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EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security
xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We
anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes.
This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for
the type of method.
Changelog v6:
- move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h
- defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data
(based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- removed unnecessary memset
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The
initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended
attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted
separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).
While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify
the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the
proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.
EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a
trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the
root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has
been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can
not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally
this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the
trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing
trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A
sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is
available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.
Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined
at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:
evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To
initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and
evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security
xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().
Changelog v7:
- Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation
Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review)
- fix URL in patch description
- remove evm_hmac_size definition
- use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)
- moved linux include before other includes
- test for crypto_hash_setkey failure
- fail earlier for invalid key
- clear entire encrypted key, even on failure
- check xattr name length before comparing xattr names
Changelog:
- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1
operation.
- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs
(Dmitry Kasatkin)
- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
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vfs_getxattr_alloc() and vfs_xattr_cmp() are two new kernel xattr helper
functions. vfs_getxattr_alloc() first allocates memory for the requested
xattr and then retrieves it. vfs_xattr_cmp() compares a given value with
the contents of an extended attribute.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
There should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
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This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a
filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes.
This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of
multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function
walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be
optimized to write multiple xattrs at once.
For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet
been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in
reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
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Update comments for scripts/kernel-doc and fix some of errors reported by
scripts/checkpatch.pl .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch fixes a typo.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch introduces a function for automatic probing for the Intel iTPM
STS_DATA_EXPECT flaw.
The patch splits the current tpm_tis_send function into 2 parts where the 1st
part is now called tpm_tis_send_data() and merely sends the data to the TPM.
This function is then used for probing. The new tpm_tis_send function now
first calls tpm_tis_send_data and if that succeeds has the TPM process the
command and waits until the response is there.
The probing for the Intel iTPM is only invoked if the user has not passed
itpm=1 as parameter for the module *or* if such a TPM was detected via ACPI.
Previously it was necessary to pass itpm=1 when also passing force=1 to the
module when doing a 'modprobe'. This function is more general than the ACPI
test function and the function relying on ACPI could probably be removed.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch fixes several aspects of the probing for interrupts.
This patch reads the TPM's timeouts before probing for the interrupts. The
tpm_get_timeouts() function is invoked in polling mode and gets the proper
timeouts from the TPM so that we don't need to fall back to 2 minutes timeouts
for short duration commands while the interrupt probing is happening.
This patch introduces a variable probed_irq into the vendor structure that gets
the irq number if an interrupt is received while the the tpm_gen_interrupt()
function is run in polling mode during interrupt probing. Previously some
parts of tpm_gen_interrupt() were run in polling mode, then the irq variable
was set in the interrupt handler when an interrupt was received and execution
of tpm_gen_interrupt() ended up switching over to interrupt mode.
tpm_gen_interrupt() execution ended up on an event queue where it eventually
timed out since the probing handler doesn't wake any queues.
Before calling into free_irq() clear all interrupt flags that may have
been set by the TPM. The reason is that free_irq() will call into the probing
interrupt handler and may otherwise fool us into thinking that a real interrupt
happened (because we see the flags as being set) while the TPM's interrupt line
is not even connected to anything on the motherboard. This solves a problem
on one machine I did testing on (Thinkpad T60).
If a TPM claims to use a specifc interrupt, the probing is done as well
to verify that the interrupt is actually working. If a TPM indicates
that it does not use a specific interrupt (returns '0'), probe all interrupts
from 3 to 15.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch delays the (ACPI S3) suspend while the TPM is busy processing a
command and the TPM TIS driver is run in interrupt mode. This is the same
behavior as we already have it for the TPM TIS driver in polling mode.
Reasoning: Some of the TPM's commands advance the internal state of the TPM.
An example would be the extending of one of its PCR registers. Upper layers,
such as IMA or TSS (TrouSerS), would certainly want to be sure that the
command succeeded rather than getting an error code (-62 = -ETIME) that may
not give a conclusive answer as for what reason the command failed. Reissuing
such a command would put the TPM into the wrong state, so waiting for it to
finish is really the only option.
The downside is that some commands (key creation) can take a long time and
actually prevent the machine from entering S3 at all before the 20 second
timeout of the power management subsystem arrives.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch makes sure that if the TPM TIS interface is run in interrupt mode
(rather than polling mode) that all interrupts are enabled in the TPM's
interrupt enable register after a resume from ACPI S3 suspend. The registers
may either have been cleared by the TPM loosing its state during device sleep
or by the BIOS leaving the TPM in polling mode (after sending a command to
the TPM for starting it up again)
You may want to check if your TPM runs with interrupts by doing
cat /proc/interrupts | grep -i tpm
and see whether there is an entry or otherwise for it to use interrupts:
modprobe tpm_tis interrupts=1 [add 'itpm=1' for Intel TPM ]
v2:
- the patch was adapted to work with the pnp and platform driver
implementations in tpm_tis.c
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch fixes the TPM's pubek sysfs entry that is accessible as long
as the TPM doesn't have an owner. It was necessary to shift the access to the
data by -10 -- the first byte immediately follows the 10 byte header. The
line
data = tpm_cmd.params.readpubek_out_buffer;
sets it at the offset '10' in the packet, so we can read the data array
starting at offset '0'.
Before:
Algorithm: 00 0C 00 00
Encscheme: 08 00
Sigscheme: 00 00
Parameters: 00 00 00 00 01 00 AC E2 5E 3C A0 78
Modulus length: -563306801
Modulus:
28 21 08 0F 82 CD F2 B1 E7 49 F7 74 70 BE 59 8C
43 78 B1 24 EA 52 E2 FE 52 5C 3A 12 3B DC 61 71
[...]
After:
Algorithm: 00 00 00 01
Encscheme: 00 03
Sigscheme: 00 01
Parameters: 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00
Modulus length: 256
Modulus:
AC E2 5E 3C A0 78 DE 6C 9E CF 28 21 08 0F 82 CD
F2 B1 E7 49 F7 74 70 BE 59 8C 43 78 B1 24 EA 52
[...]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Display the TPM's interface timeouts in a 'timeouts' sysfs entry. Display
the entries as having been adjusted when they were scaled due to their values
being reported in milliseconds rather than microseconds.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Adjust the interface timeouts if they are found to be too small, i.e., if
they are returned in milliseconds rather than microseconds as we heared
from Infineon that some (old) Infineon TPMs do.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The TPM driver currently discards the interface timeout values returned
from the TPM. The check of the response packet needs to consider that
the return_code field is 0 on success and the size of the expected
packet is equivalent to the header size + u32 length indicator for the
TPM_GetCapability() result + 4 interface timeout indicators of type u32.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Display the TPM's command timeouts in a 'durations' sysfs entry. Display
the entries as having been adjusted when they were scaled due to their values
being reported in milliseconds rather than microseconds.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Guillaume Chazarain <guichaz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Adjust the durations if they are found to be too small, i.e., if they are
returned in milliseconds rather than microseconds as some Infineon TPMs are
reported to do.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The TPM driver currently discards the durations values returned
from the TPM. The check of the response packet needs to consider that
the return_code field is 0 on success and the size of the expected
packet is equivalent to the header size + u32 length indicator for the
TPM_GetCapability() result + 3 timeout indicators of type u32.
v4:
- sysfs entry 'durations' is now a patch of its own
- the work-around for TPMs reporting durations in milliseconds is now in a
patch of its own
v3:
- sysfs entry now called 'durations' to resemble TPM-speak (previously
was called 'timeouts')
v2:
- adjusting all timeouts for TPM devices reporting timeouts in msec rather
than usec
- also displaying in sysfs whether the timeouts are 'original' or 'adjusted'
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Guillaume Chazarain <guichaz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajiv Andrade <srajiv@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Enable conditional ACL by passing object's pointers.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch adds support for permission checks using argv[]/envp[] of execve()
request. Hooks are in the last patch of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch adds support for permission checks using executable file's realpath
upon execve() and symlink's target upon symlink(). Hooks are in the last patch
of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch adds support for permission checks using file object's DAC
attributes (e.g. owner/group) when checking file's pathnames. Hooks for passing
file object's pointers are in the last patch of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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This patch adds support for permission checks using current thread's UID/GID
etc. in addition to pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status can be easily emulated using
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy . We can remove this interface by
updating /usr/sbin/tomoyo-setprofile utility.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Commit eadd99cc "TOMOYO: Add auditing interface." by error replaced
"struct tomoyo_request_info"->domain with tomoyo_domain().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Move keys-ecryptfs.txt to Documentation/security.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Sort by alphabetic order.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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I forgot to add #ifndef in commit 0e4ae0e0 "TOMOYO: Make several options
configurable.", resulting
security/built-in.o: In function `tomoyo_bprm_set_creds':
tomoyo.c:(.text+0x4698e): undefined reference to `tomoyo_load_policy'
error.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/apparmor-dev into next
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* 'kvm-updates/3.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86 emulator: fix %rip-relative addressing with immediate source operand
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jdelvare/staging
* 'i2c-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jdelvare/staging:
i2c/pca954x: Initialize the mux to disconnected state
i2c-taos-evm: Fix log messages
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/benh/powerpc
* 'merge' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/benh/powerpc:
arch/powerpc: use printk_ratelimited instead of printk_ratelimit
powerpc/rtas-rtc: remove sideeffects of printk_ratelimit
powerpc/pseries: remove duplicate SCSI_BNX2_ISCSI in pseries_defconfig
powerpc/e500: fix breakage with fsl_rio_mcheck_exception
powerpc/p1022ds: fix audio-related properties in the device tree
powerpc/85xx: fix NAND_CMD_READID read bytes number
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It's not so much an error as a warning about normal Marvell crazines.
So don't use KERN_ERR that ends up spamming the console even in quiet
mode, it's not _that_ critical.
Explained by Jeff:
"Long explanation, it's a mess:
Marvell took standard AHCI, and bastardized it to include a weird mode
whereby PATA devices appear inside the AHCI DMA and interrupt
infrastructure you're familiar with.
So, PATA devices appear via pata_marvell driver, using basic legacy
IDE programming interface. But SATA devices, which might also be
attached to this chip, either work in under-performing mode or
simply don't work at all (e.g. newer 6 Gbps devices or port
multiplier attachments, NCQ, ...)
On the other hand, 'ahci' driver loads and works with the chip's
attached SATA devices quite beautifully, but is completely unable to
drive any attached PATA devices, due to the Marvell-specific
PATA-under-AHCI interface.
The "masking port_map 0x7 -> 0x3" message is the ahci driver "hiding"
the PATA port(s) from itself, making sure it will only drive the SATA
ports it knows how to drive."
Acked-by: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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pca954x power-on default is channel 0 connected. If multiple pca954x
muxes are connected to the same physical I2C bus, the parent bus will
see channel 0 devices behind both muxes by default. This is bad.
Scenario:
-- pca954x @ 0x70 -- ch 0 (I2C-bus-101) -- EEPROM @ 0x50
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I2C-bus-1 ---
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-- pca954x @ 0x71 -- ch 0 (I2C-bus-111) -- EEPROM @ 0x50
1. Load I2C bus driver: creates I2C-bus-1
2. Load pca954x driver: creates virtual I2C-bus-101 and I2C-bus-111
3. Load eeprom driver
4. Try to read EEPROM @ 0x50 on I2C-bus-101. The transaction will also bleed
onto I2C-bus-111 because pca954x @ 0x71 channel 0 is connected by default.
Fix: Initialize pca954x to disconnected state in pca954x_probe()
Signed-off-by: Petri Gynther <pgynther@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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* Print all error and information messages even when debugging is
disabled.
* Don't use adapter device to log messages before it is ready.
Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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%rip-relative addressing is relative to the first byte of the next instruction,
so we need to add %rip only after we've fetched any immediate bytes.
Based on original patch by Li Xin <xin.li@intel.com>.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Li Xin <xin.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
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Since printk_ratelimit() shouldn't be used anymore (see comment in
include/linux/printk.h), replace it with printk_ratelimited.
Signed-off-by: Christian Dietrich <christian.dietrich@informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
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Don't use printk_ratelimit() as an additional condition for returning
on an error. Because when the ratelimit is reached, printk_ratelimit
will return 0 and e.g. in rtas_get_boot_time won't check for an error
condition.
Signed-off-by: Christian Dietrich <christian.dietrich@informatik.uni-erlangen.de>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
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AppArmor is masking the capabilities returned by capget against the
capabilities mask in the profile. This is wrong, in complain mode the
profile has effectively all capabilities, as the profile restrictions are
not being enforced, merely tested against to determine if an access is
known by the profile.
This can result in the wrong behavior of security conscience applications
like sshd which examine their capability set, and change their behavior
accordingly. In this case because of the masked capability set being
returned sshd fails due to DAC checks, even when the profile is in complain
mode.
Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The pointer returned from tracehook_tracer_task() is only valid inside
the rcu_read_lock. However the tracer pointer obtained is being passed
to aa_may_ptrace outside of the rcu_read_lock critical section.
Mover the aa_may_ptrace test into the rcu_read_lock critical section, to
fix this.
Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot sequence,
this patch adds support for activating access control without calling external
policy loader program. This will be useful for systems where operations which
can lead to the hijacking of the boot sequence are needed before loading the
policy. For example, you can activate immediately after loading the fixed part
of policy which will allow only operations needed for mounting a partition
which contains the variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG
check) and loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using
enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of hijacking
the boot sequence.
This patch makes several variables configurable on build time. This patch also
adds TOMOYO_loader= and TOMOYO_trigger= kernel command line option to boot the
same kernel in two different init systems (BSD-style init and systemd).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot sequence,
this patch adds support for built-in policy configuration (and next patch adds
support for activating access control without calling external policy loader
program).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Show statistics such as last policy update time and last policy violation time
in addition to memory usage.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Gather string constants to one file in order to make the object size smaller.
Use unsigned type where appropriate.
read()/write() returns ssize_t.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Currently TOMOYO holds SRCU lock upon open() and releases it upon close()
because list elements stored in the "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" instances are
accessed until close() is called. However, such SRCU usage causes lockdep to
complain about leaving the kernel with SRCU lock held.
This patch solves the warning by holding/releasing SRCU upon each
read()/write(). This patch is doing something similar to calling kfree()
without calling synchronize_srcu(), by selectively deferring kfree() by keeping
track of the "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" instances.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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TOMOYO wants to use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/$PID/ if $PID matches current
thread's process ID in order to prevent current thread from accessing other
process's information unless needed.
But since procfs can be mounted on various locations (e.g. /proc/ /proc2/ /p/
/tmp/foo/100/p/ ), TOMOYO cannot tell that whether the numeric part in the
string returned by __d_path() represents process ID or not.
Therefore, to be able to convert from $PID to self no matter where procfs is
mounted, this patch changes pathname representations for filesystems which do
not support rename() operation (e.g. proc, sysfs, securityfs).
Examples:
/proc/self/mounts => proc:/self/mounts
/sys/kernel/security/ => sys:/kernel/security/
/dev/pts/0 => devpts:/0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Mauras Olivier reported that it is difficult to use TOMOYO in LXC environments,
for TOMOYO cannot distinguish between environments outside the container and
environments inside the container since LXC environments are created using
pivot_root(). To address this problem, this patch introduces policy namespace.
Each policy namespace has its own set of domain policy, exception policy and
profiles, which are all independent of other namespaces. This independency
allows users to develop policy without worrying interference among namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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ACL group allows administrator to globally grant not only "file read"
permission but also other permissions.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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