diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 131 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 3 |
4 files changed, 205 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt index 57d3ee9e4bde..fc3ae951bc07 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt @@ -3403,6 +3403,52 @@ invalid, if invalid pages are written to (e.g. after the end of memory) or if no page table is present for the addresses (e.g. when using hugepages). +4.108 KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR + +Capability: KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR +Architectures: powerpc +Type: vm ioctl +Parameters: struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char (out) +Returns: 0 on successful completion + -EFAULT if struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char cannot be written + +This ioctl gives userspace information about certain characteristics +of the CPU relating to speculative execution of instructions and +possible information leakage resulting from speculative execution (see +CVE-2017-5715, CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5754). The information is +returned in struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char, which looks like this: + +struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char { + __u64 character; /* characteristics of the CPU */ + __u64 behaviour; /* recommended software behaviour */ + __u64 character_mask; /* valid bits in character */ + __u64 behaviour_mask; /* valid bits in behaviour */ +}; + +For extensibility, the character_mask and behaviour_mask fields +indicate which bits of character and behaviour have been filled in by +the kernel. If the set of defined bits is extended in future then +userspace will be able to tell whether it is running on a kernel that +knows about the new bits. + +The character field describes attributes of the CPU which can help +with preventing inadvertent information disclosure - specifically, +whether there is an instruction to flash-invalidate the L1 data cache +(ori 30,30,0 or mtspr SPRN_TRIG2,rN), whether the L1 data cache is set +to a mode where entries can only be used by the thread that created +them, whether the bcctr[l] instruction prevents speculation, and +whether a speculation barrier instruction (ori 31,31,0) is provided. + +The behaviour field describes actions that software should take to +prevent inadvertent information disclosure, and thus describes which +vulnerabilities the hardware is subject to; specifically whether the +L1 data cache should be flushed when returning to user mode from the +kernel, and whether a speculation barrier should be placed between an +array bounds check and the array access. + +These fields use the same bit definitions as the new +H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall. + 5. The kvm_run structure ------------------------ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h index 61d6049f4c1e..637b7263cb86 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h @@ -443,6 +443,31 @@ struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info { __u32 ap_encodings[8]; }; +/* For KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR */ +struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char { + __u64 character; /* characteristics of the CPU */ + __u64 behaviour; /* recommended software behaviour */ + __u64 character_mask; /* valid bits in character */ + __u64 behaviour_mask; /* valid bits in behaviour */ +}; + +/* + * Values for character and character_mask. + * These are identical to the values used by H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS. + */ +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 (1ULL << 63) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED (1ULL << 62) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 (1ULL << 61) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 (1ULL << 60) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV (1ULL << 59) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BR_HINT_HONOURED (1ULL << 58) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_MTTRIG_THR_RECONF (1ULL << 57) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DIS (1ULL << 56) + +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY (1ULL << 63) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR (1ULL << 62) +#define KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR (1ULL << 61) + /* Per-vcpu XICS interrupt controller state */ #define KVM_REG_PPC_ICP_STATE (KVM_REG_PPC | KVM_REG_SIZE_U64 | 0x8c) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c index 1915e86cef6f..0a7c88786ec0 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ #include <asm/iommu.h> #include <asm/switch_to.h> #include <asm/xive.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES +#include <asm/hvcall.h> +#include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h> +#endif #include "timing.h" #include "irq.h" @@ -548,6 +552,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS case KVM_CAP_IRQ_XICS: #endif + case KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR: r = 1; break; @@ -1759,6 +1764,124 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, return r; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +/* + * These functions check whether the underlying hardware is safe + * against attacks based on observing the effects of speculatively + * executed instructions, and whether it supplies instructions for + * use in workarounds. The information comes from firmware, either + * via the device tree on powernv platforms or from an hcall on + * pseries platforms. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES +static int pseries_get_cpu_char(struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char *cp) +{ + struct h_cpu_char_result c; + unsigned long rc; + + if (!machine_is(pseries)) + return -ENOTTY; + + rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&c); + if (rc == H_SUCCESS) { + cp->character = c.character; + cp->behaviour = c.behaviour; + cp->character_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BR_HINT_HONOURED | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_MTTRIG_THR_RECONF | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DIS; + cp->behaviour_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY | + KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR | + KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR; + } + return 0; +} +#else +static int pseries_get_cpu_char(struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char *cp) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} +#endif + +static inline bool have_fw_feat(struct device_node *fw_features, + const char *state, const char *name) +{ + struct device_node *np; + bool r = false; + + np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, name); + if (np) { + r = of_property_read_bool(np, state); + of_node_put(np); + } + return r; +} + +static int kvmppc_get_cpu_char(struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char *cp) +{ + struct device_node *np, *fw_features; + int r; + + memset(cp, 0, sizeof(*cp)); + r = pseries_get_cpu_char(cp); + if (r != -ENOTTY) + return r; + + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal"); + if (np) { + fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-features"); + of_node_put(np); + if (!fw_features) + return 0; + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", + "inst-spec-barrier-ori31,31,0")) + cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31; + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", + "fw-bcctrl-serialized")) + cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED; + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", + "inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0")) + cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30; + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", + "inst-l1d-flush-trig2")) + cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2; + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", + "fw-l1d-thread-split")) + cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV; + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", + "fw-count-cache-disabled")) + cp->character |= KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DIS; + cp->character_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV | + KVM_PPC_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DIS; + + if (have_fw_feat(fw_features, "enabled", + "speculation-policy-favor-security")) + cp->behaviour |= KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY; + if (!have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled", + "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1")) + cp->behaviour |= KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR; + if (!have_fw_feat(fw_features, "disabled", + "needs-spec-barrier-for-bound-checks")) + cp->behaviour |= KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR; + cp->behaviour_mask = KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY | + KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR | + KVM_PPC_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR; + + of_node_put(fw_features); + } + + return 0; +} +#endif + long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg) { @@ -1861,6 +1984,14 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, r = -EFAULT; break; } + case KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR: { + struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char cpuchar; + + r = kvmppc_get_cpu_char(&cpuchar); + if (r >= 0 && copy_to_user(argp, &cpuchar, sizeof(cpuchar))) + r = -EFAULT; + break; + } default: { struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data; r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->arch_vm_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg); diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h index 496e59a2738b..7a99b98cf88e 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h @@ -932,6 +932,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt { #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC2 148 #define KVM_CAP_HYPERV_VP_INDEX 149 #define KVM_CAP_S390_AIS_MIGRATION 150 +#define KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR 151 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING @@ -1261,6 +1262,8 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping { #define KVM_PPC_CONFIGURE_V3_MMU _IOW(KVMIO, 0xaf, struct kvm_ppc_mmuv3_cfg) /* Available with KVM_CAP_PPC_RADIX_MMU */ #define KVM_PPC_GET_RMMU_INFO _IOW(KVMIO, 0xb0, struct kvm_ppc_rmmu_info) +/* Available with KVM_CAP_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR */ +#define KVM_PPC_GET_CPU_CHAR _IOR(KVMIO, 0xb1, struct kvm_ppc_cpu_char) /* ioctl for vm fd */ #define KVM_CREATE_DEVICE _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xe0, struct kvm_create_device) |