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-rw-r--r--fs/namespace.c121
-rw-r--r--fs/open.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/pnode.h5
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/root.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/sysfs/mount.c11
-rw-r--r--include/linux/capability.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/fs.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kobject_ns.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/mount.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/user_namespace.h4
-rw-r--r--ipc/namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c12
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c5
-rw-r--r--kernel/groups.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/nsproxy.c36
-rw-r--r--kernel/pid.c1
-rw-r--r--kernel/pid_namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c20
-rw-r--r--kernel/uid16.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/user.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/user_namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/utsname.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/kobject.c15
-rw-r--r--net/core/net-sysfs.c8
-rw-r--r--net/core/net_namespace.c2
-rw-r--r--net/core/scm.c4
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c10
27 files changed, 177 insertions, 104 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index ad8ea9bc2518..ef69fa5d2e5b 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -831,6 +831,10 @@ static struct mount *clone_mnt(struct mount *old, struct dentry *root,
if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
+ /* Don't allow unprivileged users to reveal what is under a mount */
+ if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && list_empty(&old->mnt_expire))
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
+
atomic_inc(&sb->s_active);
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = sb;
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = dget(root);
@@ -1327,6 +1331,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(umount, char __user *, name, int, flags)
goto dput_and_out;
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
goto dput_and_out;
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto dput_and_out;
retval = do_umount(mnt, flags);
dput_and_out:
@@ -1349,14 +1355,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(oldumount, char __user *, name)
#endif
-static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct path *path)
+static bool is_mnt_ns_file(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- /* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
- * mount namespace loop?
- */
- struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+ /* Is this a proxy for a mount namespace? */
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct proc_ns *ei;
- struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
if (!proc_ns_inode(inode))
return false;
@@ -1365,7 +1368,19 @@ static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct path *path)
if (ei->ns_ops != &mntns_operations)
return false;
- mnt_ns = ei->ns;
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool mnt_ns_loop(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ /* Could bind mounting the mount namespace inode cause a
+ * mount namespace loop?
+ */
+ struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
+ if (!is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
+ return false;
+
+ mnt_ns = get_proc_ns(dentry->d_inode)->ns;
return current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->seq >= mnt_ns->seq;
}
@@ -1374,13 +1389,17 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
{
struct mount *res, *p, *q, *r, *parent;
- if (!(flag & CL_COPY_ALL) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(mnt))
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(mnt))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) && is_mnt_ns_file(dentry))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
res = q = clone_mnt(mnt, dentry, flag);
if (IS_ERR(q))
return q;
+ q->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
q->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
p = mnt;
@@ -1390,7 +1409,13 @@ struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry,
continue;
for (s = r; s; s = next_mnt(s, r)) {
- if (!(flag & CL_COPY_ALL) && IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) {
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE) &&
+ IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(s)) {
+ s = skip_mnt_tree(s);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!(flag & CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE) &&
+ is_mnt_ns_file(s->mnt.mnt_root)) {
s = skip_mnt_tree(s);
continue;
}
@@ -1696,6 +1721,19 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int flag)
return err;
}
+static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct mount *child;
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+ if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry))
+ continue;
+
+ if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* do loopback mount.
*/
@@ -1713,7 +1751,7 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
return err;
err = -EINVAL;
- if (mnt_ns_loop(&old_path))
+ if (mnt_ns_loop(old_path.dentry))
goto out;
mp = lock_mount(path);
@@ -1731,8 +1769,11 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
if (!check_mnt(parent) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out2;
+ if (!recurse && has_locked_children(old, old_path.dentry))
+ goto out2;
+
if (recurse)
- mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
+ mnt = copy_tree(old, old_path.dentry, CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE);
else
mnt = clone_mnt(old, old_path.dentry, 0);
@@ -1741,6 +1782,8 @@ static int do_loopback(struct path *path, const char *old_name,
goto out2;
}
+ mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
+
err = graft_tree(mnt, parent, mp);
if (err) {
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
@@ -1853,6 +1896,9 @@ static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out1;
+ if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto out1;
+
err = -EINVAL;
if (old_path.dentry != old_path.mnt->mnt_root)
goto out1;
@@ -2389,7 +2435,7 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns,
namespace_lock();
/* First pass: copy the tree topology */
- copy_flags = CL_COPY_ALL | CL_EXPIRE;
+ copy_flags = CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE | CL_EXPIRE;
if (user_ns != mnt_ns->user_ns)
copy_flags |= CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE | CL_UNPRIVILEGED;
new = copy_tree(old, old->mnt.mnt_root, copy_flags);
@@ -2424,6 +2470,10 @@ static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns,
}
p = next_mnt(p, old);
q = next_mnt(q, new);
+ if (!q)
+ break;
+ while (p->mnt.mnt_root != q->mnt.mnt_root)
+ p = next_mnt(p, old);
}
namespace_unlock();
@@ -2630,6 +2680,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
goto out4;
if (!check_mnt(root_mnt) || !check_mnt(new_mnt))
goto out4;
+ if (new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
+ goto out4;
error = -ENOENT;
if (d_unlinked(new.dentry))
goto out4;
@@ -2653,6 +2705,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pivot_root, const char __user *, new_root,
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
detach_mnt(new_mnt, &parent_path);
detach_mnt(root_mnt, &root_parent);
+ if (root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) {
+ new_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCKED;
+ root_mnt->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED;
+ }
/* mount old root on put_old */
attach_mnt(root_mnt, old_mnt, old_mp);
/* mount new_root on / */
@@ -2811,25 +2867,38 @@ bool current_chrooted(void)
return chrooted;
}
-void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns)
+bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *type)
{
struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
struct mount *mnt;
+ bool visible = false;
- down_read(&namespace_sem);
+ if (unlikely(!ns))
+ return false;
+
+ namespace_lock();
list_for_each_entry(mnt, &ns->list, mnt_list) {
- switch (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_magic) {
- case SYSFS_MAGIC:
- userns->may_mount_sysfs = true;
- break;
- case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
- userns->may_mount_proc = true;
- break;
+ struct mount *child;
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != type)
+ continue;
+
+ /* This mount is not fully visible if there are any child mounts
+ * that cover anything except for empty directories.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+ struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode;
+ if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+ goto next;
+ if (inode->i_nlink != 2)
+ goto next;
}
- if (userns->may_mount_sysfs && userns->may_mount_proc)
- break;
+ visible = true;
+ goto found;
+ next: ;
}
- up_read(&namespace_sem);
+found:
+ namespace_unlock();
+ return visible;
}
static void *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
@@ -2860,8 +2929,8 @@ static int mntns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct path root;
if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (fs->users != 1)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 8070825b285b..2a731b0d08bc 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ retry:
goto dput_and_out;
error = -EPERM;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
goto dput_and_out;
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
if (error)
diff --git a/fs/pnode.h b/fs/pnode.h
index b091445c1c4a..59e7eda1851e 100644
--- a/fs/pnode.h
+++ b/fs/pnode.h
@@ -19,11 +19,14 @@
#define CL_EXPIRE 0x01
#define CL_SLAVE 0x02
-#define CL_COPY_ALL 0x04
+#define CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE 0x04
#define CL_MAKE_SHARED 0x08
#define CL_PRIVATE 0x10
#define CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE 0x20
#define CL_UNPRIVILEGED 0x40
+#define CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE 0x80
+
+#define CL_COPY_ALL (CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE | CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE)
static inline void set_mnt_shared(struct mount *mnt)
{
diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c
index e0a790da726d..87dbcbef7fe4 100644
--- a/fs/proc/root.c
+++ b/fs/proc/root.c
@@ -110,7 +110,11 @@ static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
options = data;
- if (!current_user_ns()->may_mount_proc)
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !fs_fully_visible(fs_type))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
+ /* Does the mounter have privilege over the pid namespace? */
+ if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/mount.c b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
index fd7ce7a39f91..834ec2cdb7a3 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/mount.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/mount.c
@@ -112,8 +112,15 @@ static struct dentry *sysfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
struct super_block *sb;
int error;
- if (!(flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) && !current_user_ns()->may_mount_sysfs)
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ if (!(flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)) {
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !fs_fully_visible(fs_type))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+
+ for (type = KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NONE; type < KOBJ_NS_TYPES; type++) {
+ if (!kobj_ns_current_may_mount(type))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+ }
+ }
info = kzalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index d9a4f7f40f32..a6ee1f9a5018 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -210,7 +210,6 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
extern bool capable(int cap);
extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
-extern bool nsown_capable(int cap);
extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3b4cd8296e41..529d8711baba 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1900,6 +1900,7 @@ extern int vfs_ustat(dev_t, struct kstatfs *);
extern int freeze_super(struct super_block *super);
extern int thaw_super(struct super_block *super);
extern bool our_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt);
+extern bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *);
extern int current_umask(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
index f66b065a8b5f..df32d2508290 100644
--- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ enum kobj_ns_type {
*/
struct kobj_ns_type_operations {
enum kobj_ns_type type;
+ bool (*current_may_mount)(void);
void *(*grab_current_ns)(void);
const void *(*netlink_ns)(struct sock *sk);
const void *(*initial_ns)(void);
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type);
const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent);
const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj);
+bool kobj_ns_current_may_mount(enum kobj_ns_type type);
void *kobj_ns_grab_current(enum kobj_ns_type type);
const void *kobj_ns_netlink(enum kobj_ns_type type, struct sock *sk);
const void *kobj_ns_initial(enum kobj_ns_type type);
diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
index 73005f9957ea..38cd98f112a0 100644
--- a/include/linux/mount.h
+++ b/include/linux/mount.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct mnt_namespace;
#define MNT_INTERNAL 0x4000
#define MNT_LOCK_READONLY 0x400000
+#define MNT_LOCKED 0x800000
struct vfsmount {
struct dentry *mnt_root; /* root of the mounted tree */
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index 14105c26a836..4db29859464f 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ struct user_namespace {
kuid_t owner;
kgid_t group;
unsigned int proc_inum;
- bool may_mount_sysfs;
- bool may_mount_proc;
};
extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns;
@@ -85,6 +83,4 @@ static inline void put_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
#endif
-void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns);
-
#endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
diff --git a/ipc/namespace.c b/ipc/namespace.c
index 7ee61bf44933..4be6581d3b7f 100644
--- a/ipc/namespace.c
+++ b/ipc/namespace.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
{
struct ipc_namespace *ns = new;
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index f6c2ce5701e1..6fc1c8af44df 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -433,18 +433,6 @@ bool capable(int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
/**
- * nsown_capable - Check superior capability to one's own user_ns
- * @cap: The capability in question
- *
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
- * targeted at its own user namespace.
- */
-bool nsown_capable(int cap)
-{
- return ns_capable(current_user_ns(), cap);
-}
-
-/**
* inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode
* @inode: The inode in question
* @cap: The capability in question
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index bf46287c91a4..c9eaf2013002 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1825,11 +1825,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unshare, unsigned long, unshare_flags)
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER)
unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_FS;
/*
- * If unsharing a pid namespace must also unshare the thread.
- */
- if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
- unshare_flags |= CLONE_THREAD;
- /*
* If unsharing a thread from a thread group, must also unshare vm.
*/
if (unshare_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c
index 6b2588dd04ff..90cf1c38c8ea 100644
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist)
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index 997cbb951a3b..8e7811086b82 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -126,22 +126,16 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
struct nsproxy *new_ns;
- int err = 0;
- if (!old_ns)
+ if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
+ CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET)))) {
+ get_nsproxy(old_ns);
return 0;
-
- get_nsproxy(old_ns);
-
- if (!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
- CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET)))
- return 0;
-
- if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- err = -EPERM;
- goto out;
}
+ if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
/*
* CLONE_NEWIPC must detach from the undolist: after switching
* to a new ipc namespace, the semaphore arrays from the old
@@ -149,22 +143,16 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
* means share undolist with parent, so we must forbid using
* it along with CLONE_NEWIPC.
*/
- if ((flags & CLONE_NEWIPC) && (flags & CLONE_SYSVSEM)) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ if ((flags & (CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_SYSVSEM)) ==
+ (CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_SYSVSEM))
+ return -EINVAL;
new_ns = create_new_namespaces(flags, tsk, user_ns, tsk->fs);
- if (IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
- err = PTR_ERR(new_ns);
- goto out;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
+ return PTR_ERR(new_ns);
tsk->nsproxy = new_ns;
-
-out:
- put_nsproxy(old_ns);
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns)
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index 66505c1dfc51..ebe5e80b10f8 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ void free_pid(struct pid *pid)
struct pid_namespace *ns = upid->ns;
hlist_del_rcu(&upid->pid_chain);
switch(--ns->nr_hashed) {
+ case 2:
case 1:
/* When all that is left in the pid namespace
* is the reaper wake up the reaper. The reaper
diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
index 601bb361c235..42086551a24a 100644
--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static int pidns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct pid_namespace *ancestor, *new = ns;
if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/*
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 771129b299f8..c18ecca575b4 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) ||
gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
new->gid = krgid;
else
goto error;
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) ||
gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) ||
gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
new->egid = kegid;
else
goto error;
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
new->uid = kruid;
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
goto error;
}
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
!uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
!uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
goto error;
}
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
retval = set_user(new);
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
!uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
goto error;
@@ -673,7 +673,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
!gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
goto error;
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
new->fsuid = kuid;
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) ||
gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) ||
- nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+ ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) {
new->fsgid = kgid;
goto change_okay;
diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c
index f6c83d7ef000..602e5bbbceff 100644
--- a/kernel/uid16.c
+++ b/kernel/uid16.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist)
struct group_info *group_info;
int retval;
- if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETGID))
return -EPERM;
if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index 69b4c3d48cde..5bbb91988e69 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -51,8 +51,6 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
.group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
.proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
- .may_mount_sysfs = true,
- .may_mount_proc = true,
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 9064b919a406..13fb1134ba58 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -101,8 +101,6 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
- update_mnt_policy(ns);
-
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/utsname.c b/kernel/utsname.c
index 2fc8576efaa8..fd393124e507 100644
--- a/kernel/utsname.c
+++ b/kernel/utsname.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int utsns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
struct uts_namespace *ns = new;
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
get_uts_ns(ns);
diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
index 1d46c151a4ae..962175134702 100644
--- a/lib/kobject.c
+++ b/lib/kobject.c
@@ -931,6 +931,21 @@ const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj)
return kobj_child_ns_ops(kobj->parent);
}
+bool kobj_ns_current_may_mount(enum kobj_ns_type type)
+{
+ bool may_mount = false;
+
+ if (type == KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NONE)
+ return true;
+
+ spin_lock(&kobj_ns_type_lock);
+ if ((type > KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NONE) && (type < KOBJ_NS_TYPES) &&
+ kobj_ns_ops_tbl[type])
+ may_mount = kobj_ns_ops_tbl[type]->current_may_mount();
+ spin_unlock(&kobj_ns_type_lock);
+
+ return may_mount;
+}
void *kobj_ns_grab_current(enum kobj_ns_type type)
{
diff --git a/net/core/net-sysfs.c b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
index 3f40ea9de814..d954b56b4e47 100644
--- a/net/core/net-sysfs.c
+++ b/net/core/net-sysfs.c
@@ -1196,6 +1196,13 @@ static void remove_queue_kobjects(struct net_device *net)
#endif
}
+static bool net_current_may_mount(void)
+{
+ struct net *net = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
+
+ return ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+}
+
static void *net_grab_current_ns(void)
{
struct net *ns = current->nsproxy->net_ns;
@@ -1218,6 +1225,7 @@ static const void *net_netlink_ns(struct sock *sk)
struct kobj_ns_type_operations net_ns_type_operations = {
.type = KOBJ_NS_TYPE_NET,
+ .current_may_mount = net_current_may_mount,
.grab_current_ns = net_grab_current_ns,
.netlink_ns = net_netlink_ns,
.initial_ns = net_initial_ns,
diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
index f97652036754..81d3a9a08453 100644
--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
+++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static int netns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
struct net *net = ns;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
- !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
put_net(nsproxy->net_ns);
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index b4da80b1cc07..b442e7e25e60 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -56,9 +56,9 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
- uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
+ uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
- gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
+ gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe6648e..b9d613e0ef14 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -768,16 +768,16 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
*/
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
{
- int is_subset;
+ int is_subset, ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
current_cred()->cap_permitted);
+ if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+ ret = -EPERM;
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
/**
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
*/
static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_valid(cap))
return -EINVAL;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.0.4) at 2024-11-09 19:37:54 +0000