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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/Kconfig42
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm.h5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c29
4 files changed, 65 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index d35b4915b00d..d606f3d12d6b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -12,15 +12,41 @@ config EVM
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-config EVM_HMAC_VERSION
- int "EVM HMAC version"
+if EVM
+
+menu "EVM options"
+
+config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+ bool "FSUUID (version 2)"
+ default y
depends on EVM
- default 2
help
- This options adds EVM HMAC version support.
- 1 - original version
- 2 - add per filesystem unique identifier (UUID) (default)
+ Include filesystem UUID for HMAC calculation.
+
+ Default value is 'selected', which is former version 2.
+ if 'not selected', it is former version 1
- WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
+ WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
- labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+ labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+config EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
+ bool "Additional SMACK xattrs"
+ depends on EVM && SECURITY_SMACK
+ default n
+ help
+ Include additional SMACK xattrs for HMAC calculation.
+
+ In addition to the original security xattrs (eg. security.selinux,
+ security.SMACK64, security.capability, and security.ima) included
+ in the HMAC calculation, enabling this option includes newly defined
+ Smack xattrs: security.SMACK64EXEC, security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE and
+ security.SMACK64MMAP.
+
+ WARNING: changing the HMAC calculation method or adding
+ additional info to the calculation, requires existing EVM
+ labeled file systems to be relabeled.
+
+endmenu
+
+endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 37c88ddb3cfe..88bfe77efa1c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
extern int evm_initialized;
extern char *evm_hmac;
extern char *evm_hash;
-extern int evm_hmac_version;
+
+#define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001
+
+extern int evm_hmac_attrs;
extern struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 6b540f1822e0..5e9687f02e1b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
- if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
+ if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID)
crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 6e0bd933b6a9..3bcb80df4d01 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
};
char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
char *evm_hash = "sha1";
-int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
+int evm_hmac_attrs;
char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS
+ XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC,
+ XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+ XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP,
+#endif
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
XATTR_NAME_IMA,
@@ -57,6 +62,14 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
}
__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
+static void __init evm_init_config(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID
+ evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID;
+#endif
+ pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs);
+}
+
static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -287,12 +300,20 @@ out:
* @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value
* @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length
*
- * Updating 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that
- * the current value is valid.
+ * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated,
+ * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have
+ * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent
+ * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires
+ * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges.
*/
int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
+ const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
+
+ if ((strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0)
+ && (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC))
+ return -EPERM;
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
}
@@ -432,6 +453,8 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
{
int error;
+ evm_init_config();
+
error = evm_init_secfs();
if (error < 0) {
pr_info("Error registering secfs\n");