diff options
89 files changed, 1748 insertions, 492 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi index 7d1435bc976c..9921ef285899 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-ppi @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/ +What: /sys/class/tpm/tpmX/ppi/ Date: August 2012 Kernel Version: 3.6 Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com @@ -8,9 +8,14 @@ Description: folder makes sense. The folder path can be got by command 'find /sys/ -name 'pcrs''. For the detail information of PPI, please refer to the PPI specification from + http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/ -What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/version + In Linux 4.2 ppi was moved to the character device directory. + A symlink from tpmX/device/ppi to tpmX/ppi to provide backwards + compatibility. + +What: /sys/class/tpm/tpmX/ppi/version Date: August 2012 Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com Description: @@ -18,7 +23,7 @@ Description: platform. This file is readonly. -What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/request +What: /sys/class/tpm/tpmX/ppi/request Date: August 2012 Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com Description: @@ -28,7 +33,7 @@ Description: integer value range from 1 to 160, and 0 means no request. This file can be read and written. -What: /sys/devices/pnp0/00:<bus-num>/ppi/response +What: /sys/class/tpm/tpmX/ppi/response Date: August 2012 Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com Description: @@ -37,7 +42,7 @@ Description: : <response description>". This file is readonly. -What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/transition_action +What: /sys/class/tpm/tpmX/ppi/transition_action Date: August 2012 Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com Description: @@ -47,7 +52,7 @@ Description: description>". This file is readonly. -What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/tcg_operations +What: /sys/class/tpm/tpmX/ppi/tcg_operations Date: August 2012 Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com Description: @@ -58,7 +63,7 @@ Description: This attribute is only supported by PPI version 1.2+. This file is readonly. -What: /sys/devices/pnp0/<bus-num>/ppi/vs_operations +What: /sys/class/tpm/tpmX/ppi/vs_operations Date: August 2012 Contact: xiaoyan.zhang@intel.com Description: diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt index b7675904a747..8c07e0ea6bc0 100644 --- a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt @@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ and looks like the following: const struct public_key_signature *sig); }; -Asymmetric keys point to this with their type_data[0] member. +Asymmetric keys point to this with their payload[asym_subtype] member. The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of the subtype. Currently, the name is only used for print statements. @@ -269,8 +269,7 @@ mandatory: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; - void *type_data[2]; - void *payload; + void *payload[4]; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; @@ -283,16 +282,18 @@ mandatory: not theirs. If the parser is happy with the blob, it should propose a description for - the key and attach it to ->description, ->type_data[0] should be set to - point to the subtype to be used, ->payload should be set to point to the - initialised data for that subtype, ->type_data[1] should point to a hex - fingerprint and quotalen should be updated to indicate how much quota this - key should account for. - - When clearing up, the data attached to ->type_data[1] and ->description - will be kfree()'d and the data attached to ->payload will be passed to the - subtype's ->destroy() method to be disposed of. A module reference for - the subtype pointed to by ->type_data[0] will be put. + the key and attach it to ->description, ->payload[asym_subtype] should be + set to point to the subtype to be used, ->payload[asym_crypto] should be + set to point to the initialised data for that subtype, + ->payload[asym_key_ids] should point to one or more hex fingerprints and + quotalen should be updated to indicate how much quota this key should + account for. + + When clearing up, the data attached to ->payload[asym_key_ids] and + ->description will be kfree()'d and the data attached to + ->payload[asm_crypto] will be passed to the subtype's ->destroy() method + to be disposed of. A module reference for the subtype pointed to by + ->payload[asym_subtype] will be put. If the data format is not recognised, -EBADMSG should be returned. If it diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt index 5e6d07fbed07..945cc633d883 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt @@ -255,6 +255,16 @@ unconfined the access permitted if it wouldn't be otherwise. Note that this is dangerous and can ruin the proper labeling of your system. It should never be used in production. +relabel-self + This interface contains a list of labels to which the process can + transition to, by writing to /proc/self/attr/current. + Normally a process can change its own label to any legal value, but only + if it has CAP_MAC_ADMIN. This interface allows a process without + CAP_MAC_ADMIN to relabel itself to one of labels from predefined list. + A process without CAP_MAC_ADMIN can change its label only once. When it + does, this list will be cleared. + The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated + by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file. If you are using the smackload utility you can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form: diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt index c9e7f4f223a5..8c183873b2b7 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -1049,12 +1049,12 @@ search a specific keyring, so using keyrings in this way is of limited utility. NOTES ON ACCESSING PAYLOAD CONTENTS =================================== -The simplest payload is just a number in key->payload.value. In this case, -there's no need to indulge in RCU or locking when accessing the payload. +The simplest payload is just data stored in key->payload directly. In this +case, there's no need to indulge in RCU or locking when accessing the payload. -More complex payload contents must be allocated and a pointer to them set in -key->payload.data. One of the following ways must be selected to access the -data: +More complex payload contents must be allocated and pointers to them set in the +key->payload.data[] array. One of the following ways must be selected to +access the data: (1) Unmodifiable key type. @@ -1092,6 +1092,13 @@ data: the payload. key->datalen cannot be relied upon to be consistent with the payload just dereferenced if the key's semaphore is not held. + Note that key->payload.data[0] has a shadow that is marked for __rcu + usage. This is called key->payload.rcu_data0. The following accessors + wrap the RCU calls to this element: + + rcu_assign_keypointer(struct key *key, void *data); + void *rcu_dereference_key(struct key *key); + =================== DEFINING A KEY TYPE @@ -1143,8 +1150,7 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; - void *type_data[2]; - void *payload; + union key_payload payload; const void *data; size_t datalen; size_t quotalen; @@ -1160,10 +1166,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "". - The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload. These - are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. If - set, the expiry time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from - this data. + The method can attach anything it likes to payload. This is merely passed + along to the instantiate() or update() operations. If set, the expiry + time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from this data. The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code otherwise. @@ -1172,11 +1177,10 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: (*) void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided, - otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the - description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload - struct as filled in by the preparse() method. It will always be called - after preparse() returns successfully, even if instantiate() or update() - succeed. + otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the description + and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload struct as filled in by the + preparse() method. It will always be called after preparse() returns + successfully, even if instantiate() or update() succeed. (*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); @@ -1197,6 +1201,11 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory: It is safe to sleep in this method. + generic_key_instantiate() is provided to simply copy the data from + prep->payload.data[] to key->payload.data[], with RCU-safe assignment on + the first element. It will then clear prep->payload.data[] so that the + free_preparse method doesn't release the data. + (*) int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen); diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 283d602a0240..162972876cd3 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10738,6 +10738,7 @@ F: drivers/media/pci/tw68/ TPM DEVICE DRIVER M: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> M: Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net> +M: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> R: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com> W: http://tpmdd.sourceforge.net L: tpmdd-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (moderated for non-subscribers) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c index 15099c41622e..92dea8df6b26 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c @@ -1425,27 +1425,45 @@ static void __init prom_instantiate_sml(void) { phandle ibmvtpm_node; ihandle ibmvtpm_inst; - u32 entry = 0, size = 0; + u32 entry = 0, size = 0, succ = 0; u64 base; + __be32 val; prom_debug("prom_instantiate_sml: start...\n"); - ibmvtpm_node = call_prom("finddevice", 1, 1, ADDR("/ibm,vtpm")); + ibmvtpm_node = call_prom("finddevice", 1, 1, ADDR("/vdevice/vtpm")); prom_debug("ibmvtpm_node: %x\n", ibmvtpm_node); if (!PHANDLE_VALID(ibmvtpm_node)) return; - ibmvtpm_inst = call_prom("open", 1, 1, ADDR("/ibm,vtpm")); + ibmvtpm_inst = call_prom("open", 1, 1, ADDR("/vdevice/vtpm")); if (!IHANDLE_VALID(ibmvtpm_inst)) { prom_printf("opening vtpm package failed (%x)\n", ibmvtpm_inst); return; } - if (call_prom_ret("call-method", 2, 2, &size, - ADDR("sml-get-handover-size"), - ibmvtpm_inst) != 0 || size == 0) { - prom_printf("SML get handover size failed\n"); - return; + if (prom_getprop(ibmvtpm_node, "ibm,sml-efi-reformat-supported", + &val, sizeof(val)) != PROM_ERROR) { + if (call_prom_ret("call-method", 2, 2, &succ, + ADDR("reformat-sml-to-efi-alignment"), + ibmvtpm_inst) != 0 || succ == 0) { + prom_printf("Reformat SML to EFI alignment failed\n"); + return; + } + + if (call_prom_ret("call-method", 2, 2, &size, + ADDR("sml-get-allocated-size"), + ibmvtpm_inst) != 0 || size == 0) { + prom_printf("SML get allocated size failed\n"); + return; + } + } else { + if (call_prom_ret("call-method", 2, 2, &size, + ADDR("sml-get-handover-size"), + ibmvtpm_inst) != 0 || size == 0) { + prom_printf("SML get handover size failed\n"); + return; + } } base = alloc_down(size, PAGE_SIZE, 0); @@ -1454,6 +1472,8 @@ static void __init prom_instantiate_sml(void) prom_printf("instantiating sml at 0x%x...", base); + memset((void *)base, 0, size); + if (call_prom_ret("call-method", 4, 2, &entry, ADDR("sml-handover"), ibmvtpm_inst, size, base) != 0 || entry == 0) { @@ -1464,9 +1484,9 @@ static void __init prom_instantiate_sml(void) reserve_mem(base, size); - prom_setprop(ibmvtpm_node, "/ibm,vtpm", "linux,sml-base", + prom_setprop(ibmvtpm_node, "/vdevice/vtpm", "linux,sml-base", &base, sizeof(base)); - prom_setprop(ibmvtpm_node, "/ibm,vtpm", "linux,sml-size", + prom_setprop(ibmvtpm_node, "/vdevice/vtpm", "linux,sml-size", &size, sizeof(size)); prom_debug("sml base = 0x%x\n", base); diff --git a/certs/.gitignore b/certs/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f51aea4a71ec --- /dev/null +++ b/certs/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +# +# Generated files +# +x509_certificate_list diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h index 3f5b537ab33e..1d450b580245 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h @@ -14,8 +14,3 @@ extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id); extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id, struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id, size_t hexlen); -static inline -const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key) -{ - return key->type_data.p[1]; -} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index 1916680ad81b..9f2165b27d52 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -307,25 +307,34 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) } /* + * Clean up the key ID list + */ +static void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids) +{ + int i; + + if (kids) { + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++) + kfree(kids->id[i]); + kfree(kids); + } +} + +/* * Clean up the preparse data */ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0]; - struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1]; - int i; + struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->payload.data[asym_subtype]; + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids]; pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); if (subtype) { - subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]); + subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto]); module_put(subtype->owner); } - if (kids) { - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++) - kfree(kids->id[i]); - kfree(kids); - } + asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids); kfree(prep->description); } @@ -335,20 +344,19 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key) { struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); - struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1]; + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->payload.data[asym_key_ids]; + void *data = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + + key->payload.data[asym_crypto] = NULL; + key->payload.data[asym_subtype] = NULL; + key->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL; if (subtype) { - subtype->destroy(key->payload.data); + subtype->destroy(data); module_put(subtype->owner); - key->type_data.p[0] = NULL; } - if (kids) { - kfree(kids->id[0]); - kfree(kids->id[1]); - kfree(kids); - key->type_data.p[1] = NULL; - } + asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids); } struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 81efccbe22d5..6db4c01c6503 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name); static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key, struct seq_file *m) { - struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data; + struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; if (key) seq_printf(m, "%s.%s", @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature); static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key, const struct public_key_signature *sig) { - const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data; + const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig); } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c index 7525fd183574..9441240f7d2a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ int verify_signature(const struct key *key, return -EINVAL; subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); if (!subtype || - !key->payload.data) + !key->payload.data[0]) return -EINVAL; if (!subtype->verify_signature) return -ENOTSUPP; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index 1de01eaec884..dbeed6018e63 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/time.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> struct x509_certificate { struct x509_certificate *next; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index 68c3c40501ab..2a44b3752471 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, if (!IS_ERR(key)) { if (!use_builtin_keys || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) - ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data, cert); + ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data[asym_crypto], + cert); key_put(key); } return ret; @@ -353,9 +354,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); - prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype; - prep->type_data[1] = kids; - prep->payload[0] = cert->pub; + prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype; + prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids; + prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub; prep->description = desc; prep->quotalen = 100; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig index 09cb727864f0..19c007461d1c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ config TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24 tristate "STMicroelectronics TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface" - depends on GPIOLIB + depends on GPIOLIB || COMPILE_TEST ---help--- STMicroelectronics ST33ZP24 core driver. It implements the core TPM1.2 logic and hooks into the TPM kernel APIs. Physical layers will diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c index ad1ee180e0c2..309d2767c6a1 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/i2c.c @@ -258,7 +258,6 @@ static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(st33zp24_i2c_ops, st33zp24_pm_suspend, static struct i2c_driver st33zp24_i2c_driver = { .driver = { - .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = TPM_ST33_I2C, .pm = &st33zp24_i2c_ops, .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(of_st33zp24_i2c_match), diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 1082d4bb016a..f26b0ae23bea 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpmm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev, chip->dev.class = tpm_class; chip->dev.release = tpm_dev_release; chip->dev.parent = chip->pdev; +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI + chip->dev.groups = chip->groups; +#endif if (chip->dev_num == 0) chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MISC_MAJOR, TPM_MINOR); @@ -182,12 +185,6 @@ static int tpm1_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (rc) return rc; - rc = tpm_add_ppi(chip); - if (rc) { - tpm_sysfs_del_device(chip); - return rc; - } - chip->bios_dir = tpm_bios_log_setup(chip->devname); return 0; @@ -201,8 +198,6 @@ static void tpm1_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (chip->bios_dir) tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip->bios_dir); - tpm_remove_ppi(chip); - tpm_sysfs_del_device(chip); } @@ -225,10 +220,20 @@ int tpm_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip) if (rc) return rc; + tpm_add_ppi(chip); + rc = tpm_dev_add_device(chip); if (rc) goto out_err; + if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) { + rc = __compat_only_sysfs_link_entry_to_kobj(&chip->pdev->kobj, + &chip->dev.kobj, + "ppi"); + if (rc) + goto out_err; + } + /* Make the chip available. */ spin_lock(&driver_lock); list_add_rcu(&chip->list, &tpm_chip_list); @@ -263,6 +268,9 @@ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) spin_unlock(&driver_lock); synchronize_rcu(); + if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) + sysfs_remove_link(&chip->pdev->kobj, "ppi"); + tpm1_chip_unregister(chip); tpm_dev_del_device(chip); } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c index e85d3416d899..c50637db3a8a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c @@ -666,6 +666,30 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) } /** + * tpm_is_tpm2 - is the chip a TPM2 chip? + * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY + * + * Returns < 0 on error, and 1 or 0 on success depending whether the chip + * is a TPM2 chip. + */ +int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip; + int rc; + + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); + if (chip == NULL) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) != 0; + + tpm_chip_put(chip); + + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_is_tpm2); + +/** * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to retrieve @@ -1021,6 +1045,58 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_random); +/** + * tpm_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key + * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * + * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips + * are supported. + */ +int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip; + int rc; + + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); + if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + + tpm_chip_put(chip); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_seal_trusted); + +/** + * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key + * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * + * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. At the moment, only TPM 2.0 chips + * are supported. + */ +int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip; + int rc; + + chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num); + if (chip == NULL || !(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) + return -ENODEV; + + rc = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); + + tpm_chip_put(chip); + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_unseal_trusted); + static int __init tpm_init(void) { int rc; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index f8319a0860fd..a4257a32964f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright (C) 2004 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation * * Authors: * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com> @@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ #include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/cdev.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> enum tpm_const { TPM_MINOR = 224, /* officially assigned */ @@ -88,6 +90,9 @@ enum tpm2_return_codes { enum tpm2_algorithms { TPM2_ALG_SHA1 = 0x0004, + TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH = 0x0008, + TPM2_ALG_SHA256 = 0x000B, + TPM2_ALG_NULL = 0x0010 }; enum tpm2_command_codes { @@ -95,6 +100,10 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST = 0x0143, TPM2_CC_STARTUP = 0x0144, TPM2_CC_SHUTDOWN = 0x0145, + TPM2_CC_CREATE = 0x0153, + TPM2_CC_LOAD = 0x0157, + TPM2_CC_UNSEAL = 0x015E, + TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM = 0x017B, TPM2_CC_PCR_READ = 0x017E, @@ -115,6 +124,13 @@ enum tpm2_startup_types { TPM2_SU_STATE = 0x0001, }; +enum tpm2_start_method { + TPM2_START_ACPI = 2, + TPM2_START_FIFO = 6, + TPM2_START_CRB = 7, + TPM2_START_CRB_WITH_ACPI = 8, +}; + struct tpm_chip; struct tpm_vendor_specific { @@ -151,8 +167,7 @@ struct tpm_vendor_specific { enum tpm_chip_flags { TPM_CHIP_FLAG_REGISTERED = BIT(0), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_PPI = BIT(1), - TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(2), + TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 = BIT(1), }; struct tpm_chip { @@ -175,6 +190,8 @@ struct tpm_chip { struct dentry **bios_dir; #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI + const struct attribute_group *groups[2]; + unsigned int groups_cnt; acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle; char ppi_version[TPM_PPI_VERSION_LEN + 1]; #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI */ @@ -182,7 +199,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { struct list_head list; }; -#define to_tpm_chip(n) container_of(n, struct tpm_chip, vendor) +#define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev) static inline void tpm_chip_put(struct tpm_chip *chip) { @@ -382,6 +399,101 @@ struct tpm_cmd_t { tpm_cmd_params params; } __packed; +/* A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands. This is based on the + * ideas of string buffer code in security/keys/trusted.h but is heap based + * in order to keep the stack usage minimal. + */ + +enum tpm_buf_flags { + TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW = BIT(0), +}; + +struct tpm_buf { + struct page *data_page; + unsigned int flags; + u8 *data; +}; + +static inline int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) +{ + struct tpm_input_header *head; + + buf->data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER); + if (!buf->data_page) + return -ENOMEM; + + buf->flags = 0; + buf->data = kmap(buf->data_page); + + head = (struct tpm_input_header *) buf->data; + + head->tag = cpu_to_be16(tag); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); + head->ordinal = cpu_to_be32(ordinal); + + return 0; +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_destroy(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + kunmap(buf->data_page); + __free_page(buf->data_page); +} + +static inline u32 tpm_buf_length(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_input_header *head = (struct tpm_input_header *) buf->data; + + return be32_to_cpu(head->length); +} + +static inline u16 tpm_buf_tag(struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_input_header *head = (struct tpm_input_header *) buf->data; + + return be16_to_cpu(head->tag); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, + const unsigned char *new_data, + unsigned int new_len) +{ + struct tpm_input_header *head = (struct tpm_input_header *) buf->data; + u32 len = tpm_buf_length(buf); + + /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + return; + + if ((len + new_len) > PAGE_SIZE) { + WARN(1, "tpm_buf: overflow\n"); + buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + return; + } + + memcpy(&buf->data[len], new_data, new_len); + head->length = cpu_to_be32(len + new_len); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value) +{ + tpm_buf_append(buf, &value, 1); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value) +{ + __be16 value2 = cpu_to_be16(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 2); +} + +static inline void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value) +{ + __be32 value2 = cpu_to_be32(value); + + tpm_buf_append(buf, (u8 *) &value2, 4); +} + extern struct class *tpm_class; extern dev_t tpm_devt; extern const struct file_operations tpm_fops; @@ -412,15 +524,9 @@ void tpm_sysfs_del_device(struct tpm_chip *chip); int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI -extern int tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip); -extern void tpm_remove_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip); +extern void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip); #else -static inline int tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void tpm_remove_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) +static inline void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } #endif @@ -428,6 +534,12 @@ static inline void tpm_remove_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max); +int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); +int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value, const char *desc); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 011909a9be96..bd7039fafa8a 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2014, 2015 Intel Corporation * * Authors: * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ */ #include "tpm.h" +#include <keys/trusted-type.h> + +enum tpm2_object_attributes { + TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH = BIT(6), +}; struct tpm2_startup_in { __be16 startup_type; @@ -381,6 +386,249 @@ static const struct tpm_input_header tpm2_get_tpm_pt_header = { }; /** + * Append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. The buffer must be allocated with + * tpm_buf_alloc(). + * + * @param buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance + * @param nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used + * @param nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used + * @param attributes: the session attributes + * @param hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used + * @param hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used + */ +static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, + const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len, + u8 attributes, + const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len) +{ + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len); + + if (nonce && nonce_len) + tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len); + + tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes); + tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len); + + if (hmac && hmac_len) + tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); +} + +/** + * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key + * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * + * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. + */ +int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + unsigned int blob_len; + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + 0 /* session_attributes */, + options->keyauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + /* sensitive */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE + payload->key_len); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len); + + /* public */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14); + + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_SHA256); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_ATTR_USER_WITH_AUTH); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); /* policy digest size */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_NULL); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* outside info */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + + /* creation PCR */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "sealing data"); + if (rc) + goto out; + + blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(payload->blob, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4], blob_len); + payload->blob_len = blob_len; + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc > 0) + rc = -EPERM; + + return rc; +} + +static int tpm2_load(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u32 *blob_handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + unsigned int private_len; + unsigned int public_len; + unsigned int blob_len; + int rc; + + private_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[0]); + if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2)) + return -E2BIG; + + public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]); + blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4; + if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) + return -E2BIG; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + 0 /* session_attributes */, + options->keyauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len); + + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "loading blob"); + if (!rc) + *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup( + (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + +out: + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + if (rc > 0) + rc = -EPERM; + + return rc; +} + +static void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT); + if (rc) { + dev_warn(chip->pdev, "0x%08x was not flushed, out of memory\n", + handle); + return; + } + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "flushing context"); + if (rc) + dev_warn(chip->pdev, "0x%08x was not flushed, rc=%d\n", handle, + rc); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); +} + +static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options, + u32 blob_handle) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, blob_handle); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, + NULL /* nonce */, 0, + 0 /* session_attributes */, + options->blobauth /* hmac */, + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "unsealing"); + if (rc > 0) + rc = -EPERM; + + if (!rc) { + payload->key_len = be16_to_cpup( + (__be16 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]); + + memcpy(payload->key, &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 6], + payload->key_len); + } + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + return rc; +} + +/** + * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key + * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM + * @options: authentication values and other options + * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form + * + * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success. + */ +int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + u32 blob_handle; + int rc; + + rc = tpm2_load(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); + if (rc) + return rc; + + rc = tpm2_unseal(chip, payload, options, blob_handle); + + tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle); + + return rc; +} + +/** * tpm2_get_tpm_pt() - get value of a TPM_CAP_TPM_PROPERTIES type property * @chip: TPM chip to use. * @property_id: property ID. diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c index 1267322595da..4bb9727c1047 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c @@ -34,12 +34,6 @@ enum crb_defaults { CRB_ACPI_START_INDEX = 1, }; -enum crb_start_method { - CRB_SM_ACPI_START = 2, - CRB_SM_CRB = 7, - CRB_SM_CRB_WITH_ACPI_START = 8, -}; - struct acpi_tpm2 { struct acpi_table_header hdr; u16 platform_class; @@ -74,7 +68,8 @@ struct crb_control_area { u32 int_enable; u32 int_sts; u32 cmd_size; - u64 cmd_pa; + u32 cmd_pa_low; + u32 cmd_pa_high; u32 rsp_size; u64 rsp_pa; } __packed; @@ -220,12 +215,6 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) u64 pa; int rc; - chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_crb); - if (IS_ERR(chip)) - return PTR_ERR(chip); - - chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2; - status = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1, (struct acpi_table_header **) &buf); if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) { @@ -233,13 +222,15 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) return -ENODEV; } - /* At least some versions of AMI BIOS have a bug that TPM2 table has - * zero address for the control area and therefore we must fail. - */ - if (!buf->control_area_pa) { - dev_err(dev, "TPM2 ACPI table has a zero address for the control area\n"); - return -EINVAL; - } + /* Should the FIFO driver handle this? */ + if (buf->start_method == TPM2_START_FIFO) + return -ENODEV; + + chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_crb); + if (IS_ERR(chip)) + return PTR_ERR(chip); + + chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2; if (buf->hdr.length < sizeof(struct acpi_tpm2)) { dev_err(dev, "TPM2 ACPI table has wrong size"); @@ -259,11 +250,11 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) * report only ACPI start but in practice seems to require both * ACPI start and CRB start. */ - if (sm == CRB_SM_CRB || sm == CRB_SM_CRB_WITH_ACPI_START || + if (sm == TPM2_START_CRB || sm == TPM2_START_FIFO || !strcmp(acpi_device_hid(device), "MSFT0101")) priv->flags |= CRB_FL_CRB_START; - if (sm == CRB_SM_ACPI_START || sm == CRB_SM_CRB_WITH_ACPI_START) + if (sm == TPM2_START_ACPI || sm == TPM2_START_CRB_WITH_ACPI) priv->flags |= CRB_FL_ACPI_START; priv->cca = (struct crb_control_area __iomem *) @@ -273,8 +264,8 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device) return -ENOMEM; } - memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->cmd_pa, 8); - pa = le64_to_cpu(pa); + pa = ((u64) le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_high)) << 32) | + (u64) le32_to_cpu(ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_pa_low)); priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa, ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size)); if (!priv->cmd) { diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c index 3a56a131586c..bd72fb04225e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.c @@ -76,15 +76,25 @@ static void *tpm_bios_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) void *addr = log->bios_event_log; void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end; struct tcpa_event *event; + u32 converted_event_size; + u32 converted_event_type; + /* read over *pos measurements */ for (i = 0; i < *pos; i++) { event = addr; + converted_event_size = + do_endian_conversion(event->event_size); + converted_event_type = + do_endian_conversion(event->event_type); + if ((addr + sizeof(struct tcpa_event)) < limit) { - if (event->event_type == 0 && event->event_size == 0) + if ((converted_event_type == 0) && + (converted_event_size == 0)) return NULL; - addr += sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + event->event_size; + addr += (sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + + converted_event_size); } } @@ -94,8 +104,12 @@ static void *tpm_bios_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) event = addr; - if ((event->event_type == 0 && event->event_size == 0) || - ((addr + sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + event->event_size) >= limit)) + converted_event_size = do_endian_conversion(event->event_size); + converted_event_type = do_endian_conversion(event->event_type); + + if (((converted_event_type == 0) && (converted_event_size == 0)) + || ((addr + sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + converted_event_size) + >= limit)) return NULL; return addr; @@ -107,8 +121,12 @@ static void *tpm_bios_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, struct tcpa_event *event = v; struct tpm_bios_log *log = m->private; void *limit = log->bios_event_log_end; + u32 converted_event_size; + u32 converted_event_type; - v += sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + event->event_size; + converted_event_size = do_endian_conversion(event->event_size); + + v += sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + converted_event_size; /* now check if current entry is valid */ if ((v + sizeof(struct tcpa_event)) >= limit) @@ -116,11 +134,11 @@ static void *tpm_bios_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, event = v; - if (event->event_type == 0 && event->event_size == 0) - return NULL; + converted_event_size = do_endian_conversion(event->event_size); + converted_event_type = do_endian_conversion(event->event_type); - if ((event->event_type == 0 && event->event_size == 0) || - ((v + sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + event->event_size) >= limit)) + if (((converted_event_type == 0) && (converted_event_size == 0)) || + ((v + sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + converted_event_size) >= limit)) return NULL; (*pos)++; @@ -140,7 +158,7 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event, int i, n_len = 0, d_len = 0; struct tcpa_pc_event *pc_event; - switch(event->event_type) { + switch (do_endian_conversion(event->event_type)) { case PREBOOT: case POST_CODE: case UNUSED: @@ -156,14 +174,16 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event, case NONHOST_CODE: case NONHOST_CONFIG: case NONHOST_INFO: - name = tcpa_event_type_strings[event->event_type]; + name = tcpa_event_type_strings[do_endian_conversion + (event->event_type)]; n_len = strlen(name); break; case SEPARATOR: case ACTION: - if (MAX_TEXT_EVENT > event->event_size) { + if (MAX_TEXT_EVENT > + do_endian_conversion(event->event_size)) { name = event_entry; - n_len = event->event_size; + n_len = do_endian_conversion(event->event_size); } break; case EVENT_TAG: @@ -171,7 +191,7 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event, /* ToDo Row data -> Base64 */ - switch (pc_event->event_id) { + switch (do_endian_conversion(pc_event->event_id)) { case SMBIOS: case BIS_CERT: case CMOS: @@ -179,7 +199,8 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event, case OPTION_ROM_EXEC: case OPTION_ROM_CONFIG: case S_CRTM_VERSION: - name = tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[pc_event->event_id]; + name = tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[do_endian_conversion + (pc_event->event_id)]; n_len = strlen(name); break; /* hash data */ @@ -188,7 +209,8 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event, case OPTION_ROM_MICROCODE: case S_CRTM_CONTENTS: case POST_CONTENTS: - name = tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[pc_event->event_id]; + name = tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[do_endian_conversion + (pc_event->event_id)]; n_len = strlen(name); for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) d_len += sprintf(&data[2*i], "%02x", @@ -209,13 +231,24 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event, static int tpm_binary_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct tcpa_event *event = v; - char *data = v; + struct tcpa_event temp_event; + char *tempPtr; int i; - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + event->event_size; i++) - seq_putc(m, data[i]); + memcpy(&temp_event, event, sizeof(struct tcpa_event)); + + /* convert raw integers for endianness */ + temp_event.pcr_index = do_endian_conversion(event->pcr_index); + temp_event.event_type = do_endian_conversion(event->event_type); + temp_event.event_size = do_endian_conversion(event->event_size); + + tempPtr = (char *)&temp_event; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(struct tcpa_event) + temp_event.event_size; i++) + seq_putc(m, tempPtr[i]); return 0; + } static int tpm_bios_measurements_release(struct inode *inode, @@ -238,7 +271,7 @@ static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) char *eventname; struct tcpa_event *event = v; unsigned char *event_entry = - (unsigned char *) (v + sizeof(struct tcpa_event)); + (unsigned char *)(v + sizeof(struct tcpa_event)); eventname = kmalloc(MAX_TEXT_EVENT, GFP_KERNEL); if (!eventname) { @@ -247,13 +280,14 @@ static int tpm_ascii_bios_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return -EFAULT; } - seq_printf(m, "%2d ", event->pcr_index); + /* 1st: PCR */ + seq_printf(m, "%2d ", do_endian_conversion(event->pcr_index)); /* 2nd: SHA1 */ seq_printf(m, "%20phN", event->pcr_value); /* 3rd: event type identifier */ - seq_printf(m, " %02x", event->event_type); + seq_printf(m, " %02x", do_endian_conversion(event->event_type)); len += get_event_name(eventname, event, event_entry); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h index e7da086d6928..267bfbd1b7bb 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_eventlog.h @@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ #define MAX_TEXT_EVENT 1000 /* Max event string length */ #define ACPI_TCPA_SIG "TCPA" /* 0x41504354 /'TCPA' */ +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 +#define do_endian_conversion(x) be32_to_cpu(x) +#else +#define do_endian_conversion(x) x +#endif + enum bios_platform_class { BIOS_CLIENT = 0x00, BIOS_SERVER = 0x01, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c index 7a0ca78ad3c6..8dfb88b9739c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel.c @@ -217,7 +217,6 @@ static struct i2c_driver i2c_atmel_driver = { .remove = i2c_atmel_remove, .driver = { .name = I2C_DRIVER_NAME, - .owner = THIS_MODULE, .pm = &i2c_atmel_pm_ops, .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(i2c_atmel_of_match), }, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c index 33c5f360ab01..63d5d22e9e60 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon.c @@ -711,7 +711,6 @@ static struct i2c_driver tpm_tis_i2c_driver = { .remove = tpm_tis_i2c_remove, .driver = { .name = "tpm_i2c_infineon", - .owner = THIS_MODULE, .pm = &tpm_tis_i2c_ops, .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(tpm_tis_i2c_of_match), }, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c index 9d42b7d78e50..847f1597fe9b 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_i2c_nuvoton.c @@ -641,7 +641,6 @@ static struct i2c_driver i2c_nuvoton_driver = { .remove = i2c_nuvoton_remove, .driver = { .name = I2C_DRIVER_NAME, - .owner = THIS_MODULE, .pm = &i2c_nuvoton_pm_ops, .of_match_table = of_match_ptr(i2c_nuvoton_of_match), }, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c index 27ebf9511cb4..3e6a22658b63 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c @@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static void ibmvtpm_crq_process(struct ibmvtpm_crq *crq, } ibmvtpm->rtce_size = be16_to_cpu(crq->len); ibmvtpm->rtce_buf = kmalloc(ibmvtpm->rtce_size, - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_ATOMIC); if (!ibmvtpm->rtce_buf) { dev_err(ibmvtpm->dev, "Failed to allocate memory for rtce buffer\n"); return; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c index eebe6256918f..1141456a4b1f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c @@ -24,14 +24,14 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log) { struct device_node *np; const u32 *sizep; - const __be64 *basep; + const u64 *basep; if (log->bios_event_log != NULL) { pr_err("%s: ERROR - Eventlog already initialized\n", __func__); return -EFAULT; } - np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,vtpm"); + np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "vtpm"); if (!np) { pr_err("%s: ERROR - IBMVTPM not supported\n", __func__); return -ENODEV; @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log) log->bios_event_log_end = log->bios_event_log + *sizep; - memcpy(log->bios_event_log, __va(be64_to_cpup(basep)), *sizep); + memcpy(log->bios_event_log, __va(*basep), *sizep); return 0; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c index 6ca9b5d78144..692a2c6ae036 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ppi.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ tpm_eval_dsm(acpi_handle ppi_handle, int func, acpi_object_type type, static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_version(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", chip->ppi_version); } @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_request(struct device *dev, { ssize_t size = -EINVAL; union acpi_object *obj; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); obj = tpm_eval_dsm(chip->acpi_dev_handle, TPM_PPI_FN_GETREQ, ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE, NULL); @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_store_ppi_request(struct device *dev, int func = TPM_PPI_FN_SUBREQ; union acpi_object *obj, tmp; union acpi_object argv4 = ACPI_INIT_DSM_ARGV4(1, &tmp); - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); /* * the function to submit TPM operation request to pre-os environment @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_transition_action(struct device *dev, .buffer.length = 0, .buffer.pointer = NULL }; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); static char *info[] = { "None", @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_response(struct device *dev, acpi_status status = -EINVAL; union acpi_object *obj, *ret_obj; u64 req, res; - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); obj = tpm_eval_dsm(chip->acpi_dev_handle, TPM_PPI_FN_GETRSP, ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE, NULL); @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_tcg_operations(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); return show_ppi_operations(chip->acpi_dev_handle, buf, 0, PPI_TPM_REQ_MAX); @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_show_ppi_vs_operations(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev); + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); return show_ppi_operations(chip->acpi_dev_handle, buf, PPI_VS_REQ_START, PPI_VS_REQ_END); @@ -334,17 +334,16 @@ static struct attribute_group ppi_attr_grp = { .attrs = ppi_attrs }; -int tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) +void tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { union acpi_object *obj; - int rc; if (!chip->acpi_dev_handle) - return 0; + return; if (!acpi_check_dsm(chip->acpi_dev_handle, tpm_ppi_uuid, TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID, 1 << TPM_PPI_FN_VERSION)) - return 0; + return; /* Cache PPI version string. */ obj = acpi_evaluate_dsm_typed(chip->acpi_dev_handle, tpm_ppi_uuid, @@ -356,16 +355,5 @@ int tpm_add_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) ACPI_FREE(obj); } - rc = sysfs_create_group(&chip->pdev->kobj, &ppi_attr_grp); - - if (!rc) - chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_PPI; - - return rc; -} - -void tpm_remove_ppi(struct tpm_chip *chip) -{ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_PPI) - sysfs_remove_group(&chip->pdev->kobj, &ppi_attr_grp); + chip->groups[chip->groups_cnt++] = &ppi_attr_grp; } diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c index f2dffa770b8e..696ef1d56b4f 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation - * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2014, 2015 Intel Corporation * * Authors: * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/wait.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/freezer.h> +#include <acpi/actbl2.h> #include "tpm.h" enum tis_access { @@ -65,6 +66,17 @@ enum tis_defaults { TIS_LONG_TIMEOUT = 2000, /* 2 sec */ }; +struct tpm_info { + unsigned long start; + unsigned long len; + unsigned int irq; +}; + +static struct tpm_info tis_default_info = { + .start = TIS_MEM_BASE, + .len = TIS_MEM_LEN, + .irq = 0, +}; /* Some timeout values are needed before it is known whether the chip is * TPM 1.0 or TPM 2.0. @@ -91,26 +103,54 @@ struct priv_data { }; #if defined(CONFIG_PNP) && defined(CONFIG_ACPI) -static int is_itpm(struct pnp_dev *dev) +static int has_hid(struct acpi_device *dev, const char *hid) { - struct acpi_device *acpi = pnp_acpi_device(dev); struct acpi_hardware_id *id; - if (!acpi) - return 0; - - list_for_each_entry(id, &acpi->pnp.ids, list) { - if (!strcmp("INTC0102", id->id)) + list_for_each_entry(id, &dev->pnp.ids, list) + if (!strcmp(hid, id->id)) return 1; - } return 0; } + +static inline int is_itpm(struct acpi_device *dev) +{ + return has_hid(dev, "INTC0102"); +} + +static inline int is_fifo(struct acpi_device *dev) +{ + struct acpi_table_tpm2 *tbl; + acpi_status st; + + /* TPM 1.2 FIFO */ + if (!has_hid(dev, "MSFT0101")) + return 1; + + st = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1, + (struct acpi_table_header **) &tbl); + if (ACPI_FAILURE(st)) { + dev_err(&dev->dev, "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n"); + return 0; + } + + if (le32_to_cpu(tbl->start_method) != TPM2_START_FIFO) + return 0; + + /* TPM 2.0 FIFO */ + return 1; +} #else -static inline int is_itpm(struct pnp_dev *dev) +static inline int is_itpm(struct acpi_device *dev) { return 0; } + +static inline int is_fifo(struct acpi_device *dev) +{ + return 1; +} #endif /* Before we attempt to access the TPM we must see that the valid bit is set. @@ -600,9 +640,8 @@ static void tpm_tis_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip) release_locality(chip, chip->vendor.locality, 1); } -static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle, - resource_size_t start, resource_size_t len, - unsigned int irq) +static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, struct tpm_info *tpm_info, + acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle) { u32 vendor, intfcaps, intmask; int rc, i, irq_s, irq_e, probe; @@ -622,7 +661,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle, chip->acpi_dev_handle = acpi_dev_handle; #endif - chip->vendor.iobase = devm_ioremap(dev, start, len); + chip->vendor.iobase = devm_ioremap(dev, tpm_info->start, tpm_info->len); if (!chip->vendor.iobase) return -EIO; @@ -707,7 +746,7 @@ static int tpm_tis_init(struct device *dev, acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle, chip->vendor.iobase + TPM_INT_ENABLE(chip->vendor.locality)); if (interrupts) - chip->vendor.irq = irq; + chip->vendor.irq = tpm_info->irq; if (interrupts && !chip->vendor.irq) { irq_s = ioread8(chip->vendor.iobase + @@ -890,27 +929,27 @@ static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(tpm_tis_pm, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_tis_resume); static int tpm_tis_pnp_init(struct pnp_dev *pnp_dev, const struct pnp_device_id *pnp_id) { - resource_size_t start, len; - unsigned int irq = 0; + struct tpm_info tpm_info = tis_default_info; acpi_handle acpi_dev_handle = NULL; - start = pnp_mem_start(pnp_dev, 0); - len = pnp_mem_len(pnp_dev, 0); + tpm_info.start = pnp_mem_start(pnp_dev, 0); + tpm_info.len = pnp_mem_len(pnp_dev, 0); if (pnp_irq_valid(pnp_dev, 0)) - irq = pnp_irq(pnp_dev, 0); + tpm_info.irq = pnp_irq(pnp_dev, 0); else interrupts = false; - if (is_itpm(pnp_dev)) - itpm = true; - #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI - if (pnp_acpi_device(pnp_dev)) + if (pnp_acpi_device(pnp_dev)) { + if (is_itpm(pnp_acpi_device(pnp_dev))) + itpm = true; + acpi_dev_handle = pnp_acpi_device(pnp_dev)->handle; + } #endif - return tpm_tis_init(&pnp_dev->dev, acpi_dev_handle, start, len, irq); + return tpm_tis_init(&pnp_dev->dev, &tpm_info, acpi_dev_handle); } static struct pnp_device_id tpm_pnp_tbl[] = { @@ -930,6 +969,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(pnp, tpm_pnp_tbl); static void tpm_tis_pnp_remove(struct pnp_dev *dev) { struct tpm_chip *chip = pnp_get_drvdata(dev); + tpm_chip_unregister(chip); tpm_tis_remove(chip); } @@ -950,6 +990,79 @@ module_param_string(hid, tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id, MODULE_PARM_DESC(hid, "Set additional specific HID for this driver to probe"); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI +static int tpm_check_resource(struct acpi_resource *ares, void *data) +{ + struct tpm_info *tpm_info = (struct tpm_info *) data; + struct resource res; + + if (acpi_dev_resource_interrupt(ares, 0, &res)) { + tpm_info->irq = res.start; + } else if (acpi_dev_resource_memory(ares, &res)) { + tpm_info->start = res.start; + tpm_info->len = resource_size(&res); + } + + return 1; +} + +static int tpm_tis_acpi_init(struct acpi_device *acpi_dev) +{ + struct list_head resources; + struct tpm_info tpm_info = tis_default_info; + int ret; + + if (!is_fifo(acpi_dev)) + return -ENODEV; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resources); + ret = acpi_dev_get_resources(acpi_dev, &resources, tpm_check_resource, + &tpm_info); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&resources); + + if (!tpm_info.irq) + interrupts = false; + + if (is_itpm(acpi_dev)) + itpm = true; + + return tpm_tis_init(&acpi_dev->dev, &tpm_info, acpi_dev->handle); +} + +static int tpm_tis_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *dev) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(&dev->dev); + + tpm_chip_unregister(chip); + tpm_tis_remove(chip); + + return 0; +} + +static struct acpi_device_id tpm_acpi_tbl[] = { + {"MSFT0101", 0}, /* TPM 2.0 */ + /* Add new here */ + {"", 0}, /* User Specified */ + {"", 0} /* Terminator */ +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, tpm_acpi_tbl); + +static struct acpi_driver tis_acpi_driver = { + .name = "tpm_tis", + .ids = tpm_acpi_tbl, + .ops = { + .add = tpm_tis_acpi_init, + .remove = tpm_tis_acpi_remove, + }, + .drv = { + .pm = &tpm_tis_pm, + }, +}; +#endif + static struct platform_driver tis_drv = { .driver = { .name = "tpm_tis", @@ -966,9 +1079,25 @@ static int __init init_tis(void) { int rc; #ifdef CONFIG_PNP - if (!force) - return pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver); + if (!force) { + rc = pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver); + if (rc) + return rc; + } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI + if (!force) { + rc = acpi_bus_register_driver(&tis_acpi_driver); + if (rc) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PNP + pnp_unregister_driver(&tis_pnp_driver); #endif + return rc; + } + } +#endif + if (!force) + return 0; rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv); if (rc < 0) @@ -978,7 +1107,7 @@ static int __init init_tis(void) rc = PTR_ERR(pdev); goto err_dev; } - rc = tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, NULL, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0); + rc = tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, &tis_default_info, NULL); if (rc) goto err_init; return 0; @@ -992,9 +1121,14 @@ err_dev: static void __exit cleanup_tis(void) { struct tpm_chip *chip; -#ifdef CONFIG_PNP +#if defined(CONFIG_PNP) || defined(CONFIG_ACPI) if (!force) { +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI + acpi_bus_unregister_driver(&tis_acpi_driver); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PNP pnp_unregister_driver(&tis_pnp_driver); +#endif return; } #endif diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c index f4cf200b3c76..6908080e9b6d 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) goto error; /* attach the data */ - key->payload.data = payload; + key->payload.data[0] = payload; ret = 0; error: @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ error: static void cifs_spnego_key_destroy(struct key *key) { - kfree(key->payload.data); + kfree(key->payload.data[0]); } @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ cifs_get_spnego_key(struct cifs_ses *sesInfo) #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2 if (cifsFYI && !IS_ERR(spnego_key)) { - struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg = spnego_key->payload.data; + struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0]; cifs_dump_mem("SPNEGO reply blob:", msg->data, min(1024U, msg->secblob_len + msg->sesskey_len)); } diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c index 1ea780bc6376..3f93125916bf 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c @@ -58,16 +58,15 @@ cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * dereference payload.data! */ if (prep->datalen <= sizeof(key->payload)) { - key->payload.value = 0; - memcpy(&key->payload.value, prep->data, prep->datalen); - key->datalen = prep->datalen; - return 0; + key->payload.data[0] = NULL; + memcpy(&key->payload, prep->data, prep->datalen); + } else { + payload = kmemdup(prep->data, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!payload) + return -ENOMEM; + key->payload.data[0] = payload; } - payload = kmemdup(prep->data, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!payload) - return -ENOMEM; - key->payload.data = payload; key->datalen = prep->datalen; return 0; } @@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ static inline void cifs_idmap_key_destroy(struct key *key) { if (key->datalen > sizeof(key->payload)) - kfree(key->payload.data); + kfree(key->payload.data[0]); } static struct key_type cifs_idmap_key_type = { @@ -233,8 +232,8 @@ id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct cifs_sid *ssid) * it could be. */ ksid = sidkey->datalen <= sizeof(sidkey->payload) ? - (struct cifs_sid *)&sidkey->payload.value : - (struct cifs_sid *)sidkey->payload.data; + (struct cifs_sid *)&sidkey->payload : + (struct cifs_sid *)sidkey->payload.data[0]; ksid_size = CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + (ksid->num_subauth * sizeof(__le32)); if (ksid_size > sidkey->datalen) { @@ -307,14 +306,14 @@ sid_to_id(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct cifs_sid *psid, if (sidtype == SIDOWNER) { kuid_t uid; uid_t id; - memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.value, sizeof(uid_t)); + memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.data[0], sizeof(uid_t)); uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, id); if (uid_valid(uid)) fuid = uid; } else { kgid_t gid; gid_t id; - memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.value, sizeof(gid_t)); + memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.data[0], sizeof(gid_t)); gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, id); if (gid_valid(gid)) fgid = gid; diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index 773f4dc77630..3f2228570d44 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -2325,13 +2325,14 @@ static int cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) { int rc = 0; - char *desc, *delim, *payload; + const char *delim, *payload; + char *desc; ssize_t len; struct key *key; struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server; struct sockaddr_in *sa; struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6; - struct user_key_payload *upayload; + const struct user_key_payload *upayload; desc = kmalloc(CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!desc) @@ -2374,14 +2375,14 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses) } down_read(&key->sem); - upayload = key->payload.data; + upayload = user_key_payload(key); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upayload)) { rc = upayload ? PTR_ERR(upayload) : -EINVAL; goto out_key_put; } /* find first : in payload */ - payload = (char *)upayload->data; + payload = upayload->data; delim = strnchr(payload, upayload->datalen, ':'); cifs_dbg(FYI, "payload=%s\n", payload); if (!delim) { diff --git a/fs/cifs/sess.c b/fs/cifs/sess.c index bce6fdcd5d48..59727e32ed0f 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/sess.c +++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c @@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data) goto out; } - msg = spnego_key->payload.data; + msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0]; /* * check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is * sending us a response in an expected form diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c index 597a417ba94d..61276929d139 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c @@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate: goto ssetup_exit; } - msg = spnego_key->payload.data; + msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0]; /* * check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is * sending us a response in an expected form diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h index 5ba029e627cc..7b39260c7bba 100644 --- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(struct key *key) { if (key->type == &key_type_encrypted) return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *) - (&((struct encrypted_key_payload *)key->payload.data)->payload_data); + (&((struct encrypted_key_payload *)key->payload.data[0])->payload_data); else return NULL; } @@ -117,8 +117,7 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key) auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(key); if (!auth_tok) - return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *) - (((struct user_key_payload *)key->payload.data)->data); + return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)user_key_payload(key)->data; else return auth_tok; } diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c index 1d510c11b100..5c52c79dea46 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c +++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) struct key *keyring_key = NULL; struct ext4_encryption_key *master_key; struct ext4_encryption_context ctx; - struct user_key_payload *ukp; + const struct user_key_payload *ukp; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); struct crypto_ablkcipher *ctfm; const char *cipher_str; @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ retry: } crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key; BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon); - ukp = ((struct user_key_payload *)keyring_key->payload.data); + ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key); if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_key)) { res = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c index 9f77de2ef317..5de2d866a25c 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) struct key *keyring_key = NULL; struct f2fs_encryption_key *master_key; struct f2fs_encryption_context ctx; - struct user_key_payload *ukp; + const struct user_key_payload *ukp; struct crypto_ablkcipher *ctfm; const char *cipher_str; char raw_key[F2FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE]; @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ retry: } crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key; BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon); - ukp = ((struct user_key_payload *)keyring_key->payload.data); + ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key); if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct f2fs_encryption_key)) { res = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/fs/fscache/object-list.c b/fs/fscache/object-list.c index 51dde817e1f2..6b028b7c4250 100644 --- a/fs/fscache/object-list.c +++ b/fs/fscache/object-list.c @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations fscache_objlist_ops = { static void fscache_objlist_config(struct fscache_objlist_data *data) { #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - struct user_key_payload *confkey; + const struct user_key_payload *confkey; unsigned long config; struct key *key; const char *buf; @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static void fscache_objlist_config(struct fscache_objlist_data *data) config = 0; rcu_read_lock(); - confkey = key->payload.data; + confkey = user_key_payload(key); buf = confkey->data; for (len = confkey->datalen - 1; len >= 0; len--) { diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c index 2e4902203c35..5ba22c6b0ffa 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static ssize_t nfs_idmap_get_key(const char *name, size_t namelen, { const struct cred *saved_cred; struct key *rkey; - struct user_key_payload *payload; + const struct user_key_payload *payload; ssize_t ret; saved_cred = override_creds(id_resolver_cache); @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static ssize_t nfs_idmap_get_key(const char *name, size_t namelen, if (ret < 0) goto out_up; - payload = rcu_dereference(rkey->payload.rcudata); + payload = user_key_payload(rkey); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(payload)) { ret = PTR_ERR(payload); goto out_up; diff --git a/fs/sysfs/group.c b/fs/sysfs/group.c index 39a019936768..e1236594fffe 100644 --- a/fs/sysfs/group.c +++ b/fs/sysfs/group.c @@ -352,3 +352,47 @@ void sysfs_remove_link_from_group(struct kobject *kobj, const char *group_name, } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sysfs_remove_link_from_group); + +/** + * __compat_only_sysfs_link_entry_to_kobj - add a symlink to a kobject pointing + * to a group or an attribute + * @kobj: The kobject containing the group. + * @target_kobj: The target kobject. + * @target_name: The name of the target group or attribute. + */ +int __compat_only_sysfs_link_entry_to_kobj(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobject *target_kobj, + const char *target_name) +{ + struct kernfs_node *target; + struct kernfs_node *entry; + struct kernfs_node *link; + + /* + * We don't own @target_kobj and it may be removed at any time. + * Synchronize using sysfs_symlink_target_lock. See sysfs_remove_dir() + * for details. + */ + spin_lock(&sysfs_symlink_target_lock); + target = target_kobj->sd; + if (target) + kernfs_get(target); + spin_unlock(&sysfs_symlink_target_lock); + if (!target) + return -ENOENT; + + entry = kernfs_find_and_get(target_kobj->sd, target_name); + if (!entry) { + kernfs_put(target); + return -ENOENT; + } + + link = kernfs_create_link(kobj->sd, target_name, entry); + if (IS_ERR(link) && PTR_ERR(link) == -EEXIST) + sysfs_warn_dup(kobj->sd, target_name); + + kernfs_put(entry); + kernfs_put(target); + return IS_ERR(link) ? PTR_ERR(link) : 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__compat_only_sysfs_link_entry_to_kobj); diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h index 067c242b1e15..cc2516df0efa 100644 --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H #include <linux/mpi.h> -#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> enum pkey_algo { diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h index 4b840e822209..4915d40d3c3c 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype { static inline struct asymmetric_key_subtype *asymmetric_key_subtype(const struct key *key) { - return key->type_data.p[0]; + return key->payload.data[asym_subtype]; } #endif /* _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h index c0754abb2f56..59c1df9cf922 100644 --- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h @@ -19,6 +19,16 @@ extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric; /* + * The key payload is four words. The asymmetric-type key uses them as + * follows: + */ +enum asymmetric_payload_bits { + asym_crypto, + asym_subtype, + asym_key_ids, +}; + +/* * Identifiers for an asymmetric key ID. We have three ways of looking up a * key derived from an X.509 certificate: * @@ -58,6 +68,11 @@ extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1, size_t len_1, const void *val_2, size_t len_2); +static inline +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key) +{ + return key->payload.data[asym_key_ids]; +} /* * The payload is at the discretion of the subtype. diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 56f82e5c9975..f91ecd9d1bb1 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/tpm.h> #define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 -#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 320 +#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 +#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 struct trusted_key_payload { struct rcu_head rcu; @@ -26,6 +28,16 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE]; }; +struct trusted_key_options { + uint16_t keytype; + uint32_t keyhandle; + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; + int pcrlock; +}; + extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; #endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h index cebefb069c44..c56fef40f53e 100644 --- a/include/keys/user-type.h +++ b/include/keys/user-type.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS + /*****************************************************************************/ /* * the payload for a key of type "user" or "logon" @@ -46,5 +48,11 @@ extern void user_describe(const struct key *user, struct seq_file *m); extern long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); +static inline const struct user_key_payload *user_key_payload(const struct key *key) +{ + return (struct user_key_payload *)rcu_dereference_key(key); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ #endif /* _KEYS_USER_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index ff9f1d394235..7463355a198b 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ struct key_construction { */ struct key_preparsed_payload { char *description; /* Proposed key description (or NULL) */ - void *type_data[2]; /* Private key-type data */ - void *payload[2]; /* Proposed payload */ + union key_payload payload; /* Proposed payload */ const void *data; /* Raw data */ size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */ size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */ diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index e1d4715f3222..66f705243985 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ struct keyring_index_key { size_t desc_len; }; +union key_payload { + void __rcu *rcu_data0; + void *data[4]; +}; + /*****************************************************************************/ /* * key reference with possession attribute handling @@ -186,28 +191,18 @@ struct key { }; }; - /* type specific data - * - this is used by the keyring type to index the name - */ - union { - struct list_head link; - unsigned long x[2]; - void *p[2]; - int reject_error; - } type_data; - /* key data * - this is used to hold the data actually used in cryptography or * whatever */ union { - union { - unsigned long value; - void __rcu *rcudata; - void *data; - void *data2[2]; - } payload; - struct assoc_array keys; + union key_payload payload; + struct { + /* Keyring bits */ + struct list_head name_link; + struct assoc_array keys; + }; + int reject_error; }; }; @@ -336,12 +331,12 @@ static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key) } #define rcu_dereference_key(KEY) \ - (rcu_dereference_protected((KEY)->payload.rcudata, \ + (rcu_dereference_protected((KEY)->payload.rcu_data0, \ rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)(KEY))->sem))) #define rcu_assign_keypointer(KEY, PAYLOAD) \ do { \ - rcu_assign_pointer((KEY)->payload.rcudata, (PAYLOAD)); \ + rcu_assign_pointer((KEY)->payload.rcu_data0, (PAYLOAD)); \ } while (0) #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL diff --git a/include/linux/sysfs.h b/include/linux/sysfs.h index 9f65758311a4..ea090eaf468c 100644 --- a/include/linux/sysfs.h +++ b/include/linux/sysfs.h @@ -268,6 +268,9 @@ int sysfs_add_link_to_group(struct kobject *kobj, const char *group_name, struct kobject *target, const char *link_name); void sysfs_remove_link_from_group(struct kobject *kobj, const char *group_name, const char *link_name); +int __compat_only_sysfs_link_entry_to_kobj(struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobject *target_kobj, + const char *target_name); void sysfs_notify(struct kobject *kobj, const char *dir, const char *attr); @@ -451,6 +454,14 @@ static inline void sysfs_remove_link_from_group(struct kobject *kobj, { } +static inline int __compat_only_sysfs_link_entry_to_kobj( + struct kobject *kobj, + struct kobject *target_kobj, + const char *target_name) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline void sysfs_notify(struct kobject *kobj, const char *dir, const char *attr) { diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 8350c538b486..706e63eea080 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ #define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF struct tpm_chip; +struct trusted_key_payload; +struct trusted_key_options; struct tpm_class_ops { const u8 req_complete_mask; @@ -46,11 +48,22 @@ struct tpm_class_ops { #if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) || defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM_MODULE) +extern int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num); extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf); extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash); extern int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen); extern int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max); +extern int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); +extern int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options); #else +static inline int tpm_is_tpm2(u32 chip_num) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} static inline int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf) { return -ENODEV; } @@ -63,5 +76,18 @@ static inline int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen) { static inline int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *data, size_t max) { return -ENODEV; } + +static inline int tpm_seal_trusted(u32 chip_num, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} +static inline int tpm_unseal_trusted(u32 chip_num, + struct trusted_key_payload *payload, + struct trusted_key_options *options) +{ + return -ENODEV; +} #endif #endif diff --git a/kernel/.gitignore b/kernel/.gitignore index 790d83c7d160..b3097bde4e9c 100644 --- a/kernel/.gitignore +++ b/kernel/.gitignore @@ -5,4 +5,3 @@ config_data.h config_data.gz timeconst.h hz.bc -x509_certificate_list diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c index bd62f5cda746..6528a79d998d 100644 --- a/kernel/module_signing.c +++ b/kernel/module_signing.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ */ #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "module-internal.h" diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c index ae05ea393fc8..07be6c1ef4e2 100644 --- a/lib/digsig.c +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -79,12 +79,13 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, unsigned char *out1 = NULL; const char *m; MPI in = NULL, res = NULL, pkey[2]; - uint8_t *p, *datap, *endp; - struct user_key_payload *ukp; + uint8_t *p, *datap; + const uint8_t *endp; + const struct user_key_payload *ukp; struct pubkey_hdr *pkh; down_read(&key->sem); - ukp = key->payload.data; + ukp = user_key_payload(key); if (ukp->datalen < sizeof(*pkh)) goto err1; diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c index 54a00d66509e..78f098a20796 100644 --- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c +++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static int get_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *dst, const char *name) { goto out; } - ckey = ukey->payload.data; + ckey = ukey->payload.data[0]; err = ceph_crypto_key_clone(dst, ckey); if (err) goto out_key; diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c index 4440edcce0d6..42e8649c6e79 100644 --- a/net/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (ret < 0) goto err_ckey; - prep->payload[0] = ckey; + prep->payload.data[0] = ckey; prep->quotalen = datalen; return 0; @@ -549,14 +549,14 @@ err: static void ceph_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload[0]; + struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload.data[0]; ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey); kfree(ckey); } static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data; + struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data[0]; ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey); kfree(ckey); diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index 31cd4fd75486..c79b85eb4d4c 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) goto bad_option_value; kdebug("dns error no. = %lu", derrno); - prep->type_data[0] = ERR_PTR(-derrno); + prep->payload.data[dns_key_error] = ERR_PTR(-derrno); continue; } @@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* don't cache the result if we're caching an error saying there's no * result */ - if (prep->type_data[0]) { - kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->type_data[0])); + if (prep->payload.data[dns_key_error]) { + kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->payload.data[dns_key_error])); return 0; } @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) memcpy(upayload->data, data, result_len); upayload->data[result_len] = '\0'; - prep->payload[0] = upayload; + prep->payload.data[dns_key_data] = upayload; kleave(" = 0"); return 0; } @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); - kfree(prep->payload[0]); + kfree(prep->payload.data[dns_key_data]); } /* @@ -223,10 +223,10 @@ static int dns_resolver_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data) */ static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { - int err = key->type_data.x[0]; - seq_puts(m, key->description); if (key_is_instantiated(key)) { + int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]); + if (err) seq_printf(m, ": %d", err); else @@ -241,8 +241,10 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - if (key->type_data.x[0]) - return key->type_data.x[0]; + int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]); + + if (err) + return err; return user_read(key, buffer, buflen); } diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c index 39d2c39bdf87..4677b6fa6dda 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen, const char *options, char **_result, time_t *_expiry) { struct key *rkey; - struct user_key_payload *upayload; + const struct user_key_payload *upayload; const struct cred *saved_cred; size_t typelen, desclen; char *desc, *cp; @@ -137,12 +137,11 @@ int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen, goto put; /* If the DNS server gave an error, return that to the caller */ - ret = rkey->type_data.x[0]; + ret = PTR_ERR(rkey->payload.data[dns_key_error]); if (ret) goto put; - upayload = rcu_dereference_protected(rkey->payload.data, - lockdep_is_held(&rkey->sem)); + upayload = user_key_payload(rkey); len = upayload->datalen; ret = -ENOMEM; diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/internal.h b/net/dns_resolver/internal.h index 7af1ed39c009..0c570d40e4d6 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/internal.h +++ b/net/dns_resolver/internal.h @@ -23,6 +23,14 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> /* + * Layout of key payload words. + */ +enum { + dns_key_data, + dns_key_error, +}; + +/* * dns_key.c */ extern const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c index 25d60ed15284..1f8a144a5dc2 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c @@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_kernel_begin_call(struct socket *sock, if (!key) key = rx->key; - if (key && !key->payload.data) + if (key && !key->payload.data[0]) key = NULL; /* a no-security key */ bundle = rxrpc_get_bundle(rx, trans, key, service_id, gfp); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c index db0f39f5ef96..da3cc09f683e 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c @@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, token->kad->ticket[6], token->kad->ticket[7]); /* count the number of tokens attached */ - prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1); + prep->payload.data[1] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->payload.data[1] + 1); /* attach the data */ - for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0]; + for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload.data[0]; *pptoken; pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next) continue; @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep, goto inval; /* attach the payload */ - for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0]; + for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload.data[0]; *pptoken; pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next) continue; @@ -764,10 +764,10 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) memcpy(&token->kad->ticket, v1->ticket, v1->ticket_length); /* count the number of tokens attached */ - prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1); + prep->payload.data[1] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->payload.data[1] + 1); /* attach the data */ - pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0]; + pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload.data[0]; while (*pp) pp = &(*pp)->next; *pp = token; @@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_token_list(struct rxrpc_key_token *token) */ static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload[0]); + rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload.data[0]); } /* @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (prep->datalen != 8) return -EINVAL; - memcpy(&prep->type_data, prep->data, 8); + memcpy(&prep->payload.data[2], prep->data, 8); ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(ci)) { @@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0) BUG(); - prep->payload[0] = ci; + prep->payload.data[0] = ci; _leave(" = 0"); return 0; } @@ -852,8 +852,8 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) */ static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - if (prep->payload[0]) - crypto_free_blkcipher(prep->payload[0]); + if (prep->payload.data[0]) + crypto_free_blkcipher(prep->payload.data[0]); } /* @@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) */ static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *key) { - rxrpc_free_token_list(key->payload.data); + rxrpc_free_token_list(key->payload.data[0]); } /* @@ -869,9 +869,9 @@ static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *key) */ static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *key) { - if (key->payload.data) { - crypto_free_blkcipher(key->payload.data); - key->payload.data = NULL; + if (key->payload.data[0]) { + crypto_free_blkcipher(key->payload.data[0]); + key->payload.data[0] = NULL; } } @@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, size += 1 * 4; /* token count */ ntoks = 0; - for (token = key->payload.data; token; token = token->next) { + for (token = key->payload.data[0]; token; token = token->next) { toksize = 4; /* sec index */ switch (token->security_index) { @@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, ENCODE(ntoks); tok = 0; - for (token = key->payload.data; token; token = token->next) { + for (token = key->payload.data[0]; token; token = token->next) { toksize = toksizes[tok++]; ENCODE(toksize); oldxdr = xdr; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c index c0042807bfc6..a40d3afe93b7 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int rxrpc_client_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_transport *trans, service_id = htons(srx->srx_service); } key = rx->key; - if (key && !rx->key->payload.data) + if (key && !rx->key->payload.data[0]) key = NULL; bundle = rxrpc_get_bundle(rx, trans, key, service_id, GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c index 49b3cc31ee1f..8334474eb26c 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c @@ -137,9 +137,9 @@ int rxrpc_init_client_conn_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) if (ret < 0) return ret; - if (!key->payload.data) + token = key->payload.data[0]; + if (!token) return -EKEYREJECTED; - token = key->payload.data; sec = rxrpc_security_lookup(token->security_index); if (!sec) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index f226709ebd8f..d7a9ab5a9d9c 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int rxkad_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) _enter("{%d},{%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->key)); - token = conn->key->payload.data; + token = conn->key->payload.data[0]; conn->security_ix = token->security_index; ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(fcrypt)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static void rxkad_prime_packet_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) if (!conn->key) return; - token = conn->key->payload.data; + token = conn->key->payload.data[0]; memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv)); desc.tfm = conn->cipher; @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call, rxkhdr.checksum = 0; /* encrypt from the session key */ - token = call->conn->key->payload.data; + token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0]; memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv)); desc.tfm = call->conn->cipher; desc.info = iv.x; @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call, skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len); /* decrypt from the session key */ - token = call->conn->key->payload.data; + token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0]; memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv)); desc.tfm = call->conn->cipher; desc.info = iv.x; @@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, if (conn->security_level < min_level) goto protocol_error; - token = conn->key->payload.data; + token = conn->key->payload.data[0]; /* build the response packet */ memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp)); @@ -848,12 +848,12 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, } } - ASSERT(conn->server_key->payload.data != NULL); + ASSERT(conn->server_key->payload.data[0] != NULL); ASSERTCMP((unsigned long) ticket & 7UL, ==, 0); - memcpy(&iv, &conn->server_key->type_data, sizeof(iv)); + memcpy(&iv, &conn->server_key->payload.data[2], sizeof(iv)); - desc.tfm = conn->server_key->payload.data; + desc.tfm = conn->server_key->payload.data[0]; desc.info = iv.x; desc.flags = 0; diff --git a/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl b/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..faac6f2e377f --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl -w +# +# extract-mod-sig <part> <module-file> +# +# Reads the module file and writes out some or all of the signature +# section to stdout. Part is the bit to be written and is one of: +# +# -0: The unsigned module, no signature data at all +# -a: All of the signature data, including magic number +# -d: Just the descriptor values as a sequence of numbers +# -n: Just the signer's name +# -k: Just the key ID +# -s: Just the crypto signature or PKCS#7 message +# +use strict; + +die "Format: $0 -[0adnks] module-file >out\n" + if ($#ARGV != 1); + +my $part = $ARGV[0]; +my $modfile = $ARGV[1]; + +my $magic_number = "~Module signature appended~\n"; + +# +# Read the module contents +# +open FD, "<$modfile" || die $modfile; +binmode(FD); +my @st = stat(FD); +die "$modfile" unless (@st); +my $buf = ""; +my $len = sysread(FD, $buf, $st[7]); +die "$modfile" unless (defined($len)); +die "Short read on $modfile\n" unless ($len == $st[7]); +close(FD) || die $modfile; + +print STDERR "Read ", $len, " bytes from module file\n"; + +die "The file is too short to have a sig magic number and descriptor\n" + if ($len < 12 + length($magic_number)); + +# +# Check for the magic number and extract the information block +# +my $p = $len - length($magic_number); +my $raw_magic = substr($buf, $p); + +die "Magic number not found at $len\n" + if ($raw_magic ne $magic_number); +print STDERR "Found magic number at $len\n"; + +$p -= 12; +my $raw_info = substr($buf, $p, 12); + +my @info = unpack("CCCCCxxxN", $raw_info); +my ($algo, $hash, $id_type, $name_len, $kid_len, $sig_len) = @info; + +if ($id_type == 0) { + print STDERR "Found PGP key identifier\n"; +} elsif ($id_type == 1) { + print STDERR "Found X.509 cert identifier\n"; +} elsif ($id_type == 2) { + print STDERR "Found PKCS#7/CMS encapsulation\n"; +} else { + print STDERR "Found unsupported identifier type $id_type\n"; +} + +# +# Extract the three pieces of info data +# +die "Insufficient name+kid+sig data in file\n" + unless ($p >= $name_len + $kid_len + $sig_len); + +$p -= $sig_len; +my $raw_sig = substr($buf, $p, $sig_len); +$p -= $kid_len; +my $raw_kid = substr($buf, $p, $kid_len); +$p -= $name_len; +my $raw_name = substr($buf, $p, $name_len); + +my $module_len = $p; + +if ($sig_len > 0) { + print STDERR "Found $sig_len bytes of signature ["; + my $n = $sig_len > 16 ? 16 : $sig_len; + foreach my $i (unpack("C" x $n, substr($raw_sig, 0, $n))) { + printf STDERR "%02x", $i; + } + print STDERR "]\n"; +} + +if ($kid_len > 0) { + print STDERR "Found $kid_len bytes of key identifier ["; + my $n = $kid_len > 16 ? 16 : $kid_len; + foreach my $i (unpack("C" x $n, substr($raw_kid, 0, $n))) { + printf STDERR "%02x", $i; + } + print STDERR "]\n"; +} + +if ($name_len > 0) { + print STDERR "Found $name_len bytes of signer's name [$raw_name]\n"; +} + +# +# Produce the requested output +# +if ($part eq "-0") { + # The unsigned module, no signature data at all + binmode(STDOUT); + print substr($buf, 0, $module_len); +} elsif ($part eq "-a") { + # All of the signature data, including magic number + binmode(STDOUT); + print substr($buf, $module_len); +} elsif ($part eq "-d") { + # Just the descriptor values as a sequence of numbers + print join(" ", @info), "\n"; +} elsif ($part eq "-n") { + # Just the signer's name + print STDERR "No signer's name for PKCS#7 message type sig\n" + if ($id_type == 2); + binmode(STDOUT); + print $raw_name; +} elsif ($part eq "-k") { + # Just the key identifier + print STDERR "No key ID for PKCS#7 message type sig\n" + if ($id_type == 2); + binmode(STDOUT); + print $raw_kid; +} elsif ($part eq "-s") { + # Just the crypto signature or PKCS#7 message + binmode(STDOUT); + print $raw_sig; +} diff --git a/scripts/extract-sys-certs.pl b/scripts/extract-sys-certs.pl new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..d476e7d1fd88 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/extract-sys-certs.pl @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +#!/usr/bin/perl -w +# +use strict; +use Math::BigInt; +use Fcntl "SEEK_SET"; + +die "Format: $0 [-s <systemmap-file>] <vmlinux-file> <keyring-file>\n" + if ($#ARGV != 1 && $#ARGV != 3 || + $#ARGV == 3 && $ARGV[0] ne "-s"); + +my $sysmap = ""; +if ($#ARGV == 3) { + shift; + $sysmap = $ARGV[0]; + shift; +} + +my $vmlinux = $ARGV[0]; +my $keyring = $ARGV[1]; + +# +# Parse the vmlinux section table +# +open FD, "objdump -h $vmlinux |" || die $vmlinux; +my @lines = <FD>; +close(FD) || die $vmlinux; + +my @sections = (); + +foreach my $line (@lines) { + chomp($line); + if ($line =~ /\s*([0-9]+)\s+(\S+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+2[*][*]([0-9]+)/ + ) { + my $seg = $1; + my $name = $2; + my $len = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $3); + my $vma = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $4); + my $lma = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $5); + my $foff = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $6); + my $align = 2 ** $7; + + push @sections, { name => $name, + vma => $vma, + len => $len, + foff => $foff }; + } +} + +print "Have $#sections sections\n"; + +# +# Try and parse the vmlinux symbol table. If the vmlinux file has been created +# from a vmlinuz file with extract-vmlinux then the symbol table will be empty. +# +open FD, "nm $vmlinux 2>/dev/null |" || die $vmlinux; +@lines = <FD>; +close(FD) || die $vmlinux; + +my %symbols = (); +my $nr_symbols = 0; + +sub parse_symbols(@) { + foreach my $line (@_) { + chomp($line); + if ($line =~ /([0-9a-f]+)\s([a-zA-Z])\s(\S+)/ + ) { + my $addr = "0x" . $1; + my $type = $2; + my $name = $3; + + $symbols{$name} = $addr; + $nr_symbols++; + } + } +} +parse_symbols(@lines); + +if ($nr_symbols == 0 && $sysmap ne "") { + print "No symbols in vmlinux, trying $sysmap\n"; + + open FD, "<$sysmap" || die $sysmap; + @lines = <FD>; + close(FD) || die $sysmap; + parse_symbols(@lines); +} + +die "No symbols available\n" + if ($nr_symbols == 0); + +print "Have $nr_symbols symbols\n"; + +die "Can't find system certificate list" + unless (exists($symbols{"__cert_list_start"}) && + exists($symbols{"__cert_list_end"})); + +my $start = Math::BigInt->new($symbols{"__cert_list_start"}); +my $end = Math::BigInt->new($symbols{"__cert_list_end"}); +my $size = $end - $start; + +printf "Have %u bytes of certs at VMA 0x%x\n", $size, $start; + +my $s = undef; +foreach my $sec (@sections) { + my $s_name = $sec->{name}; + my $s_vma = $sec->{vma}; + my $s_len = $sec->{len}; + my $s_foff = $sec->{foff}; + my $s_vend = $s_vma + $s_len; + + next unless ($start >= $s_vma); + next if ($start >= $s_vend); + + die "Cert object partially overflows section $s_name\n" + if ($end > $s_vend); + + die "Cert object in multiple sections: ", $s_name, " and ", $s->{name}, "\n" + if ($s); + $s = $sec; +} + +die "Cert object not inside a section\n" + unless ($s); + +print "Certificate list in section ", $s->{name}, "\n"; + +my $foff = $start - $s->{vma} + $s->{foff}; + +printf "Certificate list at file offset 0x%x\n", $foff; + +open FD, "<$vmlinux" || die $vmlinux; +binmode(FD); +die $vmlinux if (!defined(sysseek(FD, $foff, SEEK_SET))); +my $buf = ""; +my $len = sysread(FD, $buf, $size); +die "$vmlinux" if (!defined($len)); +die "Short read on $vmlinux\n" if ($len != $size); +close(FD) || die $vmlinux; + +open FD, ">$keyring" || die $keyring; +binmode(FD); +$len = syswrite(FD, $buf, $size); +die "$keyring" if (!defined($len)); +die "Short write on $keyring\n" if ($len != $size); +close(FD) || die $keyring; diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index d49c53960b60..232469baa94f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH bool "SHA1 hash of loaded profiles" depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR - depends on CRYPTO + select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_SHA1 default y diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 36fb6b527829..5be9ffbe90ba 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) rc, ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); if (IS_ERR(key)) { rc = PTR_ERR(key); pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n", diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 159ef3ea4130..461f8d891579 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ int evm_init_key(void) return -ENOENT; down_read(&evm_key->sem); - ekp = evm_key->payload.data; + ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0]; if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index b6adb94f6d52..907c1522ee46 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); /* + * Layout of key payload words. + */ +enum { + big_key_data, + big_key_path, + big_key_path_2nd_part, + big_key_len, +}; + +/* * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at * least as large as the data. @@ -47,7 +57,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { */ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path]; struct file *file; ssize_t written; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; @@ -60,7 +70,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* Set an arbitrary quota */ prep->quotalen = 16; - prep->type_data[1] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen; + prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen; if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { /* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data @@ -94,7 +104,8 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - prep->payload[0] = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); + prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data; + memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); } return 0; @@ -110,10 +121,10 @@ error: void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path]; path_put(path); } else { - kfree(prep->payload[0]); + kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); } } @@ -123,11 +134,12 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) */ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); - if (key_is_instantiated(key) && key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) + if (key_is_instantiated(key) && + (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) vfs_truncate(path, 0); } @@ -136,14 +148,16 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) */ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) { - if (key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; + size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; + + if (datalen) { + struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; path_put(path); path->mnt = NULL; path->dentry = NULL; } else { - kfree(key->payload.data); - key->payload.data = NULL; + kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); + key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL; } } @@ -152,12 +166,12 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) */ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { - unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1]; + size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; seq_puts(m, key->description); if (key_is_instantiated(key)) - seq_printf(m, ": %lu [%s]", + seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]", datalen, datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); } @@ -168,14 +182,14 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) */ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1]; + size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; long ret; if (!buffer || buflen < datalen) return datalen; if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; struct file *file; loff_t pos; @@ -190,7 +204,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ret = -EIO; } else { ret = datalen; - if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data, datalen) != 0) + if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], + datalen) != 0) ret = -EFAULT; } diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 7bed4ad7cd76..927db9f35ad6 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -303,10 +303,10 @@ out: * * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key. */ -static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key, +static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload; + const struct user_key_payload *upayload; struct key *ukey; ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL); @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key, goto error; down_read(&ukey->sem); - upayload = ukey->payload.data; + upayload = user_key_payload(ukey); *master_key = upayload->data; *master_keylen = upayload->datalen; error: @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key, } static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, - u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { struct key *mkey = NULL; @@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, { struct key *mkey; u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; - u8 *master_key; + const u8 *master_key; u8 *hmac; const char *hex_encoded_data; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) */ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0]; struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; char *buf; char *new_master_desc = NULL; @@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload; struct key *mkey; - u8 *master_key; + const u8 *master_key; size_t master_keylen; char derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; char *ascii_buf; @@ -957,13 +957,13 @@ out: */ static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0]; if (!epayload) return; memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen); - kfree(key->payload.data); + kfree(key->payload.data[0]); } struct key_type key_type_encrypted = { diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h index 8136a2d44c63..47802c0de735 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) || \ (defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_MODULE) && defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS_MODULE)) extern struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, - u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen); + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen); #else static inline struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, - u8 **master_key, + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c index 013f7e5d3a2f..b5b4812dbc87 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace. */ struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, - u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload; struct key *tkey; @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, goto error; down_read(&tkey->sem); - tpayload = tkey->payload.data; + tpayload = tkey->payload.data[0]; *master_key = tpayload->key; *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len; error: diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index aee2ec5a18fc..ab7997ded725 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->index_key.desc_len = desclen; key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!key->description) + if (!key->index_key.description) goto no_memory_3; atomic_set(&key->usage, 1); @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - key->type_data.reject_error = -error; + key->reject_error = -error; smp_wmb(); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); @@ -1046,14 +1046,14 @@ int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen); if (ret == 0) { - key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0]; - key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1]; - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]); - key->payload.data2[1] = prep->payload[1]; - prep->type_data[0] = NULL; - prep->type_data[1] = NULL; - prep->payload[0] = NULL; - prep->payload[1] = NULL; + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]); + key->payload.data[1] = prep->payload.data[1]; + key->payload.data[2] = prep->payload.data[2]; + key->payload.data[3] = prep->payload.data[3]; + prep->payload.data[0] = NULL; + prep->payload.data[1] = NULL; + prep->payload.data[2] = NULL; + prep->payload.data[3] = NULL; } pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 0b9ec78a7a7a..fb111eafcb89 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, char type[32], *description; void *payload; long ret; - bool vm; ret = -EINVAL; if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1) @@ -98,14 +97,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ payload = NULL; - vm = false; if (_payload) { ret = -ENOMEM; payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!payload) { if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE) goto error2; - vm = true; payload = vmalloc(plen); if (!payload) goto error2; @@ -138,10 +135,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, key_ref_put(keyring_ref); error3: - if (!vm) - kfree(payload); - else - vfree(payload); + kvfree(payload); error2: kfree(description); error: @@ -1033,7 +1027,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, if (!instkey) goto error; - rka = instkey->payload.data; + rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; if (rka->target_key->serial != id) goto error; @@ -1200,7 +1194,7 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, if (!instkey) goto error; - rka = instkey->payload.data; + rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; if (rka->target_key->serial != id) goto error; diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index d33437007ad2..f931ccfeefb0 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) if (!keyring_name_hash[bucket].next) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&keyring_name_hash[bucket]); - list_add_tail(&keyring->type_data.link, + list_add_tail(&keyring->name_link, &keyring_name_hash[bucket]); write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock); @@ -387,9 +387,9 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring) if (keyring->description) { write_lock(&keyring_name_lock); - if (keyring->type_data.link.next != NULL && - !list_empty(&keyring->type_data.link)) - list_del(&keyring->type_data.link); + if (keyring->name_link.next != NULL && + !list_empty(&keyring->name_link)) + list_del(&keyring->name_link); write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock); } @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { smp_rmb(); - ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error); + ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error); kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); goto skipped; } @@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) * that's readable and that hasn't been revoked */ list_for_each_entry(keyring, &keyring_name_hash[bucket], - type_data.link + name_link ) { if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid)) continue; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 43b4cddbf2b3..a3f85d2a00bb 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) { - rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; + rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; ctx->cred = rka->cred; key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx); @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ try_again: key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); key = NULL; } else { - rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; + rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; key = rka->dest_keyring; __key_get(key); } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 0d6253124278..c7a117c9a8f3 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) if (cred->request_key_auth) { authkey = cred->request_key_auth; down_read(&authkey->sem); - rka = authkey->payload.data; + rka = authkey->payload.data[0]; if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) dest_keyring = @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) return -ERESTARTSYS; if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { smp_rmb(); - return key->type_data.reject_error; + return key->reject_error; } return key_validate(key); } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 5d672f7580dd..4f0f112fe276 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; + key->payload.data[0] = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; return 0; } @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; size_t datalen; long ret; @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, */ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) */ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) goto auth_key_revoked; - irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; + irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred); rka->pid = irka->pid; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index c0594cb07ada..903dace648a1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -862,12 +862,19 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) { struct trusted_key_options *options; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return NULL; options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL); if (options) { /* set any non-zero defaults */ options->keytype = SRK_keytype; - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + + if (!tpm2) + options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; } return options; } @@ -905,6 +912,11 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, int ret = 0; int key_cmd; size_t key_len; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -932,12 +944,20 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } + if (!options->keyhandle) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + else + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); if (ret < 0) @@ -950,7 +970,10 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } - ret = key_seal(payload, options); + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + else + ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); break; @@ -984,7 +1007,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) */ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0]; struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; struct trusted_key_options *new_o; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; @@ -1018,6 +1041,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) kfree(new_p); goto out; } + + if (!new_o->keyhandle) { + ret = -EINVAL; + kfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ new_p->migratable = p->migratable; new_p->key_len = p->key_len; @@ -1084,12 +1114,12 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, */ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p) return; memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); - kfree(key->payload.data); + kfree(key->payload.data[0]); } struct key_type key_type_trusted = { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h index 3249fbd2b653..ff001a5dcb24 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted.h @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ #define __TRUSTED_KEY_H /* implementation specific TPM constants */ -#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 #define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 @@ -36,16 +35,6 @@ enum { SRK_keytype = 4 }; -struct trusted_key_options { - uint16_t keytype; - uint32_t keyhandle; - unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; - int pcrlock; -}; - #define TPM_DEBUG 0 #if TPM_DEBUG diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 36b47bbd3d8c..28cb30f80256 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* attach the data */ prep->quotalen = datalen; - prep->payload[0] = upayload; + prep->payload.data[0] = upayload; upayload->datalen = datalen; memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); return 0; @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse); */ void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - kfree(prep->payload[0]); + kfree(prep->payload.data[0]); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse); @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (ret == 0) { /* attach the new data, displacing the old */ - zap = key->payload.data; + zap = key->payload.data[0]; rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); key->expiry = 0; } @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update); */ void user_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data; + struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0]; /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_revoke); */ void user_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data; + struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0]; kfree(upayload); } @@ -183,10 +183,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe); */ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload; + const struct user_key_payload *upayload; long ret; - upayload = rcu_dereference_key(key); + upayload = user_key_payload(key); ret = upayload->datalen; /* we can return the data as is */ diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index bca1b74a4a2f..8691e92f27e5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX range 0 1 - default 1 + default 0 help This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE 'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version" diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 26f4039d54b8..9e591e5989be 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = 1; #endif static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; +static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache; /** * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled @@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) struct file_security_struct *fsec; u32 sid = current_sid(); - fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); + fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL); if (!fsec) return -ENOMEM; @@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ static void file_free_security(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; file->f_security = NULL; - kfree(fsec); + kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec); } static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) @@ -674,10 +675,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; - rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], - strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); goto out; @@ -2617,15 +2617,12 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) { u32 sid; - size_t len; if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; - len = strlen(mount_options[i]); - rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid, - GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out_free_opts; @@ -2946,7 +2943,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) + if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) + && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)) av |= FILE__OPEN; return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); @@ -3166,7 +3164,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; - rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3238,7 +3236,7 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd * operation to an inode. */ -int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, +static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 requested, u16 cmd) { struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -6093,6 +6091,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security", + sizeof(struct file_security_struct), + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); avc_init(); security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 6a681d26bf20..223e9fd15d66 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); +int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); + int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 5bed7716f8ab..c02da25d7b63 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -731,13 +731,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -819,13 +817,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) objname = namebuf; } - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -882,13 +878,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -940,7 +934,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -1000,13 +994,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index b7df12ba61d8..ebb5eb3c318c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1218,13 +1218,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3 /* * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context. */ - sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s", + scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s", sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1), sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1), sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)); - scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + - 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + - 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)); mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp); @@ -1259,12 +1256,12 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1; if (!scontext) goto out; - scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC); + scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid], + *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!scontextp) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]); *scontext = scontextp; goto out; } @@ -1476,6 +1473,11 @@ int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0); } +int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) +{ + return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp); +} + /** * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context, * falling back to specified default if needed. @@ -2604,18 +2606,12 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values) goto err; for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { - size_t name_len; - (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state; - name_len = strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i)) + 1; rc = -ENOMEM; - (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC); + (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!(*names)[i]) goto err; - - strncpy((*names)[i], sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), name_len); - (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0; } rc = 0; out: diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index fff0c612bbb7..6c91156ae225 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct task_smack { struct smack_known *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */ struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */ + struct list_head smk_relabel; /* transit allowed labels */ }; #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */ @@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ struct smk_port_label { }; #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ -struct smack_onlycap { +struct smack_known_list_elem { struct list_head list; struct smack_known *smk_label; }; @@ -301,6 +302,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int); void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp); struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *); int smack_privileged(int cap); +void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list); /* * Shared data. diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index bc1053fb5d1d..a283f9e796c1 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock); int smack_privileged(int cap) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - struct smack_onlycap *sop; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; /* * All kernel tasks are privileged @@ -654,8 +654,8 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap) return 1; } - list_for_each_entry_rcu(sop, &smack_onlycap_list, list) { - if (sop->smk_label == skp) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sklep, &smack_onlycap_list, list) { + if (sklep->smk_label == skp) { rcu_read_unlock(); return 1; } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 996c88956438..ff81026f6ddb 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ #define SMK_SENDING 2 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING -LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); +static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); #endif static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache; int smack_enabled; @@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task, tsp->smk_task = task; tsp->smk_forked = forked; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel); mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock); return tsp; @@ -361,6 +362,35 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, } /** + * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list + * @nhead: new rules header pointer + * @ohead: old rules header pointer + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation + * + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error + */ +static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep; + struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead); + + list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) { + nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp); + if (nklep == NULL) { + smk_destroy_label_list(nhead); + return -ENOMEM; + } + nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label; + list_add(&nklep->list, nhead); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_* * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_* * @@ -1922,6 +1952,8 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) return; cred->security = NULL; + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) { rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list); list_del(&rp->list); @@ -1953,6 +1985,11 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, if (rc != 0) return rc; + rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel, + gfp); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + new->security = new_tsp; return 0; } @@ -3354,6 +3391,9 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) */ isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current(); break; + case PIPEFS_MAGIC: + isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current(); + break; default: isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; break; @@ -3549,9 +3589,11 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { - struct task_smack *tsp; + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); struct cred *new; struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; + int rc; /* * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous @@ -3560,7 +3602,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (p != current) return -EPERM; - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel)) return -EPERM; if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) @@ -3579,12 +3621,27 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (skp == &smack_known_web) return -EPERM; + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + rc = -EPERM; + list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list) + if (sklep->smk_label == skp) { + rc = 0; + break; + } + if (rc) + return rc; + } + new = prepare_creds(); if (new == NULL) return -ENOMEM; tsp = new->security; tsp->smk_task = skp; + /* + * process can change its label only once + */ + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); commit_creds(new); return size; @@ -4708,8 +4765,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) if (!security_module_enable("smack")) return 0; - smack_enabled = 1; - smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0); if (!smack_inode_cache) return -ENOMEM; @@ -4721,6 +4776,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) return -ENOMEM; } + smack_enabled = 1; + pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n"); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n"); diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index c20b154a33f2..94bd9e41c9ec 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum smk_inos { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) SMK_NET6ADDR = 23, /* single label IPv6 hosts */ #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + SMK_RELABEL_SELF = 24, /* relabel possible without CAP_MAC_ADMIN */ }; /* @@ -1501,8 +1502,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, */ if (smack[0] != '-') { skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0); - if (skp == NULL) { - rc = -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); goto free_out; } } else { @@ -1914,10 +1915,10 @@ static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; - struct smack_onlycap *sop = - list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_onlycap, list); + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep = + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list); - seq_puts(s, sop->smk_label->smk_known); + seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known); seq_putc(s, ' '); return 0; @@ -1974,6 +1975,54 @@ static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public, } /** + * smk_parse_label_list - parse list of Smack labels, separated by spaces + * + * @data: the string to parse + * @private: destination list + * + * Returns zero on success or error code, as appropriate + */ +static int smk_parse_label_list(char *data, struct list_head *list) +{ + char *tok; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; + + while ((tok = strsep(&data, " ")) != NULL) { + if (!*tok) + continue; + + skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + + sklep = kzalloc(sizeof(*sklep), GFP_KERNEL); + if (sklep == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + sklep->smk_label = skp; + list_add(&sklep->list, list); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smk_destroy_label_list - destroy a list of smack_known_list_elem + * @head: header pointer of the list to destroy + */ +void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list) +{ + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep2; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(sklep, sklep2, list, list) + kfree(sklep); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(list); +} + +/** * smk_write_onlycap - write() for smackfs/onlycap * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from @@ -1986,13 +2035,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char *data; - char *data_parse; - char *tok; - struct smack_known *skp; - struct smack_onlycap *sop; - struct smack_onlycap *sop2; LIST_HEAD(list_tmp); - int rc = count; + int rc; if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; @@ -2006,26 +2050,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, return -EFAULT; } - data_parse = data; - while ((tok = strsep(&data_parse, " ")) != NULL) { - if (!*tok) - continue; - - skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0); - if (IS_ERR(skp)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(skp); - break; - } - - sop = kzalloc(sizeof(*sop), GFP_KERNEL); - if (sop == NULL) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - break; - } - - sop->smk_label = skp; - list_add_rcu(&sop->list, &list_tmp); - } + rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp); kfree(data); /* @@ -2038,17 +2063,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors. * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt. */ - if (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp)) - rc = count; - - if (rc >= 0) { + if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) { mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock); smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp); mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock); + rc = count; } - list_for_each_entry_safe(sop, sop2, &list_tmp, list) - kfree(sop); + smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp); return rc; } @@ -2698,6 +2720,113 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = { .llseek = default_llseek, }; +/* + * Seq_file read operations for /smack/relabel-self + */ + +static void *relabel_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + + return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel); +} + +static void *relabel_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + + return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel); +} + +static int relabel_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) +{ + struct list_head *list = v; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep = + list_entry(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list); + + seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known); + seq_putc(s, ' '); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations relabel_self_seq_ops = { + .start = relabel_self_seq_start, + .next = relabel_self_seq_next, + .show = relabel_self_seq_show, + .stop = smk_seq_stop, +}; + +/** + * smk_open_relabel_self - open() for /smack/relabel-self + * @inode: inode structure representing file + * @file: "relabel-self" file pointer + * + * Connect our relabel_self_seq_* operations with /smack/relabel-self + * file_operations + */ +static int smk_open_relabel_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &relabel_self_seq_ops); +} + +/** + * smk_write_relabel_self - write() for /smack/relabel-self + * @file: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to get the data from + * @count: bytes sent + * @ppos: where to start - must be 0 + * + */ +static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + char *data; + int rc; + LIST_HEAD(list_tmp); + + /* + * Must have privilege. + */ + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + /* + * Enough data must be present. + */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (data == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + kfree(data); + return -EFAULT; + } + + rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp); + kfree(data); + + if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) { + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); + list_splice(&list_tmp, &tsp->smk_relabel); + return count; + } + + smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp); + return rc; +} + +static const struct file_operations smk_relabel_self_ops = { + .open = smk_open_relabel_self, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .write = smk_write_relabel_self, + .release = seq_release, +}; /** * smk_read_ptrace - read() for /smack/ptrace @@ -2824,6 +2953,9 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) [SMK_NET6ADDR] = { "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + [SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = { + "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, + S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, /* last one */ {""} }; @@ -2892,7 +3024,7 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) int err; int rc; - if (!security_module_enable("smack")) + if (smack_enabled == 0) return 0; err = smk_init_sysfs(); |