diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 103 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/device_cgroup.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/process_keys.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 |
6 files changed, 110 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index d103f5a4043d..1832cf701c3d 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -267,6 +267,16 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new, new->cap_effective = *effective; new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; new->cap_permitted = *permitted; + + /* + * Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and + * inheritable. + */ + new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient, + cap_intersect(*permitted, + *inheritable)); + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) + return -EINVAL; return 0; } @@ -347,6 +357,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, /* * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) + * The addition of pA' is handled later. */ new->cap_permitted.cap[i] = (new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) | @@ -474,10 +485,13 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - bool effective, has_cap = false; + bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old))) + return -EPERM; + effective = false; ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); if (ret < 0) @@ -522,8 +536,9 @@ skip: * * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ - if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || - !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || + is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); + + if ((is_setid || !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -539,10 +554,28 @@ skip: new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; + /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */ + if (has_cap || is_setid) + cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); + + /* + * Now that we've computed pA', update pP' to give: + * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA' + */ + new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient); + + /* + * Set pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA'). Because pA' is zero if fE is set, + * this is the same as pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) | pA'. + */ if (effective) new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; else - cap_clear(new->cap_effective); + new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient; + + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) + return -EPERM; + bprm->cap_effective = effective; /* @@ -557,7 +590,7 @@ skip: * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think * that is interesting information to audit. */ - if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) { + if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { @@ -568,6 +601,10 @@ skip: } new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); + + if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) + return -EPERM; + return 0; } @@ -589,7 +626,7 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) { if (bprm->cap_effective) return 1; - if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted)) + if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_ambient)) return 1; } @@ -691,10 +728,18 @@ static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) && (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) && - !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) && - !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { - cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); - cap_clear(new->cap_effective); + !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) { + if (!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { + cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); + cap_clear(new->cap_effective); + } + + /* + * Pre-ambient programs expect setresuid to nonroot followed + * by exec to drop capabilities. We should make sure that + * this remains the case. + */ + cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); } if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) cap_clear(new->cap_effective); @@ -924,6 +969,44 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); return commit_creds(new); + case PR_CAP_AMBIENT: + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL) { + if (arg3 | arg4 | arg5) + return -EINVAL; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); + return commit_creds(new); + } + + if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET) { + return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_ambient, arg3); + } else if (arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE && + arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER) { + return -EINVAL; + } else { + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE && + (!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, arg3) || + !cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_inheritable, + arg3) || + issecure(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE))) + return -EPERM; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE) + cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3); + else + cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3); + return commit_creds(new); + } + default: /* No functionality available - continue with default */ return -ENOSYS; diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 188c1d26393b..73455089feef 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -400,9 +400,9 @@ static bool verify_new_ex(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, { bool match = false; - rcu_lockdep_assert(rcu_read_lock_held() || - lockdep_is_held(&devcgroup_mutex), - "device_cgroup:verify_new_ex called without proper synchronization"); + RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_read_lock_held() && + lockdep_is_held(&devcgroup_mutex), + "device_cgroup:verify_new_ex called without proper synchronization"); if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { if (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index e72548b5897e..d33437007ad2 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -1181,9 +1181,11 @@ void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, if (index_key->type == &key_type_keyring) up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem); - if (edit && !edit->dead_leaf) { - key_payload_reserve(keyring, - keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); + if (edit) { + if (!edit->dead_leaf) { + key_payload_reserve(keyring, + keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES); + } assoc_array_cancel_edit(edit); } up_write(&keyring->sem); diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index bd536cb221e2..43b4cddbf2b3 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork) new->cap_inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; new->cap_permitted = old->cap_permitted; new->cap_effective = old->cap_effective; + new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient; new->cap_bset = old->cap_bset; new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index e693ffcf9266..46f405ce6b0f 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -375,8 +375,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, return 0; if (!initxattrs) - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr, - NULL, NULL, NULL); + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, + dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL); memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, @@ -404,8 +404,8 @@ int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr, - name, value, len); + return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, + qstr, name, value, len); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); @@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case */ - if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) { + if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) { #ifndef CONFIG_MMU if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) { unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file); @@ -1276,7 +1276,8 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { - return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, 0, sock, skb, secid); + return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, + skb, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 55285054aa73..e4369d86e588 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, seq_puts(m, prefix); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); - seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]); + seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\"); if (has_comma) seq_putc(m, '\"'); } |