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commit 027bc8b08242c59e19356b4b2c189f2d849ab660 upstream.
On some ARMs the memory can be mapped pgprot_noncached() and still
be working for atomic operations. As pointed out by Colin Cross
<ccross@android.com>, in some cases you do want to use
pgprot_noncached() if the SoC supports it to see a debug printk
just before a write hanging the system.
On ARMs, the atomic operations on strongly ordered memory are
implementation defined. So let's provide an optional kernel parameter
for configuring pgprot_noncached(), and use pgprot_writecombine() by
default.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Rob Herring <robherring2@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <anton@enomsg.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 7ae9cb81933515dc7db1aa3c47ef7653717e3090 upstream.
Currently trying to use pstore on at least ARMs can hang as we're
mapping the peristent RAM with pgprot_noncached().
On ARMs, pgprot_noncached() will actually make the memory strongly
ordered, and as the atomic operations pstore uses are implementation
defined for strongly ordered memory, they may not work. So basically
atomic operations have undefined behavior on ARM for device or strongly
ordered memory types.
Let's fix the issue by using write-combine variants for mappings. This
corresponds to normal, non-cacheable memory on ARM. For many other
architectures, this change does not change the mapping type as by
default we have:
#define pgprot_writecombine pgprot_noncached
The reason why pgprot_noncached() was originaly used for pstore
is because Colin Cross <ccross@android.com> had observed lost
debug prints right before a device hanging write operation on some
systems. For the platforms supporting pgprot_noncached(), we can
add a an optional configuration option to support that. But let's
get pstore working first before adding new features.
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
[tony@atomide.com: updated description]
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 36e8164882ca6d3c41cb91e6f09a3ed236841f80 upstream.
Commit 6ac665c63dca ("PCI: rewrite PCI BAR reading code") masked off
low-order bits from 'l', but not from 'sz'. Both are passed to pci_size(),
which compares 'base == maxbase' to check for read-only BARs. The masking
of 'l' means that comparison will never be 'true', so the check for
read-only BARs no longer works.
Resolve this by also masking off the low-order bits of 'sz' before passing
it into pci_size() as 'maxbase'. With this change, pci_size() will once
again catch the problems that have been encountered to date:
- AGP aperture BAR of AMD-7xx host bridges: if the AGP window is
disabled, this BAR is read-only and read as 0x00000008 [1]
- BARs 0-4 of ALi IDE controllers can be non-zero and read-only [1]
- Intel Sandy Bridge - Thermal Management Controller [8086:0103];
BAR 0 returning 0xfed98004 [2]
- Intel Xeon E5 v3/Core i7 Power Control Unit [8086:2fc0];
Bar 0 returning 0x00001a [3]
Link: [1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/drivers/pci/probe.c?id=1307ef6621991f1c4bc3cec1b5a4ebd6fd3d66b9 ("PCI: probing read-only BARs" (pre-git))
Link: [2] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=43331
Link: [3] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85991
Reported-by: William Unruh <unruh@physics.ubc.ca>
Reported-by: Martin Lucina <martin@lucina.net>
Signed-off-by: Myron Stowe <myron.stowe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 8117ac6a6c2fa0f847ff6a21a1f32c8d2c8501d0 upstream.
Currently, when going idle, we set the flag indicating that we are in
nap mode (paca->kvm_hstate.hwthread_state) and then execute the nap
(or sleep or rvwinkle) instruction, all with the MMU on. This is bad
for two reasons: (a) the architecture specifies that those instructions
must be executed with the MMU off, and in fact with only the SF, HV, ME
and possibly RI bits set, and (b) this introduces a race, because as
soon as we set the flag, another thread can switch the MMU to a guest
context. If the race is lost, this thread will typically start looping
on relocation-on ISIs at 0xc...4400.
This fixes it by setting the MSR as required by the architecture before
setting the flag or executing the nap/sleep/rvwinkle instruction.
[ shreyas@linux.vnet.ibm.com: Edited to handle LE ]
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Shreyas B. Prabhu <shreyas@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit cd32e2dcc9de6c27ecbbfc0e2079fb64b42bad5f upstream.
We have some code in udbg_uart_getc_poll() that tries to protect
against a NULL udbg_uart_in, but gets it all wrong.
Found with the LLVM static analyzer (scan-build).
Fixes: 309257484cc1 ("powerpc: Cleanup udbg_16550 and add support for LPC PIO-only UARTs")
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
[mpe: Add some newlines for readability while we're here]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 3475c3d034d7f276a474c8bd53f44b48c8bf669d upstream.
Flush the FIFOs when the stream is prepared for use. This avoids
an inadvertent swapping of the left/right channels if the FIFOs are
not empty at startup.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jackson <Andrew.Jackson@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 48826ee590da03e9882922edf96d8d27bdfe9552 upstream.
Commit 5fe5b767dc6f ("ASoC: dapm: Do not pretend to support controls for non
mixer/mux widgets") revealed ill-defined control in a route between
"STENL Mux" and DACs in max98090.c:
max98090 i2c-193C9890:00: Control not supported for path STENL Mux -> [NULL] -> DACL
max98090 i2c-193C9890:00: ASoC: no dapm match for STENL Mux --> NULL --> DACL
max98090 i2c-193C9890:00: ASoC: Failed to add route STENL Mux -> NULL -> DACL
max98090 i2c-193C9890:00: Control not supported for path STENL Mux -> [NULL] -> DACR
max98090 i2c-193C9890:00: ASoC: no dapm match for STENL Mux --> NULL --> DACR
max98090 i2c-193C9890:00: ASoC: Failed to add route STENL Mux -> NULL -> DACR
Since there is no control between "STENL Mux" and DACs the control name must
be NULL not "NULL".
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 50c0f21b42dd4cd02b51f82274f66912d9a7fa32 upstream.
Make sure to check the version field of the firmware header to make sure to
not accidentally try to parse a firmware file with a different layout.
Trying to do so can result in loading invalid firmware code to the device.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 9e4982f6a51a2442f1bb588fee42521b44b4531c upstream.
Like with ath9k, ath5k queues also need to be ordered by priority.
queue_info->tqi_subtype already contains the correct index, so use it
instead of relying on the order of ath5k_hw_setup_tx_queue calls.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit dc50ddcd4c58a5a0226038307d6ef884bec9f8c2 upstream.
This patchs fixes a misplaced call to memset() that fills the request
buffer with 0. The problem was with sending PCAN_USBPRO_REQ_FCT
requests, the content set by the caller was thus lost.
With this patch, the memory area is zeroed only when requesting info
from the device.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean@peak-system.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit af35d0f1cce7a990286e2b94c260a2c2d2a0e4b0 upstream.
This patch sets the correct reverse sequence order to the instructions
set to run, when any failure occurs during the initialization steps.
It also adds the missing unregistration call of the can device if the
failure appears after having been registered.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Grosjean <s.grosjean@peak-system.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 78063d81d353e10cbdd279c490593113b8fdae1c upstream.
Hardware queues are ordered by priority. Use queue index 0 for BK, which
has lower priority than BE.
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit ad8fdccf9c197a89e2d2fa78c453283dcc2c343f upstream.
The driver passes the desired hardware queue index for a WMM data queue
in qinfo->tqi_subtype. This was ignored in ath9k_hw_setuptxqueue, which
instead relied on the order in which the function is called.
Reported-by: Hubert Feurstein <h.feurstein@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 136f49b9171074872f2a14ad0ab10486d1ba13ca upstream.
For buffer write, page lock will be got in write_begin and released in
write_end, in ocfs2_write_end_nolock(), before it unlock the page in
ocfs2_free_write_ctxt(), it calls ocfs2_run_deallocs(), this will ask
for the read lock of journal->j_trans_barrier. Holding page lock and
ask for journal->j_trans_barrier breaks the locking order.
This will cause a deadlock with journal commit threads, ocfs2cmt will
get write lock of journal->j_trans_barrier first, then it wakes up
kjournald2 to do the commit work, at last it waits until done. To
commit journal, kjournald2 needs flushing data first, it needs get the
cache page lock.
Since some ocfs2 cluster locks are holding by write process, this
deadlock may hung the whole cluster.
unlock pages before ocfs2_run_deallocs() can fix the locking order, also
put unlock before ocfs2_commit_trans() to make page lock is unlocked
before j_trans_barrier to preserve unlocking order.
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 0e95325525c4383565cea4f402f15a3113162d05 upstream.
Move rtc register to be later than hardware initialization. The reason
is that devm_rtc_device_register() will do read_time() which is a
callback accessing hardware. This sometimes causes a hang in the
hardware related callback.
Signed-off-by: Guo Zeng <guo.zeng@csr.com>
Signed-off-by: Barry Song <Baohua.Song@csr.com>
Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 6424babfd68dd8a83d9c60a5242d27038856599f upstream.
During file system stress testing on 3.10 and 3.12 based kernels, the
umount command occasionally hung in fsnotify_unmount_inodes in the
section of code:
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
continue;
}
As this section of code holds the global inode_sb_list_lock, eventually
the system hangs trying to acquire the lock.
Multiple crash dumps showed:
The inode->i_state == 0x60 and i_count == 0 and i_sb_list would point
back at itself. As this is not the value of list upon entry to the
function, the kernel never exits the loop.
To help narrow down problem, the call to list_del_init in
inode_sb_list_del was changed to list_del. This poisons the pointers in
the i_sb_list and causes a kernel to panic if it transverse a freed
inode.
Subsequent stress testing paniced in fsnotify_unmount_inodes at the
bottom of the list_for_each_entry_safe loop showing next_i had become
free.
We believe the root cause of the problem is that next_i is being freed
during the window of time that the list_for_each_entry_safe loop
temporarily releases inode_sb_list_lock to call fsnotify and
fsnotify_inode_delete.
The code in fsnotify_unmount_inodes attempts to prevent the freeing of
inode and next_i by calling __iget. However, the code doesn't do the
__iget call on next_i
if i_count == 0 or
if i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE)
The patch addresses this issue by advancing next_i in the above two cases
until we either find a next_i which we can __iget or we reach the end of
the list. This makes the handling of next_i more closely match the
handling of the variable "inode."
The time to reproduce the hang is highly variable (from hours to days.) We
ran the stress test on a 3.10 kernel with the proposed patch for a week
without failure.
During list_for_each_entry_safe, next_i is becoming free causing
the loop to never terminate. Advance next_i in those cases where
__iget is not done.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Hoemann <jerry.hoemann@hp.com>
Cc: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Cc: Ken Helias <kenhelias@firemail.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit b5a8cad376eebbd8598642697e92a27983aee802 upstream.
[stable 3.12 note]
This commit was supposed to fix a completely other issue. But in 3.12,
with commit f72e7dcdd25229446b102e587ef2f826f76bff28 (mm: let
mm_find_pmd fix buggy race with THP fault), we need this commit as
well (it fixes the issue as a by-product). Hugh Dickins writes:
<== citation starts here>
Fine for this to go in, but there is one catch, which I discovered
when backporting to v3.11: it needed one more hunk. I haven't checked
your base tree, but if this applies then I believe you need it - most
of the time no problem, but it can case page migration to fail to find
a migration entry it inserted earlier, then BUG_ON(!PageLocked(p)) in
migration_entry_to_page() soon after. Here's what I wrote back then:
Note on rebase to v3.11: added a hunk to replace the use of
mm_find_pmd() in page_check_address_pmd(). This call had been
similarly replaced by the time of my v3.16 commit, in Kirill
Shutemov's v3.15 b5a8cad376ee ("thp: close race between split and zap
huge pages"): which we do not need as such, since it's fixing v3.13
117b0791ac42 ("mm, thp: move ptl taking inside
page_check_address_pmd()"), from a split page-table-lock series we are
not backporting. But without this additional hunk, rmap sometimes
broke when the new semantic for mm_find_pmd() was used here.
<== end of citation>
But instead of appending hunks to commits, I am taking a full,
backported version of commit b5a8cad376ee with this note prepended.
So the changelog of b5a8cad376ee is left below, but does not apply to
3.12 yet.
[=== stable 3.12 note ends here]
Sasha Levin has reported two THP BUGs[1][2]. I believe both of them
have the same root cause. Let's look to them one by one.
The first bug[1] is "kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1829!". It's
BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page)) in __split_huge_page(). From my
testing I see that page_mapcount() is higher than mapcount here.
I think it happens due to race between zap_huge_pmd() and
page_check_address_pmd(). page_check_address_pmd() misses PMD which is
under zap:
CPU0 CPU1
zap_huge_pmd()
pmdp_get_and_clear()
__split_huge_page()
anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach()
__split_huge_page_splitting()
page_check_address_pmd()
mm_find_pmd()
/*
* We check if PMD present without taking ptl: no
* serialization against zap_huge_pmd(). We miss this PMD,
* it's not accounted to 'mapcount' in __split_huge_page().
*/
pmd_present(pmd) == 0
BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page)) // CRASH!!!
page_remove_rmap(page)
atomic_add_negative(-1, &page->_mapcount)
The second bug[2] is "kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1371!".
It's VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page), page) in zap_huge_pmd().
This happens in similar way:
CPU0 CPU1
zap_huge_pmd()
pmdp_get_and_clear()
page_remove_rmap(page)
atomic_add_negative(-1, &page->_mapcount)
__split_huge_page()
anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach()
__split_huge_page_splitting()
page_check_address_pmd()
mm_find_pmd()
pmd_present(pmd) == 0 /* The same comment as above */
/*
* No crash this time since we already decremented page->_mapcount in
* zap_huge_pmd().
*/
BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
/*
* We split the compound page here into small pages without
* serialization against zap_huge_pmd()
*/
__split_huge_page_refcount()
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHead(page), page); // CRASH!!!
So my understanding the problem is pmd_present() check in mm_find_pmd()
without taking page table lock.
The bug was introduced by me commit with commit 117b0791ac42. Sorry for
that. :(
Let's open code mm_find_pmd() in page_check_address_pmd() and do the
check under page table lock.
Note that __page_check_address() does the same for PTE entires
if sync != 0.
I've stress tested split and zap code paths for 36+ hours by now and
don't see crashes with the patch applied. Before it took <20 min to
trigger the first bug and few hours for second one (if we ignore
first).
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/g/<53440991.9090001@oracle.com>
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/g/<5310C56C.60709@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <lliubbo@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit c9b08884c9c98929ec2d8abafd78e89062d01ee7 upstream.
The current code simply assumes Intel Arch PerfMon v2+ to have
the IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES MSR; the SDM specifies that we should check
CPUID[1].ECX[15] (aka, FEATURE_PDCM) instead.
This was found by KVM which implements v2+ but didn't provide the
capabilities MSR. Change the code to DTRT; KVM will also implement the
MSR and return 0.
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com
Reported-by: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140203132903.GI8874@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit f72e7dcdd25229446b102e587ef2f826f76bff28 upstream.
Trinity has reported:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: __lock_acquire (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3070 (discriminator 1))
CPU: 6 PID: 16173 Comm: trinity-c364 Tainted: G W
3.15.0-rc1-next-20140415-sasha-00020-gaa90d09 #398
lock_acquire (arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3602)
_raw_spin_lock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:143
kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151)
remove_migration_pte (mm/migrate.c:137)
rmap_walk (mm/rmap.c:1628 mm/rmap.c:1699)
remove_migration_ptes (mm/migrate.c:224)
migrate_pages (mm/migrate.c:922 mm/migrate.c:960 mm/migrate.c:1126)
migrate_misplaced_page (mm/migrate.c:1733)
__handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3762 mm/memory.c:3812 mm/memory.c:3925)
handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:3948)
__get_user_pages (mm/memory.c:1851)
__mlock_vma_pages_range (mm/mlock.c:255)
__mm_populate (mm/mlock.c:711)
SyS_mlockall (include/linux/mm.h:1799 mm/mlock.c:817 mm/mlock.c:791)
I believe this comes about because, whereas collapsing and splitting THP
functions take anon_vma lock in write mode (which excludes concurrent
rmap walks), faulting THP functions (write protection and misplaced
NUMA) do not - and mostly they do not need to.
But they do use a pmdp_clear_flush(), set_pmd_at() sequence which, for
an instant (indeed, for a long instant, given the inter-CPU TLB flush in
there), leaves *pmd neither present not trans_huge.
Which can confuse a concurrent rmap walk, as when removing migration
ptes, seen in the dumped trace. Although that rmap walk has a 4k page
to insert, anon_vmas containing THPs are in no way segregated from
4k-page anon_vmas, so the 4k-intent mm_find_pmd() does need to cope with
that instant when a trans_huge pmd is temporarily absent.
I don't think we need strengthen the locking at the THP end: it's easily
handled with an ACCESS_ONCE() before testing both conditions.
And since mm_find_pmd() had only one caller who wanted a THP rather than
a pmd, let's slightly repurpose it to fail when it hits a THP or
non-present pmd, and open code split_huge_page_address() again.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit b6684228726cc25551a43f5c0bd9c5f977f10f48 upstream.
Allow more than one viperboard to be connected by registering with
PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO instead of PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE.
The subdevices are currently registered with PLATFORM_DEVID_NONE, which
will cause a name collision on the platform bus when a second viperboard
is plugged in:
viperboard 1-2.4:1.0: version 0.00 found at bus 001 address 004
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 181 at /home/johan/work/omicron/src/linux/fs/sysfs/dir.c:31 sysfs_warn_dup+0x74/0x84()
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/bus/platform/devices/viperboard-gpio'
Modules linked in: i2c_viperboard viperboard netconsole [last unloaded: viperboard]
CPU: 0 PID: 181 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 3.17.0-rc6 #1
[<c0016bf4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0013860>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<c0013860>] (show_stack) from [<c04305f8>] (dump_stack+0x24/0x28)
[<c04305f8>] (dump_stack) from [<c0040fb4>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x80/0x98)
[<c0040fb4>] (warn_slowpath_common) from [<c004100c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x40/0x48)
[<c004100c>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c016f1bc>] (sysfs_warn_dup+0x74/0x84)
[<c016f1bc>] (sysfs_warn_dup) from [<c016f548>] (sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.2+0xcc/0xd0)
[<c016f548>] (sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.2) from [<c016f588>] (sysfs_create_link+0x3c/0x48)
[<c016f588>] (sysfs_create_link) from [<c02867ec>] (bus_add_device+0x12c/0x1e0)
[<c02867ec>] (bus_add_device) from [<c0284820>] (device_add+0x410/0x584)
[<c0284820>] (device_add) from [<c0289440>] (platform_device_add+0xd8/0x26c)
[<c0289440>] (platform_device_add) from [<c02a5ae4>] (mfd_add_device+0x240/0x344)
[<c02a5ae4>] (mfd_add_device) from [<c02a5ce0>] (mfd_add_devices+0xb8/0x110)
[<c02a5ce0>] (mfd_add_devices) from [<bf00d1c8>] (vprbrd_probe+0x160/0x1b0 [viperboard])
[<bf00d1c8>] (vprbrd_probe [viperboard]) from [<c030c000>] (usb_probe_interface+0x1bc/0x2a8)
[<c030c000>] (usb_probe_interface) from [<c028768c>] (driver_probe_device+0x14c/0x3ac)
[<c028768c>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c02879e4>] (__driver_attach+0xa4/0xa8)
[<c02879e4>] (__driver_attach) from [<c0285698>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xa4)
[<c0285698>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c0287030>] (driver_attach+0x2c/0x30)
[<c0287030>] (driver_attach) from [<c030a288>] (usb_store_new_id+0x170/0x1ac)
[<c030a288>] (usb_store_new_id) from [<c030a2f8>] (new_id_store+0x34/0x3c)
[<c030a2f8>] (new_id_store) from [<c02853ec>] (drv_attr_store+0x30/0x3c)
[<c02853ec>] (drv_attr_store) from [<c016eaa8>] (sysfs_kf_write+0x5c/0x60)
[<c016eaa8>] (sysfs_kf_write) from [<c016dc68>] (kernfs_fop_write+0xd4/0x194)
[<c016dc68>] (kernfs_fop_write) from [<c010fe40>] (vfs_write+0xb4/0x1c0)
[<c010fe40>] (vfs_write) from [<c01104a8>] (SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0)
[<c01104a8>] (SyS_write) from [<c000f900>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
---[ end trace 98e8603c22d65817 ]---
viperboard 1-2.4:1.0: Failed to add mfd devices to core.
viperboard: probe of 1-2.4:1.0 failed with error -17
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 871c3cf4ea7d5baf58e0a40bce7431ca5525aa2a upstream.
The least significat byte of the GPIO value read register
on the STMPE24xx series is on addres 0xA4 not 0xA5. Correct
against datasheet and tested on the STMPE2401 hardware.
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 678886bdc6378c1cbd5072da2c5a3035000214e3 upstream.
When we abort a transaction we iterate over all the ranges marked as dirty
in fs_info->freed_extents[0] and fs_info->freed_extents[1], clear them
from those trees, add them back (unpin) to the free space caches and, if
the fs was mounted with "-o discard", perform a discard on those regions.
Also, after adding the regions to the free space caches, a fitrim ioctl call
can see those ranges in a block group's free space cache and perform a discard
on the ranges, so the same issue can happen without "-o discard" as well.
This causes corruption, affecting one or multiple btree nodes (in the worst
case leaving the fs unmountable) because some of those ranges (the ones in
the fs_info->pinned_extents tree) correspond to btree nodes/leafs that are
referred by the last committed super block - breaking the rule that anything
that was committed by a transaction is untouched until the next transaction
commits successfully.
I ran into this while running in a loop (for several hours) the fstest that
I recently submitted:
[PATCH] fstests: add btrfs test to stress chunk allocation/removal and fstrim
The corruption always happened when a transaction aborted and then fsck complained
like this:
_check_btrfs_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/sdc is inconsistent
*** fsck.btrfs output ***
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
Check tree block failed, want=94945280, have=0
read block failed check_tree_block
Couldn't open file system
In this case 94945280 corresponded to the root of a tree.
Using frace what I observed was the following sequence of steps happened:
1) transaction N started, fs_info->pinned_extents pointed to
fs_info->freed_extents[0];
2) node/eb 94945280 is created;
3) eb is persisted to disk;
4) transaction N commit starts, fs_info->pinned_extents now points to
fs_info->freed_extents[1], and transaction N completes;
5) transaction N + 1 starts;
6) eb is COWed, and btrfs_free_tree_block() called for this eb;
7) eb range (94945280 to 94945280 + 16Kb) is added to
fs_info->pinned_extents (fs_info->freed_extents[1]);
8) Something goes wrong in transaction N + 1, like hitting ENOSPC
for example, and the transaction is aborted, turning the fs into
readonly mode. The stack trace I got for example:
[112065.253935] [<ffffffff8140c7b6>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x66
[112065.254271] [<ffffffff81042984>] warn_slowpath_common+0x7f/0x98
[112065.254567] [<ffffffffa0325990>] ? __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x50/0x10b [btrfs]
[112065.261674] [<ffffffff810429e5>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x48/0x50
[112065.261922] [<ffffffffa032949e>] ? btrfs_free_path+0x26/0x29 [btrfs]
[112065.262211] [<ffffffffa0325990>] __btrfs_abort_transaction+0x50/0x10b [btrfs]
[112065.262545] [<ffffffffa036b1d6>] btrfs_remove_chunk+0x537/0x58b [btrfs]
[112065.262771] [<ffffffffa033840f>] btrfs_delete_unused_bgs+0x1de/0x21b [btrfs]
[112065.263105] [<ffffffffa0343106>] cleaner_kthread+0x100/0x12f [btrfs]
(...)
[112065.264493] ---[ end trace dd7903a975a31a08 ]---
[112065.264673] BTRFS: error (device sdc) in btrfs_remove_chunk:2625: errno=-28 No space left
[112065.264997] BTRFS info (device sdc): forced readonly
9) The clear kthread sees that the BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR bit is set in
fs_info->fs_state and calls btrfs_cleanup_transaction(), which in
turn calls btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent();
10) Then btrfs_destroy_pinned_extent() iterates over all the ranges
marked as dirty in fs_info->freed_extents[], and for each one
it calls discard, if the fs was mounted with "-o discard", and
adds the range to the free space cache of the respective block
group;
11) btrfs_trim_block_group(), invoked from the fitrim ioctl code path,
sees the free space entries and performs a discard;
12) After an umount and mount (or fsck), our eb's location on disk was full
of zeroes, and it should have been untouched, because it was marked as
dirty in the fs_info->pinned_extents tree, and therefore used by the
trees that the last committed superblock points to.
Fix this by not performing a discard and not adding the ranges to the free space
caches - it's useless from this point since the fs is now in readonly mode and
we won't write free space caches to disk anymore (otherwise we would leak space)
nor any new superblock. By not adding the ranges to the free space caches, it
prevents other code paths from allocating that space and write to it as well,
therefore being safer and simpler.
This isn't a new problem, as it's been present since 2011 (git commit
acce952b0263825da32cf10489413dec78053347).
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit a28046956c71985046474283fa3bcd256915fb72 upstream.
We use the modified list to keep track of which extents have been modified so we
know which ones are candidates for logging at fsync() time. Newly modified
extents are added to the list at modification time, around the same time the
ordered extent is created. We do this so that we don't have to wait for ordered
extents to complete before we know what we need to log. The problem is when
something like this happens
log extent 0-4k on inode 1
copy csum for 0-4k from ordered extent into log
sync log
commit transaction
log some other extent on inode 1
ordered extent for 0-4k completes and adds itself onto modified list again
log changed extents
see ordered extent for 0-4k has already been logged
at this point we assume the csum has been copied
sync log
crash
On replay we will see the extent 0-4k in the log, drop the original 0-4k extent
which is the same one that we are replaying which also drops the csum, and then
we won't find the csum in the log for that bytenr. This of course causes us to
have errors about not having csums for certain ranges of our inode. So remove
the modified list manipulation in unpin_extent_cache, any modified extents
should have been added well before now, and we don't want them re-logged. This
fixes my test that I could reliably reproduce this problem with. Thanks,
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 942080643bce061c3dd9d5718d3b745dcb39a8bc upstream.
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 332b122d39c9cbff8b799007a825d94b2e7c12f2 upstream.
The ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option greatly changes the
functionality of an eCryptfs mount. Instead of encrypting and decrypting
lower files, it provides a unified view of the encrypted files in the
lower filesystem. The presence of the ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount
option is intended to force a read-only mount and modifying files is not
supported when the feature is in use. See the following commit for more
information:
e77a56d [PATCH] eCryptfs: Encrypted passthrough
This patch forces the mount to be read-only when the
ecryptfs_encrypted_view mount option is specified by setting the
MS_RDONLY flag on the superblock. Additionally, this patch removes some
broken logic in ecryptfs_open() that attempted to prevent modifications
of files when the encrypted view feature was in use. The check in
ecryptfs_open() was not sufficient to prevent file modifications using
system calls that do not operate on a file descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Priya Bansal <p.bansal@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit a1d47b262952a45aae62bd49cfaf33dd76c11a2c upstream.
UDF specification allows arbitrarily large symlinks. However we support
only symlinks at most one block large. Check the length of the symlink
so that we don't access memory beyond end of the symlink block.
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 24c037ebf5723d4d9ab0996433cee4f96c292a4d upstream.
alloc_pid() does get_pid_ns() beforehand but forgets to put_pid_ns() if it
fails because disable_pid_allocation() was called by the exiting
child_reaper.
We could simply move get_pid_ns() down to successful return, but this fix
tries to be as trivial as possible.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit a682e9c28cac152e6e54c39efcf046e0c8cfcf63 upstream.
If some error happens in NCP_IOC_SETROOT ioctl, the appropriate error
return value is then (in most cases) just overwritten before we return.
This can result in reporting success to userspace although error happened.
This bug was introduced by commit 2e54eb96e2c8 ("BKL: Remove BKL from
ncpfs"). Propagate the errors correctly.
Coverity id: 1226925.
Fixes: 2e54eb96e2c80 ("BKL: Remove BKL from ncpfs")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Petr Vandrovec <petr@vandrovec.name>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 7e77bdebff5cb1e9876c561f69710b9ab8fa1f7e upstream.
If a request is backlogged, it's complete() handler will get called
twice: once with -EINPROGRESS, and once with the final error code.
af_alg's complete handler, unlike other users, does not handle the
-EINPROGRESS but instead always completes the completion that recvmsg()
is waiting on. This can lead to a return to user space while the
request is still pending in the driver. If userspace closes the sockets
before the requests are handled by the driver, this will lead to
use-after-frees (and potential crashes) in the kernel due to the tfm
having been freed.
The crashes can be easily reproduced (for example) by reducing the max
queue length in cryptod.c and running the following (from
http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html) on AES-NI capable hardware:
$ while true; do kcapi -x 1 -e -c '__ecb-aes-aesni' \
-k 00000000000000000000000000000000 \
-p 00000000000000000000000000000000 >/dev/null & done
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin.vincent@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 041d7b98ffe59c59fdd639931dea7d74f9aa9a59 upstream.
A regression was caused by commit 780a7654cee8:
audit: Make testing for a valid loginuid explicit.
(which in turn attempted to fix a regression caused by e1760bd)
When audit_krule_to_data() fills in the rules to get a listing, there was a
missing clause to convert back from AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET to AUDIT_LOGINUID.
This broke userspace by not returning the same information that was sent and
expected.
The rule:
auditctl -a exit,never -F auid=-1
gives:
auditctl -l
LIST_RULES: exit,never f24=0 syscall=all
when it should give:
LIST_RULES: exit,never auid=-1 (0xffffffff) syscall=all
Tag it so that it is reported the same way it was set. Create a new
private flags audit_krule field (pflags) to store it that won't interact with
the public one from the API.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit db86da7cb76f797a1a8b445166a15cb922c6ff85 upstream.
A security fix in caused the way the unprivileged remount tests were
using user namespaces to break. Tweak the way user namespaces are
being used so the test works again.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 66d2f338ee4c449396b6f99f5e75cd18eb6df272 upstream.
Now that setgroups can be disabled and not reenabled, setting gid_map
without privielge can now be enabled when setgroups is disabled.
This restores most of the functionality that was lost when unprivileged
setting of gid_map was removed. Applications that use this functionality
will need to check to see if they use setgroups or init_groups, and if they
don't they can be fixed by simply disabling setgroups before writing to
gid_map.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 9cc46516ddf497ea16e8d7cb986ae03a0f6b92f8 upstream.
- Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc/<pid>/setgroups
A value of "deny" means the setgroups system call is disabled in the
current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the
future in this user namespace.
A value of "allow" means the segtoups system call is enabled.
- Descendant user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from
their parents.
- A proc file is used (instead of a sysctl) as sysctls currently do
not allow checking the permissions at open time.
- Writing to the proc file is restricted to before the gid_map
for the user namespace is set.
This ensures that disabling setgroups at a user namespace
level will never remove the ability to call setgroups
from a process that already has that ability.
A process may opt in to the setgroups disable for itself by
creating, entering and configuring a user namespace or by calling
setns on an existing user namespace with setgroups disabled.
Processes without privileges already can not call setgroups so this
is a noop. Prodcess with privilege become processes without
privilege when entering a user namespace and as with any other path
to dropping privilege they would not have the ability to call
setgroups. So this remains within the bounds of what is possible
without a knob to disable setgroups permanently in a user namespace.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit f0d62aec931e4ae3333c797d346dc4f188f454ba upstream.
Generalize id_map_mutex so it can be used for more state of a user namespace.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit f95d7918bd1e724675de4940039f2865e5eec5fe upstream.
If you did not create the user namespace and are allowed
to write to uid_map or gid_map you should already have the necessary
privilege in the parent user namespace to establish any mapping
you want so this will not affect userspace in practice.
Limiting unprivileged uid mapping establishment to the creator of the
user namespace makes it easier to verify all credentials obtained with
the uid mapping can be obtained without the uid mapping without
privilege.
Limiting unprivileged gid mapping establishment (which is temporarily
absent) to the creator of the user namespace also ensures that the
combination of uid and gid can already be obtained without privilege.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 80dd00a23784b384ccea049bfb3f259d3f973b9d upstream.
setresuid allows the euid to be set to any of uid, euid, suid, and
fsuid. Therefor it is safe to allow an unprivileged user to map
their euid and use CAP_SETUID privileged with exactly that uid,
as no new credentials can be obtained.
I can not find a combination of existing system calls that allows setting
uid, euid, suid, and fsuid from the fsuid making the previous use
of fsuid for allowing unprivileged mappings a bug.
This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 upstream.
As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.
For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality. This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c
Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups. Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.
For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.
This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 273d2c67c3e179adb1e74f403d1e9a06e3f841b5 upstream.
setgroups is unique in not needing a valid mapping before it can be called,
in the case of setgroups(0, NULL) which drops all supplemental groups.
The design of the user namespace assumes that CAP_SETGID can not actually
be used until a gid mapping is established. Therefore add a helper function
to see if the user namespace gid mapping has been established and call
that function in the setgroups permission check.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2014-8989, being able to drop groups
without privilege using user namespaces.
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 0542f17bf2c1f2430d368f44c8fcf2f82ec9e53e upstream.
The rule is simple. Don't allow anything that wouldn't be allowed
without unprivileged mappings.
It was previously overlooked that establishing gid mappings would
allow dropping groups and potentially gaining permission to files and
directories that had lesser permissions for a specific group than for
all other users.
This is the rule needed to fix CVE-2014-8989 and prevent any other
security issues with new_idmap_permitted.
The reason for this rule is that the unix permission model is old and
there are programs out there somewhere that take advantage of every
little corner of it. So allowing a uid or gid mapping to be
established without privielge that would allow anything that would not
be allowed without that mapping will result in expectations from some
code somewhere being violated. Violated expectations about the
behavior of the OS is a long way to say a security issue.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream.
Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their
permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that
they may all share the same permission checking code.
This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks
and adds a helper to avoid this in the future.
A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit b2f5d4dc38e034eecb7987e513255265ff9aa1cf upstream.
Forced unmount affects not just the mount namespace but the underlying
superblock as well. Restrict forced unmount to the global root user
for now. Otherwise it becomes possible a user in a less privileged
mount namespace to force the shutdown of a superblock of a filesystem
in a more privileged mount namespace, allowing a DOS attack on root.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 4a44a19b470a886997d6647a77bb3e38dcbfa8c5 upstream.
- MNT_NODEV should be irrelevant except when reading back mount flags,
no longer specify MNT_NODEV on remount.
- Test MNT_NODEV on devpts where it is meaningful even for unprivileged mounts.
- Add a test to verify that remount of a prexisting mount with the same flags
is allowed and does not change those flags.
- Cleanup up the definitions of MS_REC, MS_RELATIME, MS_STRICTATIME that are used
when the code is built in an environment without them.
- Correct the test error messages when tests fail. There were not 5 tests
that tested MS_RELATIME.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 3e1866410f11356a9fd869beb3e95983dc79c067 upstream.
Now that remount is properly enforcing the rule that you can't remove
nodev at least sandstorm.io is breaking when performing a remount.
It turns out that there is an easy intuitive solution implicitly
add nodev on remount when nodev was implicitly added on mount.
Tested-by: Cedric Bosdonnat <cbosdonnat@suse.com>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 9d367e5e7b05c71a8c1ac4e9b6e00ba45a79f2fc upstream.
thermal_unregister_governors() and class_unregister() were being called in
the wrong order.
Fixes: 80a26a5c22b9 ("Thermal: build thermal governors into thermal_sys module")
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 28a9bc68124c319b2b3dc861e80828a8865fd1ba upstream.
When writing the code to allow per-station GTKs, I neglected to
take into account the management frame keys (index 4 and 5) when
freeing the station and only added code to free the first four
data frame keys.
Fix this by iterating the array of keys over the right length.
Fixes: e31b82136d1a ("cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit d025933e29872cb1fe19fc54d80e4dfa4ee5779c upstream.
As multicast-frames can't be fragmented, "dot11MulticastReceivedFrameCount"
stopped being incremented after the use-after-free fix. Furthermore, the
RX-LED will be triggered by every multicast frame (which wouldn't happen
before) which wouldn't allow the LED to rest at all.
Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89431 which also had the
patch.
Fixes: b8fff407a180 ("mac80211: fix use-after-free in defragmentation")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Müller <goo@stapelspeicher.org>
[rewrite commit message]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit b26bdde5bb27f3f900e25a95e33a0c476c8c2c48 upstream.
When loading encrypted-keys module, if the last check of
aes_get_sizes() in init_encrypted() fails, the driver just returns an
error without unregistering its key type. This results in the stale
entry in the list. In addition to memory leaks, this leads to a kernel
crash when registering a new key type later.
This patch fixes the problem by swapping the calls of aes_get_sizes()
and register_key_type(), and releasing resources properly at the error
paths.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=908163
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 4e2024624e678f0ebb916e6192bd23c1f9fdf696 upstream.
We didn't check length of rock ridge ER records before printing them.
Thus corrupted isofs image can cause us to access and print some memory
behind the buffer with obvious consequences.
Reported-and-tested-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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commit 42f74461a5b60cf6b42887e6d2ff5b7be4abf1ca upstream.
SFR reported this 2013-05-15:
> After merging the final tree, today's linux-next build (i386 defconfig)
> produced this warning:
>
> kernel/auditfilter.c: In function 'audit_data_to_entry':
> kernel/auditfilter.c:426:3: warning: this decimal constant is unsigned only
> in ISO C90 [enabled by default]
>
> Introduced by commit 780a7654cee8 ("audit: Make testing for a valid
> loginuid explicit") from Linus' tree.
Replace this decimal constant in the code with a macro to make it more readable
(add to the unsigned cast to quiet the warning).
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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