diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig.debug | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/asm-x86/pda.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/asm-x86/system.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/magic.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/sched.h | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/stackprotector.h | 16 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | init/main.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/exit.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/fork.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/panic.c | 77 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/sched.c | 7 |
17 files changed, 196 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index e0edaaa6920a..09a28a36ff26 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1145,13 +1145,17 @@ config SECCOMP If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. +config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL + bool + config CC_STACKPROTECTOR bool "Enable -fstack-protector buffer overflow detection (EXPERIMENTAL)" - depends on X86_64 && EXPERIMENTAL && BROKEN + depends on X86_64 + select CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL help - This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This - feature puts, at the beginning of critical functions, a canary - value on the stack just before the return address, and validates + This option turns on the -fstack-protector GCC feature. This + feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on + the stack just before the return address, and validates the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then @@ -1159,15 +1163,8 @@ config CC_STACKPROTECTOR This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution gcc with the feature backported. Older versions are automatically - detected and for those versions, this configuration option is ignored. - -config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL - bool "Use stack-protector for all functions" - depends on CC_STACKPROTECTOR - help - Normally, GCC only inserts the canary value protection for - functions that use large-ish on-stack buffers. By enabling - this option, GCC will be asked to do this for ALL functions. + detected and for those versions, this configuration option is + ignored. (and a warning is printed during bootup) source kernel/Kconfig.hz diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug index 18363374d51a..a8d3c7e0414a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ config DIRECT_GBPAGES config DEBUG_RODATA_TEST bool "Testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA feature" depends on DEBUG_RODATA + default y help This option enables a testcase for the DEBUG_RODATA feature as well as for the change_page_attr() infrastructure. diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 3cff3c894cf3..c3e0eeeb1dd2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ else stackp := $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/gcc-x86_64-has-stack-protector.sh stackp-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR) := $(shell $(stackp) \ - "$(CC)" -fstack-protector ) + "$(CC)" "-fstack-protector -DGCC_HAS_SP" ) stackp-$(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL) += $(shell $(stackp) \ "$(CC)" -fstack-protector-all ) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 77807d4769c9..d001739d8b06 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) CFLAGS_vsyscall_64.o := $(PROFILING) -g0 $(nostackp) CFLAGS_hpet.o := $(nostackp) CFLAGS_tsc_64.o := $(nostackp) +CFLAGS_paravirt.o := $(nostackp) obj-y := process_$(BITS).o signal_$(BITS).o entry_$(BITS).o obj-y += traps_$(BITS).o irq_$(BITS).o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index c6eb5c91e5f6..f73cfbc2c281 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include <stdarg.h> +#include <linux/stackprotector.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/sched.h> @@ -146,6 +147,17 @@ static inline void play_dead(void) void cpu_idle(void) { current_thread_info()->status |= TS_POLLING; + + /* + * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack + * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have + * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating + * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the + * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever + * trigger): + */ + boot_init_stack_canary(); + /* endless idle loop with no priority at all */ while (1) { tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(); @@ -641,7 +653,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) write_pda(kernelstack, (unsigned long)task_stack_page(next_p) + THREAD_SIZE - PDA_STACKOFFSET); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - write_pda(stack_canary, next_p->stack_canary); /* * Build time only check to make sure the stack_canary is at * offset 40 in the pda; this is a gcc ABI requirement diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 8bcb6f40ccb6..0c5dcee23bb1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/kprobes.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/kdebug.h> +#include <linux/magic.h> #include <asm/system.h> #include <asm/desc.h> @@ -586,6 +587,8 @@ void __kprobes do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) unsigned long address; int write, si_code; int fault; + unsigned long *stackend; + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 unsigned long flags; #endif @@ -855,6 +858,10 @@ no_context: show_fault_oops(regs, error_code, address); + stackend = end_of_stack(tsk); + if (*stackend != STACK_END_MAGIC) + printk(KERN_ALERT "Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted\n"); + tsk->thread.cr2 = address; tsk->thread.trap_no = 14; tsk->thread.error_code = error_code; diff --git a/include/asm-x86/pda.h b/include/asm-x86/pda.h index 101fb9e11954..62b734986a44 100644 --- a/include/asm-x86/pda.h +++ b/include/asm-x86/pda.h @@ -16,11 +16,9 @@ struct x8664_pda { unsigned long oldrsp; /* 24 user rsp for system call */ int irqcount; /* 32 Irq nesting counter. Starts -1 */ unsigned int cpunumber; /* 36 Logical CPU number */ -#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR unsigned long stack_canary; /* 40 stack canary value */ /* gcc-ABI: this canary MUST be at offset 40!!! */ -#endif char *irqstackptr; unsigned int __softirq_pending; unsigned int __nmi_count; /* number of NMI on this CPUs */ diff --git a/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h b/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3baf7ad89be1 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/asm-x86/stackprotector.h @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +#ifndef _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H +#define _ASM_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 + +#include <asm/tsc.h> + +/* + * Initialize the stackprotector canary value. + * + * NOTE: this must only be called from functions that never return, + * and it must always be inlined. + */ +static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) +{ + u64 canary; + u64 tsc; + + /* + * If we're the non-boot CPU, nothing set the PDA stack + * canary up for us - and if we are the boot CPU we have + * a 0 stack canary. This is a good place for updating + * it, as we wont ever return from this function (so the + * invalid canaries already on the stack wont ever + * trigger). + * + * We both use the random pool and the current TSC as a source + * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, + * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later + * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. + */ + get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); + tsc = __native_read_tsc(); + canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); + + current->stack_canary = canary; + write_pda(stack_canary, canary); +} + +#endif diff --git a/include/asm-x86/system.h b/include/asm-x86/system.h index a2f04cd79b29..172f54185093 100644 --- a/include/asm-x86/system.h +++ b/include/asm-x86/system.h @@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ do { \ ".globl thread_return\n" \ "thread_return:\n\t" \ "movq %%gs:%P[pda_pcurrent],%%rsi\n\t" \ + "movq %P[task_canary](%%rsi),%%r8\n\t" \ + "movq %%r8,%%gs:%P[pda_canary]\n\t" \ "movq %P[thread_info](%%rsi),%%r8\n\t" \ LOCK_PREFIX "btr %[tif_fork],%P[ti_flags](%%r8)\n\t" \ "movq %%rax,%%rdi\n\t" \ @@ -103,7 +105,9 @@ do { \ [ti_flags] "i" (offsetof(struct thread_info, flags)), \ [tif_fork] "i" (TIF_FORK), \ [thread_info] "i" (offsetof(struct task_struct, stack)), \ - [pda_pcurrent] "i" (offsetof(struct x8664_pda, pcurrent)) \ + [task_canary] "i" (offsetof(struct task_struct, stack_canary)),\ + [pda_pcurrent] "i" (offsetof(struct x8664_pda, pcurrent)), \ + [pda_canary] "i" (offsetof(struct x8664_pda, stack_canary))\ : "memory", "cc" __EXTRA_CLOBBER) #endif diff --git a/include/linux/magic.h b/include/linux/magic.h index 1fa0c2ce4dec..74e68e201166 100644 --- a/include/linux/magic.h +++ b/include/linux/magic.h @@ -42,4 +42,5 @@ #define FUTEXFS_SUPER_MAGIC 0xBAD1DEA #define INOTIFYFS_SUPER_MAGIC 0x2BAD1DEA +#define STACK_END_MAGIC 0x57AC6E9D #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */ diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index c5d3f847ca8d..f0132f9ef4dd 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1095,10 +1095,9 @@ struct task_struct { pid_t pid; pid_t tgid; -#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR /* Canary value for the -fstack-protector gcc feature */ unsigned long stack_canary; -#endif + /* * pointers to (original) parent process, youngest child, younger sibling, * older sibling, respectively. (p->father can be replaced with @@ -1971,6 +1970,19 @@ static inline unsigned long *end_of_stack(struct task_struct *p) extern void thread_info_cache_init(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE +static inline unsigned long stack_not_used(struct task_struct *p) +{ + unsigned long *n = end_of_stack(p); + + do { /* Skip over canary */ + n++; + } while (!*n); + + return (unsigned long)n - (unsigned long)end_of_stack(p); +} +#endif + /* set thread flags in other task's structures * - see asm/thread_info.h for TIF_xxxx flags available */ diff --git a/include/linux/stackprotector.h b/include/linux/stackprotector.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6f3e54c704c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/stackprotector.h @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +#ifndef _LINUX_STACKPROTECTOR_H +#define _LINUX_STACKPROTECTOR_H 1 + +#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/random.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR +# include <asm/stackprotector.h> +#else +static inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) +{ +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index f7fb20021d48..b44e4eb0f5e3 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/stackprotector.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/delay.h> @@ -545,6 +546,12 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(void) unwind_init(); lockdep_init(); debug_objects_early_init(); + + /* + * Set up the the initial canary ASAP: + */ + boot_init_stack_canary(); + cgroup_init_early(); local_irq_disable(); diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 8f6185e69b69..fb8de6cbf2c7 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -899,12 +899,9 @@ static void check_stack_usage(void) { static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(low_water_lock); static int lowest_to_date = THREAD_SIZE; - unsigned long *n = end_of_stack(current); unsigned long free; - while (*n == 0) - n++; - free = (unsigned long)n - (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current); + free = stack_not_used(current); if (free >= lowest_to_date) return; diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 19908b26cf80..d428336e7aa1 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ #include <linux/tty.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> +#include <linux/magic.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/pgalloc.h> @@ -186,6 +187,8 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig) { struct task_struct *tsk; struct thread_info *ti; + unsigned long *stackend; + int err; prepare_to_copy(orig); @@ -211,6 +214,8 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig) goto out; setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig); + stackend = end_of_stack(tsk); + *stackend = STACK_END_MAGIC; /* for overflow detection */ #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 425567f45b9f..6729e3f4ebcb 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -80,6 +80,9 @@ NORET_TYPE void panic(const char * fmt, ...) vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); printk(KERN_EMERG "Kernel panic - not syncing: %s\n",buf); +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE + dump_stack(); +#endif bust_spinlocks(0); /* @@ -321,13 +324,85 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_on_slowpath); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR + +#ifndef GCC_HAS_SP +#warning You have selected the CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR option, but the gcc used does not support this. +#endif +static unsigned long __stack_check_testing; +/* + * Self test function for the stack-protector feature. + * This test requires that the local variable absolutely has + * a stack slot, hence the barrier()s. + */ +static noinline void __stack_chk_test_func(void) +{ + unsigned long foo; + barrier(); + /* + * we need to make sure we're not about to clobber the return address, + * while real exploits do this, it's unhealthy on a running system. + * Besides, if we would, the test is already failed anyway so + * time to pull the emergency brake on it. + */ + if ((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0) == + *(((unsigned long *)&foo)+1)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "No -fstack-protector-stack-frame!\n"); + return; + } +#ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER + /* We also don't want to clobber the frame pointer */ + if ((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0) == + *(((unsigned long *)&foo)+2)) { + printk(KERN_ERR "No -fstack-protector-stack-frame!\n"); + return; + } +#endif + barrier(); + if (current->stack_canary == *(((unsigned long *)&foo)+1)) + *(((unsigned long *)&foo)+1) = 0; + else + printk(KERN_ERR "No -fstack-protector canary found\n"); + barrier(); +} + +static int __stack_chk_test(void) +{ + printk(KERN_INFO "Testing -fstack-protector-all feature\n"); + __stack_check_testing = (unsigned long)&__stack_chk_test_func; + __stack_chk_test_func(); + if (__stack_check_testing) { + printk(KERN_ERR "-fstack-protector-all test failed\n"); + WARN_ON(1); + } + return 0; +} /* * Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and * gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value */ void __stack_chk_fail(void) { - panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted"); + if (__stack_check_testing == (unsigned long)&__stack_chk_test_func) { + long delta; + + delta = (unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(0) - + __stack_check_testing; + /* + * The test needs to happen inside the test function, so + * check if the return address is close to that function. + * The function is only 2 dozen bytes long, but keep a wide + * safety margin to avoid panic()s for normal users regardless + * of the quality of the compiler. + */ + if (delta >= 0 && delta <= 400) { + __stack_check_testing = 0; + return; + } + } + panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %p\n", + __builtin_return_address(0)); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail); + +late_initcall(__stack_chk_test); #endif diff --git a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c index 3aaa5c8cb421..0cdb50260dbf 100644 --- a/kernel/sched.c +++ b/kernel/sched.c @@ -5406,12 +5406,7 @@ void sched_show_task(struct task_struct *p) printk(KERN_CONT " %016lx ", thread_saved_pc(p)); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE - { - unsigned long *n = end_of_stack(p); - while (!*n) - n++; - free = (unsigned long)n - (unsigned long)end_of_stack(p); - } + free = stack_not_used(p); #endif printk(KERN_CONT "%5lu %5d %6d\n", free, task_pid_nr(p), task_pid_nr(p->real_parent)); |