diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/array.c | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/capability.h | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 3 |
5 files changed, 13 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 64db2bceac59..3e1290b0492e 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -297,15 +297,11 @@ static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header, seq_puts(m, header); CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) { seq_printf(m, "%08x", - a->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - __capi]); + a->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - __capi]); } seq_putc(m, '\n'); } -/* Remove non-existent capabilities */ -#define NORM_CAPS(v) (v.cap[CAP_TO_INDEX(CAP_LAST_CAP)] &= \ - CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1) - static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) { const struct cred *cred; @@ -319,11 +315,6 @@ static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p) cap_bset = cred->cap_bset; rcu_read_unlock(); - NORM_CAPS(cap_inheritable); - NORM_CAPS(cap_permitted); - NORM_CAPS(cap_effective); - NORM_CAPS(cap_bset); - render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable); render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &cap_permitted); render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective); diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 84b13ad67c1c..aa93e5ef594c 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -78,8 +78,11 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set; # error Fix up hand-coded capability macro initializers #else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */ +#define CAP_LAST_U32 ((_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) - 1) +#define CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) -1) + # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) -# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) +# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK }}) # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 3ef2e0e797e8..ba2ff5a5c600 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap) audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix); CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", - cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]); + cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]); } } diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index a5cf13c018ce..989f5bfc57dc 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -258,6 +258,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) i++; } + effective.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; + permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; + inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; + new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 9fe46e22c7f2..bab0611afc1e 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -421,6 +421,9 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable); } + cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; + cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK; + return 0; } |