path path; - - if (pathname && kern_path(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path) == 0) { - char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path); - path_put(&path); - return buf; + if (!name) + tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__); + else if (is_dir && *name) { + /* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */ + char *pos = name + strlen(name) - 1; + if (*pos != '/') + /* + * This is OK because tomoyo_encode() reserves space + * for appending "/". + */ + *++pos = '/'; } - return NULL; + return name; } /** @@ -189,191 +179,3 @@ char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname) } return NULL; } - -/* Memory allocated for non-string data. */ -static atomic_t tomoyo_policy_memory_size; -/* Quota for holding policy. */ -static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_policy; - -/** - * tomoyo_memory_ok - Check memory quota. - * - * @ptr: Pointer to allocated memory. - * - * Returns true on success, false otherwise. - * - * Caller holds tomoyo_policy_lock. - * Memory pointed by @ptr will be zeroed on success. - */ -bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr) -{ - int allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0; - atomic_add(allocated_len, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size); - if (ptr && (!tomoyo_quota_for_policy || - atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) - <= tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) { - memset(ptr, 0, allocated_len); - return true; - } - printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory " - "for tomoyo_alloc_element().\n"); - if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) - panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n"); - return false; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_commit_ok - Check memory quota. - * - * @data: Data to copy from. - * @size: Size in byte. - * - * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise. - */ -void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size) -{ - void *ptr = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS); - if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) { - memmove(ptr, data, size); - memset(data, 0, size); - return ptr; - } - return NULL; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_memory_free - Free memory for elements. - * - * @ptr: Pointer to allocated memory. - */ -void tomoyo_memory_free(void *ptr) -{ - atomic_sub(ksize(ptr), &tomoyo_policy_memory_size); - kfree(ptr); -} - -/* - * tomoyo_name_list is used for holding string data used by TOMOYO. - * Since same string data is likely used for multiple times (e.g. - * "/lib/libc-2.5.so"), TOMOYO shares string data in the form of - * "const struct tomoyo_path_info *". - */ -struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]; - -/** - * tomoyo_get_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data. - * - * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory. - * - * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise. - */ -const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_name(const char *name) -{ - struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr; - unsigned int hash; - int len; - int allocated_len; - struct list_head *head; - - if (!name) - return NULL; - len = strlen(name) + 1; - hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1); - head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)]; - if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock)) - return NULL; - list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, list) { - if (hash != ptr->entry.hash || strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name)) - continue; - atomic_inc(&ptr->users); - goto out; - } - ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_NOFS); - allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0; - if (!ptr || (tomoyo_quota_for_policy && - atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) + allocated_len - > tomoyo_quota_for_policy)) { - kfree(ptr); - printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory " - "for tomoyo_get_name().\n"); - if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) - panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n"); - ptr = NULL; - goto out; - } - atomic_add(allocated_len, &tomoyo_policy_memory_size); - ptr->entry.name = ((char *) ptr) + sizeof(*ptr); - memmove((char *) ptr->entry.name, name, len); - atomic_set(&ptr->users, 1); - tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry); - list_add_tail(&ptr->list, head); - out: - mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock); - return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_realpath_init - Initialize realpath related code. - */ -void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void) -{ - int i; - - BUILD_BUG_ON(TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN > PATH_MAX); - for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[i]); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list); - tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME); - /* - * tomoyo_read_lock() is not needed because this function is - * called before the first "delete" request. - */ - list_add_tail_rcu(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list); - if (tomoyo_find_domain(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) != &tomoyo_kernel_domain) - panic("Can't register tomoyo_kernel_domain"); -} - -/** - * tomoyo_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage in bytes. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns memory usage. - */ -int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) -{ - if (!head->read_eof) { - const unsigned int policy - = atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size); - char buffer[64]; - - memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); - if (tomoyo_quota_for_policy) - snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1, - " (Quota: %10u)", - tomoyo_quota_for_policy); - else - buffer[0] = '\0'; - tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Policy: %10u%s\n", policy, buffer); - tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total: %10u\n", policy); - head->read_eof = true; - } - return 0; -} - -/** - * tomoyo_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota. - * - * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer". - * - * Returns 0. - */ -int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) -{ - char *data = head->write_buf; - unsigned int size; - - if (sscanf(data, "Policy: %u", &size) == 1) - tomoyo_quota_for_policy = size; - return 0; -} diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..e43d5554b506 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/common.c + * + * Securityfs interface for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION + */ + +#include <linux/security.h> +#include "common.h" + +/** + * tomoyo_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode". + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + const int key = ((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private) + - ((u8 *) NULL); + return tomoyo_open_control(key, file); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode". + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return tomoyo_close_control(file); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_poll - poll() for /proc/ccs/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". + * + * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +{ + return tomoyo_poll_control(file, wait); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @buf: Pointer to buffer. + * @count: Size of @buf. + * @ppos: Unused. + * + * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static ssize_t tomoyo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + return tomoyo_read_control(file, buf, count); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * @file: Pointer to "struct file". + * @buf: Pointer to buffer. + * @count: Size of @buf. + * @ppos: Unused. + * + * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise. + */ +static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count); +} + +/* + * tomoyo_operations is a "struct file_operations" which is used for handling + * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * Some files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory accept open(O_RDWR). + * See tomoyo_io_buffer for internals. + */ +static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = { + .open = tomoyo_open, + .release = tomoyo_release, + .poll = tomoyo_poll, + .read = tomoyo_read, + .write = tomoyo_write, + .llseek = noop_llseek, +}; + +/** + * tomoyo_create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory. + * + * @name: The name of the interface file. + * @mode: The permission of the interface file. + * @parent: The parent directory. + * @key: Type of interface. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode, + struct dentry *parent, const u8 key) +{ + securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key, + &tomoyo_operations); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. + * + * Returns 0. + */ +static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void) +{ + struct dentry *tomoyo_dir; + + /* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */ + if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain) + return 0; + + tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL); + tomoyo_create_entry("query", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_QUERY); + tomoyo_create_entry("domain_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY); + tomoyo_create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY); + tomoyo_create_entry("self_domain", 0400, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN); + tomoyo_create_entry(".domain_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS); + tomoyo_create_entry(".process_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS); + tomoyo_create_entry("meminfo", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_MEMINFO); + tomoyo_create_entry("profile", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_PROFILE); + tomoyo_create_entry("manager", 0600, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_MANAGER); + tomoyo_create_entry("version", 0400, tomoyo_dir, + TOMOYO_VERSION); + return 0; +} + +fs_initcall(tomoyo_initerface_init); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index dedd97d0c163..95d3f9572237 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -3,10 +3,7 @@ * * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux. * - * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION - * - * Version: 2.2.0 2009/04/01 - * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION */ #include <linux/security.h> @@ -96,8 +93,7 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, O_RDONLY); } -static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length, - unsigned int time_attrs) +static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path) { return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE, path); } @@ -112,7 +108,8 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, int mode) { struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry }; - return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, &path); + return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR, &path, + mode & S_IALLUGO); } static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry) @@ -133,6 +130,7 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, { struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry }; int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE; + const unsigned int perm = mode & S_IALLUGO; switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFCHR: @@ -141,6 +139,12 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, case S_IFBLK: type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK; break; + default: + goto no_dev; + } + return tomoyo_mkdev_perm(type, &path, perm, dev); + no_dev: + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFIFO: type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO; break; @@ -148,7 +152,7 @@ static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK; break; } - return tomoyo_path_perm(type, &path); + return tomoyo_path_number_perm(type, &path, perm); } static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir, @@ -173,7 +177,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND)) - return tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(file); + return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE, &file->f_path); return 0; } @@ -189,23 +193,24 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred) static int tomoyo_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { - return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, &file->f_path); + return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_IOCTL, &file->f_path, cmd); } static int tomoyo_path_chmod(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt, mode_t mode) { struct path path = { mnt, dentry }; - return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, &path); + return tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHMOD, &path, + mode & S_IALLUGO); } static int tomoyo_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) { int error = 0; if (uid != (uid_t) -1) - error = tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path); + error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHOWN, path, uid); if (!error && gid != (gid_t) -1) - error = tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path); + error = tomoyo_path_number_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_CHGRP, path, gid); return error; } @@ -217,7 +222,7 @@ static int tomoyo_path_chroot(struct path *path) static int tomoyo_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { - return tomoyo_path_perm(TOMOYO_TYPE_MOUNT, path); + return tomoyo_mount_permission(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); } static int tomoyo_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) @@ -277,7 +282,7 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux"); printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n"); cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain; - tomoyo_realpath_init(); + tomoyo_mm_init(); return 0; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9bfc1ee8222d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c @@ -0,0 +1,963 @@ +/* + * security/tomoyo/util.c + * + * Utility functions for TOMOYO. + * + * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 NTT DATA CORPORATION + */ + +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include "common.h" + +/* Lock for protecting policy. */ +DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_policy_lock); + +/* Has /sbin/init started? */ +bool tomoyo_policy_loaded; + +/** + * tomoyo_parse_ulong - Parse an "unsigned long" value. + * + * @result: Pointer to "unsigned long". + * @str: Pointer to string to parse. + * + * Returns value type on success, 0 otherwise. + * + * The @src is updated to point the first character after the value + * on success. + */ +static u8 tomoyo_parse_ulong(unsigned long *result, char **str) +{ + const char *cp = *str; + char *ep; + int base = 10; + if (*cp == '0') { + char c = *(cp + 1); + if (c == 'x' || c == 'X') { + base = 16; + cp += 2; + } else if (c >= '0' && c <= '7') { + base = 8; + cp++; + } + } + *result = simple_strtoul(cp, &ep, base); + if (cp == ep) + return 0; + *str = ep; + switch (base) { + case 16: + return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL; + case 8: + return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL; + default: + return TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL; + } +} + +/** + * tomoyo_print_ulong - Print an "unsigned long" value. + * + * @buffer: Pointer to buffer. + * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer. + * @value: An "unsigned long" value. + * @type: Type of @value. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +void tomoyo_print_ulong(char *buffer, const int buffer_len, + const unsigned long value, const u8 type) +{ + if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_DECIMAL) + snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "%lu", value); + else if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_OCTAL) + snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "0%lo", value); + else if (type == TOMOYO_VALUE_TYPE_HEXADECIMAL) + snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "0x%lX", value); + else + snprintf(buffer, buffer_len, "type(%u)", type); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_parse_name_union - Parse a tomoyo_name_union. + * + * @filename: Name or name group. + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename, + struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr) +{ + if (!tomoyo_correct_word(filename)) + return false; + if (filename[0] == '@') { + ptr->group = tomoyo_get_group(filename + 1, TOMOYO_PATH_GROUP); + ptr->is_group = true; + return ptr->group != NULL; + } + ptr->filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename); + ptr->is_group = false; + return ptr->filename != NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_parse_number_union - Parse a tomoyo_number_union. + * + * @data: Number or number range or number group. + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_number_union". + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_parse_number_union(char *data, struct tomoyo_number_union *num) +{ + u8 type; + unsigned long v; + memset(num, 0, sizeof(*num)); + if (data[0] == '@') { + if (!tomoyo_correct_word(data)) + return false; + num->group = tomoyo_get_group(data + 1, TOMOYO_NUMBER_GROUP); + num->is_group = true; + return num->group != NULL; + } + type = tomoyo_parse_ulong(&v, &data); + if (!type) + return false; + num->values[0] = v; + num->min_type = type; + if (!*data) { + num->values[1] = v; + num->max_type = type; + return true; + } + if (*data++ != '-') + return false; + type = tomoyo_parse_ulong(&v, &data); + if (!type || *data) + return false; + num->values[1] = v; + num->max_type = type; + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_byte_range - Check whether the string is a \ooo style octal value. + * + * @str: Pointer to the string. + * + * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise. + * + * TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF. + * This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range. + */ +static inline bool tomoyo_byte_range(const char *str) +{ + return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' && + *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' && + *str >= '0' && *str <= '7'; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet. + * + * @c: The character to check. + * + * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise. + */ +static inline bool tomoyo_alphabet_char(const char c) +{ + return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z'); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters. + * + * @c1: The first character. + * @c2: The second character. + * @c3: The third character. + * + * Returns byte value. + */ +static inline u8 tomoyo_make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3) +{ + return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0'); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword. + * + * @src: Pointer to pointer to the string. + * @find: Pointer to the keyword. + * + * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise. + * + * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find + * if @src starts with @find. + */ +bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find) +{ + const int len = strlen(find); + char *tmp = *src; + + if (strncmp(tmp, find, len)) + return false; + tmp += len; + *src = tmp; + return true; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_normalize_line - Format string. + * + * @buffer: The line to normalize. + * + * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed. + * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space. + * + * Returns nothing. + */ +void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer) +{ + unsigned char *sp = buffer; + unsigned char *dp = buffer; + bool first = true; + + while (tomoyo_invalid(*sp)) + sp++; + while (*sp) { + if (!first) + *dp++ = ' '; + first = false; + while (tomoyo_valid(*sp)) + *dp++ = *sp++; + while (tomoyo_invalid(*sp)) + sp++; + } + *dp = '\0'; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_tokenize - Tokenize string. + * + * @buffer: The line to tokenize. + * @w: Pointer to "char *". + * @size: Sizeof @w . + * + * Returns true on success, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size) +{ + int count = size / sizeof(char *); + int i; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) + w[i] = ""; + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + char *cp = strchr(buffer, ' '); + if (cp) + *cp = '\0'; + w[i] = buffer; + if (!cp) + break; + buffer = cp + 1; + } + return i < count || !*buffer; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_correct_word2 - Validate a string. + * + * @string: The string to check. May be non-'\0'-terminated. + * @len: Length of @string. + * + * Check whether the given string follows the naming rules. + * Returns true if @string follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_correct_word2(const char *string, size_t len) +{ + const char *const start = string; + bool in_repetition = false; + unsigned char c; + unsigned char d; + unsigned char e; + if (!len) + goto out; + while (len--) { + c = *string++; + if (c == '\\') { + if (!len--) + goto out; + c = *string++; + switch (c) { + case '\\': /* "\\" */ + continue; + case '$': /* "\$" */ + case '+': /* "\+" */ + case '?': /* "\?" */ + case '*': /* "\*" */ + case '@': /* "\@" */ + case 'x': /* "\x" */ + case 'X': /* "\X" */ + case 'a': /* "\a" */ + case 'A': /* "\A" */ + case '-': /* "\-" */ + continue; + case '{': /* "/\{" */ + if (string - 3 < start || *(string - 3) != '/') + break; + in_repetition = true; + continue; + case '}': /* "\}/" */ + if (*string != '/') + break; + if (!in_repetition) + break; + in_repetition = false; + continue; + case '0': /* "\ooo" */ + case '1': + case '2': + case '3': + if (!len-- || !len--) + break; + d = *string++; + e = *string++; + if (d < '0' || d > '7' || e < '0' || e > '7') + break; + c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e); + if (tomoyo_invalid(c)) + continue; /* pattern is not \000 */ + } + goto out; + } else if (in_repetition && c == '/') { + goto out; + } else if (tomoyo_invalid(c)) { + goto out; + } + } + if (in_repetition) + goto out; + return true; + out: + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_correct_word - Validate a string. + * + * @string: The string to check. + * + * Check whether the given string follows the naming rules. + * Returns true if @string follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_correct_word(const char *string) +{ + return tomoyo_correct_word2(string, strlen(string)); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_correct_path - Validate a pathname. + * + * @filename: The pathname to check. + * + * Check whether the given pathname follows the naming rules. + * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_correct_path(const char *filename) +{ + return *filename == '/' && tomoyo_correct_word(filename); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules. + * + * @domainname: The domainname to check. + * + * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname) +{ + if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, + TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN)) + goto out; + domainname += TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN; + if (!*domainname) + return true; + if (*domainname++ != ' ') + goto out; + while (1) { + const unsigned char *cp = strchr(domainname, ' '); + if (!cp) + break; + if (*domainname != '/' || + !tomoyo_correct_word2(domainname, cp - domainname - 1)) + goto out; + domainname = cp + 1; + } + return tomoyo_correct_path(domainname); + out: + return false; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname. + * + * @buffer: The token to check. + * + * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise. + */ +bool tomoyo_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer) +{ + return !strncmp(buffer, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name. + * + * @domainname: The domainname to find. + * + * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname) +{ + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; + struct tomoyo_path_info name; + + name.name = domainname; + tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) { + if (!domain->is_deleted && + !tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname)) + return domain; + } + return NULL; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token. + * + * @filename: The string to evaluate. + * + * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename. + */ +static int tomoyo_const_part_length(const char *filename) +{ + char c; + int len = 0; + + if (!filename) + return 0; + while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') { + if (c != '\\') { + len++; + continue; + } + c = *filename++; + switch (c) { + case '\\': /* "\\" */ + len += 2; + continue; + case '0': /* "\ooo" */ + case '1': + case '2': + case '3': + c = *filename++; + if (c < '0' || c > '7') + break; + c = *filename++; + if (c < '0' || c > '7') + break; + len += 4; + continue; + } + break; + } + return len; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members. + * + * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" to fill in. + * + * The caller sets "struct tomoyo_path_info"->name. + */ +void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr) +{ + const char *name = ptr->name; + const int len = strlen(name); + + ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name); + ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/'); + ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len); + ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character and "\-" pattern. + * + * @filename: The start of string to check. + * @filename_end: The end of string to check. + * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare. + * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare. + * + * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(const char *filename, + const char *filename_end, + const char *pattern, + const char *pattern_end) +{ + while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) { + char c; + if (*pattern != '\\') { + if (*filename++ != *pattern++) + return false; + continue; + } + c = *filename; + pattern++; + switch (*pattern) { + int i; + int j; + case '?': + if (c == '/') { + return false; + } else if (c == '\\') { + if (filename[1] == '\\') + filename++; + else if (tomoyo_byte_range(filename + 1)) + filename += 3; + else + return false; + } + break; + case '\\': + if (c != '\\') + return false; + if (*++filename != '\\') + return false; + break; + case '+': + if (!isdigit(c)) + return false; + break; + case 'x': + if (!isxdigit(c)) + return false; + break; + case 'a': + if (!tomoyo_alphabet_char(c)) + return false; + break; + case '0': + case '1': + case '2': + case '3': + if (c == '\\' && tomoyo_byte_range(filename + 1) + && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) { + filename += 3; + pattern += 2; + break; + } + return false; /* Not matched. */ + case '*': + case '@': + for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) { + if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2( + filename + i, filename_end, + pattern + 1, pattern_end)) + return true; + c = filename[i]; + if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@') + break; + if (c != '\\') + continue; + if (filename[i + 1] == '\\') + i++; + else if (tomoyo_byte_range(filename + i + 1)) + i += 3; + else + break; /* Bad pattern. */ + } + return false; /* Not matched. */ + default: + j = 0; + c = *pattern; + if (c == '$') { + while (isdigit(filename[j])) + j++; + } else if (c == 'X') { + while (isxdigit(filename[j])) + j++; + } else if (c == 'A') { + while (tomoyo_alphabet_char(filename[j])) + j++; + } + for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) { + if (tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2( + filename + i, filename_end, + pattern + 1, pattern_end)) + return true; + } + return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */ + } + filename++; + pattern++; + } + while (*pattern == '\\' && + (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@')) + pattern += 2; + return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_file_matches_pattern - Pattern matching without '/' character. + * + * @filename: The start of string to check. + * @filename_end: The end of string to check. + * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare. + * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare. + * + * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(const char *filename, + const char *filename_end, + const char *pattern, + const char *pattern_end) +{ + const char *pattern_start = pattern; + bool first = true; + bool result; + + while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) { + /* Split at "\-" pattern. */ + if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-') + continue; + result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename, + filename_end, + pattern_start, + pattern - 2); + if (first) + result = !result; + if (result) + return false; + first = false; + pattern_start = pattern; + } + result = tomoyo_file_matches_pattern2(filename, filename_end, + pattern_start, pattern_end); + return first ? result : !result; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2 - Do pathname pattern matching. + * + * @f: The start of string to check. + * @p: The start of pattern to compare. + * + * Returns true if @f matches @p, false otherwise. + */ +static bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(const char *f, const char *p) +{ + const char *f_delimiter; + const char *p_delimiter; + + while (*f && *p) { + f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/'); + if (!f_delimiter) + f_delimiter = f + strlen(f); + p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/'); + if (!p_delimiter) + p_delimiter = p + strlen(p); + if (*p == '\\' && *(p + 1) == '{') + goto recursive; + if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p, + p_delimiter)) + return false; + f = f_delimiter; + if (*f) + f++; + p = p_delimiter; + if (*p) + p++; + } + /* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */ + while (*p == '\\' && + (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@')) + p += 2; + return !*f && !*p; + recursive: + /* + * The "\{" pattern is permitted only after '/' character. + * This guarantees that below "*(p - 1)" is safe. + * Also, the "\}" pattern is permitted only before '/' character + * so that "\{" + "\}" pair will not break the "\-" operator. + */ + if (*(p - 1) != '/' || p_delimiter <= p + 3 || *p_delimiter != '/' || + *(p_delimiter - 1) != '}' || *(p_delimiter - 2) != '\\') + return false; /* Bad pattern. */ + do { + /* Compare current component with pattern. */ + if (!tomoyo_file_matches_pattern(f, f_delimiter, p + 2, + p_delimiter - 2)) + break; + /* Proceed to next component. */ + f = f_delimiter; + if (!*f) + break; + f++; + /* Continue comparison. */ + if (tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p_delimiter + 1)) + return true; + f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/'); + } while (f_delimiter); + return false; /* Not matched. */ +} + +/** + * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. + * + * @filename: The filename to check. + * @pattern: The pattern to compare. + * + * Returns true if matches, false otherwise. + * + * The following patterns are available. + * \\ \ itself. + * \ooo Octal representation of a byte. + * \* Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/'. + * \@ Zero or more repetitions of characters other than '/' or '.'. + * \? 1 byte character other than '/'. + * \$ One or more repetitions of decimal digits. + * \+ 1 decimal digit. + * \X One or more repetitions of hexadecimal digits. + * \x 1 hexadecimal digit. + * \A One or more repetitions of alphabet characters. + * \a 1 alphabet character. + * + * \- Subtraction operator. + * + * /\{dir\}/ '/' + 'One or more repetitions of dir/' (e.g. /dir/ /dir/dir/ + * /dir/dir/dir/ ). + */ +bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename, + const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern) +{ + const char *f = filename->name; + const char *p = pattern->name; + const int len = pattern->const_len; + + /* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */ + if (!pattern->is_patterned) + return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern); + /* Don't compare directory and non-directory. */ + if (filename->is_dir != pattern->is_dir) + return false; + /* Compare the initial length without patterns. */ + if (strncmp(f, p, len)) + return false; + f += len; + p += len; + return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern2(f, p); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_exe - Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process. + * + * Returns the tomoyo_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise. + * + * This function uses kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree() + * if this function didn't return NULL. + */ +const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void) +{ + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + const char *cp = NULL; + + if (!mm) + return NULL; + down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) { + if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) { + cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path); + break; + } + } + up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); + return cp; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_get_mode - Get MAC mode. + * + * @profile: Profile number. + * @index: Index number of functionality. + * + * Returns mode. + */ +int tomoyo_get_mode(const u8 profile, const u8 index) +{ + u8 mode; + const u8 category = TOMOYO_MAC_CATEGORY_FILE; + if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded) + return TOMOYO_CONFIG_DISABLED; + mode = tomoyo_profile(profile)->config[index]; + if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT) + mode = tomoyo_profile(profile)->config[category]; + if (mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_USE_DEFAULT) + mode = tomoyo_profile(profile)->default_config; + return mode & 3; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_init_request_info - Initialize "struct tomoyo_request_info" members. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info" to initialize. + * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info". NULL for tomoyo_domain(). + * @index: Index number of functionality. + * + * Returns mode. + */ +int tomoyo_init_request_info(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain, const u8 index) +{ + u8 profile; + memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r)); + if (!domain) + domain = tomoyo_domain(); + r->domain = domain; + profile = domain->profile; + r->profile = profile; + r->type = index; + r->mode = tomoyo_get_mode(profile, index); + return r->mode; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_last_word - Get last component of a line. + * + * @line: A line. + * + * Returns the last word of a line. + */ +const char *tomoyo_last_word(const char *name) +{ + const char *cp = strrchr(name, ' '); + if (cp) + return cp + 1; + return name; +} + +/** + * tomoyo_warn_log - Print warning or error message on console. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". + * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters. + */ +void tomoyo_warn_log(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + char *buffer; + const struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain = r->domain; + const struct tomoyo_profile *profile = tomoyo_profile(domain->profile); + switch (r->mode) { + case TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING: + if (!profile->enforcing->enforcing_verbose) + return; + break; + case TOMOYO_CONFIG_PERMISSIVE: + if (!profile->permissive->permissive_verbose) + return; + break; + case TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING: + if (!profile->learning->learning_verbose) + return; + break; + } + buffer = kmalloc(4096, GFP_NOFS); + if (!buffer) + return; + va_start(args, fmt); + vsnprintf(buffer, 4095, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + buffer[4095] = '\0'; + printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Access %s denied for %s\n", + r->mode == TOMOYO_CONFIG_ENFORCING ? "ERROR" : "WARNING", buffer, + tomoyo_last_word(domain->domainname->name)); + kfree(buffer); +} + +/** + * tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok - Check for domain's quota. + * + * @r: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_request_info". + * + * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise. + * + * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock(). + */ +bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) +{ + unsigned int count = 0; + struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = r->domain; + struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr; + + if (r->mode != TOMOYO_CONFIG_LEARNING) + return false; + if (!domain) + return true; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) { + if (ptr->is_deleted) + continue; + switch (ptr->type) { + u16 perm; + u8 i; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL: + perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head) + ->perm; + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; i++) + if (perm & (1 << i)) + count++; + if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)) + count -= 2; + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL: + perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head) + ->perm; + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; i++) + if (perm & (1 << i)) + count++; + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_NUMBER_ACL: + perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_number_acl, + head)->perm; + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_NUMBER_OPERATION; i++) + if (perm & (1 << i)) + count++; + break; + case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDEV_ACL: + perm = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_mkdev_acl, + head)->perm; + for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_MKDEV_OPERATION; i++) + if (perm & (1 << i)) + count++; + break; + default: + count++; + } + } + if (count < tomoyo_profile(domain->profile)->learning-> + learning_max_entry) + return true; + if (!domain->quota_warned) { + domain->quota_warned = true; + printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: " + "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. " + "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name); + } + return false; +} |