diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
26 files changed, 394 insertions, 184 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig index d49c53960b60..232469baa94f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig +++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH bool "SHA1 hash of loaded profiles" depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR - depends on CRYPTO + select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_SHA1 default y diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 36fb6b527829..5be9ffbe90ba 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) rc, ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); if (IS_ERR(key)) { rc = PTR_ERR(key); pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate (%d): %s\n", diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 159ef3ea4130..461f8d891579 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ int evm_init_key(void) return -ENOENT; down_read(&evm_key->sem); - ekp = evm_key->payload.data; + ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0]; if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index e24121afb2f2..6eb62936c672 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static void *ima_alloc_pages(loff_t max_size, size_t *allocated_size, { void *ptr; int order = ima_maxorder; - gfp_t gfp_mask = __GFP_WAIT | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY; + gfp_t gfp_mask = __GFP_RECLAIM | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY; if (order) order = min(get_order(max_size), order); diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index b6adb94f6d52..907c1522ee46 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -21,6 +21,16 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); /* + * Layout of key payload words. + */ +enum { + big_key_data, + big_key_path, + big_key_path_2nd_part, + big_key_len, +}; + +/* * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at * least as large as the data. @@ -47,7 +57,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { */ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path]; struct file *file; ssize_t written; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; @@ -60,7 +70,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* Set an arbitrary quota */ prep->quotalen = 16; - prep->type_data[1] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen; + prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen; if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { /* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data @@ -94,7 +104,8 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - prep->payload[0] = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); + prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data; + memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen); } return 0; @@ -110,10 +121,10 @@ error: void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path]; path_put(path); } else { - kfree(prep->payload[0]); + kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); } } @@ -123,11 +134,12 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) */ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); - if (key_is_instantiated(key) && key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) + if (key_is_instantiated(key) && + (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) vfs_truncate(path, 0); } @@ -136,14 +148,16 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) */ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) { - if (key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; + size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; + + if (datalen) { + struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; path_put(path); path->mnt = NULL; path->dentry = NULL; } else { - kfree(key->payload.data); - key->payload.data = NULL; + kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); + key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL; } } @@ -152,12 +166,12 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) */ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { - unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1]; + size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; seq_puts(m, key->description); if (key_is_instantiated(key)) - seq_printf(m, ": %lu [%s]", + seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]", datalen, datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); } @@ -168,14 +182,14 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) */ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1]; + size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; long ret; if (!buffer || buflen < datalen) return datalen; if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) { - struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2; + struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path]; struct file *file; loff_t pos; @@ -190,7 +204,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) ret = -EIO; } else { ret = datalen; - if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data, datalen) != 0) + if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], + datalen) != 0) ret = -EFAULT; } diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 7bed4ad7cd76..927db9f35ad6 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -303,10 +303,10 @@ out: * * Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key. */ -static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key, +static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload; + const struct user_key_payload *upayload; struct key *ukey; ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL); @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key, goto error; down_read(&ukey->sem); - upayload = ukey->payload.data; + upayload = user_key_payload(ukey); *master_key = upayload->data; *master_keylen = upayload->datalen; error: @@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key, } static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, - u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { struct key *mkey = NULL; @@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, { struct key *mkey; u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; - u8 *master_key; + const u8 *master_key; u8 *hmac; const char *hex_encoded_data; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) */ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0]; struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload; char *buf; char *new_master_desc = NULL; @@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload; struct key *mkey; - u8 *master_key; + const u8 *master_key; size_t master_keylen; char derived_key[HASH_SIZE]; char *ascii_buf; @@ -957,13 +957,13 @@ out: */ static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data; + struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0]; if (!epayload) return; memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen); - kfree(key->payload.data); + kfree(key->payload.data[0]); } struct key_type key_type_encrypted = { diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h index 8136a2d44c63..47802c0de735 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h @@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ #if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) || \ (defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_MODULE) && defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS_MODULE)) extern struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, - u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen); + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen); #else static inline struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, - u8 **master_key, + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c index 013f7e5d3a2f..b5b4812dbc87 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ * data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace. */ struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, - u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) + const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen) { struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload; struct key *tkey; @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc, goto error; down_read(&tkey->sem); - tpayload = tkey->payload.data; + tpayload = tkey->payload.data[0]; *master_key = tpayload->key; *master_keylen = tpayload->key_len; error: diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index aee2ec5a18fc..ab7997ded725 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->index_key.desc_len = desclen; key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!key->description) + if (!key->index_key.description) goto no_memory_3; atomic_set(&key->usage, 1); @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - key->type_data.reject_error = -error; + key->reject_error = -error; smp_wmb(); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); @@ -1046,14 +1046,14 @@ int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen); if (ret == 0) { - key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0]; - key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1]; - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]); - key->payload.data2[1] = prep->payload[1]; - prep->type_data[0] = NULL; - prep->type_data[1] = NULL; - prep->payload[0] = NULL; - prep->payload[1] = NULL; + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]); + key->payload.data[1] = prep->payload.data[1]; + key->payload.data[2] = prep->payload.data[2]; + key->payload.data[3] = prep->payload.data[3]; + prep->payload.data[0] = NULL; + prep->payload.data[1] = NULL; + prep->payload.data[2] = NULL; + prep->payload.data[3] = NULL; } pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index 0b9ec78a7a7a..fb111eafcb89 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, char type[32], *description; void *payload; long ret; - bool vm; ret = -EINVAL; if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1) @@ -98,14 +97,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ payload = NULL; - vm = false; if (_payload) { ret = -ENOMEM; payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!payload) { if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE) goto error2; - vm = true; payload = vmalloc(plen); if (!payload) goto error2; @@ -138,10 +135,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, key_ref_put(keyring_ref); error3: - if (!vm) - kfree(payload); - else - vfree(payload); + kvfree(payload); error2: kfree(description); error: @@ -1033,7 +1027,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, if (!instkey) goto error; - rka = instkey->payload.data; + rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; if (rka->target_key->serial != id) goto error; @@ -1200,7 +1194,7 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, if (!instkey) goto error; - rka = instkey->payload.data; + rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; if (rka->target_key->serial != id) goto error; diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index d33437007ad2..f931ccfeefb0 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring) if (!keyring_name_hash[bucket].next) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&keyring_name_hash[bucket]); - list_add_tail(&keyring->type_data.link, + list_add_tail(&keyring->name_link, &keyring_name_hash[bucket]); write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock); @@ -387,9 +387,9 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring) if (keyring->description) { write_lock(&keyring_name_lock); - if (keyring->type_data.link.next != NULL && - !list_empty(&keyring->type_data.link)) - list_del(&keyring->type_data.link); + if (keyring->name_link.next != NULL && + !list_empty(&keyring->name_link)) + list_del(&keyring->name_link); write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock); } @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { smp_rmb(); - ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error); + ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error); kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); goto skipped; } @@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) * that's readable and that hasn't been revoked */ list_for_each_entry(keyring, &keyring_name_hash[bucket], - type_data.link + name_link ) { if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid)) continue; diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 43b4cddbf2b3..a3f85d2a00bb 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) { - rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; + rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; ctx->cred = rka->cred; key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx); @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ try_again: key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); key = NULL; } else { - rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; + rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; key = rka->dest_keyring; __key_get(key); } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 0d6253124278..c7a117c9a8f3 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) if (cred->request_key_auth) { authkey = cred->request_key_auth; down_read(&authkey->sem); - rka = authkey->payload.data; + rka = authkey->payload.data[0]; if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags)) dest_keyring = @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) return -ERESTARTSYS; if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { smp_rmb(); - return key->type_data.reject_error; + return key->reject_error; } return key_validate(key); } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 5d672f7580dd..4f0f112fe276 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; + key->payload.data[0] = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data; return 0; } @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key, static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; size_t datalen; long ret; @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, */ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) */ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data; + struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0]; kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) goto auth_key_revoked; - irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data; + irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred); rka->pid = irka->pid; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index c0594cb07ada..903dace648a1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -862,12 +862,19 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) { struct trusted_key_options *options; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return NULL; options = kzalloc(sizeof *options, GFP_KERNEL); if (options) { /* set any non-zero defaults */ options->keytype = SRK_keytype; - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + + if (!tpm2) + options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; } return options; } @@ -905,6 +912,11 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, int ret = 0; int key_cmd; size_t key_len; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; @@ -932,12 +944,20 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, goto out; } + if (!options->keyhandle) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + else + ret = key_unseal(payload, options); dump_payload(payload); dump_options(options); if (ret < 0) @@ -950,7 +970,10 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } - ret = key_seal(payload, options); + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + else + ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); break; @@ -984,7 +1007,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) */ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0]; struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; struct trusted_key_options *new_o; size_t datalen = prep->datalen; @@ -1018,6 +1041,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) kfree(new_p); goto out; } + + if (!new_o->keyhandle) { + ret = -EINVAL; + kfree(new_p); + goto out; + } + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ new_p->migratable = p->migratable; new_p->key_len = p->key_len; @@ -1084,12 +1114,12 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, */ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data; + struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p) return; memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); - kfree(key->payload.data); + kfree(key->payload.data[0]); } struct key_type key_type_trusted = { diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h index 3249fbd2b653..ff001a5dcb24 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted.h @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ #define __TRUSTED_KEY_H /* implementation specific TPM constants */ -#define MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE 64 #define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512 #define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14 #define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36 @@ -36,16 +35,6 @@ enum { SRK_keytype = 4 }; -struct trusted_key_options { - uint16_t keytype; - uint32_t keyhandle; - unsigned char keyauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - unsigned char blobauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; - int pcrlock; -}; - #define TPM_DEBUG 0 #if TPM_DEBUG diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 36b47bbd3d8c..28cb30f80256 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* attach the data */ prep->quotalen = datalen; - prep->payload[0] = upayload; + prep->payload.data[0] = upayload; upayload->datalen = datalen; memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen); return 0; @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse); */ void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) { - kfree(prep->payload[0]); + kfree(prep->payload.data[0]); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse); @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) if (ret == 0) { /* attach the new data, displacing the old */ - zap = key->payload.data; + zap = key->payload.data[0]; rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload); key->expiry = 0; } @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update); */ void user_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data; + struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0]; /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_revoke); */ void user_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data; + struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0]; kfree(upayload); } @@ -183,10 +183,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe); */ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { - struct user_key_payload *upayload; + const struct user_key_payload *upayload; long ret; - upayload = rcu_dereference_key(key); + upayload = user_key_payload(key); ret = upayload->datalen; /* we can return the data as is */ diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index bca1b74a4a2f..8691e92f27e5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX range 0 1 - default 1 + default 0 help This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE 'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy. - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0. config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version" diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 23307da15f1d..d0cfaa9f19d0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ int selinux_enabled = 1; #endif static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; +static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache; /** * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled @@ -287,7 +288,7 @@ static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) struct file_security_struct *fsec; u32 sid = current_sid(); - fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); + fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL); if (!fsec) return -ENOMEM; @@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ static void file_free_security(struct file *file) { struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; file->f_security = NULL; - kfree(fsec); + kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec); } static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) @@ -674,10 +675,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; - rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], - strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); goto out; @@ -2617,15 +2617,12 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) { u32 sid; - size_t len; if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; - len = strlen(mount_options[i]); - rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid, - GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); goto out_free_opts; @@ -2946,7 +2943,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) + if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) + && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)) av |= FILE__OPEN; return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); @@ -3166,7 +3164,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; - rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3238,7 +3236,7 @@ static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd * operation to an inode. */ -int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, +static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, u32 requested, u16 cmd) { struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -6091,6 +6089,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security", + sizeof(struct file_security_struct), + 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); avc_init(); security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 6a681d26bf20..223e9fd15d66 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); +int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); + int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags); diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 5bed7716f8ab..c02da25d7b63 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -731,13 +731,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -819,13 +817,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) objname = namebuf; } - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -882,13 +878,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -940,7 +934,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; @@ -1000,13 +994,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid, - GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index b7df12ba61d8..ebb5eb3c318c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1218,13 +1218,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3 /* * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context. */ - sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s", + scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s", sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1), sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1), sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)); - scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + - 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + - 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)); mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp); @@ -1259,12 +1256,12 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1; if (!scontext) goto out; - scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC); + scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid], + *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!scontextp) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]); *scontext = scontextp; goto out; } @@ -1476,6 +1473,11 @@ int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0); } +int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) +{ + return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp); +} + /** * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context, * falling back to specified default if needed. @@ -2604,18 +2606,12 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values) goto err; for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { - size_t name_len; - (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state; - name_len = strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i)) + 1; rc = -ENOMEM; - (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC); + (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!(*names)[i]) goto err; - - strncpy((*names)[i], sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), name_len); - (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0; } rc = 0; out: diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index fff0c612bbb7..6c91156ae225 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ struct task_smack { struct smack_known *smk_forked; /* label when forked */ struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */ struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */ + struct list_head smk_relabel; /* transit allowed labels */ }; #define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */ @@ -169,7 +170,7 @@ struct smk_port_label { }; #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */ -struct smack_onlycap { +struct smack_known_list_elem { struct list_head list; struct smack_known *smk_label; }; @@ -301,6 +302,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int); void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp); struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *); int smack_privileged(int cap); +void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list); /* * Shared data. diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index bc1053fb5d1d..a283f9e796c1 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock); int smack_privileged(int cap) { struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - struct smack_onlycap *sop; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; /* * All kernel tasks are privileged @@ -654,8 +654,8 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap) return 1; } - list_for_each_entry_rcu(sop, &smack_onlycap_list, list) { - if (sop->smk_label == skp) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sklep, &smack_onlycap_list, list) { + if (sklep->smk_label == skp) { rcu_read_unlock(); return 1; } diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 996c88956438..ff81026f6ddb 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ #define SMK_SENDING 2 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING -LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); +static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); #endif static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache; int smack_enabled; @@ -326,6 +326,7 @@ static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task, tsp->smk_task = task; tsp->smk_forked = forked; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel); mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock); return tsp; @@ -361,6 +362,35 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, } /** + * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list + * @nhead: new rules header pointer + * @ohead: old rules header pointer + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation + * + * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error + */ +static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep; + struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead); + + list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) { + nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp); + if (nklep == NULL) { + smk_destroy_label_list(nhead); + return -ENOMEM; + } + nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label; + list_add(&nklep->list, nhead); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_* * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_* * @@ -1922,6 +1952,8 @@ static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred) return; cred->security = NULL; + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); + list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) { rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list); list_del(&rp->list); @@ -1953,6 +1985,11 @@ static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, if (rc != 0) return rc; + rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel, + gfp); + if (rc != 0) + return rc; + new->security = new_tsp; return 0; } @@ -3354,6 +3391,9 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) */ isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current(); break; + case PIPEFS_MAGIC: + isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current(); + break; default: isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; break; @@ -3549,9 +3589,11 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size) { - struct task_smack *tsp; + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); struct cred *new; struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; + int rc; /* * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous @@ -3560,7 +3602,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (p != current) return -EPERM; - if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel)) return -EPERM; if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) @@ -3579,12 +3621,27 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (skp == &smack_known_web) return -EPERM; + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { + rc = -EPERM; + list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list) + if (sklep->smk_label == skp) { + rc = 0; + break; + } + if (rc) + return rc; + } + new = prepare_creds(); if (new == NULL) return -ENOMEM; tsp = new->security; tsp->smk_task = skp; + /* + * process can change its label only once + */ + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); commit_creds(new); return size; @@ -4708,8 +4765,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) if (!security_module_enable("smack")) return 0; - smack_enabled = 1; - smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0); if (!smack_inode_cache) return -ENOMEM; @@ -4721,6 +4776,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) return -ENOMEM; } + smack_enabled = 1; + pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n"); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n"); diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index c20b154a33f2..94bd9e41c9ec 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum smk_inos { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) SMK_NET6ADDR = 23, /* single label IPv6 hosts */ #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + SMK_RELABEL_SELF = 24, /* relabel possible without CAP_MAC_ADMIN */ }; /* @@ -1501,8 +1502,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, */ if (smack[0] != '-') { skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0); - if (skp == NULL) { - rc = -EINVAL; + if (IS_ERR(skp)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(skp); goto free_out; } } else { @@ -1914,10 +1915,10 @@ static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) { struct list_head *list = v; - struct smack_onlycap *sop = - list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_onlycap, list); + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep = + list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list); - seq_puts(s, sop->smk_label->smk_known); + seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known); seq_putc(s, ' '); return 0; @@ -1974,6 +1975,54 @@ static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public, } /** + * smk_parse_label_list - parse list of Smack labels, separated by spaces + * + * @data: the string to parse + * @private: destination list + * + * Returns zero on success or error code, as appropriate + */ +static int smk_parse_label_list(char *data, struct list_head *list) +{ + char *tok; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; + + while ((tok = strsep(&data, " ")) != NULL) { + if (!*tok) + continue; + + skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0); + if (IS_ERR(skp)) + return PTR_ERR(skp); + + sklep = kzalloc(sizeof(*sklep), GFP_KERNEL); + if (sklep == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + sklep->smk_label = skp; + list_add(&sklep->list, list); + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * smk_destroy_label_list - destroy a list of smack_known_list_elem + * @head: header pointer of the list to destroy + */ +void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list) +{ + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep2; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(sklep, sklep2, list, list) + kfree(sklep); + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(list); +} + +/** * smk_write_onlycap - write() for smackfs/onlycap * @file: file pointer, not actually used * @buf: where to get the data from @@ -1986,13 +2035,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { char *data; - char *data_parse; - char *tok; - struct smack_known *skp; - struct smack_onlycap *sop; - struct smack_onlycap *sop2; LIST_HEAD(list_tmp); - int rc = count; + int rc; if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; @@ -2006,26 +2050,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, return -EFAULT; } - data_parse = data; - while ((tok = strsep(&data_parse, " ")) != NULL) { - if (!*tok) - continue; - - skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0); - if (IS_ERR(skp)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(skp); - break; - } - - sop = kzalloc(sizeof(*sop), GFP_KERNEL); - if (sop == NULL) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - break; - } - - sop->smk_label = skp; - list_add_rcu(&sop->list, &list_tmp); - } + rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp); kfree(data); /* @@ -2038,17 +2063,14 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors. * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt. */ - if (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp)) - rc = count; - - if (rc >= 0) { + if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) { mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock); smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp); mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock); + rc = count; } - list_for_each_entry_safe(sop, sop2, &list_tmp, list) - kfree(sop); + smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp); return rc; } @@ -2698,6 +2720,113 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = { .llseek = default_llseek, }; +/* + * Seq_file read operations for /smack/relabel-self + */ + +static void *relabel_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + + return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel); +} + +static void *relabel_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + + return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel); +} + +static int relabel_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v) +{ + struct list_head *list = v; + struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep = + list_entry(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list); + + seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known); + seq_putc(s, ' '); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations relabel_self_seq_ops = { + .start = relabel_self_seq_start, + .next = relabel_self_seq_next, + .show = relabel_self_seq_show, + .stop = smk_seq_stop, +}; + +/** + * smk_open_relabel_self - open() for /smack/relabel-self + * @inode: inode structure representing file + * @file: "relabel-self" file pointer + * + * Connect our relabel_self_seq_* operations with /smack/relabel-self + * file_operations + */ +static int smk_open_relabel_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &relabel_self_seq_ops); +} + +/** + * smk_write_relabel_self - write() for /smack/relabel-self + * @file: file pointer, not actually used + * @buf: where to get the data from + * @count: bytes sent + * @ppos: where to start - must be 0 + * + */ +static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); + char *data; + int rc; + LIST_HEAD(list_tmp); + + /* + * Must have privilege. + */ + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + /* + * Enough data must be present. + */ + if (*ppos != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (data == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) { + kfree(data); + return -EFAULT; + } + + rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp); + kfree(data); + + if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) { + smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel); + list_splice(&list_tmp, &tsp->smk_relabel); + return count; + } + + smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp); + return rc; +} + +static const struct file_operations smk_relabel_self_ops = { + .open = smk_open_relabel_self, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, + .write = smk_write_relabel_self, + .release = seq_release, +}; /** * smk_read_ptrace - read() for /smack/ptrace @@ -2824,6 +2953,9 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) [SMK_NET6ADDR] = { "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + [SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = { + "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, + S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, /* last one */ {""} }; @@ -2892,7 +3024,7 @@ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) int err; int rc; - if (!security_module_enable("smack")) + if (smack_enabled == 0) return 0; err = smk_init_sysfs(); |