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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c4565
1 files changed, 4565 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a2cc75b3948
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4565 @@
+/*
+ * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
+ *
+ * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
+ * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
+ * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/config.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/unistd.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <net/icmp.h>
+#include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
+#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/quota.h>
+#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
+#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netif.h"
+
+#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
+
+extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
+extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+int selinux_enforcing = 0;
+
+static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
+{
+ selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
+int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+
+static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+ selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
+#endif
+
+/* Original (dummy) security module. */
+static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
+
+/* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
+ just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
+ The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
+ module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
+static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
+
+/* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
+ before the policy was loaded. */
+static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
+
+/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
+
+static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
+ tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ tsec->task = task;
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ task->security = tsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
+
+ if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ task->security = NULL;
+ kfree(tsec);
+}
+
+static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!isec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
+ init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
+ isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ isec->inode = inode;
+ isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
+ if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
+ else
+ isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ inode->i_security = isec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+ if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
+ list_del_init(&isec->list);
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+
+ inode->i_security = NULL;
+ kfree(isec);
+}
+
+static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+ fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!fsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
+ fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ fsec->file = file;
+ if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
+ fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
+ } else {
+ fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ }
+ file->f_security = fsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+
+ if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+ kfree(fsec);
+}
+
+static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+ sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sbsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
+ init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
+ spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ sbsec->sb = sb;
+ sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+ sb->s_security = sbsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+ if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+ if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
+ list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
+ spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
+ kfree(sbsec);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+
+ if (family != PF_UNIX)
+ return 0;
+
+ ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
+ if (!ssec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
+ ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ ssec->sk = sk;
+ ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sk->sk_security = ssec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ sk->sk_security = NULL;
+ kfree(ssec);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+/* The security server must be initialized before
+ any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
+extern int ss_initialized;
+
+/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
+
+static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
+ "uses xattr",
+ "uses transition SIDs",
+ "uses task SIDs",
+ "uses genfs_contexts",
+ "not configured for labeling",
+ "uses mountpoint labeling",
+};
+
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
+
+static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_context = 1,
+ Opt_fscontext = 2,
+ Opt_defcontext = 4,
+};
+
+static match_table_t tokens = {
+ {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
+ {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
+ {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
+};
+
+#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
+
+static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+ char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
+ const char *name;
+ u32 sid;
+ int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+ if (!data)
+ goto out;
+
+ name = sb->s_type->name;
+
+ if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
+
+ /* NFS we understand. */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
+ struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
+
+ if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (d->context[0]) {
+ context = d->context;
+ seen |= Opt_context;
+ }
+ } else
+ goto out;
+
+ } else {
+ /* Standard string-based options. */
+ char *p, *options = data;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
+ int token;
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+ if (!*p)
+ continue;
+
+ token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_context:
+ if (seen) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!context) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (!alloc)
+ alloc = 1;
+ seen |= Opt_context;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_fscontext:
+ if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!context) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (!alloc)
+ alloc = 1;
+ seen |= Opt_fscontext;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_defcontext:
+ if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
+ "defcontext option is invalid "
+ "for this filesystem type\n");
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!defcontext) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (!alloc)
+ alloc = 1;
+ seen |= Opt_defcontext;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
+ "option\n");
+ goto out_free;
+
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!seen)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (context) {
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ sbsec->sid = sid;
+
+ if (seen & Opt_context)
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+ }
+
+ if (defcontext) {
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ sbsec->def_sid = sid;
+ }
+
+out_free:
+ if (alloc) {
+ kfree(context);
+ kfree(defcontext);
+ }
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+ struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ down(&sbsec->sem);
+ if (sbsec->initialized)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized) {
+ /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+ after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+ server is ready to handle calls. */
+ spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+ if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
+ list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
+ spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
+ rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
+ /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
+ error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
+ the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
+ the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
+ assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
+ if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+ "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+ rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
+ if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+ "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+ else
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+ "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
+ sb->s_type->name, -rc);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
+ sbsec->proc = 1;
+
+ sbsec->initialized = 1;
+
+ if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
+ }
+ else {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
+ sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
+ labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the root inode. */
+ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
+
+ /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
+ inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
+ during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
+ populates itself. */
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+next_inode:
+ if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec =
+ list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
+ struct inode_security_struct, list);
+ struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ inode = igrab(inode);
+ if (inode) {
+ if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
+ inode_doinit(inode);
+ iput(inode);
+ }
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ list_del_init(&isec->list);
+ goto next_inode;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+out:
+ up(&sbsec->sem);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
+{
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFSOCK:
+ return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
+ case S_IFLNK:
+ return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
+ case S_IFREG:
+ return SECCLASS_FILE;
+ case S_IFBLK:
+ return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
+ case S_IFDIR:
+ return SECCLASS_DIR;
+ case S_IFCHR:
+ return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
+ case S_IFIFO:
+ return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
+
+ }
+
+ return SECCLASS_FILE;
+}
+
+static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
+{
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_UNIX:
+ switch (type) {
+ case SOCK_STREAM:
+ case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
+ return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
+ case SOCK_DGRAM:
+ return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PF_INET:
+ case PF_INET6:
+ switch (type) {
+ case SOCK_STREAM:
+ return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
+ case SOCK_DGRAM:
+ return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
+ case SOCK_RAW:
+ return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PF_NETLINK:
+ switch (protocol) {
+ case NETLINK_ROUTE:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_TCPDIAG:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_NFLOG:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_XFRM:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_SELINUX:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_AUDIT:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
+ default:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
+ }
+ case PF_PACKET:
+ return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
+ case PF_KEY:
+ return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
+ }
+
+ return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ int buflen, rc;
+ char *buffer, *path, *end;
+
+ buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
+ end = buffer+buflen;
+ *--end = '\0';
+ buflen--;
+ path = end-1;
+ *path = '/';
+ while (de && de != de->parent) {
+ buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
+ if (buflen < 0)
+ break;
+ end -= de->namelen;
+ memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
+ *--end = '/';
+ path = end;
+ de = de->parent;
+ }
+ rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
+ free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
+ return rc;
+}
+#else
+static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
+static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
+{
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ u32 sid;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
+ char *context = NULL;
+ unsigned len = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int hold_sem = 0;
+
+ if (isec->initialized)
+ goto out;
+
+ down(&isec->sem);
+ hold_sem = 1;
+ if (isec->initialized)
+ goto out;
+
+ sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+ /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
+ after the initial policy is loaded and the security
+ server is ready to handle calls. */
+ spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ if (list_empty(&isec->list))
+ list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
+ spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch (sbsec->behavior) {
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
+ if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
+ isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
+ Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
+ if (opt_dentry) {
+ /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
+ dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
+ } else {
+ /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ }
+ if (!dentry) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
+ "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
+ inode->i_ino);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
+ context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!context) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ context, len);
+ if (rc == -ERANGE) {
+ /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ NULL, 0);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+ len = rc;
+ context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!context) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dput(dentry);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
+ XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ context, len);
+ }
+ dput(dentry);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc != -ENODATA) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
+ "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ kfree(context);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
+ sid = sbsec->def_sid;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(context, rc, &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
+ "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ kfree(context);
+ /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(context);
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
+ isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
+ break;
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
+ /* Default to the fs SID. */
+ isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+ /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
+ sbsec->sid,
+ isec->sclass,
+ &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Default to the fs SID. */
+ isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
+
+ if (sbsec->proc) {
+ struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
+ if (proci->pde) {
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
+ isec->sclass,
+ &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ isec->initialized = 1;
+
+out:
+ if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+
+ if (hold_sem)
+ up(&isec->sem);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
+{
+ u32 perm = 0;
+
+ switch (sig) {
+ case SIGCHLD:
+ /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
+ break;
+ case SIGKILL:
+ /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
+ break;
+ case SIGSTOP:
+ /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* All other signals. */
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return perm;
+}
+
+/* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
+ fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
+static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
+ struct task_struct *tsk2,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
+
+ tsec1 = tsk1->security;
+ tsec2 = tsk2->security;
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
+static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ int cap)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ tsec = tsk->security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
+ ad.tsk = tsk;
+ ad.u.cap = cap;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
+static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = tsk->security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+ SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
+ The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
+ data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
+static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ u32 perms,
+ struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ tsec = tsk->security;
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ if (!adp) {
+ adp = &ad;
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
+ }
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+}
+
+/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
+ the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
+ pathname if needed. */
+static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ u32 av)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+ return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
+ access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
+ descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
+ check a particular permission to the file.
+ Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
+ has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
+ access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
+ where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
+static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct file *file,
+ u32 av)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+ if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FD,
+ FD__USE,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
+ if (av)
+ return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
+static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ u32 newsid;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ dsec = dir->i_security;
+ sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+ } else {
+ rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+#define MAY_LINK 0
+#define MAY_UNLINK 1
+#define MAY_RMDIR 2
+
+/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
+static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int kind)
+
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 av;
+ int rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ dsec = dir->i_security;
+ isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+ av = DIR__SEARCH;
+ av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ switch (kind) {
+ case MAY_LINK:
+ av = FILE__LINK;
+ break;
+ case MAY_UNLINK:
+ av = FILE__UNLINK;
+ break;
+ case MAY_RMDIR:
+ av = DIR__RMDIR;
+ break;
+ default:
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 av;
+ int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
+ int rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
+ old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+ old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
+ new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+ DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
+ old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
+ old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
+ av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
+ if (new_dentry->d_inode)
+ av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
+ new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+ new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
+ new_isec->sclass,
+ (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
+static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct super_block *sb,
+ u32 perms,
+ struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+
+ tsec = tsk->security;
+ sbsec = sb->s_security;
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ perms, ad);
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
+ if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+ av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+ if (mask & MAY_READ)
+ av |= FILE__READ;
+
+ if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
+ av |= FILE__APPEND;
+ else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+ } else {
+ if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
+ av |= DIR__SEARCH;
+ if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
+ av |= DIR__WRITE;
+ if (mask & MAY_READ)
+ av |= DIR__READ;
+ }
+
+ return av;
+}
+
+/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
+static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
+{
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+ av |= FILE__READ;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
+ av |= FILE__APPEND;
+ else
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+ }
+
+ return av;
+}
+
+/* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
+static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+ if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+ /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ down(&isec->sem);
+ isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = 1;
+ up(&isec->sem);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Set the security attributes on a newly created file. */
+static int post_create(struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ u32 newsid;
+ char *context;
+ unsigned int len;
+ int rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ dsec = dir->i_security;
+ sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
+
+ inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ if (!inode) {
+ /* Some file system types (e.g. NFS) may not instantiate
+ a dentry for all create operations (e.g. symlink),
+ so we have to check to see if the inode is non-NULL. */
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: no inode, dir (dev=%s, "
+ "ino=%ld)\n", dir->i_sb->s_id, dir->i_ino);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ newsid = tsec->create_sid;
+ } else {
+ rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: "
+ "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
+ "ino=%ld)\n",
+ -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: inode_security_set_sid "
+ "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
+ -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
+ inode->i_op->setxattr) {
+ /* Use extended attributes. */
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &len);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: sid_to_context "
+ "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
+ -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ down(&inode->i_sem);
+ rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry,
+ XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
+ context, len, 0);
+ up(&inode->i_sem);
+ kfree(context);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: setxattr failed, "
+ "rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
+ -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Hook functions begin here. */
+
+static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
+ struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
+ /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
+ if (!rc)
+ csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
+}
+
+static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+ u32 av;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 tsid;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+
+ rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
+ SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
+ tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
+ }
+
+ /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
+ * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
+ if(op == 001) {
+ error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
+ SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
+ } else {
+ av = 0;
+ if (op & 004)
+ av |= FILE__READ;
+ if (op & 002)
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+ if (av)
+ error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
+ SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!sb)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (cmds) {
+ case Q_SYNC:
+ case Q_QUOTAON:
+ case Q_QUOTAOFF:
+ case Q_SETINFO:
+ case Q_SETQUOTA:
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
+ sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
+ break;
+ case Q_GETFMT:
+ case Q_GETINFO:
+ case Q_GETQUOTA:
+ rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
+ sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_syslog(int type)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
+ case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
+ rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
+ break;
+ case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
+ case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
+ case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
+ rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
+ break;
+ case 0: /* Close log */
+ case 1: /* Open log */
+ case 2: /* Read from log */
+ case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
+ case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
+ default:
+ rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
+ * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
+ * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
+ *
+ * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
+ * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
+ * the capability is granted.
+ *
+ * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
+ * processes that allocate mappings.
+ */
+static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
+{
+ int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
+ NULL);
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ cap_sys_admin = 1;
+
+ return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
+}
+
+/* binprm security operations */
+
+static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+
+ bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
+ bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ bsec->bprm = bprm;
+ bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ bsec->set = 0;
+
+ bprm->security = bsec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+ u32 newsid;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ bsec = bprm->security;
+
+ if (bsec->set)
+ return 0;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ /* Default to the current task SID. */
+ bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
+
+ /* Reset create SID on execve. */
+ tsec->create_sid = 0;
+
+ if (tsec->exec_sid) {
+ newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
+ /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
+ tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
+ rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+ ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
+
+ if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+ newsid = tsec->sid;
+
+ if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ } else {
+ /* Check permissions for the transition. */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
+ current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+ /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
+ bsec->sid = newsid;
+ }
+
+ bsec->set = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+}
+
+
+static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ int atsecure = 0;
+
+ if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
+ /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
+ the noatsecure permission is granted between
+ the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
+ atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+}
+
+static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct bprm_security_struct *bsec = bprm->security;
+ bprm->security = NULL;
+ kfree(bsec);
+}
+
+extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
+
+/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
+static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
+{
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
+ struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
+ long j = -1;
+
+ if (tty) {
+ file_list_lock();
+ file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
+ if (file) {
+ /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
+ Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
+ than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
+ file may belong to another process and we are only
+ interested in the inode-based check here. */
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
+ FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
+ /* Reset controlling tty. */
+ current->signal->tty = NULL;
+ current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ file_list_unlock();
+ }
+
+ /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+
+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned long set, i;
+ int fd;
+
+ j++;
+ i = j * __NFDBITS;
+ if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
+ break;
+ set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
+ if (!set)
+ continue;
+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+ for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
+ if (set & 1) {
+ file = fget(i);
+ if (!file)
+ continue;
+ if (file_has_perm(current,
+ file,
+ file_to_av(file))) {
+ sys_close(i);
+ fd = get_unused_fd();
+ if (fd != i) {
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
+ fput(file);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (devnull) {
+ atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
+ } else {
+ devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
+ if (!devnull) {
+ put_unused_fd(fd);
+ fput(file);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ fd_install(fd, devnull);
+ }
+ fput(file);
+ }
+ }
+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+}
+
+static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+ u32 sid;
+ int rc;
+
+ secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+
+ bsec = bprm->security;
+ sid = bsec->sid;
+
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
+ bsec->unsafe = 0;
+ if (tsec->sid != sid) {
+ /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
+ unchanged and kill. */
+ if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ bsec->unsafe = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+ Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
+ if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
+ NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ bsec->unsafe = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ tsec->sid = sid;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
+ */
+static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
+ struct itimerval itimer;
+ struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+ int rc, i;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ bsec = bprm->security;
+
+ if (bsec->unsafe) {
+ force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
+ return;
+
+ /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
+ flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
+
+ /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
+ from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
+ subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
+ signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
+ been updated so that any kill done after the flush
+ will be checked against the new SID. */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+ do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
+ flush_signals(current);
+ spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+ flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+ sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+ recalc_sigpending();
+ spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
+ from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
+ the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
+ task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
+ (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
+ check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
+ the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
+ than the default soft limit for cases where the default
+ is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
+ RLIMIT_STACK.*/
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
+ rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
+ initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
+ rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
+ }
+ if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
+ /*
+ * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
+ * to be refigured.
+ */
+ current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
+ recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
+ wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
+}
+
+/* superblock security operations */
+
+static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ superblock_free_security(sb);
+}
+
+static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
+{
+ if (plen > olen)
+ return 0;
+
+ return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
+{
+ return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
+ match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
+ match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
+}
+
+static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
+{
+ if (!*first) {
+ **to = ',';
+ *to += 1;
+ }
+ else
+ *first = 0;
+ memcpy(*to, from, len);
+ *to += len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
+{
+ int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
+ char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
+ char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
+
+ in_curr = orig;
+ sec_curr = copy;
+
+ /* Binary mount data: just copy */
+ if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
+ copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!nosec) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nosec_save = nosec;
+ fnosec = fsec = 1;
+ in_save = in_end = orig;
+
+ do {
+ if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
+ int len = in_end - in_curr;
+
+ if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
+ take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
+ else
+ take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
+
+ in_curr = in_end + 1;
+ }
+ } while (*in_end++);
+
+ copy_page(in_save, nosec_save);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
+ return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
+ return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
+ struct nameidata *nd,
+ char * type,
+ unsigned long flags,
+ void * data)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
+ else
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
+ FILE__MOUNTON);
+}
+
+static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
+ FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
+}
+
+/* inode security operations */
+
+static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return inode_alloc_security(inode);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ inode_free_security(inode);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+ post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
+{
+ post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ post_create(dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (!mask) {
+ /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
+ file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+ ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+ if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
+ Restrict to administrator. */
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+ ordinary setattr permission. */
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ }
+
+ sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+ FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
+ isec->sclass);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+ sbsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
+ &ad);
+}
+
+static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+ /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
+ "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ isec->sid = newsid;
+ return;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
+ if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
+ !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
+ Restrict to administrator. */
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
+ ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
+ permission for removexattr. */
+ return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
+ }
+
+ /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
+ You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ char *context;
+ unsigned len;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (!buffer || !size) {
+ kfree(context);
+ return len;
+ }
+ if (size < len) {
+ kfree(context);
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+ kfree(context);
+ return len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (!value || !size)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ isec->sid = newsid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
+{
+ const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
+ if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
+ memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/* file security operations */
+
+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+
+ if (!mask) {
+ /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
+ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
+ mask |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+ return file_has_perm(current, file,
+ file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ return file_alloc_security(file);
+}
+
+static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ file_free_security(file);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FIONREAD:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIBMAP:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIGETBSZ:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
+ break;
+
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
+ /* fall through */
+ case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
+ break;
+
+ /* sys_ioctl() checks */
+ case FIONBIO:
+ /* fall through */
+ case FIOASYNC:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+ break;
+
+ case KDSKBENT:
+ case KDSKBSENT:
+ error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
+ break;
+
+ /* default case assumes that the command will go
+ * to the file's ioctl() function.
+ */
+ default:
+ error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
+{
+#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
+ if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
+ /*
+ * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
+ * private file mapping that will also be writable.
+ * This has an additional check.
+ */
+ int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (file) {
+ /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
+ u32 av = FILE__READ;
+
+ /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
+ if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
+ av |= FILE__WRITE;
+
+ if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+ av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
+
+ return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+ prot = reqprot;
+
+ return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
+ (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+ prot = reqprot;
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
+ if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
+ /*
+ * We are making executable a file mapping that has
+ * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
+ * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
+ * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
+ */
+ int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case F_SETFL:
+ if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
+ err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* fall through */
+ case F_SETOWN:
+ case F_SETSIG:
+ case F_GETFL:
+ case F_GETOWN:
+ case F_GETSIG:
+ /* Just check FD__USE permission */
+ err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
+ break;
+ case F_GETLK:
+ case F_SETLK:
+ case F_SETLKW:
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
+ case F_GETLK64:
+ case F_SETLK64:
+ case F_SETLKW64:
+#endif
+ if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ fsec = file->f_security;
+ fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ u32 perm;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+
+ /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
+ file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
+
+ tsec = tsk->security;
+ fsec = file->f_security;
+
+ if (!signum)
+ perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
+ else
+ perm = signal_to_av(signum);
+
+ return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+}
+
+static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+ return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
+}
+
+/* task security operations */
+
+static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
+ int rc;
+
+ tsec1 = current->security;
+
+ rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ tsec2 = tsk->security;
+
+ tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
+ tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
+
+ /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
+ tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
+ tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
+
+ /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
+ This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
+ subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
+ tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ task_free_security(tsk);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
+{
+ /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
+ since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
+ identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
+ this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
+ of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
+ capable hook. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
+{
+ return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
+{
+ /* See the comment for setuid above. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
+{
+ /* See the comment for setuid above. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+ struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
+ lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
+ later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
+ upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
+ if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
+ return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
+{
+ u32 perm;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
+ (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!sig)
+ perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
+ else
+ perm = signal_to_av(sig);
+
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
+ unsigned long arg2,
+ unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4,
+ unsigned long arg5)
+{
+ /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
+ any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
+ the state of the current process. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ u32 perm;
+
+ perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
+
+ return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
+
+ tsec = p->security;
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
+ tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ return;
+}
+
+static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ isec->initialized = 1;
+ return;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
+
+ offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
+ ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+ if (ih == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
+ if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
+ goto out;
+
+ ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
+ ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ switch (ih->protocol) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
+ offset += ihlen;
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+ if (th == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+ if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+ break;
+
+ offset += ihlen;
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ if (uh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ u8 nexthdr;
+ int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
+ struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
+
+ offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
+ ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+ if (ip6 == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
+ ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
+ ret = 0;
+
+ nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+ offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+ offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr,
+ skb->tail - skb->head - offset);
+ if (offset < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (nexthdr) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP: {
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+ if (th == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case IPPROTO_UDP: {
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ if (uh == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
+ ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* includes fragments */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+ char **addrp, int *len, int src)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (ad->u.net.family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
+ if (ret || !addrp)
+ break;
+ *len = 4;
+ *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
+ &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
+ break;
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
+ if (ret || !addrp)
+ break;
+ *len = 16;
+ *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
+ &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
+ break;
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* socket security operations */
+static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
+ u32 perms)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ tsec = task->security;
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+ if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
+ goto out;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
+ err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
+ int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ if (kern)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
+ protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
+ isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
+ isec->initialized = 1;
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
+ Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
+ permission check between the socket and the port number. */
+#define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
+#define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
+
+static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ u16 family;
+ int err;
+
+ err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
+ */
+ family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+ if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
+ char *addrp;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+ unsigned short snum;
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+ if (family == PF_INET) {
+ addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
+ addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ } else {
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+ addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
+ addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+ }
+
+ if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
+ snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
+ err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
+ isec->sclass,
+ SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ switch(sk->sk_protocol) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+ if (family == PF_INET)
+ ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ else
+ ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
+ isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ int err;
+
+ err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /*
+ * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+ */
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+ if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
+ unsigned short snum;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+ addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
+ } else {
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+ }
+
+ err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
+ ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
+ TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
+
+ err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
+
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+ newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
+ newisec->sid = isec->sid;
+ newisec->initialized = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size, int flags)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+ return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *other,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int err;
+
+ err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+ other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
+ isec->sclass,
+ UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* connecting socket */
+ ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
+
+ /* server child socket */
+ ssec = newsk->sk_security;
+ ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
+ struct socket *other)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int err;
+
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+ other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
+ ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
+ isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ u16 family;
+ char *addrp;
+ int len, err = 0;
+ u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
+ u32 sock_sid = 0;
+ u16 sock_class = 0;
+ struct socket *sock;
+ struct net_device *dev;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ family = sk->sk_family;
+ if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+
+ read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ if (sock) {
+ struct inode *inode;
+ inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+ if (inode) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+ sock_sid = isec->sid;
+ sock_class = isec->sclass;
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ if (!sock_sid)
+ goto out;
+
+ dev = skb->dev;
+ if (!dev)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (sock_class) {
+ case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+ netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
+ node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
+ recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+ netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
+ node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
+ recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
+ node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+ err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
+ err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (recv_perm) {
+ u32 port_sid;
+
+ /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
+ err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
+ &port_sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
+ sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
+ }
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ char *scontext;
+ u32 scontext_len;
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+ if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+ err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+ err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (scontext_len > len) {
+ err = -ERANGE;
+ goto out_len;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+
+out_len:
+ if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+
+ kfree(scontext);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
+{
+ return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+}
+
+static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ sk_free_security(sk);
+}
+
+static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ u32 perm;
+ struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+ struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+ if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
+
+ err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == -EINVAL) {
+ audit_log(current->audit_context,
+ "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
+ " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
+ nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
+ if (!selinux_enforcing)
+ err = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore */
+ if (err == -ENOENT)
+ err = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+ struct sk_buff **pskb,
+ const struct net_device *in,
+ const struct net_device *out,
+ int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
+ u16 family)
+{
+ char *addrp;
+ int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
+ u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
+ struct sock *sk;
+ struct socket *sock;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
+
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (!sk)
+ goto out;
+
+ sock = sk->sk_socket;
+ if (!sock)
+ goto out;
+
+ inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ switch (isec->sclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
+ netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
+ node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
+ send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
+ break;
+
+ case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+ netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
+ node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
+ send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
+ node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
+ break;
+ }
+
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+ ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
+ ad.u.net.family = family;
+
+ err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
+ &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+ if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
+ netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+ if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
+ err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
+ &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+ if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
+ node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+ if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (send_perm) {
+ u32 port_sid;
+
+ /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
+ err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
+ sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol,
+ ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
+ &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+ if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
+ send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+ struct sk_buff **pskb,
+ const struct net_device *in,
+ const struct net_device *out,
+ int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+ return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
+ struct sk_buff **pskb,
+ const struct net_device *in,
+ const struct net_device *out,
+ int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
+{
+ return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
+}
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#else
+
+static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ int err;
+
+ err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+
+ avd.allowed = 0;
+ avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
+ cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
+
+ if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
+ err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
+ u16 sclass)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+
+ isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!isec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct));
+ isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ isec->sclass = sclass;
+ isec->ipc_perm = perm;
+ if (tsec) {
+ isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ } else {
+ isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ }
+ perm->security = isec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
+ if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ perm->security = NULL;
+ kfree(isec);
+}
+
+static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+
+ msec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!msec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memset(msec, 0, sizeof(struct msg_security_struct));
+ msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
+ msec->msg = msg;
+ msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ msg->security = msec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
+ if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ return;
+
+ msg->security = NULL;
+ kfree(msec);
+}
+
+static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
+ u16 sclass, u32 perms)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = ipc_perms->security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, sclass, perms, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ msg_msg_free_security(msg);
+}
+
+/* message queue security operations */
+static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
+ if (rc) {
+ ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+ int err;
+ int perms;
+
+ switch(cmd) {
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case MSG_INFO:
+ /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+ return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case MSG_STAT:
+ perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
+ break;
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ, perms);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+ msec = msg->security;
+
+ /*
+ * First time through, need to assign label to the message
+ */
+ if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
+ /*
+ * Compute new sid based on current process and
+ * message queue this message will be stored in
+ */
+ rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
+ isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSG,
+ &msec->sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+ /* Can this process write to the queue? */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+ MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
+ if (!rc)
+ /* Can this process send the message */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
+ if (!rc)
+ /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
+ rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ struct task_struct *target,
+ long type, int mode)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct msg_security_struct *msec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ tsec = target->security;
+ isec = msq->q_perm.security;
+ msec = msg->security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Shared Memory security operations */
+static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ SHM__CREATE, &ad);
+ if (rc) {
+ ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+ SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
+static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+ int perms;
+ int err;
+
+ switch(cmd) {
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case SHM_INFO:
+ /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+ return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case SHM_STAT:
+ perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ perms = SHM__SETATTR;
+ break;
+ case SHM_LOCK:
+ case SHM_UNLOCK:
+ perms = SHM__LOCK;
+ break;
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ perms = SHM__DESTROY;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM, perms);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
+ char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
+{
+ u32 perms;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
+ perms = SHM__READ;
+ else
+ perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM, perms);
+}
+
+/* Semaphore security operations */
+static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ SEM__CREATE, &ad);
+ if (rc) {
+ ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+ ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+ SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
+}
+
+/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
+static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
+{
+ int err;
+ u32 perms;
+
+ switch(cmd) {
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case SEM_INFO:
+ /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
+ return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
+ case GETPID:
+ case GETNCNT:
+ case GETZCNT:
+ perms = SEM__GETATTR;
+ break;
+ case GETVAL:
+ case GETALL:
+ perms = SEM__READ;
+ break;
+ case SETVAL:
+ case SETALL:
+ perms = SEM__WRITE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ perms = SEM__DESTROY;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ perms = SEM__SETATTR;
+ break;
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case SEM_STAT:
+ perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM, perms);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
+ struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+ u32 perms;
+
+ if (alter)
+ perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
+ else
+ perms = SEM__READ;
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM, perms);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ u16 sclass = SECCLASS_IPC;
+ u32 av = 0;
+
+ if (isec && isec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
+ sclass = isec->sclass;
+
+ av = 0;
+ if (flag & S_IRUGO)
+ av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
+ if (flag & S_IWUGO)
+ av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
+
+ if (av == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, sclass, av);
+}
+
+/* module stacking operations */
+static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
+ "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ secondary_ops = ops;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
+ __FUNCTION__,
+ name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (ops != secondary_ops) {
+ printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
+ "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ secondary_ops = original_ops;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ if (inode)
+ inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+ char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 sid, len;
+ char *context;
+ int error;
+
+ if (current != p) {
+ error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ if (!size)
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ tsec = p->security;
+
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ sid = tsec->sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+ sid = tsec->osid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ sid = tsec->exec_sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ sid = tsec->create_sid;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!sid)
+ return 0;
+
+ error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ if (len > size) {
+ kfree(context);
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ memcpy(value, context, len);
+ kfree(context);
+ return len;
+}
+
+static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+ char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+ int error;
+ char *str = value;
+
+ if (current != p) {
+ /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
+ security attributes. */
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
+ * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
+ * above restriction is ever removed.
+ */
+ if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
+ else
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
+ if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
+ if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
+ str[size-1] = 0;
+ size--;
+ }
+ error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
+ performed during the actual operation (execve,
+ open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
+ operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
+ checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
+ operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
+ tsec = p->security;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ tsec->exec_sid = sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+ struct av_decision avd;
+
+ if (sid == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+ if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
+ struct task_struct *g, *t;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ do_each_thread(g, t)
+ if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ while_each_thread(g, t);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ }
+
+ /* Check permissions for the transition. */
+ error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
+ Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+ task_lock(p);
+ if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
+ error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
+ if (!error)
+ tsec->sid = sid;
+ task_unlock(p);
+ avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+ PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ } else {
+ tsec->sid = sid;
+ task_unlock(p);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
+ .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
+ .capget = selinux_capget,
+ .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
+ .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
+ .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
+ .capable = selinux_capable,
+ .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
+ .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
+ .syslog = selinux_syslog,
+ .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
+
+ .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
+ .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
+
+ .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
+ .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
+ .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
+ .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
+ .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
+ .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
+ .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
+
+ .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
+ .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
+ .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
+ .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
+ .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
+ .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
+ .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
+
+ .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
+ .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
+ .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
+ .inode_post_create = selinux_inode_post_create,
+ .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
+ .inode_post_link = selinux_inode_post_link,
+ .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
+ .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
+ .inode_post_symlink = selinux_inode_post_symlink,
+ .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
+ .inode_post_mkdir = selinux_inode_post_mkdir,
+ .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
+ .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
+ .inode_post_mknod = selinux_inode_post_mknod,
+ .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
+ .inode_post_rename = selinux_inode_post_rename,
+ .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
+ .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
+ .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
+ .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
+ .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
+ .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
+ .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
+ .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
+ .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
+ .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
+ .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
+ .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
+ .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
+
+ .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
+ .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
+ .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
+ .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
+ .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
+ .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
+ .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
+ .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
+ .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
+ .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
+ .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
+
+ .task_create = selinux_task_create,
+ .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
+ .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
+ .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
+ .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
+ .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
+ .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
+ .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
+ .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
+ .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
+ .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
+ .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
+ .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
+ .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
+ .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
+ .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
+ .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
+ .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
+ .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
+
+ .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
+
+ .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+ .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
+
+ .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
+ .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
+ .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
+ .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
+ .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
+ .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
+
+ .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
+ .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
+ .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
+ .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
+ .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
+
+ .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
+ .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
+ .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
+ .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
+ .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
+
+ .register_security = selinux_register_security,
+ .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
+
+ .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
+
+ .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
+ .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
+ .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
+
+ .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
+ .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
+ .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
+ .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
+ .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
+ .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
+ .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
+ .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
+ .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
+ .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
+ .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
+ .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
+ .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
+ .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+ .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
+ .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
+ .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
+#endif
+};
+
+static __init int selinux_init(void)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
+
+ /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
+ if (task_alloc_security(current))
+ panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
+ tsec = current->security;
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+
+ avc_init();
+
+ original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
+ if (!secondary_ops)
+ panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
+ if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
+ panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+
+ if (selinux_enforcing) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+ } else {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_complete_init(void)
+{
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
+
+ /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+ spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+next_sb:
+ if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
+ list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
+ struct superblock_security_struct,
+ list);
+ struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
+ spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+ sb->s_count++;
+ spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+ down_read(&sb->s_umount);
+ if (sb->s_root)
+ superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
+ drop_super(sb);
+ spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
+ list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
+ goto next_sb;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
+}
+
+/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
+ all processes and objects when they are created. */
+security_initcall(selinux_init);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
+ .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .pf = PF_INET,
+ .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
+ .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .pf = PF_INET6,
+ .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
+};
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled)
+ goto out;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+ err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
+ if (err)
+ panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+ err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
+ if (err)
+ panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
+
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
+{
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+ nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+}
+#endif
+
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+int selinux_disable(void)
+{
+ extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
+ static int selinux_disabled = 0;
+
+ if (ss_initialized) {
+ /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (selinux_disabled) {
+ /* Only do this once. */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
+
+ selinux_disabled = 1;
+
+ /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
+ security_ops = secondary_ops;
+
+ /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
+ selinux_nf_ip_exit();
+
+ /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
+ exit_sel_fs();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+